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Abstract 
 
 The study examines the role of government venture funding in facilitating entrepreneurship 
and innovation. In particular, the study integrates financial and behavioural perspectives in a unified 
framework to analyse the determinants and outcomes of innovation investments designed to help 
small firms commercialise their research and development activities. On the one hand, it draws upon 
real options reasoning theory to understand the effects of various resource allocation strategies on 
investment yield and firm performance. On the other hand, it uses signalling theory and the attention-
based view to examine which individual-, project- and firm-level characteristics affect early- and late-
stage funding allocation decisions, and whether these signals are also accurate predictors of 
investment yield and firm performance.  
 To investigate government investment patterns, 367 projects from 275 firms that participated 
in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme administered by the National Health 
Institute in the U.S. were analysed over a seven-year period from 2006 to 2012 using a combination 
of statistical and econometric techniques.  
 First, the study finds that the formal real options reasoning (ROR) structure evident in the 
composition and execution of the government venture funding programme is only intuitively 
underpinned by the real options logic of decision-making. The results reveal that high initial funding 
commitment and continuation of government venture funding have a diminishing effect on return on 
investment, whereas consistent matching of funding decisions in line with ROR allows to extract value 
from staged investments. Second, drawing on signalling theory and attention-based view helps 
uncover discrepancies between prescribed and actual investment behaviour. Third, to benefit from 
options-like investments, firms require different combinations of skills and capabilities depending on 
their experience and the target performance outcome. 
 In sum, the study adds to the empirical body of literature analysing the tension between 
economic logic of efficient resource allocation and behavioural and cognitive effects on rational sense-
making. The analysis delineates boundary conditions of real options reasoning in the context of 
government venture funding, which provides important implications for strategic management theory 
and research policy. 
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 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
New project development is at the heart of innovation and entrepreneurship but is costly. 
Nascent entrepreneurial ventures require financial resources to convert ideas into products. Since 
private funds are often limited, entrepreneurs seek capital from other sources and approach external 
finance providers. Start-up firms lack substantial tangible assets, have no track record of performance, 
promise no immediate returns and have uncertain prospects, which makes them dubious bets in the 
eyes of bankers and debt providers (Gompers and Lerner 2000). This is where venture capitalists come 
into play to fill the void in small firm financing (Jeng and Wells 2000). Venture capital (VC) firms 
disproportionately fund nascent ventures in high-tech industries and have the extensive expertise 
necessary to carry out the rigorous selection and evaluation processes to screen and filter candidates 
for potential funding. However, although venture capital firms are less susceptible to costs associated 
with information asymmetry than other external funding providers, they still favour lower-risk later 
stage candidates (Amit et al. 1998) and have the funds to support only a small fraction of new ventures 
(Lerner 2002). As a result, there exists a funding gap at early stages of the small firm development.  
 The extant literature holds a uniform view that well-developed capital systems stimulate 
technological innovation, which subsequently leads to productivity growth and economic 
development (King and Levine 1993a; 1993b). In particular, the role of capital markets is pronounced 
in spurring innovation-induced ‘creative destruction’ in the economy (Schumpeter 1942) by 
supporting small firms in high-tech industries (Brown et al. 2009; Hsu et al. 2014). To compensate for 
the failure of financial markets to provide adequate capital to high-risk early-stage ventures, 
governments intervene with the initiation of public funding programmes. Numerous studies have 
been dedicated to evaluating the role of public subsidies in fostering innovation and entrepreneurship, 
in particular in comparison to private venture capital. For the most part, the extant literature shares 
the view that venture capital, both private and public, has a positive impact on firm growth, 
employment creation, innovative activity and country-level economic growth. However, much less is 
understood about what effects different resource allocation strategies have on performance 
outcomes of investors and investees. Additionally, little is known about the behavioural aspects at 
play in the seemingly rational process of sequential investments followed by decision-makers. These 
questions are particularly important in relation to government venture capital, which is frequently 
being criticised for its questionable ability to allocate taxpayers’ money appropriately.  
This chapter sets the scene for the entire study by outlining the research motivation, 
theoretical and empirical gaps. The chapter ends with a synopsis of the thesis.  
2 
 
1.2 Rationale for Conducting the Research Project 
 
Research Motivation  
 
Why is Financing Small and Medium Enterprises Important? 
 
It is well established that technological change is at the heart of economic growth (Solow 
1957; Romer 1990). Therefore, to achieve economic growth, governments need to establish a robust 
innovation system (Guan and Chen 2012).  
 There is a general consensus that encouragement of market competition through 
entrepreneurship is a way to add value to a society (Birley 1986). A significant amount of effort 
continues to be dedicated to understanding in what ways entrepreneurship creates value in a society. 
A number of studies found statistical evidence that new venture creation has a positive effect on 
innovation and job creation, which subsequently influences regional development, state welfare and 
economic growth (Acs and Armington 2004; Acs and Audretsch 1988; Acs and Varga 2005; Wennekers 
and Thurik 1999; Stel et al. 2005).  
 More specifically, recent evidence from a novel multi-country dataset demonstrated a 
positive effect of the size of the small  and medium enterprise (SME) sector on economic growth, 
expressed by the GDP per capita (Beck et al. 2005). However, Beck and colleagues (2005) found no 
causal link, implying that the growing SME sector is not a direct underlying cause, but instead a 
characteristic of economic wealth. While the direct effect of SMEs on economic growth is disputable, 
strong evidence exists of a significant contribution of SMEs to employment creation (Birley 1986). For 
example, a recent cross-country study by Ayyagari et al. (2007) showed that the SMEs in the 
manufacturing sector make up at least 50% of the total country employment. 
 There is a longstanding literature on the role of small firms in innovation. A considerable 
amount of scholarly work has presented evidence that despite their low level of R&D spend, small and 
medium size enterprises contribute a significant proportion of total R&D knowledge produced 
(Audretsch 2003). As Acs and Audretsch (1988) estimated, the share of innovations from small firms 
on average constitutes 40% and those innovations are of comparable quality and importance to the 
ones from larger firms. Furthermore, Akcigit and Kerr (2015) documented that the rate of the main 
technological inventions and patent citations is higher in small firms, which indicates that small firms 
yield greater spillovers to the economy. Overall, it has been recognised that projects undertaken by 
the SMEs contribute around 20% to the private sector economy (Turner et al. 2009). 
 In spite of a large share of the SMEs in total employment and innovation across the globe, 
their contribution to the economic growth is much smaller, which is in part attributable to a number 
of constraints, in particular, access to finance, that prohibits them from growing as much as their larger 
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counterparts. On a global scale, less than 2% of firms with 10 or more employees grow sufficiently in 
terms of employment and revenue to evolve into ‘gazelles’—small firms with an annual growth of at 
least 20% (OECD 2015a). Despite representing a minor part of the total SME sector, ‘gazelles’ are a 
driving force behind economic development, in particular in terms of employment and wealth 
creation. For instance, OECD data (2015a) showed that in 2012, 36,000 high-growth ventures in the 
U.S. employed over 8 million people. The importance of ‘gazelles’ for economic development has been 
acknowledged by public policy makers around the world, and effort has been made towards designing 
appropriate mechanisms to support the high pace of growth among small firms (Grilli and Murtinu 
2011).  
 To understand the reasons behind differences in growth rates of new ventures, much interest 
has been directed at exploring which institutional arrangements stimulate or inhibit entrepreneurial 
risk-taking in pursuing opportunities for potential value creation (e.g. Busenitz et al. 2000). 
Competitive business environments that have regulatory arrangements in place, such as low cost of 
incorporation, access to finance, favourable labour laws, efficient credit information sharing and 
protection of intellectual property, facilitate new firm entry and SME sector growth (Klapper et al. 
2006; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006; Ayyagari et al. 2007). Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) 
emphasised that developing favourable business environments for new firm entry is even more 
important for economic growth than facilitating the growth of the SME sector, which is often 
characterised by a large number of small but stagnating firms.  
 Klapper et al. (2006) in their study on entry barriers to entrepreneurship found that improved 
access to start-up capital, a feature of more financially developed markets, is associated with higher 
new firm creation. Similarly, a literature review by Gilbert and colleagues (2006) revealed that human 
and financial resources are vital for the growth of new ventures. A recent survey of extant literature 
on SMEs by Beck and Demircut-Kunt (2006) concluded that access to capital is a critical growth 
constraint for SMEs and that financing mechanisms independently or in conjunction with institutional 
arrangements can mitigate problems associated with obtaining start-up finance. Furthermore, 
Zerbinati and colleagues (2012) provided evidence that early growth of research-based spin-offs is 
mainly attributed to the initial capital investment in those ventures.  
 As Atanassov (2016) expressed it, the positive effect of well-developed capital markets on 
stimulation of R&D is twofold: relaxation of financial constraints makes funds more easily accessible 
for development of innovative projects and creates stimuli to engage in more risky and novel 
endeavours, particularly for small firms (Brown et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2012). Consequently, 
reduction of financing constraints is an important channel that facilitates technological innovation 
and, consequently, economic growth (Bekaert et al. 2005; Brown et al. 2012). 
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Research Problem 
  
Risks Associated with Limited Access to Finance by the Small and Medium Entrerprises 
  
 Experimentation is an integral part of R&D and is a core ingredient for innovation. Early stages 
of R&D have been described as the ‘fuzzy front end’ due to the high levels of associated uncertainty 
(Khurana and Rosenthal 1997; Khurana and Rosenthal 1998; Koen et al. 2001). A number of studies 
have shown that early stage activities are crucial for innovation success (e.g. Markham 2013; Kock et 
al. 2015). Furthermore, evidence exists that being highly effective at idea conversion1 is more 
important to financial and innovation success than being highly skilled at generating ideas (Booz&Co 
2012). 
 Experimentation2 is also an expensive process that requires time and financial commitment. 
To raise capital an entrepreneur has to approach external funders. Financing SMEs is problematic due 
to asymmetric information flows, which cause adverse selection3 problems (Bouvard 2012), with an 
entrepreneur holding private information to which an investor has only limited access. Further to that, 
R&D projects conducted by the SMEs are even more susceptible to financial constraints because of 
inherent uncertainties surrounding them. 
 Conventional capital providers such as banks are reluctant to provide finance to small firms 
with uncertain prospects as there exist information gaps between entrepreneurs and investors (Lerner 
2002). Venture capital firms, however, specialise in screening and monitoring risky ventures in high-
tech industries, which gives them a comparative advantage in dealing with information asymmetries 
(Brander et al. 2014). Although private venture capitalists disproportionately fund start-ups, they still 
favour the less risky ones (Amit et al. 1998), which restricts access of early stage ventures to capital. 
 Also, the venture capital industry is only accountable for a minor fraction of the total 
investment activity. Global data show that in the majority of countries, venture capital represents a 
very small proportion of GDP averaging 0.05%, with the U.S. being the notable exception, representing 
0.28% of GDP and 80% of the total OECD venture capital investment in 2014 (OECD 2015a). 
Nonetheless, on average, venture capital provides finance to less than 0.1% of firms and even less in 
the times of the financial crisis, when the average size of investment surges (OECD 2015a). 
                                                          
1 Conversion stage refers to the phase in the process where ideas in the pipeline are screened and selected for 
full-scale product development (Booz&Co 2012). 
2 Experimentation stage refers to the early phase of project research and development activities, which involves 
collection of information to minimise the associated uncertainty and to inform the future trajectory of actions, 
including investment decisions (Bouvard 2012). 
3 Adverse selection arises as a result of funders’ limited ability to differentiate between low-quality and high-
quality borrowers and leads to the erroneous allocation of funds to less profitable or unprofitable ventures. 
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 Given the limited availability of private venture capital for small early stage firms, the 
screening procedure is critical yet problematic. A number of studies emphasised the tremendous 
complexity of ex-ante evaluations of the prospects of early stage innovative projects undertaken by 
the nascent ventures, and even well-established VC firms struggle with this task (Kerr et al. 2014). 
Evidence supports the notion that the adverse selection problem that arises when firms cannot 
reliably convey their abilities for the future potential to investors, results in substantial social losses, 
as foregone investment opportunities reduce the stream of prospective public value4 creation (Myers 
and Majluf 1984).  
 SMEs’ constrained access to funds, magnified by the ‘liability of newness’, causes 
underinvestment in R&D due to the danger of knowledge appropriability. R&D is considered as one of 
the most economically valuable knowledge sources (Audretsch 2003). The impact of R&D activities of 
small firms is significant at two levels. The direct impact is attributable to small firms that translate 
internally produced novel R&D knowledge into technological innovations. The indirect contribution of 
R&D of small firms to economic value creation takes the form of knowledge spillovers. That is, the 
internally generated knowledge shifts to the public domain and becomes available for open use. 
However, while R&D knowledge spillovers are critical for the economy, small firms are concerned 
about the issues of knowledge appropriability. One of the primary underlying rationales behind new 
venture creation is the intention of researchers to appropriate the economic value of their knowledge 
through organised innovation activity. Since knowledge cannot be kept secret, other economic agents 
will ‘freeride’, implying that the returns from the investment in its production will not be fully 
appropriated by its original source (Hall and Lerner 2010). Therefore, innovation efforts yield higher 
social returns than private returns (Griliches 1992; Beck et al. 2016). As a result, the unprohibited use 
of knowledge by the public is perceived as a threat by the original knowledge producers, in that case, 
small firms, which results in underinvestment in R&D—the idea originally expressed in the seminal 
work of Nelson (1959). Underinvestment in R&D can take the form of the project scale down or 
complete discontinuation (Feldman and Kelley 2006), thereby impeding economic development. Yet, 
conservative estimates suggest that the optimal R&D investment is between two and four times higher 
than the actual investment (Jones and Williams 1998). 
 From the above discussion, two primary problems become apparent that prevent 
entrepreneurs from pursuing potentially fruitful opportunities. First, external funding providers are 
unable to accurately assess future potential of new ventures due to the volatility of returns from 
innovation projects and information asymmetries. As a result, there is a lack of available finance to 
SMEs, which significantly inhibits their potential for growth (Gilbert et al., 2006). Second, financial 
                                                          
4 Public value reflects direct and indirect economic outcomes that can be appropriated by the society. 
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constraints magnify concerns of small firms about knowledge appropriability, leading to 
underinvestment in R&D and slower economic growth. 
 To reduce the financing gap and capital constraints caused by market imperfections and to 
stimulate innovation in the SME sector, governments from around the world intervene with the 
provision of public financing programmes for the private sector (Brander et al. 2014). There are two 
primary mechanisms that policy makers utilise to mitigate inefficiencies of capital markets in support 
of entrepreneurship. One is indirect involvement through R&D tax initiatives, intellectual property 
protection and reinforcement of various co-operation systems; another is direct investments in R&D 
(Hall and Lerner 2010). Evidence exists that public capital sources provide over 60% more financial 
support for SMEs than private venture capital, with particular emphasis to ventures in early stages of 
development  (Audretsch 2003). Moreover, public funding minimises the cost of socially valuable R&D 
to a level at which firms have an incentive to undertake the project (Aerts and Schmidt 2008).  
 
Practical Relevance  
 
What is the Magnitude of Governmental Support of Small and Medium Enterprises? 
 
 Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme launched in 1982 in the U.S. was the 
first of its kind. Its initiation was intended to fuel technological growth in response to the productivity 
slowdown in the U.S. Over the years, 11 Federal agencies administering the programme have awarded 
over 100,000 grants to small firms in technological sectors, some of which have grown into multi-
million and multi-billion corporations such as Qualcomm in the semiconductor industry, Symantec and 
iRobot in the advanced technology industries and Genentech in the biotech industry, just to name a 
few. By recognising the importance of knowledge-based nature of the SMEs, the SBIR programme took 
the lead in promoting knowledge commercialisation of the SME sector in a number of critical 
industries, including biotechnology (Audretsch 2003). The success of the SBIR programme has inspired 
similar initiatives around the world, and now the governments of most major economies have 
innovation programmes in place, including Russia’s Skolkovo Foundation, Australia’s National 
Innovation and Science Agenda, India’s National Innovation Foundation, Japan’s Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency, and China’s Innofund. 
 In the same vein, most European governments have launched initiatives to stimulate 
innovation among the SMEs5 and the EU has taken a lead by introducing Eurostars Programme. Under 
the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), Eurostars had a public budget of €400 million for 2007-
2013, which has been increased to €1.14 billion for 2014-2020 under the Horizon 2020 Framework to 
                                                          
5 A full list of European national innovation programmes is presented in Appendix 1. 
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meet the growing demand by the European SME applicants. Eurostars is 75% backed by national funds 
and 25% by EU funds, and although the projects are only up to 60% funded by the scheme, a sizeable 
budget of €1.5 billion has been set aside during 13 years of operation. 
 According to the OECD report on Science, Technology and Industry (2015b), the level of 
government investment varies country by country. Three investment patterns become apparent from 
Figure 1-1. Government investment in R&D of small firms in countries like New Zealand, Norway, 
Canada, Italy, France and Sweden, is proportionate to the share of R&D of small firms in the gross 
domestic R&D expenditure. On the other hand, in countries like Iceland, Greece, Slovenia, Chile, 
Portugal, Poland and Slovakia government funding goes almost exclusively to SMEs. Finally, U.K., 
Luxembourg and U.S. have a shortage of government support for R&D activities of small firms. 
Figure 1-1: 2013 share of SMEs expenditure on R&D as percentage of gross domestic expenditure on R&D 
 
Notes:  Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) - gross expenditures on R&D performed by all for-
profit public and private firms, organisations and institutions. 
Government-funded business R&D (BERD) - is the component of R&D attributed to direct government 
funding such as grants and payments for R&D contracts for procurement, but not R&D tax incentives, 
repayable loans or equity investments. 
Source: OECD Report on Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2015 
 However, a closer look at the government contribution of “underspending” countries in 
absolute terms, changes the picture dramatically. Figure 1-2 compares government funding 
programmes in two major economies: U.S. and U.K. Although the programmes have been in operation 
for a different number of years, with the SMART programme launched 30 years after SBIR, the trend 
is apparent of both schemes incrementally increasing budgets on an annual basis except in recession 
times. And although for both the U.S. and the U.K. the annual spend on programmes is less than a 
10th of 1% of their respective GDPs, over the years the amount spent on the programmes has 
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accumulated to a grand total. Over 22 years since 1990, the U.S. government has spent $30 billion on 
the SBIR initiative. Although on average the annual budget of the U.K.’s SMART programme is only 5% 
of its U.S.-based counterpart, in 4 years of running the programme, the U.K. so far has spent $281 
million. Moreover, cross-country data from a study by Brander and colleagues (2014) demonstrated 
that government VC around the world on average dedicates $4 billion per year to small private 
ventures. These data confirm that the governments direct significant sums of public money in support 
of innovative SMEs. 
Figure 1-2: The magnitude of government spend on SMEs: U.S. versus U.K. 
 
 Source: Author’s analysis of data from SBIR and SMART 
 
Summary of the Main Issues for the Current Project 
 
 SMEs significantly contribute to employment and innovation creation, but their role in 
fostering the economic growth is less prominent. In particular, limited access to finance constraints 
entry, high-paced growth and innovative activities of small firms. Financing constraints for SMEs exist 
for two primary reasons: (i) conventional capital providers are unable to resolve uncertainty due to 
information gaps; (ii) venture capital funds, although targeting start-ups, are more inclined to finance 
less risky candidates and have insufficient funds to take forward all high-potential ventures. 
 Imperfections of capital markets result in substantial social losses and are manifested in two 
major problems. First, limited access to finance by the SMEs leads to underinvestment in R&D. Second, 
identification of high-potential ventures through common due diligence, screening and evaluation 
procedures is difficult. To address market imperfections, governments of major economies initiate 
high-budget publicly-funded financing programmes to support entrepreneurship and innovation. 
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1.3 Brief Overview of the Research Field & Research Gaps 
 
Literature on Financing of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
 
 A large number of studies on external funding of innovation and entrepreneurship are 
concentrated on the role of the venture capital industry (Hall and Lerner 2010; Da Rin et al. 2013). As 
a result of their disproportionate support of high-risk but high-potential firms with no immediate 
returns (Puri and Zarutskie 2012), venture capital has become an important international channel for 
stimulating and managing the flow of funds and novel ideas (Patricof 1989). A number of studies have 
investigated the role of VC in broader terms and provided compelling evidence that VC-backed firms 
drive the development of high-tech sectors and contribute to innovative activity, employment 
creation and economic growth at the country-level.  
 Kortum and Learner (2000) examined the relationship between venture capital and 
innovation, and found that venture capital is associated with a substantial increase in patenting and 
quality of patents, as measured by forward citations. The authors demonstrated that VC-financed 
ventures are more innovative than non-VC-financed firms and generated 8% of industrial innovations 
in the United States in the decade ending in 1992 (Kortum and Lerner 2000). Likewise, the econometric 
analysis of Bertoni et al. (2011) showed strong support for the view that venture capital has a positive 
impact on the growth of new technology-based firms. Hellmann and Puri (1998) provided evidence 
that venture capital is crucial for innovative start-up companies as it positively affects their ability to 
introduce new products faster to the market.  
 To understand the role of venture capital in fostering entrepreneurship, a recent study by Puri 
and Zarutskie (2012) compared differences of VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms using data from 
the United States over 25 years. Their evidence shows that although VC-financed firms make up a 
negligible portion of the total newly created firms—0.11% for the period 1981 to 2005—their 
contribution to the employment is more significant, accounting for 5-7% during 2001-2005 (Puri and 
Zarutskie 2012). Additionally, VC-backed firms in the sample outperformed non-VC-backed firms in 
terms of sales and employment growth, higher IPO and acquisition rates and lower failure rates. 
Further, the results of Puri and Zarutskie (2012) showed that 40% of VC-backed firms fail, 34% are 
acquired and 16% go public, in comparison to 79% of non-VC-backed firms that fail and just over 1% 
that get acquired and go public. As a consequence, VC funds persistently earn higher average returns 
in comparison to other capital funds (Kaplan and Schoar 2005). 
 Enhanced performance of VC-backed firms is attributed to a number of factors. First, VCs 
provide funds to the ventures that have withstood rigorous selection criteria and those financial 
resources  give entrepreneurs a chance to develop the venture into a high-growth profitable business 
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(Sahlman 1990). Second, venture capitalists provide value-added services and access to non-financial 
resources to nascent firms (Hellmann and Puri 2002). In particular, monitoring through staged 
investments is critical in mitigating agency problems (Gompers 1995). Finally, VC-backing has a 
certification effect in the market and alleviates the ‘liability of newness’ problem experienced by 
young firms (Hsu 2006). Taken together, these findings indicate the important contribution of VC 
financing in fostering innovation and entrepreneurship. 
 Governments of many industrialised economies around the world have started to appreciate 
the impact of SMEs on economic growth and the role of venture capital in developing entrepreneurial 
enterprises, and have intervened in the venture capital market with own programmes and initiatives 
designed to fund start-up firms (Jeng and Wells 2000; Brander et al. 2014).  
 Extensive efforts have been made to evaluate the role of government programmes in 
enhancing the economic value of entrepreneurial endeavours. Different questions were addressed 
from different analytical perspectives, concerning the effect of public funding programmes for R&D 
on: (i) input additionality, in particular with respect to the crowding out effect; (ii) output additionality, 
predominantly with a focus on the long-term outcomes; and, more recently (iii) behavioural 
additionality6. The findings of extant scholarly work are disparate with regards to the impact of 
governmental capital backing programmes. While some studies found evidence of a positive effect of 
government financing programmes on growth and performance of awardees (Lerner 1999), recent 
studies showed that the government VC-backed firms display significant reductions in productivity 
compared to their non-VC-backed peers (Alperovych et al. 2015). 
 Analysing the data on the SBIR initiative, a number of studies provided findings that 
government funded programmes can have a positive impact on firm performance (Lerner 1999).  The 
results of Audretsch (2003) demonstrated that the SBIR programme is associated with a positive 
private and social rate of return. The findings of Elston and Audretsch (2010) suggested that SBIR 
grants reduce liquidity problems of less wealthy entrepreneurs as well as stimulate opportunity-
seeking behaviour among risk-averse entrepreneurs. More recently, Howell (2015) documented an 
important role of government subsidies in relaxing financial constraints of small early-stage firms.  
 In addition to the direct positive impact of such programmes as SBIR on commercial 
performance of small firms, Cooper (2003) summarised their latent advantages as follows: (i) 
stimulation of entrepreneurial risk-taking behaviour of small firms with regards to novelty and scope 
of innovation activities; (ii) development of scientific human capital; (iii) certification of financial and 
operational legitimacy of awardees through the halo effect; (iv) reduced threat of knowledge 
                                                          
6 The concepts of input, output and behavioural additionality are discussed in greater detail in the subsequent 
chapter dedicated to reviewing the extant literature. 
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appropriation as the government funding programmes do not take equity stake in nor claim IP rights 
for innovation projects; (v) support for projects in a wider range of research and geographical areas. 
 On the other hand, critics noted that such programmes can bear substantial costs to the 
taxpayers when poorly designed and implemented (O’Shea and Stevens 1998). Leleux and Surlemont 
(2003) criticised public VC for its propensity to misallocate funds, which may be a result of the paucity 
of government officials’ suitable expertise for screening entrepreneurial ventures and non-
performance-linked incentives structure. Additionally, concerns were expressed that public funds 
subsidise the wages of scientific human capital but have a significantly smaller impact on the level of 
inventive activity (Goolsbee 1998; David and Hall 2000). 
 Overall, the evidence on the effects of government funds to spur innovation and 
entrepreneurship remains equivocal. More importantly, sceptics cast doubts on the governments’ 
ability to replicate the functions of the private venture capital, due to issues related to political and 
bureaucratic processes leading to inefficient resource allocations and rent-seeking behaviour (Lerner 
2002). 
 
Theory of R&D Investments 
 
 It is well established that R&D projects with high potential can enhance firm-level and country-
level economic performance and competitive advantage (Lewis et al. 2002). However, innovation 
projects require substantial capital endowments, even though their chances of success remain low 
irrespective of the amount of support they receive (Klingebiel and Rammer 2014). This makes resource 
allocation a challenging task because decisions have to be taken before a portion of endogenous 
uncertainty is resolved.  
 Three characteristics are inherent in the majority of investment decisions: (i) they incur 
unrecoverable sunk costs, (ii) information asymmetry adds to the enduring economic uncertainty and, 
(iii) decision on whether to invest is equally important as when to invest (Dixit 1992). For investments 
that encompass all these characteristics, the value of waiting has a positive effect as uncertainty 
regarding future prospects can be resolved with time through the arrival of new information. Such 
approach towards investments under conditions of uncertainty has been coined “a theory of optimal 
inertia” or “a benevolent tyranny of the status quo” (Dixit 1992 p.109). The value created through 
waiting is at the core of real options financial models, under which potential yield from investments is 
assessed through flexible sequential decision-making practices. Analogous to financial options, real 
options in strategic management are created through splitting a large financial commitment into 
several smaller investments and distributing them over time (Miller and Waller 2003). Such staged 
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investment tactic enables flexible and timely responses of decision-makers to unfolding possibilities, 
minimising downside risks and maximising upside potential benefits. 
 R&D projects have a number of prominent features that make them distinct types of 
investments. First, research has highlighted that R&D investments are characterised as particularly 
irreversible capital (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). R&D costs predominantly cover the salaries of scientific 
personnel as well as equipment and materials necessary to conduct the project, and cannot be 
recovered in the case of unsuccessful outcome (Toole and Czarnitzki 2009; Czarnitzki and Toole 2011; 
Czarnitzki and Toole 2013). Second, R&D investments have a high uncertainty component and 
evaluation of payoffs from the possible outcomes goes above and beyond simple risk assessment 
exercises (Kerr and Nanda 2014). Third, resolution of R&D uncertainty is in part dependent upon tacit 
knowledge engrained in human capital, making an estimation of projects’ future potential difficult as 
there is a threat of losing uncodified knowledge if project members leave the team (Hall and Lerner 
2010). Fourth, project assessment task may be further complicated by the level of funders’ expertise 
in dealing with risky endeavours, incentives, decision-making heuristics and interpretative practices, 
which may lead to under- or over-involvement of funders in shaping the direction of R&D activities 
(Kerr et al. 2014). Fifth, project owners inevitably have more information on the R&D project than 
project funders, thereby enhancing information asymmetry. Finally, the way the investment process 
is structured has a significant impact on the type and trajectory of innovation (Kerr and Nanda 2014). 
 It is widely known that innovation projects are associated with high failure rates, which 
increases the likelihood of considerable financial loss (Schmidt et al. 2009). Progression of the project 
through the stages of development clarifies uncertainties by generating new information, but also 
entails rising resource commitments (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986). Therefore, early elimination of 
failures becomes an imperative to avoid significant investment loss and can be achieved by 
discontinuing projects as a result of increased and disciplined monitoring and review practices 
(Schmidt et al. 2009). The notion of early pruning of the project portfolio becomes even more critical 
taking into account that financial markets react more favourably to new product development failure 
in early stages than in late stages of the innovation process (Urbig et al. 2013). Therefore, the 
mechanisms that stimulate experimentation are vital for maintaining vibrant innovation systems and, 
subsequently, the entrepreneurial economy (Dosi and Nelson 2010). 
 The real options framework is one such mechanism that supports the notion of 
experimentation (Kerr et al. 2014; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf 2016). The unique characteristics of R&D 
investments, which encompass irreversibility, uncertainty, flexibility and information revelation, 
enable to view such investments as options (Krychowski and Quelin 2010). Therefore, real options lens 
is naturally suited to extracting value from the staged innovation projects (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Hall 
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and Lerner 2010; Krychowski and Quelin 2010) as learning about the prospects of a new technology is 
less costly in early stages of the investment process (Kerr et al. 2014). The inexpensive 
experimentation channel is especially critical for the nascent financially constrained ventures since 
the sooner resolution of project uncertainty, which is greatest in the early phases, shapes the 
trajectory of future aggregate innovation activity (Ewens et al. 2015). The primary advantage of real 
options is confined to its ability to explicitly comprehend the evolving nature of investment projects 
and to foster a more flexible approach to resource allocations (Krychowski and Quelin 2010). As a 
consequence, venture capital firms often follow the real options approach to allocating resources to 
innovation projects (Hurry et al. 1992; Guler 2007b; Guler 2007a). 
 
Theoretical Gaps 
 
 Although the extant literature on real options theory is conceptually well developed, there 
remain a number of under-researched areas that constrain the full comprehension of the conceptual 
underpinnings of the theory. Specifically, the most widely discussed shortcomings of the real options 
theory pertain to three primary issues: (i) implementation of real options approach by the 
organisations may not be in close agreement with the theory; (ii) behavioural and cognitive aspects 
may introduce bias to the real options decision-making process and, (iii) the approach may not be 
applicable to all strategic investments (Krychowski and Quelin 2010). 
 Broadly speaking, the questions remain on whether and how organisations can effectively 
implement the real options to capture the value offered by such approach (McGrath et al. 2004). 
Identified theoretical gaps are articulated in detail subsequently.  
 
Agreement of Real Options Theory with Practice 
 
 As Krychowski and Quélin (2010) observed, the interpretative and decision-making 
frameworks of real options theory evolved separately from each other, resulting in somewhat 
disparate conceptual underpinnings. On the one hand, the interpretative strand of research is built 
upon the belief that organisations implicitly align their strategic thinking with the real options 
approach. On the other hand, the decision-making strand of research argues that the real options 
approach creates value only if organisations implement it systematically rather than casually.  
 The extant literature is abundant in studies on the rhetorical formalisation of real options 
theory; yet, little empirical evidence exists on the extent to which firms implicitly or explicitly follow 
the prescriptions of the real options approach in the organisational settings (Reuer and Tong 2007). It 
was suggested that to advance and clarify propositions of real options theory, future research should 
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focus on understanding organisational practices in implementing the real options approach (McGrath 
and Nerkar 2004).  
 Therefore, real options theory could be further enriched by examining the interplay of its 
descriptive and normative tenets, which by itself is a challenging task (Krychowski and Quelin 2010). 
Currently, the evidence shows that organisational decision-makers often intuitively, albeit 
infrequently and only approximately, follow the real options reasoning (ROR) logic (e.g. Busby and 
Pitts 1997; Triantis 2005; Howell and Jaegle 1997). However, it is still unclear to what extent deviations 
from the prescriptions of the real options logic distort the process of value creation. Specifically, it is 
important to test whether the judgements of organisational decision-makers follow propositions of 
the theory (Howell and Jaegle 1997).  
 Overall, a better understanding of whether and to what extent the formal and disciplined 
implementation of the real options approach is associated with performance improvements is 
expected to inform organisational decision-making (Krychowski and Quelin 2010).  
 
Reconciliation of Financial and Behavioural Aspects of Real Options Theory 
 
 One of the core strengths of real options theory relates to its ability to merge financial and 
behavioural perspectives. As such, not only it helps understand the budgeting principles, but also to 
capture the effects of decision-making practices on organisational performance in relation to a single 
option or a portfolio of options (Krychowski and Quelin 2010).  
 Organisational research integrating financial and behavioural theories remains scarce, and 
little progress has been made towards understanding decision-making processes underpinning 
innovation investment outcomes (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). It was expressed that empirical studies 
testing propositions of real options theory have started to emerge in the recent years in the strategic 
management literature (e.g. McGrath and Nerkar 2004; Hurry et al. 1992). Still, more research is 
needed to examine the correspondence of the theory with decision-making practices, accounting for 
heuristics and biases inherent in the process (Scherpereel 2008).  
 
Resource Allocation Strategies under Real Options Theory 
 
 Existing literature offers little insight into the advantages provided by resource allocation 
strategies under ROR (Krychowski and Quelin 2010). One of the notable benefits of the real options 
lens is confined to its ability to explicitly investigate the heterogeneous effects of different resource 
allocation strategies on organisational performance. However, although conceptual aspects of 
resource allocation strategies have attracted some scholarly attention (e.g. Ding and Eliashberg 2002), 
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despite its practical importance, little empirical research exists on the topic (Klingebiel and Rammer 
2014), especially using the real options reasoning lens. 
 
Applicability of Real Options Theory to Organisational Contexts 
 
 As was noted above, the academic debate on the boundary conditions of the real options 
reasoning called for more evidence on whether the actual investment behaviour is consistent with the 
theoretically predicted with regards to exercising options (Li and Chi 2013).  
 More precisely, it was argued that when the theory is tested in broad organisational settings, 
it provides little insight into the specific benefits of the approach (Krychowski and Quelin 2010). 
Instead, a number of prior studies acknowledged that understanding of real options theory can be 
further enhanced through studying investment portfolios in different empirical contexts. For instance, 
scholars have been encouraged to test real options theory in relation to R&D and technological 
projects of start-up or small firms funded by venture capital (Trigeorgis 2005). 
 
The Role of Resources and Capabilities in Real Options Theory 
 
 Last, but not least, the potential interrelationships between real options and different 
categories of human capital and firm resources have been recognised in prior literature (Janney and 
Dess 2004). However, limited work exists that has explicitly investigated the impact of industry-level, 
firm-level and individual-level resources and capabilities on real options performance outcomes in a 
single conceptual framework (Chang 1995; Leiblein and Miller 2003; Lu and Beamish 2004; O’Brien et 
al. 2003). Evidence shows that the level and heterogeneity of resources and capabilities shapes the 
way firms react upon and manage options (Bowman and Hurry 1993). Hence, research analysing the 
impact of heterogeneous firm-specific factors on the processes underlying the options-based 
investment structure has been identified as a promising area for future studies (Li et al. 2007).   
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Empirical Gaps 
 
 In addition to theoretical gaps outlined earlier, a number of empirical gaps have been 
identified that relate to contextual settings as well as methodological and measurement issues. 
 
Resource Allocation Strategies of Public Venture Capitalists 
 
 As was mentioned in the previous section, there was a call to test the principles of real options 
theory in different empirical settings. Specifically, review of the extant literature has identified that 
while sequential investments in the private venture capital industry have attracted some scholarly 
attention (Guler 2007a; Guler 2007b), to the best of knowledge, no such study was conducted on 
investment patterns of public venture capital.   
 In particular, there remains an opportunity for researchers to advance the knowledge of the 
impact of governmental subsidies for R&D by incorporating the structural aspects of resource 
allocation strategies into a coherent model (Klette et al. 2000).  
 It was also expressed that future research on the public venture capital programmes should 
integrate human capital characteristics of academic entrepreneurs to better comprehend the 
selection and evaluation processes (Toole and Czarnitzki 2007).  
 
Multi-Stakeholder View of Venture Performance Outcomes 
 
 As Lerner (1999) noted, it is hard to evaluate the effectiveness of the government programmes 
as a function of firms’ ability to maintain the rate of internal R&D spending by the awardees; instead, 
the long-term economic impact of awards has been recognised as a critical issue (Lerner 1999). 
 Assessment of the performance of funded projects is an important task in organisation and 
policy domains as it allows to estimate whether investments yield anticipated gains. There has been 
criticism that a large proportion of existing studies evaluate project performance from the process-
oriented perspective (Zwikael and Smyrk 2012). However, this approach sheds a little light on the 
implications of funding decisions.  
 To address this issue, Zwikael and Smyrk (2012) proposed that project success should be 
assessed from the investment-oriented perspective in terms of its net worth. The authors developed 
a multi-stakeholder framework that explicitly evaluates project performance from the funder’s, 
project owner’s and project manager’s perspectives in relation to target outcomes of each group. 
Under this view, the firm owning and managing the project becomes the funder’s agent and is 
accountable for the realisation of target outcomes, which are different for both groups (Zwikael and 
Smyrk 2012).  
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Multi-Level Conceptual Model 
 
 There has been a call for more multi-level research efforts in the entrepreneurship domain 
(Hoskisson et al. 2011). Low and MacMillan (1988) pointed out that increased and continuing use of 
the multi-level approach to theory and methodology would improve the understanding of the 
entrepreneurship field. Traditionally, entrepreneurship studies have been conducted at the individual 
level of analysis. And, although entrepreneurship research has seen a rise of scholarly work 
incorporating firm-level analysis, more still needs to be done to advance the field (Hoskisson et al. 
2011). In particular, multi-level research should attempt to address interactions of micro- and macro-
level antecedents that lead to improved outcomes of entrepreneurship activity such as innovation, 
competitive advantage and firm performance (Hoskisson et al. 2011).  
 
Research Policy Gaps 
 
 There is generally a wide consensus in academic and research policy domains on the 
appropriateness of government intervention to stimulate innovation activity in the SME sector. 
However, “compared to the size of the programmes and the emphasis put on technology policy by 
politicians, the effort to evaluate in quantitative terms the economic benefits and costs of R&D 
subsidies has been rather modest” (Klette et al. 2000).  
 It was noted that although studies on public venture capital programmes have gained 
momentum in the last decade, the evidence on the effects of government funds to subsidise R&D 
efforts of SMEs remains inconsistent. As a result, there was a call for more studies evaluating the 
effectiveness and limitations of such initiatives (Pavitt 1998; Bayona-Saez and Garcia-Marco 2010) as 
well as their impact on entrepreneurship and innovation (Cumming and Li 2013). 
 More precisely, there is still a limited understanding of how such initiatives should be 
structured to reap maximal benefits and to restrain politically and bureaucratically induced 
inefficiencies (Lerner 2002). Despite the prevailing belief that governmental programmes are 
associated with a number of advantages, more recent studies have called their efficiency into 
question, suggesting that they merit re-evaluation and perhaps a comprehensive reformation of an 
underlying structure (Alperovych et al. 2015). 
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1.4 Brief Overview of the Research Project 
 
Research Objectives & Questions 
 
 Although there is a sizeable body of literature that has been dedicated to examining whether 
capital markets impact innovation and entrepreneurship, there has been much less focus on 
understanding how capital markets might influence technological innovation and growth of small 
firms. The focal interest of the current project is a specific type of external finance—direct 
governmental support for the innovation activities of the SME sector. Here, the assumption is made 
that by using a staged investment process of value creation and by selecting high-potential candidates, 
the government chooses to act as a public venture capitalist. More precisely, the present research 
study pursues three primary objectives.  
 The first objective is to investigate the financial decisions underpinning the resource allocation 
process of government venture funders. The aim is to understand which elements of the budgeting 
strategy are associated with enhancements in investors’ and firms’ performance. The first objective 
can be formulated as the following research question: What effect do various funding allocation 
decisions have on long-term performance outcomes of investors and investees? 
 The second objective is to understand the evaluation process and selection criteria that public 
capital investors follow to allocate funding to candidates. Additionally, attention is devoted to the 
behavioural aspects of the resource allocation process. That is, the intention is to grasp which 
characteristics of candidates receive higher weights among public capital investors. Furthermore, the 
interest lies in exploring whether the evaluation process is subject to decision-making bias or 
distortions and whether investors use heuristics to minimise information asymmetry associated with 
the assessment of innovation projects.  The research question articulated by the second research 
objective can be expressed as: Which firm-level, project-level and individual-level characteristics affect 
early- and late-stage funding allocation outcomes of government venture capital? 
 The final objective is to examine the investors’ ability in distilling high-profile candidates. 
Investors’ decision-making accuracy is questioned by comparing the effects of candidates’ 
characteristics that were used as important selection criteria on desired performance outcomes. As 
part of the interrogation, the role of resources and capabilities in affecting performance is assessed. 
Specifically, the objectives entail addressing the following research questions: How accurate are 
selection criteria that funding allocation decisions are based upon at explaining long-term performance 
outcomes of investors and investees? Which configurations of ventures’ capabilities affect long-term 
performance outcomes of investors and investees? 
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Synopsis of the Thesis 
 
 This project uses real options theory to integrate financial and behavioural perspectives in a 
unified framework to examine the determinants and outcomes of innovation investments designed 
to help small firms commercialise their research and development activities. The study examines 
whether the formal real options reasoning (ROR) structure evident in the composition and execution 
of the government venture funding programme is also underpinned by the real options logic of 
decision-making. Real options reasoning lens helps to capture organisational reality, in which the 
tension exists between economic logic of efficient resource allocation, and behavioural and cognitive 
effects on rational sense-making. 
 To investigate government investment patterns, 367 projects from 275 firms that participated 
in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme administered by the National Health 
Institute in the U.S. were analysed over a seven-year period from 2006 to 2012. Under the staged 
funding scheme, Phase I initial investment is characterised as a real option, which grants investors the 
right to make further investment into Phase II or to discontinue funding. The intention was to 
delineate determinants and outcomes of government venture funding decisions. Investment decisions 
consistent with ROR were conceptualised as funding allocation outcomes and operationalised as initial 
commitment, discontinuation, sequencing and fit based on the primary idea that staged investment 
approach facilitates knowledge creation during R&D activities and leads to commercialisation 
outcomes. Determinants of funding allocation decision outcomes were analysed from the signalling 
perspective and comprised five categories of signals: legitimacy, efficacy, capabilities, project appeal 
characteristics and distortions. The attention-based view was drawn upon to understand whether 
more observable, more salient and more relevant attributes and categories of signals distort decision-
makers’ selection and interpretation practices. The performance of new ventures was assessed in 
terms of their ability to achieve target outcomes of two distinct groups of stakeholders—investors and 
firms. Hence, the outcomes of investment allocation decisions were measured as investment yield and 
firm performance related to sales, employment and innovation.  
 This study finds evidence that government venture funders intuitively follow real options 
reasoning. That is, the funding initiative is explicitly structured in line with the real options approach 
that allows extracting value from the staged investments. However, although the structure of the 
programme is consistent with the characteristics of real options reasoning, the funding allocation 
decisions are only made in accordance with the real options logic in approximately half the cases, 
undermining the overall efficiency of the programme. Drawing on signalling and attention-based view 
helps explain some discrepancies between prescribed and actual investment behaviour. The findings 
advance the theory of R&D investments in the context of government venture funding and have 
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important research policy implications. The study is believed to be a timely addition to the still rather 
underdeveloped empirical body of literature integrating financial and behavioural perspectives of 
ROR. It aids with delineating further boundary conditions of ROR by investigating the choices of 
government venture capitalists in financing innovation projects of small entrepreneurial firms. 
 
Main Contributions to the Field 
 
 This study is known to be among the few to test propositions of real options reasoning in the 
context of government venture funding. As such, it offers unique insights for a better understanding 
of the investment logic and behaviour of the capital markets, which has significant repercussions for 
research, management and public policy theory and practice related to innovation and 
entrepreneurship. The contribution of the current study is threefold.  
 
Theoretical Contributions 
 
 The options approach has been described as a useful strategic tool in making resource 
commitments with the minimal risks (Chatterjee et al. 1999). Given that allocation of financial 
resources is a primary task of investors, the project adds to the developing body of work that 
investigates whether prescriptions of real options reasoning theory has an empirical validity and to 
what extent their formal and explicit implementation helps enhance performance. The adopted 
conceptual approach enabled to move beyond the sheer assumptions of the importance of budget as 
an input to the innovation process and instead examined how resources can be allocated in the most 
optimal way to yield performance benefits, making a contribution to the literature on strategic 
management of investment portfolios.    
 First, to test the propositions of ROR, the study concentrated on a specific empirical context 
in which funding decisions take place—government venture capital, thereby helping comprehend the 
normative validity of the theory. The findings confirm that real options reasoning is indeed applicable 
to a wide range of organisational settings associated with strategic uncertainty and with embedded 
options, such as investments in innovation projects by public venture capital. However, in spite of the 
fact that the studied venture capital programme is explicitly structured in line with ROR and 
encompasses stage-wise sequential investment practices, the structure does not directly translate 
into a disciplined options-like decision-making approach.  
 The judgements of public venture capital decision-makers reflect the inconsistent discrepancy 
between prescriptions of the real options approach and the actual implementation of resource 
allocation strategies, suggesting that the theory is of high empirical value and offers important 
practical implications. The results show that when venture capitalists allocate financial resources in 
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line with real options decision-making logic, they gain significant improvements in performance 
outcomes, whereas deviations from prescriptions of ROR potentially detract from the value offered 
by a flexible options-like approach. Therefore, the inconsistent use of the real options approach in 
practice undermines the benefits associated with ROR.  
 Second, the examination of the organisational practice of the real options approach in the 
context of government venture capital offers new empirical evidence for the validation and 
refinement of the descriptive propositions of the theory. To reconcile the understanding of financial 
and behavioural aspects related to resource allocation strategies, real options theory was 
complemented with signalling theory and attention-based view, which offered insights into the 
decision-making process of government venture capital providers. Hence, the study adds to a yet 
underdeveloped body of literature integrating financial and behavioural perspectives of real options 
reasoning and helps explain some discrepancies between prescribed and actual investment behaviour. 
Specifically, insights derived by leaning on signalling theory outline categories of factors that influence 
investors’ perceptions of options’ value during the evaluation process. At the same time, the 
attention-based view suggests that the process of options-like decision-making is subject to the 
investors’ bounded rationality, resulting in evaluation bias. 
 Finally, the study makes a contribution to the understanding of the role of resources and 
capabilities in extracting value from sequential stage-wise investments. The results show that 
configurations of capabilities have complementarity as well as substitution effects on performance 
outcomes. Such inquiry helps establish the link between economic and decision-making theories, and 
informs practitioners of the competences necessary for exercising the real options for strategic 
investment.  
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Empirical Contributions 
 
The primary empirical contribution of the study is confined to its multi-level conceptual model 
and measurement instruments. Theoretical propositions were tested on a novel dataset comprising 
longitudinal secondary data compiled from multiple sources, which aided generation of new insights.  
 Research applying positivist-induced principles to investigate antecedents and consequences 
of ROR decision-making has only started to develop recently (e.g. Vassolo et al. 2004; Levitas and Chi 
2010). Thus, focusing on the issues relevant to the unique setting enabled developing context-specific 
variables, thereby significantly enhancing the power of the model analysing the impact of real options 
decisions on performance (Krychowski and Quelin 2010).  
 The multi-level model containing established as well as newly-developed variables on firms, 
projects and individuals allowed for a more fine-grained analysis resulting in a delineation of critical 
boundary conditions of the tested hypotheses. The split sample analysis showed that firms perform 
differently depending on whether they previously participated in the funding programme or not. That 
is, multiple-award holding firms achieved different performance outcomes and required different 
configurations of skills, resources and capabilities in comparison to their single-award holding peers. 
 The study makes a distinction between private and social returns by incorporating a multi-
stakeholder perspective and assessing the performance of new ventures in terms of their ability to 
achieve target outcomes of two distinct groups—investors and firms7. Whereas the firm’s perspective 
is concerned with determining the worth of the venture, the funder’s perspective aims to evaluate the 
value of the investment by comparing its cost to the desired outcomes. As such, the incorporation of 
different groups of project stakeholders allowed to make judgements about the performance of new 
ventures from multiple perspectives and to account for heterogeneous pursued end goals. The 
findings show that real options approach is predominantly an investment tool, which offers more gains 
to project funders than to project owners or managers. Additionally, the heterogeneity in statistical 
effects is explained by the differences in the types of performance outcomes, i.e. sales, employment, 
or innovation. 
 Finally, scientific inquiry into resource allocation strategies of public venture capitalists 
benefitted from studying investments in R&D and innovation at the project-level, as it is deemed the 
most suitable level of analysis (Link et al. 2014). Overall, focusing on the breadth and multi-
dimensionality of measurement and operationalisation instruments through the use of innovative 
research tools provided the means of grasping a comprehensive picture of issues pertaining to the 
entrepreneurship research (Brown et al. 2001). 
                                                          
7 In contrast to the original framework of Zwikael and Smyrk (2012), given that studied firms are nascent 
ventures, the project manager and project owner present the same stakeholder category. 
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Managerial and Research Policy Contributions 
 
 Finally, the study bears practical contributions. To managers and entrepreneurs, the results 
help understand the process of how funding allocation decisions are made and which characteristics 
applicants need to focus on signalling strategically to increase their chances of receiving external 
financial support.  
 The study also contributes to the longstanding debate on whether public funding programmes 
generate sufficient private and social returns to justify their existence and also whether taxpayers’ 
money is allocated in the most efficient way (David et al. 2000; Klette et al. 2000).  
 Prior scholarly work on the effects of public funding programmes has been dominated by 
empirical investigations, giving a little theoretical explanation of the phenomena (Kleer 2010). Guided 
by strong theoretical rationale, the empirical model presented here contributes to the understanding 
of the extent to which present operational procedures implemented by the government funders 
promise performance advantages. The understanding of the effect of government venture capital 
programmes was enhanced by analysing the data on returns from such initiatives (Jeng and Wells 
2000).  
 Also, the evaluation criteria of the government venture funders’ decision-making process are 
scrutinised, which allows for an objective assessment of the overall efficiency of the program and 
informs policy makers of the apparent weaknesses of such initiatives. Most importantly, the results 
indicate that the value offered by the government funding programmes gets eroded due to inefficient 
funding allocation decisions and evaluation bias, whereby an additional unit of government 
investment does not lead to better stream of social value from the private sector. 
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1.5 Thesis Outline 
 
 The thesis consists of ten chapters. The current introductory chapter presents the rationale 
for undertaking the project and discusses motivations as well as research and practical problems that 
laid the foundation for the study. Then, it gives a brief overview of the literature and conceptual 
underpinnings that enabled identification of theoretical, empirical and research policy gaps, followed 
by a statement of resulting contributions to the field.  
 Chapter 2 summarises the main strands of the extant literature on the financing of innovation 
and entrepreneurship. It starts with an overview of sources of funding available to SMEs and then goes 
into a detailed discussion of the types of governmental funding programmes, their objectives and 
shortcomings. Next, the findings from existing studies are categorised by the type of the intended 
effect. Then, the performance of government venture capital is compared and contrasted with private 
venture capital and is followed by the discussion of the typical steps and procedures involved in the 
decision-making process of the venture capitalist. Finally, the effects of sequential investments and 
resource allocation strategies are reviewed. To conclude, the chapter finishes with a set of specific 
learnings that set the scene for the development of the conceptual underpinnings.  
 Chapter 3 presents an in-depth review of theoretical perspectives guiding the direction of 
conceptual developments underlying the project; namely, real options theory, signalling theory and 
attention-based view. Rhetorical ideas and formalisations of each theory are discussed, followed by 
an explanation of how the theory is expected to help address the aims and objectives of the present 
research. The final section gives an account of the complementary power of selected theories in 
investigating the phenomena in question.  
 Chapter 4 is an extension of the theoretical chapter but specifically focuses on developing a 
set of conceptual propositions and testable research hypotheses under the umbrella of each theory. 
More specifically, to reflect the adopted theoretical directions, conceptual developments comprise 
three distinct frameworks. Part I conceptual model uses the real options reasoning lens to present the 
hypotheses related to the effects of distinct elements of resource allocation strategies on performance 
outcomes. Part II draws on signalling theory and attention-based view to express a series of 
conjectures pertaining to the question of which factors affect resource allocation outcomes. Part III is 
dedicated to exploring the impact of financial decisions and firm-level heterogeneity on performance 
in a unified framework.   
 Chapter 5 is focused on explaining philosophical and methodological foundations that 
informed the development of an analytical approach for the research design. Following the 
explanation of primary research formulations, procedures related to data collection, database 
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building, operationalisation and measurement of variables, and statistical tools and techniques are 
described. 
 Chapter 6 gives an account of the steps taken to convert raw data into a working format, 
including missing value analysis, imputation procedure and outlier analysis. Next, it sketches out 
empirical procedures that were carried out to prepare and investigate the data prior to the regression 
analyses, such as examination of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, multicollinearity and 
endogeneity assumptions. To conclude, the chapter presents preliminary exploratory analysis to get 
an insight into the patterns of the data by examining descriptive and correlation statistics. 
 Chapters 7 through 9 report results corresponding to Part I, Part II and Part III analyses. 
Hypotheses are confirmed or refuted in light of the statistical findings. Additional tests are conducted 
to check for robustness and sensitivity of obtained results. Finally, the main findings are summarised 
and discussed. 
 Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by giving a succinct summary of the primary insights of the 
scientific investigation. Next, the findings are interpreted in relation to the implications that they 
present to the theoretical, managerial and public policy research and practice. Finally, the chapter 
outlines any limitations of the study that might have an impact on the understanding of the studied 
phenomena and finishes with a set of suggestions for future research.
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 Literature on Financing of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 It is important to fund entrepreneurship (Klein et al. 2014). However, funding is problematic 
due to high uncertainty, agency problems, information asymmetry and moral hazards, which make it 
difficult to evaluate success chances of innovative SMEs (Lee et al. 2015; Burchardt et al. 2016). 
Government venture capitalists intervene to support SMEs when private venture capitalists are 
reluctant to provide early-stage funding. The governmental interventionist programmes are 
associated with a number of private and social benefits, yet are subject to criticism due to limitations 
inherent in the evaluation and selection process (Lerner 2010). Resource allocation mechanisms and 
accurate decision-making criteria are believed to offer a way forward in improving efficiency and 
optimality of sequential investments into R&D projects by public government funds. 
 This chapter provides background for the development of conceptual propositions 
underpinning the present study and summarises the primary debates in the relevant literature 
domains, making links and drawing conclusions, which helps identify a set of research gaps and 
unanswered issues. 
 
2.2 Overview of Funding Sources Available to Small and Medium Enterprises 
 
 Different stages of venture development are characterised by various levels of risk which, 
subsequently, affects the ability of nascent firms to access external funding sources. Figure 2-1 
demonstrates the providers of funding available to entrepreneurs at different stages of venture 
development. As the project advances through the stages of development, the level of associated risk 
diminishes, opening up a wider range of funding sources. At the early stages, however, access to 
capital is limited. In particular, there is a gap between the seed and the start-up stages, which requires 
entrepreneurs to rely on personal equity in order to progress the venture to the point that will make 
it attractive to angel and venture capital providers (Cooper 2003). Angels—wealthy individuals that 
provide start-up capital to entrepreneurs—are an alternative source of external funding (Gompers 
1995; Van Osnabrugge and Robinson 2000). Prior research found that angel investors provide an 
equivalent amount of financial support to entrepreneurs at initial stages of venture development 
(Roberts 1991). However, financing by business angels has two primary caveats. First, business angels 
favour funding deals that require small amounts for venture launch (Freear et al. 1994). Second, the 
supply of such finance is contingent upon the availability of the slack capital of angels, which is limited 
in nature (Jeng and Wells 2000). Consequently, although business angels are a suitable substitute for 
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personal equity at initial stages, they are insufficient for early venture development stages. As a result, 
venture capital is the most suitable form of financing small firm growth. 
 
Figure 2-1: Funding sources at different stages of venture development 
 
Source: Adopted from Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000 p.37) 
 High-risk ventures are associated with higher uncertainty but also high variance for potential 
returns, which in combination increase information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders (Lee 
et al. 2007). In contrast to funds offered by banks or raised in the equity markets, venture capital firms 
are more represented in high-risk industries due to their ability to reduce the cost of information 
asymmetry through efficient selection and monitoring procedures (Amit et al. 1998). Venture 
capitalists have specialised expertise and skills necessary to assess the risks of complex technologies 
and innovations of nascent firms operating in high-tech industries, which neither bankers nor capital 
markets can do, magnifying information asymmetry problems for the latter (Elston and Audretsch 
2011).  
 In addition to their specialisation in financing risky ventures, venture capital firms exhibit a 
number of other attributes that distinguish them from other external funding providers (Wright and 
Robbie 1998). First, venture capitalists make fixed term investments and anticipate no returns from 
such deals until after their completion (Wright et al. 2005). Puri and Zarutskie (2012) found that nearly 
half of VC-funded new firms start without any commercial revenues. Second, venture capitalists 
maintain an active position in the relationship with their borrowers, characterised by the ongoing 
monitoring and provision of value-added services (Jeng and Wells 2000). Therefore, venture capitalists 
are frequently viewed as ‘informal capital’ (Lee et al. 2007) or ‘active investor’ (Jensen 1989) due to 
their involvement beyond the sheer provision of finance. Last, but not least, venture capital firms 
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structure the investment process across a number of stages (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; Sahlman 1990), 
with funds being allocated sequentially based on the attainment of milestones (Gompers and Lerner 
2000). 
 Broadly speaking, venture capital firms can be organised as private sector funds and public 
sector funds, which fall into three dominant categories—independent VC, corporate VC and 
government VC8. The form that venture capitalists take determines their investment patterns, sources 
of funds, investment targets, screening and evaluation criteria, skills, governance structure, the level 
of risk-taking, the extent and duration of post-deal involvement as well as overarching funding 
objectives (Wright et al. 2005; Grilli and Murtinu 2014). For example, Manigart et al. (2002) found that 
venture capitalists making early-stage deals expect higher returns on their investment than on late-
stage deals. Likewise, in contrast to their public sector counterparts, private venture capitalists pursue 
deals that offer higher returns on investment (Manigart et al. 2002). 
 As Amit and colleagues (1998) argued, even though venture capitalists’ perception of costs 
associated with information asymmetry is lower than that of other external finance providers, venture 
capitalists still prefer less risky firms that can provide more information. As a result, venture capitalists 
favour investments into later-stage ventures over start-up ventures (Amit et al. 1998). Also, the supply 
of private venture capital is insufficient to support all potentially lucrative technology-oriented 
ventures. For example, according to Lerner (2002), in 2000 in the U.S. private VCs provided first-time 
funding to only 2,200 ventures, while each year on average one million new firms emerge. Moreover, 
provision of VC capital is affected by legal and institutional factors, which differ hugely across 
countries, making some environments more prone to underinvestment in high-potential small firms 
(Groh et al. 2010; Jeng and Wells 2000). Finally, evidence exists that private VC is reluctant to fund 
projects that have extended experimentation stages, which is often the case of emerging high-
potential industries such as, for instance, sustainable energy (Nanda et al. 2015). As a result, 
governments intervene with the provision of public venture capital programmes. 
  
                                                          
8 Corporate VCs will not be discussed in further detail in subsequent sections as their organisation differs 
significantly from independent VCs and government VCs. 
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Government as Venture Capitalist 
 
Motivations and Objectives of Governmental Interventionist Programmes 
 
 Governmental interventionist actions are aimed to address the externalities caused by market 
failure—private sector underinvestment in socially-valuable R&D as a result of incomplete knowledge 
appropriability and limited access to finance by the SMEs, triggered by information gaps and high 
uncertainty (Czarnitzki and Toole 2007; Hsu 2006; Link and Scott 2009). 
 The key intended positive effects that governmental financial programmes pursue are 
twofold: stimulate R&D knowledge spillover from the private to the public sector and to certify the 
quality of small firms to other finance providers, especially in high-tech industries, where conventional 
financial evaluation instruments convey little information (Lerner 1999; Lerner 2002). Another indirect 
justification of such programmes relates to the promotion of the economic diversity, which is achieved 
by giving support to the underrepresented members of the SME sectors (Scott 2000) and neglected 
industries (Lerner 2002). 
 The literature uses two lenses to analyse the position adopted by the government in funding 
SMEs—innovation policy or entrepreneurship policy. Studies using the innovation policy lens argue 
that the primary objective of the government is to prevent private sector underinvestment in R&D 
and fund those projects that are considered marginal, i.e. projects that may have low private returns 
but high social returns (e.g. Wallsten 2000). On the other hand, academics adopting the 
entrepreneurship policy lens compare the government with a risk-taking entrepreneur that is driven 
by the same motives as private venture capitalists, i.e. selection of high-profile candidates in order to 
maximise returns on investment, which in the case of the government are of social nature (Link and 
Scott 2010). In the first case, the projects are selected based on their economic merit, while in the 
second case they are based on their likelihood of commercial success (Wallsten 2000). 
 Either way, however, researchers agree that the primary motivation of governments behind 
the initiation of public venture capital funds and subsidy programmes is to directly intervene with a 
‘hands-on policy approach’ to mitigate the problems caused by market failure, manifested in the lack 
of provision of private venture capital to support early-stage ventures, which then leads to the 
shortage of high-quality candidates for late-stage VC funding (Cumming et al. 2014).  
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Overview of Governmental Interventionist Programmes 
 
 Many governments that recognise the insufficient market delivery of financial support for the 
development of innovation have introduced a spectrum of policy measures. Edler and Georghiou 
(2007) presented a taxonomy that depicts a range of innovation policy measures (Figure 2-2). Public 
support to stimulate private sector innovation activities is typically broken down into supply-side and 
demand-side instruments, with the former focused on the provision of additional inputs for 
innovation, i.e. tangible and intangible resources, and the latter on the facilitation of production of 
innovation outputs, i.e. products and services (Aschhoff and Sofka 2009).  
 Both supply-side and demand-side instruments operate under three broad frameworks—
direct, indirect and regulatory (Alperovych et al. 2015; Cumming and Li 2013). Regulatory framework 
refers to laws that include tax incentives and other institutional mechanisms. Indirect framework 
relates to support systems for knowledge transfer via universities, laboratories, research clusters and 
business incubators. Finally, direct framework captures investment programmes, such as guarantee 
schemes to private VC, public-private syndicates and hybrid co-investment schemes, and subsidies to 
SMEs.  
 
Figure 2-2: Overview of public support innovation instruments 
 
Source: Adapted from Edler and Georghiou (2007 p.953) 
 As a result of the presence of multiple instruments that refer to the direct financial 
intervention programmes, the extant literature lacks an agreement regarding the conceptualisation 
of government venture capital and a number of definitions prevail (Cumming et al. 2014). The most 
important distinction concerns the governance mechanism, which differentiates between 
government-owned venture capitalists (GOVCs) and government-supported venture capitalists 
(GSVCs) (Brander et al. 2014). Government-owned VCs are entities, initiated and managed by 
governments via financial instruments, such as financing, tax credits and subsidies (Cumming et al. 
2014; Brander et al. 2014). Government-supported VCs are typically private entities in which 
government is a limited partner or a major investor, or which participate in government programmes 
to obtain financial support. In other words, the primary difference is that GOVCs are fully funded by 
the government, while GSVCs are partly funded by the government (Brander et al. 2014). 
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 The present study focuses on direct R&D subsidies by government-owned VC investment 
funds that are implemented in most OECD countries. The subsidy schemes operate on a competitive 
basis, whereby firms apply for financial support to develop novel technologies and the government 
takes on a role of a venture capitalist to select and fund promising R&D projects that would not have 
been carried out in the absence of public support (Aschhoff and Sofka 2009). Table 2-1 presents a 
summary of the primary elements that characterise public R&D subsidies. 
Table 2-1: Overview of public R&D subsidies 
Characteristic Public R&D subsidies 
Selection by State 
Primary government objective Stimulation of R&D activities of firms 
Input for firms Money 
Primary participation incentive for firms Cost/risk sharing 
Effect on firm success Cost reduction 
Time horizon Medium-term 
Inherent risk Crowding out of private R&D investments 
Source: Adopted from Aschhoff and Sofka (2009 p.1238) 
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2.3 Consequences of External Funding on Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
 
Effects of Government Venture Funding on Performance Outcomes 
 
 To assess the contribution made by the policy intervention, the literature refers to the concept 
of additionality of support (Georghiou 2002). Scholarly work differentiates between three types of 
additionality effects of government subsidies on desired performance outcomes—input additionality 
(R&D intensity and efforts), output additionality (firm growth and innovation performance) and 
behavioural additionality (certification, productivity and learning). While measures related to input 
and output additionality capture long-term performance effects of specific R&D projects, behavioural 
additionality reflects short-term changes in learning practices (Georghiou 2002). Furthermore, input 
and output additionalities have been defined as first-order factors, while behavioural additionalities 
refer to second-order factors (Autio et al. 2008). Table 2-2 presents a summary of the effects of public 
R&D subsidies on a range of outcomes. 
 
Input Additionality 
 
 Input additionality concerns the substitution and complementarity effects of public 
investment on private investments (David et al. 2000). Public R&D subsidies reduce development costs 
and raise the anticipated profits, creating incentives for firms to intensify private R&D spending and 
efforts, which results in input additionality effects (Dimos and Pugh 2016). In the opposite case, when 
firms reduce the private spending after receiving public support, the crowding out effect occurs.  
 A number of review papers concluded that the extant literature provided contradictory 
findings concerning the effect of government subsidies, showing that public subsidies complement 
private R&D, have no effect at all, or crowd-out private R&D (Klette et al. 2000; David et al. 2000; 
Dimos and Pugh 2016). For instance, Wallsten (2000) found that government-financed firms reduced 
their own internal R&D spending in the years immediately following the award. Goolsbee (1998) noted 
that larger government grants directly increase salaries of R&D workers, thereby crowding out internal 
R&D efforts. However, recent studies have generated results using more robust methods and 
datasets, and explicitly accounting for potential endogeneity issues, which lean towards the absence 
of the crowding-out effect. A new meta-analysis by Dimos and Pugh (2016) rejected the hypothesis 
that public subsidies crowd out private investment but found no evidence of substantial additionality, 
suggesting that in general public funds are associated with both increased input and output 
additionality, thereby correcting for market failures, although their effects diminish with time. 
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Table 2-2: Effects of financial support of government venture capital on firm performance 
Category & Definition Consequence Effect of R&D subsidies Direction 
of effect9 
Source of findings10 
Input Additionality 
Continued efficiency in R&D 
process by the firms after 
receipt of public subsidies 
(Clarysse et al. 2009) 
Continued internal R&D 
intensity & efforts  
Increased or stable level of R&D spending by the 
firm 
+ Beck et al. 2016; Aerts and Schmidt 2008; Czarnitzki and 
Lopes-Bento 2013; Dimos and Pugh 2016; Gonzalez and 
Pazo 2008; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014; Hud and 
Hussinger 2015 
Crowding out of private 
funds 
Reduced level of R&D spending by the firm - Wallsten 2000; Boente 2004; Goolsbee 1998 
Output Additionality 
The proportion of outputs from 
the R&D process attributed to 
public subsidies  
(Georghiou 2002) 
Knowledge spillover R&D spillovers / & +11 Boente 2004 
Firm growth Sales growth + Lerner 1999; Howell 2015 
Employment growth + Lerner 1999; Link and Scott 2012; Link and Scott 2013 
/ Wallsten 2000 
Greater survival rate + Lerner and Kegler 2001 
Profitability (return on assets) + Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco 2010 
Commercialisation of 
innovation 
Number of patents + Radas et al. 2015; Howell 2015 
/ Bertoni and Tykvova 2015 
Quality of patents / Bertoni and Tykvova 2015 
Behavioural Additionality 
Changes in the behaviour of 
other market actors towards the 
SME induced by public subsidies  
(Georghiou 2002; Meuleman 
and De Maeseneire 2012) 
Certification / Halo 
effect 
Positive signal to private investors or banks to 
stimulate influx of subsequent external funding 
+ Lerner 1999; Feldman and Kelley 2006; Meuleman and 
De Maeseneire 2012; Soederblom et al. 2015; Toole and 
Czarnitzki 2007; Kleer 2010; Leleux and Surlemont 2003; 
Howell 2015; Feldman and Kelley 2006; Brander et al. 
2014 
Positive signal to potential employees for accessing 
human capital 
+ Soederblom et al. 2015 
Impact on career 
choices and academic 
entrepreneurship 
Direct and demonstration effect on stimulating 
commercialisation behaviour of knowledge workers 
+ Audretsch et al. 2000b; Audretsch et al. 2002b, 
Audretsch 2003, Toole and Czarnitzki 2007 
Efficiency Productivity improvement - Alperovych et al. 2015 
Learning Intra- and inter-organisational learning imposes a 
positive effect during the first financed projects, but 
it diminishes the more projects are financed 
+ & - Clarysse et al. 2009  
 
Capability building Strengthened absorptive capacity + Radas et al. 2015 
                                                          
9 + refers to the positive effect, - refers to the negative effect, / refers to no effect. 
10 The list of sources of findings is not exhaustive, but indicative. 
11 No effect was found in the total sample and low-technology industries, but weak positive effect was observed in the high-technology industries. 
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Output Additionality 
 
 The studies concerned with evaluating output additionality investigated whether the 
alleviation of financial constraints with the provision of public subsidies stimulates the development 
of an entrepreneurial economy. Link and Scott (2010) demonstrated that small firms invest below the 
private hurdle rates because external capital providers face high perceived technical and market 
uncertainty.  
 Empirical evidence showed that R&D subsidies minimise private R&D underinvestment 
stemming from financial constraints by mitigating product market uncertainty (Toole and Czarnitzki 
2007). As such, support for public subsidies corrects for the private market failure of underinvestment 
in socially-valuable fields and stimulates commercialisation from research (Audretsch, Link, et al. 
2002). Moreover, Link and Ruhm (2009) confirmed that government subsidies are also crucial for 
projects that eventually reach the commercialisation stage. Feldman and Kelley (2006) concluded that 
the absence of public subsidies prevents firms from continuing high-risk high-potential R&D projects. 
All in all, government grants are critical sources the firms draw upon to reduce capital shortage at 
early development and growth stages (Elston and Audretsch 2011). 
 Yet another research strand concentrated on examining the effects of subsidies on the direct 
firms’ performance. Lerner (1999) investigated the effects of the government VC initiative on the long-
term performance of high-tech ventures. The author found that government-VC-financed firms 
achieved higher sales and employment growth and were more likely to receive private VC in the years 
to come in comparison to the firms that did not receive subsidies, but such effects were only applicable 
to the firms located in regions with high concentration of VC capital and from high-tech industries. 
The finding implies that the allocation of the award per se has no effect, but instead is contingent 
upon other factors (Lerner 1999). The effect of larger or additional awards on performance was 
insignificant, suggesting the mere certification role of R&D grants.  
 A recent study by Howell (2015) confirmed the positive effect of early-stage government 
subsidies on the likelihood of receiving subsequent venture funding, patenting, revenue growth and 
successful exit via IPO or acquisition, but found no positive spillover effects of subsidies. However, in 
contrast to Lerner (1999), Howell (2015) concluded that it is not the certification effect of grants that 
increases the probability of attracting future external funding, but the prototyping effect—reduction 
of investors’ uncertainty as a result of undertaking proof-of-concept work. As such, funding is helpful 
in conducting preliminary tests on the viability of technology for subsequent development, which 
reduces information asymmetry and agency problems. This finding is consistent with the proposition 
of Toole and Czarnitzki (2007). Taken together, the results of the author suggest that early-stage grants 
dedicated to prototyping are more beneficial than larger follow-on funds (Howell 2015). 
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 However, despite the numerous positive effects of subsidies identified in prior studies, 
evidence exists that public funding programmes are subject to a number of problems. For instance, in 
his paper, Lerner (1999) found that distortions exist in the award allocation process and questioned 
the effectiveness of the practice of government VCs to allocate larger awards to a few firms as well as 
to make geographically disperse allocations. In the similar vein, using data on the SBIR programme, 
Wallsten (2000) found that firms with more employees and patents received more R&D subsidies, but 
these subsidies did not increase employment growth. More recently, Howell (2015) indicated that the 
ranks within a competition allocated by government officials are unrelated to market outcomes, 
suggesting that (i) public venture capitalists fail to distill high-quality candidates from the pool of 
applicants and (ii) external investors do not perceive grants as signals of firms’ superior quality. 
Overall, these insights from the extant literature point out that public funding programmes may be 
regarded as Pandora’s Box as much as Panacea.  
 
Behavioural Additionality 
 
 Additionally, the benefits of the government venture capital programmes are linked to 
stimulation of the entrepreneurial economy by changing the behaviour of knowledge workers 
(Audretsch, Weigand, et al. 2002). The results of the survey and the case studies conducted in the U.S. 
showed that public grants help many firms to start up (Elston and Audretsch 2011; Cumming and Li 
2013) and stimulate academic knowledge commercialisation (Audretsch, Weigand, et al. 2002). Toole 
and Czarnitzki (2007) in their study confirmed that the SBIR programme fosters academic 
commercialisation behaviour and, hence, can be viewed as an entrepreneurship policy. Overall, SBIR 
awards are believed to promote entrepreneurship, venture capital, and innovation (Cumming and Li 
2013). 
 A number of studies highlighted the importance of a combination of public and private funding 
in accelerating commercialisation and entrepreneurship behaviour. For instance, Link et al. (2014) 
indicated that 17% of all ventures that received SBIR funding subsequently attracted private capital. 
Hsu (2006) showed that government-funded (SBIR) firms that later received VC funding had a higher 
likelihood of an R&D alliance and an IPO in contrast to those government-funded firms that did not 
receive VC funding. Similarly, Link and Ruhm (2009) provided evidence that additional investments 
from external sources increase the likelihood of innovation commercialisation spurring from later-
stage government awards. Recent studies tested the complementarity effect of different sources of 
external funding and found that investment level and exit performance are highest for the firms that 
have mixed private and government funds, followed by private funds alone and then government 
funds alone (Brander et al. 2014; Cumming et al. 2014).  
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 The literature on VC funding has attempted to distinguish between financial and value-added 
support of different investor types and investigated their impact not only on firms’ direct outputs 
(Brander et al. 2014; Cumming et al. 2014) but also on intermediate operational performance, 
expressed as efficiency and productivity improvement (Chemmanur et al. 2011; Croce et al. 2013; 
Alperovych et al. 2015). The findings demonstrated that performance improvement of GVC-backed 
firms is debatable. 
 In particular, efforts have been made towards understanding the differences in performance 
between public and private fund holders. More precisely, literature has shown that government-
financed firms achieve lower or no sales growth, employment growth and IPO performance in 
comparison to their private-VC-financed firms (Grilli and Murtinu 2014; Cumming et al. 2014). On the 
other hand, Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014) found that public finance enhances innovation 
performance of SMEs, measured by radical novelties, as much as private finance. Beck et al. (2016) 
extended this insight by clarifying that in relation to private VC, government VC enhances innovation 
performance of radical innovations only, but has no impact on incremental innovations.  
 More recently, academic attention has been diverted to the effect of VC funding on firm 
efficiency, a metric related to operational performance, which is one of the core mechanisms behind 
sales and employment growth (Bottazzi et al. 2008). Boente (2004) demonstrated that in comparison 
to privately-financed projects, publicly-financed projects have no productivity-enhancing effects of 
R&D spillovers. Chemmanur et al. (2011) and Croce et al. (2013) found that VC-financed firms have 
higher productivity than their non-VC-financed firms, which may be due to the rigorous selection and 
evaluation criteria used by VC firms. Further to these studies, Alperovych and colleagues (2015), 
analysed the effects of different types of VC funding inclusive of government programmes on firms’ 
efficiency in Belgium. The authors found that although firms’ efficiency increases as a result of VC 
investment, this effect is inconsistent across different VC types, with private-VC-funded firms 
outperforming their government-VC-funded peers in terms of productivity. While there are no 
observed differences in post-investment productivity levels of private-VC-funded and non-VC-funded 
firms, government-VC-funded firms significantly lag behind both. Overall, the results suggest that 
private VC improves the productivity of funded firms, but government VC hinders the improvement in 
productivity.  
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Heterogeneity in Effects of Government Venture Capital versus Private Venture Capital 
 
 The type of ownership is the most prominent characteristic of the organisational structure of 
VC firms that can have a profound role in explaining the heterogeneous performance of VC-backed 
firms (Da Rin et al. 2013). Nonetheless, within the abundant literature on venture capital, the studies 
analysing the effects of different types of VC ownership and structure on the growth of high-tech 
ventures remain relatively scant (Grilli and Murtinu 2014). In their paper, Grilli and Murtinu (2014) 
summarised the potential reasons that might explain the variance in performance of government-VC-
backed firms versus private-VC-backed firms.  
 First, although both government VCs and private VCs share the same goal—to stimulate the 
growth of small high-potential firms—their final objectives are different. Whereas government VCs 
aim to foster innovation within the SME sector to increase economic growth and amplify social returns 
from private R&D efforts, private VCs are driven by profit-maximisation incentives and strive to 
increase the value of ventures for the initial public offering (IPO) or acquisition (Chemmanur et al. 
2011). The study by Jeng and Wells (2000) found that government-funded venture capital is not as 
strongly determined by IPOs as non-government funded venture capital, and places greater focus on 
funding early-stage ventures that would otherwise have no access to private finance providers. 
Overall, the functioning of private venture capital firms is strongly determined by contractual, financial 
and reputational obligations towards their fundraising sources (Bottazzi et al. 2008). Government VCs 
are largely exempt from such pressures: since they use public monies to sponsor their activities and 
supply of these is practically unlimited, sound performance of portfolio firms is not a priority as follow-
on funds do not need to be raised (Alperovych et al. 2015). 
 Second, the extent of direct involvement or value-added services provided by the government 
VCs may be low, or, if at all present, may be counterproductive due public officers’ paucity of expertise 
in identifying and supporting high-potential ventures and the non-profit driven incentive system 
(Leleux and Surlemont 2003). 
 Third, private VCs adhere to the role of an active investor and vigorously monitor the progress 
of firms they back up financially (Gompers and Lerner 2000), with the aim to account for the potential 
agency and hold-up problems (Kaplan and Stroemberg 2004). Government VCs do not scrutinise the 
track record of applicants to the same degree as private VCs (Lerner 2002). Moreover, in contrast to 
private VCs, their government-managed peers engage in a less elaborate range of post-investment 
activities and place less emphasis on such value-added services as the development of the business 
idea, professionalisation and exit orientation (Luukkonen et al. 2013). 
 Fourth, private VCs and government VCs differ in terms of their perceptions of risk, which 
explains their preference for certain types of deals. While private venture capitalists favour lower-risk 
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later stage candidates (Amit et al. 1998), government VCs exhibit less risk-aversion by providing 
support for underdeveloped early-stage ventures and by giving them a chance to come of out shadow, 
recognising that their activity may eventually yield potential social returns (Grilli and Murtinu 2013). 
 Finally, government venture capitalists are more prone to influences of political and interest 
groups in their networks, which can distort the rational selection and evaluation processes, resulting 
in biassed decision-making (Lerner 2002). 
 
2.4 Antecedents of External Funding on Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
 
Venture Capital Decision-Making 
 
 The persistently high failure rate among new ventures makes screening and evaluation of 
applicants for funding an extremely difficult task (Lerner 2002). Yet, it is also an activity that enables 
venture capitalists to create value (Alperovych and Hübner 2013). Given that new ventures applying 
for external funding exhibit significant variation in the quality and nature of their characteristics and 
pursued opportunities, some will be more qualified to receive financial support than others (Eckhardt 
et al. 2006). Therefore, evaluation and selection criteria are used to make the judgements about the 
ventures’ viability.  
 Venture capitalists follow stringent selection criteria to scrutinise candidates and business 
plans to assess the potential of technology and management (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; Macmillan et 
al. 1985; Desarbo et al. 1987; Macmillan et al. 1987). Table 2-3 presents a summary of the criteria 
ranked as the most important among the venture capital firms. Although the business plan allows 
assessing to some degree the feasibility of the proposed technology (Lerner 2002), evidence shows 
that it is the quality of the entrepreneurial team that bears the highest weight on the funding decision 
(Macmillan et al. 1985). Given that the markets for technology do not always develop as anticipated, 
the experienced entrepreneurial team is believed to be able to take existing opportunities in new 
potentially profitable directions (Lerner 2002). 
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Table 2-3: Summary of the evaluation criteria used by venture capitalists 
Category Characteristic 
Entrepreneur’s personality Evaluates risk well 
Capable of sustained effort 
Articulate in discussing venture 
Attends to detail 
Entrepreneur’s experience Relevant task record 
Demonstrated leadership ability 
Familiar with market 
Characteristics of product/service Product protectable 
Product has market acceptance 
Prototype developed 
Market characteristics  Product stimulates existing market 
Market has high growth rate 
Low threat of early competition 
Venture capitalist familiar with an industry 
Financial considerations Ten times investment in ten years or less 
Highly liquid investment 
Venture team composition Functionally balanced team essential 
Source: Adapted from MacMillan et al. (1985 p.127) 
 
 Adherence to strict evaluation process allows venture capitalist to reduce information gaps 
associated with the quality of candidates prior to making an initial financial commitment (Knockaert 
et al. 2006). After the first infusion of capital into the venture, VC firms stay actively involved and 
employ a range of monitoring and controlling mechanisms (Macmillan et al. 1989; Bottazzi et al. 2008), 
one of which is staging of capital investments12 (Lerner 1995).  
 Multi-stage venture capital process allows to portion uncertainty and thereby addresses the 
need for flexibility (Lerner 2002). Subsequently, evaluation and selection of new ventures also occurs 
at multiple stages and is path-dependent in nature, signifying that later-stage decisions are dependent 
on the prior-stage decisions, yet may be based on different criteria and be contingent upon new 
information or new priorities (Eckhardt et al. 2006). 
 Quality of the evaluation, monitoring and control processes, as well as venture capital firms’ 
proficiency in structuring and conducting such activities are the necessary conditions for efficient 
resource allocations, which are expected to lead to superior productivity and efficiency of VC-financed 
firms (Chemmanur et al. 2011; Croce et al. 2013; Alperovych et al. 2015). 
 
                                                          
12 Discussion of sequential investments is subject of the next section. 
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Weaknesses of Government Venture Capital Decision-Making 
 
 Government venture capitalists follow the same selection and evaluation process and 
evaluate applicants based on their technical and commercial potential (Hsu 2006). However, evidence 
exists that governmental VC programmes are more susceptible to selection issues. Despite the fact 
that governmental programmes pursue beneficial end goals and often allocate experts to carry out 
the selection process, who might be even better equipped to deal with technical information than 
private VCs, evaluating the potential of young ventures in high-tech markets is extremely complex 
(Lerner 1999). Due to the apparent flaws of the resource allocation processes, public sector 
investments have been the subject of criticism (Lerner 1999) and described as “gambles with the 
public’s monies” (Link and Scott 2009 p.264). 
 The primary concern surrounding the efficient functioning of public venture capital 
programmes is related to the effects of institutional and political settings that may introduce 
distortions to the investment decision-making process based on non-economic criteria (Lerner 2002). 
More specifically, politicians and other interest groups may exhibit rent-seeking or opportunistic 
behaviour (Lerner 1999) that may be manifested in a number of ways. 
 First, government programmes are driven by the internal research agenda and allocate 
awards to firms that address research or geographic priority areas, even when such firms are unlikely 
to achieve better long-term performance. The scepticism about the benefits of public subsidies then 
pertains to the questionable ability of government venture capitalists to select viable candidates that 
forego funding by private sources as a result of market imperfections and not because they present a 
low-potential investment opportunity (OECD 1997).  
 Second, bureaucratic decision-makers may be inclined to ‘cherry-pick’ candidates to portray 
the programmes as ‘effective’ and thereby also enhance their own credentials in the eyes of the public 
(Dimos and Pugh 2016). As a result of the selection bias, some firms get awards even if they would 
have succeeded in innovation or commercialisation activities in their absence (Wallsten 2000; 
Audretsch, Weigand, et al. 2002).  
 Third, governmental programme officials frequently support politically influential firms, 
whereby a disproportionate amount of financial resources is allocated to ventures that have already 
received a large number of awards and have had low commercialisation record13 (Lerner 1999). 
 Taken together, a combination of poor selection, monitoring and control practices of 
government agents results in the investments in unprofitable ventures (Lerner 2002), undermining 
the efficient and optimal resource allocation of public funds (Lerner 2010; Dimos and Pugh 2016). 
                                                          
13 In the context of the SBIR programme, such firms have been labelled ‘SBIR mills’ (Lerner 1999). 
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2.5 Sequential Venture Capital Investments as a Funding Pattern 
 
 Many organisational strategic decisions, such as new product development, market expansion 
or mergers and acquisitions, are carried out in a sequence of steps (e.g. Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994a; 
Folta and Miller 2002). Such decisions unfold as a result of an iterative process of information 
acquisition through learning and experimentation (Guler 2007a). Staged financial allocations and 
resource endowments enable continuing evaluation of projects’ potential, which shapes 
organisations’ course of action and limits associated risks (Guler 2007b). The venture capital industry 
presents a suitable setting for examining the process of sequential capital allocations because 
investors make a number of staged investments in new ventures to manage uncertainty and maximise 
their returns (Sahlman 1990; Lerner 1994; Gompers 1995). Given high levels of ex-ante uncertainty 
associated with R&D projects that only experimentation can resolve, the nature of VC investments 
encourages making multiple early bets, which helps delineate a few lucrative investments generating 
yields (Kerr and Nanda 2014). 
 Venture capital investments are associated with two primary problems—information 
asymmetry and agency costs (Gompers 1995). Staged funding is used to mitigate such problems and 
benefits both investors and firms (Neher 1999; Wang and Zhou 2004). For investors, the management 
of the investment process through sequential funding allows reducing endogenous uncertainty 
related to projects and entrepreneurs (Guler 2007a). Ongoing accumulation of project-specific 
information through sequencing helps investors assess costs and benefits of the project as well as 
monitor entrepreneurs’ effort and opportunistic behaviour. As a result, investors have a strong 
intention to make timely investments in order to obtain relevant information (Li 2008). For 
entrepreneurs, staged venture capital financing allows to focus on developing new products and 
technologies and growing the firm, maximising firms’ chances of survival (Dean and Giglierano 1990).  
 Specifically, in the investment context, sequential funding allocations involve incremental 
monetary commitments over an extended period of time and at different stages of the project’s life 
cycle (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Three attributes characterise sequential investments: (i) no yields can 
be appropriated prior to the completion of the project; (ii) costs and benefits of the project are 
uncertain; (iii) investors have to balance a portfolio of projects that vie for considerable resources 
(Guler 2007b). Each investment has an opportunity cost, so investors have to make a trade-off 
between making an investment in existing projects in order to acquire more information on their 
potential or switch to new alternative projects (Guler 2007a).  
 Assessment of potential returns from competing investment opportunities is complicated by 
the fact that information on alternative projects is obtained over time, yet decisions have to be based 
on currently available information (March 1991). Thus, new information that regularly arrives due to 
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the staged nature of investments offers the means for investors to update their perspectives on 
projects’ chances of success and make timely continuation or termination decisions (Guler 2007b).  
 Although sequential funding allocations offer a flexibility advantage and limit downside risks 
by preventing investors from making excessive capital commitments, such gains are contingent upon 
the venture capitalist firms’ ability to modify investment patterns in response to up-to-date 
information (Coff and Laverty 2001). Technically, the decision whether to continue subsequent 
funding allocations should reflect the likelihood of the project succeeding in the future (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994; Gompers 1995; Bergemann and Hege 1998); however, in the real life scenario, investors 
have a number of challenges managing the sequential investment process (Coff and Laverty 2001). 
 Recent studies on investment patterns in the venture capital industry found that investors 
exhibit escalated commitment to investments and systematically neglect new information received 
through a sequential process indicating diminishing anticipated returns (Guler 2007b; Guler 2007a). 
The results suggest that venture capital firms are prone to making inefficient funding termination 
decisions that may be triggered by biassed decision-making, agency problems as well as institutional 
and political influences, making them subject to moral hazards—the primary issue that sequential 
investments aim to solve (Guler 2007b).  
 
Effects of Resource Allocation Strategies on Performance Outcomes 
 
 Resource allocation strategies underlying sequential capital investments comprise initial 
decision-making and adaptive decision-making. Adaptive decisions are made following the 
implementation of initial plans and are characterised by the increased emphasis on decision-makers’ 
attention and less procedural rationality (Klingebiel and De Meyer 2013). Organisations implementing 
sequential projects are faced with the challenge to allocate resources in such a way that makes it 
possible to combine the efficient delivery of plans with any necessary adaptations (Eisenhardt et al. 
2010; Lewis et al. 2002).  
 Flexibility in resource allocation is a crucial aspect for entrepreneurial firms to create value 
under dynamic market circumstances (McGrath 1999). Such flexibility enables firms to concurrently 
explore a window of scenarios and pursue subsequent implementation of the most promising ones 
(Sanchez 1993). However, flexibility also limits the firms’ ability to stabilise plans and make strategic 
commitments (Ghemawat and Costa 1993; Sull 2003). The options-like investment decision-making is 
one such approach that helps organisations balance the intended plans with flexibility in resource 
allocation (Reuer and Tong 2007). 
 Organisations use a number of strategies to allocate resources to a portfolio of innovative 
projects and combine elements such as breadth, selectiveness, sequencing and magnitude. Breadth 
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denotes the concurrent allocation of initial resources to a number of alternative projects at earlier 
stages; selectiveness and sequencing refer to resource reallocation strategies at later stages and 
indicate intentional pruning of the portfolio; the magnitude of resource allocation reflects the size of 
investment commitment and the level of project resourcing (Klingebiel and Rammer 2014; Klingebiel 
and Adner 2015). Existing literature on project portfolio management indicates that organisations 
exhibit heterogeneity in strategic implementation of resource allocation for product development 
(Griffin 1997; Hauser et al. 2006). 
 Strategic resource allocation elements shape the scope of innovation projects, the size of the 
overall portfolio as well as project development duration (Klingebiel and Rammer 2014). Research 
evidence exists that various resource allocation mechanisms have a differential impact on 
performance outcomes of innovative projects, suggesting that it is not the quantity of resources per 
se, but rather the quality of resource allocation decisions that enhance innovation performance 
(Klingebiel and Rammer 2014). Adaptive resource allocation strategies are associated with improved 
overall long-term performance, allowing to contain costs and respond to unravelling contingencies 
(Klingebiel and De Meyer 2013). 
 Greater breadth of resource allocations positively affects anticipated performance in a 
number of ways. First, it allows to simultaneously place bets on multiple innovation projects that can 
potentially target a variety of customer markets (Sorenson 2000). Second, it stimulates information 
search, which is known to enhance new product development decision-making and activities 
(Leiponen and Helfat 2010). As a result, the likelihood of innovation success increases. 
 Termination of projects under development is not valuable in all situations. However, as the 
firm reduces complexity and uncertainty by exploring a broad spectrum of opportunities, selectiveness 
is necessary at later stages, which call for more extensive resource commitments (Pich et al. 2002; 
Sommer and Loch 2004; Loch et al. 2008; Sommer et al. 2009). In other words, while breadth is 
inexpensive at early stages, its benefits diminish over time as the costs of development surge 
(Klingebiel and Rammer 2014). Selectiveness allows firms to respond to new contingencies that arise 
during the early stages and to withdraw resources from failing initiatives in favour of the more 
commercially viable ones. Sequencing is an attribute of dynamic allocation regimes where innovation 
endeavours are developed iteratively through the trial and error process (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). 
The sequencing logic forms the basis of the new product development funnel models, whereby a 
multitude of opportunities are sieved through at early stages through explorative research and result 
in a small number of products that merit commercialisation efforts (Ding and Eliashberg 2002; Khurana 
and Rosenthal 1997; Cooper 2008). 
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 At present, the literature strand that addresses how distinct resource allocation strategies 
affect performance outcomes is limited. The results of Klingebiel and Rammer (2014) show that the 
breadth of initial opportunities has a stronger positive impact on innovation performance than the 
magnitude of project investments.  Allocating smaller funds to a portfolio of projects is more beneficial 
than allocating larger lump sums to individual projects. Therefore, fewer resource allocations per 
project enable to explore more uncertain opportunities with minimal risks (Klingebiel and De Meyer 
2013). Moreover, the authors found that performance gains are more profound among the firms that 
match broad initial allocation of resources with late-stage selectiveness, and this effect is strongest 
among the firms pursuing more novel innovation projects. Another study by Klingebiel and Adner 
(2015) found no direct impact of the magnitude of initial project investment and discontinuation on 
innovation performance, yet sequencing had a positive effect on new product sales. Guler (2007b), 
however, provided evidence that the high number of financing rounds lowers the odds of success and 
the magnitude of anticipated returns, suggesting that venture capital firms can appropriate the 
maximum value from fewer rounds of investments in each venture. Overall, the research shows that 
although sequencing is beneficial, its rate ought to be low and guided by disciplined selectiveness 
criteria. The findings provide support for wider strategic literature that posited that organisational 
performance is enhanced by learning via low-cost probes (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997), 
entrepreneurial failure (McGrath 1999) and funnel-style innovation (Ding and Eliashberg 2002).  
 
2.6 Critical Observations and Research Opportunities for the Current Project 
 
 Following the work of Lerner (1999), the view adopted in the present study refers to the 
government as a public venture capitalist. Kortum and Lerner (2000 p.676) defined venture capital as 
“equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a 
financial intermediary who is typically active as a director, an advisor, or even a manager of the firm”. 
Therefore, when the government provides financial support to nascent firms for the development of 
R&D initiatives, it follows the same rationale as private venture capital.  
 The studies by Link and Scott (2009; 2010) showed that the probability of commercialisation 
by firms that received R&D subsidies in the U.S. is on average 50%, but the results among the firms 
are widely spread, ranging from 0.1% to 100% probability of commercialisation. These findings suggest 
the entrepreneurial role that the government takes on by accepting the uncertainty related to the fact 
that half of the funded projects will fail to reach the market. Such position is shared by other studies 
that have utilised the entrepreneurial framework to analyse public sector initiatives (Zerbinati and 
Souitaris 2005). 
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 More specifically, the primary point of interest in the present study is government-owned 
venture capital, which is often affiliated with federal departments and agencies and is fully funded by 
public monies. Such programmes make direct equity-like14 investments in nascent innovative firms 
(Lerner 2002).  
 Although R&D subsidies are not distributed through venture capital funds (Brander et al. 
2014), they are still often referred to as government venture capital because of a number of 
similarities they share with private venture capital. First, both private and public funding schemes are 
highly competitive, as demonstrated by the low ‘success rate’ of later-stage awards (Hsu 2006). 
Second, the level of offered financial support is comparable, as is the age of ventures at the time of 
application (Lerner 1999). Furthermore, both private and public VC follow the same selection and 
evaluation process to make sequential infusions of capital in risky projects with uncertain payoffs. In 
particular, the certification justification for the existence of public venture capital awards makes it an 
imperative that the governments select high-quality as opposed to marginal candidates (Lerner 2002).  
 Nonetheless, government VC is often criticised for funding a significant number of 
underachieving firms (Lerner 2002). Given that R&D subsidies are non-repayable, low-quality firms 
may be encouraged to apply (Czarnitzki and Toole 2007). Hence, if the government funders are unable 
to select promising firms, it renders public financing programmes counter-productive (De Meza 2002; 
Lerner 2002). Overall, it was argued that to screen out potentially underachieving firms, government 
officials should focus more on the rigorous selection process, which entails a thorough consideration 
of factors that accurately predict venture’s success, such as the experience of the management team 
and strategic clarity of technology development plans (Lerner 2002). Moreover, Feldman and Kelley 
(2006) suggested that to maximise social rates of return, government venture capital programmes 
should specifically include selection criteria that assess project’s potential for knowledge spillovers.  
 A persistently high proportion of investments that have no private or public payoffs stresses 
the importance of efficient venture selection and evaluation, as well as the execution of investment 
decisions in enhancing the performance of VC firms, which is measured in terms of the yields on each 
investment (Guler 2007b; Guler 2007a).  
 As Guler (2007b) observed, although the scholarly work covering various aspects of VC 
investments is prolific, sequential investments have received the least attention and the studies in this 
domain have predominantly focused on agency and moral hazard problems (Sahlman 1990; Admati 
                                                          
14 In contrast to the private or corporate venture capital, government venture capital programmes such as 
SBIR have no equity stake in the firms they fund and also no right to appropriate their intellectual property 
(Lerner 1999). Instead, the funds are provided as a grant, contract or subsidy (Lerner 2002). 
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and Pfleiderer 1994; Gompers 1995; Bergemann and Hege 1998). In particular, the review of the 
literature has not identified any papers that questioned the efficiency of various resource allocation 
strategies available within the sequential investment process in the VC setting, neither private nor 
public. The present study aims to address this gap and investigate resource allocation strategies and 
candidate evaluation and selection practices of a specific type of VC—government venture 
programmes. 
 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
 The present chapter started off with an overview of funding sources available to small 
entrepreneurial firms to finance innovation and then concentrated on discussing the specific role of 
the venture capital in financing entrepreneurship. Next, an account was given of the structure, 
motivations and goals of a specific type of venture capital—government funds. Then, the extant 
literature investigating the effects of government funding programmes was summarised, and the most 
significant findings highlighted, followed by a discussion of notable performance differences between 
private- and government-funded-VC firms. Following an in-depth review of consequences of public 
funding, attention was drawn to antecedents of financing outcomes; namely, discussion of the 
evaluation and selection process that venture capitalists go through and the limitations specific to the 
decision-making of government venture capital. Further to that, the nature of sequential investments 
was described, finishing off with the analysis of the effects of differential resource allocation 
strategies. The chapter concludes with a series of learning points relevant for the current project. 
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 Theoretical Perspectives on Antecedents and Outcomes of 
Venture Funding 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 The key questions that the current research project aims to address are: ‘what effect do 
various funding decisions have on investment yield and long-term firm performance in the context of 
government venture capital?’ and ‘which factors affect funding allocation outcomes and what is their 
association with performance outcomes?’. 
 Given the role that the government has in selecting attractive projects and allocating financial 
resources to them, the current study takes a project funders’ perspective. It postulates that real 
options reasoning investment logic underlying project evaluation processes will impact outcomes of 
funding allocation decisions and that funders will attend to signals to minimise information asymmetry 
associated with assessment of innovation projects. Moreover, the aim is to examine whether 
signalling theory is affected by an attention-based view, whereby more salient signals distort funders’ 
attention from the signals of legitimacy. In addition to investigating separate effects of real options 
reasoning and signalling theory in the context of government venture capital, the project takes on a 
challenge to merge these theories in order to examine whether legitimacy signals used as selection 
criteria for funding allocation decisions are also accurate predictors of desirable investment outcomes.  
 Theoretical positions underpinning the present research are schematised in Figure 3-1. The 
study seeks to explore whether the real options structure exhibited by the staged nature of the 
venture capital programme is also reflected in the decision-making logic of government venture 
funders in relation to R&D investments. Therefore, an adoption of a combination of real options 
reasoning, signalling theory and attention-based view helps to reflect different tensions of 
organisational reality, while complementarity of theories aids in understanding how choices made 
during decision-making affect achievement of efficiency goals. The inverted pyramid displays the role 
of theories in a studied setting, in which ROR logic predominantly guides the investment process, and 
is supported by sense-making, with signals influencing the process of decision-making and attention-
regulating mechanisms influencing outcomes of decision-making. Table 3-1 presents a summary of 
the primary theoretical assumptions underpinning theories employed here, while Table 3-2 outlines 
how adopted theories dovetail and apply to the research context. Theoretical underpinnings are 
explained in more detail in the following sections of the chapter, finishing with the discussion of their 
relevance and complementarity to the study.  
  
48 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Theoretical schemata underpinning the current research project 
 
Content: Real Options Reasoning
Process: Signalling Theory
Outcome: 
Attention-Based
View
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Table 3-1: Description of theories 
Theory Description & main tenets Key manifestations & dimensions Primary 
theoretical papers 
Exemplary 
empirical studies 
Real 
Options 
Reasoning 
(ROR) 
ROR uses an options-based view 
to describe investment decision-
making process. Real options 
investments are characterised 
by sequential, irreversible 
resource commitments made 
under conditions of uncertainty 
(Dixit and Pindyck 1994).   
The process of creating a portfolio of options entails the following steps: 
(1) funder invests in a number of options to create a portfolio;  
(2) funder preserves the right to exercise those options when a significant 
portion of uncertainty about the project has been resolved; 
(3) funder turns attention to signals about the current value of the option 
to minimise the level of perceived uncertainty;  
(4) funder either extends or abandons the option based on new 
information. 
McGrath 1997; 
McGrath et al. 
2004; 
Adner and 
Levinthal 2004b; 
Driouchi and 
Bennett 2012 
McGrath and 
Nerkar, 2004; 
Li and Chi 2013 
Signalling 
Theory 
Signalling theory is concerned 
with how two parties resolve 
information asymmetries about 
underlying qualities. Quality 
refers to signaller’s 
unobservable ability to fulfil the 
needs of a receiver of a signal 
(Connelly et al. 2011). 
The process of signalling underlying qualities has the following structure: 
(1) sender has an underlying quality; 
(2) sender transmits signal to convey the unobservable quality;  
(3) receiver notices and interprets a signal;  
(4) receiver provides feedback to signaller. 
Akerlof 1970; 
Spence 1973; 
Weiss 1995; 
Spence 2002; 
Connelly et al. 
2011 
Busenitz 2005; 
Higgins and 
Gulati 2006 
 
Attention-
based 
View 
(ABV) 
The primary notion of ABV is 
that decision-makers, given 
their bounded rationality, have 
limited ability to respond to a 
universe of external and internal 
stimuli surrounding them 
(Barnett 2008). 
ABV is based on three main  principles: 
(1) focus of attention: decision-makers focus their attention on a limited 
set of issues and answers, and that determines what they do; 
(2) situated attention: the attention of decision-makers is situated in the 
firm’s procedural and communication channels; 
(3) structural distribution of attention: the distribution of issues, answers, 
and decision-makers within the various channels depends on the rules, 
resources, players and social positions within attention structures. 
Ocasio 1997; 
Barnett 2008 
Barreto 2012 
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Table 3-2: Application of theories 
Theoretical Lens  Real Options Reasoning Signalling Theory Attention-based View 
Rationale for Inclusion Empirical relevance 
-content 
Conceptual reasoning 
-process 
Theoretical application 
-outcome 
Type of Decision-making Deliberate 
Organisations invest to maximise operating 
efficiency 
Emergent 
Organisational investment is the product of 
sense-making 
Bounded 
Organisational investment is the product of 
perceptual biases and intuition 
Anticipated Contribution The study assumes that the funders in the 
current setting follow the ROR logic to 
sequence the process of potential value 
creation. The main focus is to identify the 
effects of ROR funding allocation outcomes 
on performance outcomes. 
The primary expectation is that the 
presence of the ROR logic in investment 
decisions will be reflected in high 
investment yield and firm performance 
when: 
(1) initial funding commitment is low 
(2) discontinuation of funding is low  
(3) sequencing of funding is low 
(4) fit of funding decisions is high 
 
Investors use a cue approach to attend to 
observable signals that would allow them to 
infer firms’ underlying abilities and draw 
conclusions about given projects’ potential 
performance.  
A requirement to include specific 
information in a funding application form 
indicates that investors consider this 
information as an important signal of firms’ 
underlying quality. 
The primary expectation is that the value of 
a real option will be affected by signals of: 
(1) legitimacy  
(2) capabilities 
(3) project attractiveness 
(4) efficacy 
Routinised review processes imposed by 
organisations lead to conserved attention 
and decision-makers can only respond to 
information that they notice. As such, 
selective attention can both facilitate and 
inhibit strategic perception and action.  
By integrating the concept of situated 
attention under the ABV, the study suggests 
that more salient signals received via 
application forms are stronger than any 
other visible signals.  
Hereby, the intention is to examine whether 
the following mechanisms affect outcomes 
of investors’ decision-making: 
(1) signal observability  
(2) signal salience 
(3) presence of distortion mechanisms 
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3.2 Real Options Reasoning 
 
Summary of the Main Theoretical Propositions of Real Options Theory 
 
 Turgot’s writings on the formation and distribution of wealth laid the foundations of capital 
theory and classical economics (Brewer 1987). The question of what comprises the ‘cost of capital’ 
when yields on funds used to acquire assets are uncertain has been addressed by three schools of 
economic thought: (i) corporate finance is concerned with financing of firms for growth and survival; 
(ii) managerial economics is concerned with capital budgeting; (iii) and economic theory is concerned 
with understanding investment behaviour (Modigliani and Miller 1958 p.261).  
 The classical economic theory valuates investment and financing decisions in terms of their 
relative utility function, as defined by the ability to maximise expected yield (Modigliani and Miller 
1958). Although the utility approach is helpful in understanding the concept of the cost of capital, it 
overlooks that valuation of the capital budgeting may be affected by pursuit of own goals of decision-
makers (Brennan 1995). To mitigate this agency problem, there has been a move towards capital 
rationing as a way of putting constraints on capital allocations (Brennan 1995). This, in turn, resulted 
in a broader change in corporate finance described as “a shift away from attempts to prescribe 
normative rules for decision makers that would assist them to take decisions that are optimal from the 
point of view of shareholders and towards attempts to describe more realistically the way that 
decisions are actually made” (Brennan 1995 p.17), manifested by the first option pricing model by 
Black and Scholes (1973).  
 The primary contrasting assumption of an options approach distinguishing it from 
conventional investment models is that the process of incremental resource allocation grants the right 
to firms to pursue investments only if their sequential outcomes are positive (McGrath 1997). Capital 
budgeting process under the real options view is consistent with the utility maximisation objective, 
but also allows integrating strategic information in the process of systematic decision-making 
regarding resource allocation (Kester 1984). Therefore, a real options perspective integrates financial 
and behavioural theories of decision-making (March 1991; Dixit 1992) and accommodates the role of 
organisational and managerial factors in exercising and redeploying a firm’s portfolio of options under 
uncertainty (Driouchi and Bennett 2012).  
 Unlike normative models of investments, real options theory accounts for information 
asymmetries, path dependence, retrospective sense-making, the value of flexibility, and the role of 
uncertainty (Bowman and Hurry 1993; Kogut 1991). Real options funding logic is characterised by 
sequential, irreversible investments made under conditions of uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck 1994), 
which has significantly changed the decision process related to capital investment (Dixit and Pindyck 
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1995). An option creates value by generating future decision rights and by allowing access to a greater 
variety of opportunities. A such, the real options approach depicts the response of decision-makers to 
their right to make further investments or defer such investments when the future is not certain 
(McGrath and Nerkar 2004). Once uncertainty associated with the project is minimised, an investor 
can use its right to expand the options that are favourable and abandon the remainder (McGrath and 
Nerkar 2004).  
 
Real Options Theory in Strategic Management Research 
 
 In strategic management field, the structure of financial options has been applied to 
evaluating situations with unforeseeable future outcomes such as joint ventures (Kogut 1991), 
strategic alliances (Vassolo et al. 2004), corporate restructuring (Hurry 1993), production shifting 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994a), hi-tech ventures (Hurry et al. 1992), foreign direct investments (Li and 
Rugman 2007), international market entries (Reuer and Leiblein 2000), minority equity partnerships 
(Folta and Miller 2002), new technologies (McGrath 1997) and R&D activities (McGrath and Nerkar 
2004). Moreover, the real options lens has been applied to studying entrepreneurship (McGrath 
1999). 
 The ‘wait and see’ setting of real options is well-suited for assessing strategic investments 
(Adner and Levinthal 2004b), while ‘keeping options open’ allows firms to expand and enter new 
markets in the future provided the conditions are favourable (Bowman and Hurry 1993). The term 
‘real option’ is used as a primary point of difference between business and financial literature, 
indicating that initial investments in strategic assets grant the right to exercise an operating option as 
opposed to a financial option (Kogut 1991). As such, in contrast to financial economics which uses the 
options lens to assess investments in terms of their economic value, strategic management literature 
treats options as resource-investment choices and examines actions preceding as well as performance 
resulting from such choices (Bowman and Hurry 1993).  
 In an effort to harmonise the extant literature, McGrath et al. (2004) proposed a taxonomy 
that distinguishes among four distinct definitions of real options. According to the authors, a real 
option can be conceptualised as: (i) an element of firm’s value leading to strategic growth; (ii) an 
investment project with an option-like structure; (iii) decisions related to a portfolio of investment 
projects; and (iv) a heuristic for strategic decision-making (McGrath et al. 2004). Further to that, in 
management stream of research, real options theory comprises concepts of real options valuation 
(ROV), real options reasoning (ROR) and real options as capabilities, that can have independent 
existence of each other or be interrelated in organisational implementation (Driouchi and Bennett 
2012).  
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 As such, real options approach can be regarded as a decision-making and valuation tool or as 
a technique to exploit organisational resources. ROV offers a way to quantitatively assess resource 
allocation and project management processes through integrating possibilities to wait or partly 
reverse commitment which optimises decision-making (McGrath 1997; Anderson 2000). ROR, the 
dominant paradigm in real options theory research, refers to option-based thinking, and strategic 
mapping and planning processes that involve resource allocation and reconfiguration for the purpose 
of value creation rather than value maximisation (Driouchi and Bennett 2012). Such form of real 
options approach reflects intuitive heuristics used by decision-makers, with an element of flexibility 
being implicitly rooted in the investment and operational process (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). Finally, 
the third stream of research postulates that real options approach is a mechanism for organisational 
learning and investment in development of new capabilities to create and capture value (Kogut and 
Kulatilaka 1994b; 2001). This view builds on theories of dynamic capabilities and organisational inertia 
by investigating the role of stage-wise reconfiguration of resources in the process of firm’s evolution 
under conditions of uncertainty (Kogut and Kulatilaka 2004). 
 Critics of the real options approach claim that the real options logic is subject to bounded 
rationality of decision-makers, making the process ineffective and complicated (Adner and Levinthal 
2004b; Adner and Levinthal 2004a). The ROR approach is difficult to implement in practice due to 
organisational complexities, such as perceptual differences in understanding of the real options 
concepts and implications by decision-makers, and their behavioural pitfalls (Busby and Pitts 1997; 
Janney and Dess 2004). Proponents of the real options logic stress that learning by doing is embedded 
in the staged process, which allows to partly reverse commitment in light of new information and 
sequentially generate knowledge stocks for future exploitation (McGrath 1997; 1999). The realists 
recognise the critical role of organisational and behavioural boundaries in extracting value from the 
ROR approach (Reuer and Tong 2007) and that flexibility of staged commitment offers advantages 
only when organisations are committed to learning and change (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994b; 2001). 
 
Structure and Key Concepts of Real Options Reasoning 
 
In management studies, a real option refers to the organisation’s ability to mitigate effects of 
uncertainty through flexibility to sequence, stage and reverse commitment in strategic investment 
choices (Driouchi and Bennett 2012). Such option structure is deemed suitable for analysing 
organisational resource-committing decisions (Anderson 2000). 
Literature distinguishes between two primary types of options: incremental and flexible 
(Sharp 1991). Incremental options are mechanisms of executing investments in form of calls and puts, 
the former exercised to proceed with investments and the latter to reverse the investments (Bowman 
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and Hurry 1993). Flexible options, on the other hand, incur no additional investments and instead 
utilise and redirect existing investment streams (Sharp 1991), which creates a form of strategic change 
through striking expansion, contraction or switching options (Bowman and Hurry 1993).  
Alternatively, researchers have referred to incremental options as inherent, and to flexible 
options as proactive, to distinguish between investment decisions that are always available to firms 
irrespective of the circumstances in the former case versus the ones that require planning and 
platform building in the latter case (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994a). However, before any of these options 
can be exercised, they first need to be recognised from a window of potential, or shadow, options 
(Bowman and Hurry 1993). The structure of the real options reasoning allows for several forms of 
flexibility behaviour to respond to new incoming information: to defer, abandon, expand, contract 
and switch (Trigeorgis 1996; Driouchi and Bennett 2012). Table 3-3 presents a summary of the key 
option types and the types of behavioural responses that they trigger. 
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Table 3-3: Summary of option types and corresponding flexibility decisions 
Real 
Option 
Type  
Flexibility 
Decision15 
Definition  Rationale 
Shadow Recognise An option awaiting 
recognition (Bowman 
and Hurry 1992). 
An option needs to be recognised through assessment 
of possibilities before being struck. Sequential 
investments in recognised options grant access to the 
next option in the chain (Hurry et al. 1992; Bowman 
and Hurry 1993). 
Call Defer 
Wait 
Delay 
An option to enter the 
decision now or in the 
future (Janey and Dess 
2004). 
 
The value of waiting to invest creates extra value 
(Newton et al. 2004) as deferral of investment for 
some time does not reduce potential future benefits 
(Fichman et al. 2005). Instead, it allows to capitalise 
on upside potential and limit downside risk (Bowman 
and Hurry 1993). The chances of choosing the winning 
proposition increase as the time elapses (Fichman et 
al. 2005). 
Exercise An option to make the 
subsequent beneficial 
decision (Janney and 
Dess 2004). 
The cost of making the subsequent decision is 
minimised through waiting until new information 
becomes available (Janney and Dess 2004). 
Put Abandon 
Discontinue 
Terminate 
Withdraw 
An option to exit the 
decision now or in the 
future (Janey and Dess 
2004). 
Abandonment allows to reduce losses by reallocating 
resources from less promising to more promising 
options (Fichman et al. 2005). 
 
Flexibility Expand 
Scale up 
An option to make an 
additional investment 
outlay (Trigeorgis 
1993, 2005). 
The scale of allocated resources can be increased to 
maximise potential benefits under favourable 
circumstances (Fichman et al. 2005). 
Contract 
Scale down 
 
An option to reduce 
planned investment 
outlays (Trigeorgis 
1993, 2005). 
The scale of allocated resources can be decreased to 
minimise potential losses under unfavourable 
circumstances (Fichman et al. 2005). 
Switch An option to 
reallocate investment 
from the current 
planned to its best 
alternative use 
(Trigeorgis 1993, 
2005). 
Resources can be redeployed or swapped for 
alternative options that have higher benefits 
(Fichman et al. 2005). 
 
 Additionally, there are specific parameters that are attributed to implicit employment of 
options-like decisions in undertaking and managing investments (Driouchi and Bennett 2012). The 
study by Hurry et al. (1992) found that the venture capital investing firms differ in their strategic 
decision-making objectives depending on whether they see the investment as a project or an option. 
Table 3-4 summarises the primary aspects of options-like decision-making. 
  
                                                          
15 Multiple terms are used in the literature to refer to the same concepts 
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Table 3-4: Characteristics of real options investors and their underlying logic 
ROR Characteristic Rationale 
Small initial 
commitment 
Initial commitment refers to irreversible sunk cost, which is equal in value to the 
‘option to defer’, or exercise price of the first option (Folta et al. 2006; Jensen and 
Warren 2001). Therefore, small, manageable amounts of capital limit downside risk 
(Hurry et al. 1992). 
Sequencing Pursuit of each subsequent stage is contingent on re-evaluation of costs and 
benefits following exercising of the preceding option. Only options with positive 
payoffs are pursued. Investors have to make a second investment with a larger 
amount of capital before return on investment can be realised (Fichman et al. 
2005). 
Large portfolio size  Exploration of several opportunities simultaneously (Hurry et al. 1992) and 
extensive investments in opening options, does not discourage to open still more 
options (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). 
High proportion of 
loss-making ventures 
Small possible loss and higher number of potential opportunities in a portfolio 
result in higher risk-taking behaviour (Hurry et al. 1992). 
Long-term and 
indirect strategic 
gains 
Sequencing allows to hold an option f or an indefinite amount of time until the 
opportunity to exercise the option arises; moreover, investors are inclined to fund 
ventures with which they had prior business relations (Hurry et al. 1992). 
 
Empirical Findings of Studies on Real Options Reasoning 
 
 Empirical research on real options falls into two categories. On the one hand, statistical and 
exploratory studies tend to investigate implicit and explicit determinants of real options reasoning, or 
effects of real options on decision-making and performance (Driouchi and Bennett 2012). Research 
within this domain is concerned with addressing the impact of uncertainty-flexibility tension on 
performance and with validating presence of sequential and flexible planning processes in 
management and investment decision-making (Driouchi and Bennett 2012). In particular, research on 
the antecedents of real options investments, has presented evidence that interactions of uncertainty 
and irreversibility, tension between options, portfolio-effects, firm-specific and industry-specific 
factors have impact on exercising of options and their value (Bulan 2005; Folta and O’Brien 2004; Folta 
et al. 2006; Vassolo et al. 2004; Tong and Reuer 2006). These findings support the proposition that 
real options approach of decision-making is used by organisations when evaluating investment 
options (Aabo and Simkins 2005; Guler 2007a). 
 On the other hand, research stream investigating consequences of real options reasoning has 
found impact of multinationality, joint ventures and flexibility on economic and financial performance, 
risk and growth prospects (Reuer and Leiblein 2000; Tong et al. 2008). The findings indicate that real 
options decision-making is associated with improved performance and lower downside risk, provided 
that firm-specific resources and capabilities are accounted for in the analysis (Driouchi and Bennett 
2012). It has been recognised that exclusion of intangible assets from analytical models may generate 
inconsistent results (Pantzalis 2001; Reuer and Tong 2007; Reuer and Leiblein 2000). Such observation 
calls for more research conducted from a realistic perspective, accounting for the impact of 
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heterogeneity in firms’ knowledge capacities on outcomes of real options investments (e.g. Driouchi 
and Bennett 2011; Tong and Reuer 2006).  
 The latter suggests that the ambiguity of findings may also be explained by applying more 
diverse methodological tools to different empirical settings (Driouchi and Bennett 2012). Clear 
evidence exists of implementation of real options investment procedures in practice (e.g. Busby and 
Pitts 1997). However, understanding of the mechanisms affecting the link between determinants and 
outcomes of the real options approach, such as differences in attention and knowledge levels 
embedded in the decision-making process, is still limited (Barnett 2008; Reuer and Tong 2007). 
 
Real Options Reasoning in Innovation and R&D Contexts 
 
 Traditional net present value (NPV) approaches have also been acknowledged inappropriate 
for valuing R&D and technology projects since they are based on the underlying assumption that the 
project will advance as intended, irrespective of what future information flow will convey (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994; Newton et al. 2004). Real options approach, on the other hand, is a more sophisticated 
way of dealing with R&D projects as it enables strategic and operational flexibility through a sequence 
of investments (Newton et al. 2004). 
 R&D investments have been described as “backing up the hunch of a research scientist” 
(Bowman and Hurry 1993 p.773). The real options lens provides a useful perspective to economically 
rationalise the intuition of a decision-maker. Technical uncertainty embedded in R&D options, which 
refers to the likelihood of achieving technical success, can only be resolved through investment (Dixit 
and Pindyck 1994). By analogy with financial options, high level of uncertainty magnifies potential 
gains, making an options approach particularly suitable for R&D projects (McGrath 1997).  
 Breaking down the R&D project into sequential stages enables decision-makers to evaluate 
the progress before making further investment (Newton et al. 2004). Such iterative and milestone-
driven project management approach allows to curtail possible losses through learning and 
reallocation of resources from losing to winning projects (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). Technical 
uncertainty associated with R&D options can be further reduced though deployment of firm-specific 
intangible assets such as skills, resources and capabilities (McGrath 1997).  
 Since some assumptions derived from financial options models do no hold in R&D option 
models, the R&D real options investments are similar to financial only in terms of structure and 
reasoning, and not in valuation rationale (McGrath 1997). In contrast to a financial option which is 
valued based on the price of its underlying asset, an R&D option cannot be approximated based on 
the price of its underlying technology asset because it is not known. Instead, the price of an R&D 
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option relates to its cost of development and is equivalent to the price to take out the option (McGrath 
1997).  
 Successful completion of the development stage generates a subsequent option to 
commercialise the technology following additional commitment of capital or to abandon it (McGrath 
1997). Finally, the value can be extracted from the option through returns on licensing out or by 
exploiting the commercialised technology (McGrath 1997). As such, R&D option value comprises three 
elements: (i) development cost, (ii) commercialisation cost; (iii) value of the underlying claim on the 
upside cumulative returns from operations (McGrath 1997). The underlying idea is that an R&D option 
is regarded as worthy of investment if its claim for the upside potential payoff is greater than the cost 
of development (McGrath and MacMillan 2000). 
 Prior literature has identified ten applied practices of real R&D options: general R&D planning, 
planning R&D in stages, evaluating test information, new product development timing, operations, 
abandonment, risk sharing, market funding, industry strategy and regulation (Paxson 2003). A number 
of authors applied the real options approach to the staged NPD process. An option gives the right but 
not the obligation for future decision, which makes it equivalent to an opportunity (Dixit and Pindyck 
1995). Therefore, investments in R&D create opportunities for patents and new technologies, and a 
go or no-go decision during the stage-gate process relates to the option to exercise or abandon the 
option (Dixit and Pindyck 1995).  
 Lint and Pennings (2001) used a real-options lens to merge R&D, marketing and financial 
perspectives in a stage-gate framework, which comprises three stages and grants the decision-makers 
the flexibility to either proceed to the next stage of the NPD process or to stop it after completion of 
any stage. Under this framework, (i) idea generation stage refers to the option assessment for R&D 
portfolio, (ii) research and development stage relates to the option assessment for launch portfolio, 
and finally (iii) validation stage to the decision to launch (Lint and Pennings 2001).  
 Similarly, Jensen and Warren (2001) employed a real-option approach for a project lifecycle 
model that includes a research stage, a development stage and an implementation stage. Successful 
completion of each stage is associated with a call option to succeed to the next stage, which allows to 
capture the multi-stage nature of the NPD process and take into account development costs at each 
stage (Jensen and Warren 2001). As can be seen, a multi-stage nature of R&D activities is similar to a 
compound option, whereby the value of each ongoing stage is contingent on the potential value of 
each subsequent stage (Trigeorgis 2005; Chevalier-Roignant et al. 2011). Given the practical relevance 
of the compound option approach to evaluating R&D opportunities, more research in this domain will 
help explain critical strategic issues faced in various empirical contexts (Trigeorgis 2005). 
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Use of Quantitative Methods in Real Options Reasoning Studies 
 
 There has been a move towards a more realist approach in quantitative studies building on 
the ROR logic (e.g. Vassolo et al. 2004). However, application of quantitative modelling in the field of 
strategic management has been limited in scope (Scherpereel 2008). Accurate model building is 
constrained by the difficulty to locate the research setting in which real options model assumptions 
reflect the actual context and to determine the appropriate proxies for discrete inputs used in the 
options-like process (Bowman and Moskowitz 2001; Miller and Waller 2003). Nevertheless, despite 
some practical issues related to implementing quantitative real options models, there is increasing 
support that real options reasoning matches intuition of decision-makers (Scherpereel 2008). This 
notion is expressed in the paper by McGrath and Nerkar (2004 p.87), which stresses that “options 
reasoning is often found to be more consistent with the pattern of choices made by organisations than 
are other investment alternatives”. 
 Research applying the ROR logic to positivist-induced principles to investigate antecedents 
and consequences of the ROR decision-making has only started to develop in the last ten years (e.g. 
McGrath and Nerkar 2004; Belderbos et al. 2014). Existing quantitative studies on real options have 
tended to employ secondary data analysis to test the hypotheses pertaining to the decision-making 
logic under the real options framework (Reuer and Tong 2007). The scholars have acknowledged the 
difficulty of obtaining micro-level details on real options and their exercising properties in 
organisational context. There is presently a scarcity of statistical studies that explicitly investigate the 
“generalised effect of real options decision-making on performance, or the structural interactions 
between real options determinants and firm performance outcomes” (Driouchi and Bennett 2012 
p.51). As a result, there has been a growing recognition that quantitative studies will help shed light 
on different aspects related to processes of exercising options and the bounded rationality of decision-
makers in implementing ROR in organisations (Barnett 2008; Reuer and Tong 2007). 
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Relevance of Real Options Reasoning to the Current Study 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, the literature distinguishes between ten applied practices 
of real R&D options (Paxson 2003). The present study focuses on general R&D options and their 
execution in stages, as well as issues related to abandonment and sequencing. Moreover, two 
conceptualisations of real options from the proposed taxonomy by McGrath et al. (2004) are relevant 
here. The projects are treated to have an options-like staged structure which refers to the ability to 
portion financial commitment and delay action until more information comes through. Under this 
view, it is theorised that a sequence of choices conforms to real options reasoning, and empirical effort 
is directed at confirming whether the actual choices reflect the theory. Such view also builds upon real 
options reasoning as a heuristic to refer to the rationally-constrained investment logic that guides 
decision-making of sequential resource allocation. As such, it reflects a strategic approach to build a 
portfolio of opportunities and capabilities for the long-term benefit.  
 Since many, if not all, characteristics of real options investors summarised in Table 3-4 are 
present, the study hereby proposes that the venture funding programme follows the explicit ROR 
structure. The structure is expressed in Adner and Levinthal’s (2004b) schemata depicted in Figure 3-2 
and explains the steps that government funders take to sequence the process of potential value 
creation.  
 First, funders invest in a number of Phase I projects (Stage 1). By doing so, the funding federal 
agency creates a portfolio of options and preserves the right to defer further investments in those 
options until a major part of uncertainty about their viability has been resolved. Therefore, to minimise 
the level of perceived uncertainty, investors attend to signals that arise during Phase I or after its 
completion to approximate the current value of the option. Finally, when Phase I awardees apply for 
Phase II funding, investors are faced with two types of flexibility decisions: to either exercise or 
abandon the option (Stage 2). Given the sequential nature of decision processes attributed to real 
options investments under uncertainty, abandonment, which arises from the decision to withdraw 
funding from the project, is a vital mechanism for funders to limit downside risk (Bowman and Hurry 
1993; Adner and Levinthal 2004b). 
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Figure 3-2: The structure of real options 
 
Source: Adopted from Adner and Levinthal (2004b  p. 75) 
 
 Adner and Levinthal (2004b p.75) stress that “investments with this structure are option-like 
in that Stage 2 investments are not a necessary consequence of having made an initial Stage 1 
investment but, rather, can be conditioned on the realisation of interim information”. In that respect, 
the authors emphasise that it is crucial to distinguish ROR from structured and sequential decision-
making triggered by sheer path dependency. Although it was later argued by McGrath et al. (2004) 
that some types of investment projects may benefit from flexibility offered by trial-and-error learning 
which evolves through incremental path-dependency, evaluation of individual investment projects 
may be difficult when the underlying propositions of real options theory are relaxed. 
 In particular, given that in the present setting the investment decision is made by the external 
funder and not the firm conducting the project, it is important that the decision-makers’ economic 
logic is specified a priori. For the ROR structure depicted in the schemata to be valid empirically, two 
critical conditions have to hold true: (i) the value of the option should be independent of the investor’s 
behaviour and (ii) the signal of option value should be visible and not manipulated by the investor’s 
actions (Adner and Levinthal 2004b). Both features are present in the current study context—neither 
can the funding federal agency affect the attractiveness of internal project characteristics, nor 
influence receivable signals. 
 Additional critical prerequisite for the validity of the ROR framework is a high level of rigour 
in the design, planning and management of processes related to real option evaluation. That is, 
decision-making needs to be carried out in a disciplined way, and heuristics for choices should be 
specified ex-ante (Adner and Levinthal 2004b). In the absence of clear criteria for determining success 
or failure, the asymmetry between positive and negative signals complicates the interpretation of 
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option value, and decision-makers may be inclined to use the flexibility of sequential investment to 
let the option unfold through further learning, exploiting the path-dependent as opposed to the 
option-like approach (Adner and Levinthal 2004b). Therefore, the scope of potential opportunity and 
option expiration dates should be defined before the initial investment, so that the technical and 
market viability can be assessed against the deadline to justify the ‘continue’ or ‘abandon’ option. This 
condition is also met in the study as funding agencies follow explicit evaluation criteria making it 
possible to justify continuation or discontinuation of projects. Moreover, distinct stages of the 
government venture capital initiative are clearly demarcated and defined a priori with project and 
budget start and end dates, as well as application deadlines to proceed from Phase I and Phase II, so 
options have a definite, exogenous expiration date. 
 The last indication of the presence of ROR in R&D strategic initiatives worth noting here is 
manifested by strong orientation towards exploratory research activity (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
Exploratory research is strongly associated with the increased likelihood of substantial scientific 
advancements that have the potential to open up new options for potential future development 
(McGrath and Nerkar 2004). Strong orientation towards exploratory research is evident from the 
mission of the government venture capital programs “to support scientific excellence and 
technological innovation” (e.g. SBIR 2015).  
 Given the theoretical premises described above, it can be concluded that the ROR framework 
is deemed appropriate in the current empirical setting. First, the stage-wise process of building a 
portfolio of opportunities for potential value creation explicitly follows the ROR structure. Second, the 
underlying option value develops independently of investors’ actions. Third, investors follow a priori 
specified evaluation criteria to assist the decision-making process at clearly demarcated points in time. 
Finally, potential value embedded in R&D opportunities is derived through the process of exploration. 
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3.3 Signalling Theory 
 
Summary of the Main Theoretical Propositions of Signalling Theory 
 
 Individuals make decisions based on available information, but because some information is 
public and some is private, “different people know different things” (Stiglitz 2002 p. 469). In other 
words, since information exchange is imperfect, it causes information asymmetry. In particular, there 
are two critical characteristics of information that can get affected under conditions of asymmetry: 
quality and intent (Stiglitz 2000). Quality-related information asymmetry occurs when one group is 
only partially aware of the attributes of another group, while intent-related information asymmetry 
occurs when one group is only partially aware of the behavioural rationale of another group, which 
causes moral hazard (Connelly et al. 2010).  
 Signalling theory plays a profound role in explaining how parties resolve information 
asymmetries about underlying qualities (Connelly et al. 2010). The theory has its roots in financial and 
economic models (Riley 2001) which are concerned with “informational aspects of market structure 
to study the ways in which markets adapt, and the market consequences of informational gaps for 
market performance” (Spence 2002 p.435). The key premise behind signalling theory depicted in 
Figure 3-3 is that senders transmit signals to convey their latent and unobservable abilities to meet a 
set of receivers’ essential and pre-defined requirements; then, receivers notice and decode these 
signals, which results in responses (Connelly et al. 2011). As such, at the core of signalling models are 
the signallers who possesses insider information and choose to intentionally transmit it in order to 
lean the outcome of the outsiders’ decision-making process in their favour. On the other hand, the 
receivers also benefit from information exchange by being able to make a more informed choice. In 
sum, although both parties may have conflicting interests, the signalling process manifests the 
potential for strategic gains to the signaller as well as the receiver. 
Figure 3-3: Signalling timeline 
 
Source: Adopted from Connelly et al. (2011 p. 44) 
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Key Concepts of Signalling Theory 
 
 Market signals have been analysed in many scientific domains, including economics, finance, 
marketing, psychology, strategic and human resource management, and applied to many different 
empirical settings characterised by information asymmetry (Connelly et al. 2010). Advances in 
research resulted in proliferation of important constructs relevant to the understanding of signalling 
theory, which are summarised in Table 3-5. 
 In order for a signal to be efficacious, it has to comprise two attributes—be easily observable 
and costly (Connelly et al. 2010). In other words, not only the signal has to be visible to the outsider, 
but also expensive to produce. The notion of costly-signalling theory (Bird and Smith 2005) is an 
important mechanism to differentiate between sincere and deceptive candidates (Ndofor and Levitas 
2004). The underlying logic maintains that the cost of producing the signal is lower for the parties that 
actually possess the intrinsic quality associated with that signal; that is, the cost of signalling and the 
unobservable attribute are negatively correlated (Spence 1974). The resultant cost-quality trade-off is 
known as separation (Spence 2002), which helps to distinguish high quality from low quality signallers. 
However, if the low quality signaller can afford the cost of producing the false signal without having 
the underlying ability, it results in dishonesty of the signaller (Durcikova and Gray 2009), or the signal 
lacking fit. Subsequently, signal fit is described as a statistical relationship between the visible signal 
and an invisible quality of the signaller, which, together with honesty, forms notion of a credible signal 
(Zhang and Wiersema 2009). Additionally, there is literature that differentiates between the visibility 
and strength dimensions of the signal, whereby the latter refers to the perceived importance to the 
receiver, and presents a third characteristic of an efficacious signal (Ramaswami et al. 2010). 
   Signals can also be described in terms of their temporal effects and literature tends to 
differentiate between point and flow signals (DeKinder and Kohli 2008). Certain qualities do not 
change over time and are perceived as snapshots at a specific point. However, dynamic market 
environments often require up to date information to reflect recent changes (Davila et al. 2003). In 
that case, firms can increase signal frequency to minimise information asymmetry (Janney and Folta 
2003; Janney and Folta 2006). 
 Moreover, research evidence exists that efficiency of the signalling process is also affected by 
the receivers’ attention and interpretation (Heil and Robertson 1991), as well as the level of 
surrounding noise in the environment (Ehrhart and Ziegert 2005). Receivers are unlikely to notice any 
signals if they are not paying attention to (Gulati and Higgins 2003) or are not proactively scanning 
(Ilmola and Kuusi 2006) the environment in which the signal may appear. Similarly, signals may receive 
different levels of importance or get cognitively distorted by the receiver depending on their 
interpretative framework as well as existing perceptions and preconceptions (Branzei et al. 2004). In 
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the same vein, the signalling environment can introduce the distortions that prohibit effective 
resolution of information asymmetry (Lester et al. 2006). 
 
Table 3-5: Key signalling theory constructs16 
Macro 
Construct 
Micro 
Construct 
Definition Level Source of Theory 
Efficacy Observability The extent to which the signal is 
visible, or noticeable to outsiders 
Signal Certo et al. 2001 
Strength The extent to which the signal is 
important, or salient, to outsiders 
Signal Ramaswami et al. 2010 
Cost The extent to which the signal is 
costly to produce to the signaller 
Signal Bhattacharya and 
Dittmar 2001 
Reliability Fit The extent to which the signal is 
correlated with unobservable 
quality  
Signal Zhang and Wiersema 
2009 
Honesty The extent to which the signaller 
has the underlying quality 
associated with the signal 
Signaller Ndofor and Levitas 
2004 
Temporal 
Effect 
Point  The pattern of signals at one point 
in time, which refers to static 
attributes, behaviours or states  
Signal DeKinder and Kohli 
2008 
Flow The pattern of signals over time, 
which refers to changing attributes, 
behaviours or states 
Signal DeKinder and Kohli 
2008 
Cognition Attention The extent to which receivers 
carefully scan the environment for 
signals 
Receiver Heil and Robertson 
1991; Gulati and 
Higgins 2003 
Interpretation The amount of calibration applied 
by the receiver which distorts signal 
strength or meaning 
Receiver Branzei et al. 2004; 
Ehrhart and Ziegert 
2005 
Noise Distortion The level of noise present in the 
signalling environment which 
reduces signal visibility 
Environment Rynes et al. 1991; 
Lester et al. 2006 
 
  
                                                          
16 The list is not exhaustive but is rather focused on the constructs that are relevant to the present study 
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Signalling Theory in the Entrepreneurship Literature 
 
 Information asymmetry is especially evident in contexts associated with high uncertainty, such 
as valuation of small or new ventures. Therefore, signalling theory has gained prominence in 
entrepreneurship literature (Connelly et al. 2010).  
 Empirical studies in the entrepreneurship domain have used signalling theory to investigate 
signalling properties of the structure of the board of directors (Certo 2003; Certo et al. 2001), 
characteristics of top management teams (Lester et al. 2006) and new venture teams (Busenitz et al. 
2005), or involvement of founder and business angels (Elitzur and Gavious 2003; Bruton et al. 2009). 
Significant amount of literature in the entrepreneurship domain has applied signalling theory in the 
context of young firms starting-up (Elitzur and Gavious 2003) or undergoing an initial public offering 
(IPO) (Filatotchev and Bishop 2002; Certo 2003), although studies in the strategic management field 
have more broadly analysed the effects of signalling patterns by firms (Basdeo et al. 2006), managers 
(Goranova et al. 2007), directors (Miller and Triana 2009) and CEOs (Zhang and Wiersema 2009). In 
the field of entrepreneurship, the receivers of intended signals are most likely to be current or future 
investors, either private, such as VCs and investment bankers (Busenitz et al. 2005; Daily et al. 2005) 
or public (Cohen and Dean 2005; Jain et al. 2008).  
 Signalling theory in the management context seeks to explain how economic actors make 
choices based on limited information (Bergh et al. 2014). The primary proposition of the signalling 
theory is that firm characteristics, activities and attributes convey information that helps investors 
form opinions about or increase confidence in firms’ inherent qualities (Spence 1973). Signals are used 
by individuals and organisations to reveal their qualitative differences to affect perceptions of 
decision-makers within markets about their idiosyncratic value. 
 Such signals are important mechanisms for young firms to resolve newness and validity bias 
(Higgins and Gulati 2006). The dearth of objective data on firms’ operational and financial 
performance maximises the chances of adverse selection (Sanders and Boivie 2004). In cases when 
the widely accepted metrics of firm’s quality are unavailable, investors rely on alternative information 
sources to minimise the chances of adverse selection in the process of filtering and sorting firms. In 
such situations, visible signals of inherent quality act as credible proxies for absent objective data on 
firms’ performance (Sanders and Boivie 2004). Hence, observable characteristics of firms are treated 
as implicit points of difference between higher and lower quality firms due to their perceived 
association with true and pursued, but unobservable characteristics (Weiss 1995).  
 The extant literature suggests that under conditions of uncertainty markets attend to socio-
economic and status factors, which are likely to be easily observable, to sort economic actors and 
decrease information asymmetry (Sanders and Boivie 2004). Stuart et al. (1999) outlined two broad 
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groups of information that are positively associated with the perceived quality of a young entity by 
the markets. First, prior accomplishments of nascent ventures signal their latent abilities to achieve 
success; second, the characteristics of network partners signal reputation of firm’s affiliates, which 
magnifies perception of firm’s own value (Stuart et al. 1999). As such, decision-makers attend to 
signals of social and economic characteristics as underlying drivers of heterogeneity in firms’ perceived 
value.  
 Likewise, given the myriad of options that investors have to consider at any given point in 
time, they use a cue approach to simplify the decision-making process. Investors attend to signals that 
would allow them to draw conclusions about given firms’ or projects’ potential performance without 
having to investigate it thoroughly (Su and Rao 2010). Therefore, investors use observable socio-
economic and status attributes as alternative information cues and, because of their costliness to 
imitate, perceive them to be reliable second-tier indicators of quality that help them shape their 
expectations of the potential value of nascent ventures and their ability to yield returns in the future 
(DeKinder and Kohli 2008). The stronger the signals of potential value, the more likely investors are to 
continue funding the venture (Busenitz et al. 2005). 
 
Indicators of Signal Quality 
 
 Management studies have attended to institutional, upper echelons, network, and agency 
theories to identify a number of signals of value. One central theme that combines all these theoretical 
perspectives is the notion of legitimacy which is an indirect signal of quality. Literature has frequently 
linked the concept of legitimacy with more symbolical status aspects, such as reputation (Fombrun 
and Shanley 1990) and prestige (Certo 2003), that can be attributed to boards of directors, TMTs or 
founders (Lester et al. 2006; Filatotchev and Bishop 2002). Other common proxies for firm’s underlying 
value that have been detected in scholarly work are social ties (Gulati and Higgins 2003) and patents 
(Warner et al. 2006), among others. 
 The key premise behind the concept of legitimacy is the social judgement of the actions of an 
entity as desirable, proper, or appropriate (Suchman 1995 p.574). Thus, to gain acceptance in the 
market, nascent ventures need to “create an impression of viability and legitimacy” (Starr and 
Macmillan 1990 p.83). Some authors argue that legitimacy is an indispensable yet alterable strategic 
resource that grants access to other valuable resources and enables new venture growth (Zimmerman 
and Zeitz 2002; Starr and Macmillan 1990). Moreover, research demonstrates that outsiders associate 
organisational legitimacy with firm’s stock of intangible resources, such as human and social capital, 
which assure outsiders of the presence of competences and capabilities necessary to improve firm 
performance (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). 
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 A number of conceptual typologies of legitimacy have been proposed and empirically tested 
in the extant literature. There is a stream of research that differentiates between three types of 
legitimacy: (i) socio-political regulatory legitimacy encompasses adherence to rules and standards 
stipulated by official organisations and can be achieved through acquisition of professional statuses, 
certifications and accreditations; (ii) socio-political normative legitimacy encompasses adherence to 
societal values and norms, and can be attained through powerful endorsements from within networks; 
(iii) cognitive legitimacy refers to mental schemas of understandings and values underpinning 
behaviours, and is reflected in qualifications and knowledge stocks of the founder or the TMT (Hunt 
and Aldrich 1996). This typology has been later extended to include industry as a source of legitimacy 
which refers to collective norms, established operational practices, and the state of technology and 
know-how (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002).  
 The view of legitimacy as a strategic resource was further developed in later works. For 
example, Tornikoski and Newbert (2007) differentiate between conforming and strategic legitimacy. 
Conforming legitimacy is a result of a passive adaptation of institutionalised requirements and 
practices that a credible organisation is expected to meet in a given environment. Strategic legitimacy, 
on the other hand, is gained through proactive behaviour such as forming and influencing perceptions 
of different stakeholders in the environment. In essence, however, organisational legitimacy is shaped 
through a combination of both characteristics and behaviours. To reflect this, the authors developed 
a taxonomy of legitimacy along four dimensions critical for new venture creation proposed by Gartner 
(1985)—individual, organisation, environment and process (Tornikoski and Newbert 2007). First, 
personal and demographic characteristics of an entrepreneur are associated with their skills and 
abilities and therefore signal trustworthiness. Second, combined ability of the founding and 
management team is related to organisational capital and industry competence, increasing overall 
credentials of the firm. Third, industry characteristics such as early stages of life cycle, high growth 
prospects and low competition signal the potential for new product opportunities and increased 
anticipated future payoffs. Finally, resource reconfiguration processes and behaviours signal 
operational capability to produce tangible outputs. In the same vein, Higgins and Gulati (2006) in their 
study proposed to measure organisational legitimacy in terms of three elements: (i) ability to access 
resources, (ii) ability to perform key roles, and (iii) ability to attract the reputable endorsements, which 
young firms can signal though their TMT composition.  
 A large proportion of literature within the strategic management and entrepreneurship 
domain has focused on cognitive legitimacy of firm’s founder and TMT (e.g. Wang et al. 2014). The 
main idea is that a qualified founding team can add value to the new venture and hence signal firm’s 
potential to investors. Following this steam of logic, scholars found that entrepreneurs’ and managers’ 
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characteristics, such as age, education and prior types of experience are widely used by funders to 
assess the credibility of nascent firms and have a profound effect on outcomes of investment decision-
making (Macmillan et al. 1985; Deeds et al. 1997; Deeds et al. 2004; Cohen and Dean 2005; Higgins 
and Gulati 2006). 
 
Relevance of Signalling Theory to the Current Study 
 
 Although real options theory has attracted undivided attention in the strategic management 
field, scholarly debates on the main attributes of the theory are still widely prevalent, calling for more 
research on understanding its boundaries to help reach consensus (McGrath et al. 2004). 
 In particular, despite a significant amount of work on normative tenets of real options theory, 
comprehension of behavioural aspects guiding real options reasoning is still limited. A small number 
of prior studies focused on the descriptive tenets of the real options theory and found empirical 
evidence for systematic and unsystematic deviations of decision-makers from prescribed real options 
logic due to lack of coherent evaluation approaches and imposition of subjective perceptions (Howell 
and Jaegle 1997; Busby and Pitts 1997; Miller and Shapira 2004). 
 In comparison to financial options, evaluation of strategic real options is more complicated as 
decision criteria are less explicit, while ‘best practice’ planning techniques and cognitive rules to 
identify and analyse investment opportunities are difficult to develop and implement in practice 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994b). Additionally, forecasting the value of a new technology or an R&D 
proposal using universal quantitative methods may not be meaningful because value of an investment 
is a function of firm-specific assets and capabilities (McGrath and MacMillan 2000). Instead, more 
accurate evaluation practices of R&D options are based on factors that are proven to be relevant to 
commercial viability, such as potential market size, state of competition, development and 
commercialisation costs, scope of the project, firm’s resources and capabilities, and industry dynamics 
(McGrath and MacMillan 2000). The use of explicit and robust assessment criteria simplifies decision-
making regarding attractiveness of uncertain R&D projects. Empirical evidence also suggests that 
investors’ valuations of real options tend to be driven by factors pertaining to the macroeconomic 
environment, the industry and the firm (Tong and Reuer 2006; Alessandri et al. 2007). Although the 
role of firm-specific core competences is at the heart of strategy literature on real options reasoning, 
all three levels of factors are important in studying real options due to their possible interactions over 
time (Alessandri et al. 2007).  
 The above arguments lead to a conclusion that ex-ante specification of option-like decision 
criteria stipulated by Adner and Levinthal (2004b) is built upon a set of assumptions which form an 
option-signal interpretive framework to infer future outcomes. The real options reasoning literature 
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has systematically used the cue approach to explain decision-makers’ logic and attended to the 
signalling theory (e.g. Kogut 1991).  
 Figure 3-4 demonstrates how signalling occurs in the staged investment process of the 
government venture capital programme. At t=0, firms include specific information in a funding 
application form to signal their underlying abilities. In the financing context, the narratives that the 
borrowers provide to the lenders are necessary mechanisms for information asymmetry resolution 
and hence facilitate decision-making. Information from bibliographies and application narratives, such 
as education degrees, age and experience of the TMT, as well as industry certification and professional 
memberships are clear and efficacious signals of characteristics and behavioural intentions of the 
borrowers (Zahra and Filatotchev 2004). Therefore, investors evaluate attributes of the applicants 
based on evidence included in the application narratives, and their perceptions of firms’ and projects’ 
potential is reflected in the variation of monetary sizes of awards. At t=2, in addition to already known 
attributes of applicants, investors also have access to post-Phase I interim information, that can help 
draw further conclusions about firms’ or projects’ potential for future payoffs, which results in the 
decision to continue or discontinue subsequent funding.  
 
Figure 3-4: Empirical map of the signalling environment 
 
Source: Based on Connelly et al. (2011 p.44) 
 
 To sum, signalling theory is relevant to the present context both theoretically and empirically. 
Theoretically, it articulates the behavioural aspects of decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty and contributes to the understanding of descriptive aspects of real options reasoning. 
Empirically, it allows to examine which characteristics of firms, projects and individuals are perceived 
as signals of quality, or lack thereof, and influence decisions of government venture capitalists to 
extend or withdraw funding. 
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3.4 Attention-based View of the Firm 
 
Summary of the Main Theoretical Propositions of Attention-Based View 
 
 Early economic models of organisational decision-making were built upon the premises of the 
rational choice theory, which assumes inherent pursuit of utility maximisation by organisational actors 
(Simon 1983). However, the practical limitations of this paradigm have been highlighted in behavioural 
economics and psychology, emerging with the theory of bounded rationality (Simon 1983). Process 
models of firm’s behaviour recognised that “to explain firm behaviour is to explain how firms distribute 
and regulate the attention of their decision-makers” (Ocasio 1997 p.188).  
 Attentional perspectives of organisational behaviour linking structure and cognition were first 
introduced by Simon (1947). The later updated and extended version of the theory of bounded 
rationality, an attention-based view (ABV), explicitly emphasises the role of situated attention of 
decision-makers and aims to explain differences in firms’ attentional processing as evident in 
heterogeneity of organisation moves (Ocasio 1997). 
 A model of situated attention and firm behaviour developed by Ocasio (1997 p.192) postulates 
that decision-makers focus their attention on a limited set of issues and answers which are situated in 
the firm’s procedural and communication channels and structure within these channels determines 
what decision-makers choose to do. Table 3-6 presents a summary of the main theoretical 
propositions of Ocasio’s model. However, since it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss in detail 
all theoretical tenets underpinning the ABV, the discussion here will focus on the main ideas and 
mechanisms relevant to the present context. 
 Simon (1947 p.220) referred to organisational behaviour as a complex network of attentional 
processes, in which cognitive procedures of different levels of decision-makers interact and result in 
a compound action. The environment of decision presents an abundance of stimuli that firms have a 
limited capacity to process, so they focus their attention on a set of issues which they select through 
procedural and communication channels (Ocasio 1997). The repertoire of issues and answers is 
shaped through cognitive sense-making and responsive schemas of decision-makers to react to 
environmental stimuli and is a result of cultural and institutional processes (Ocasio 1997).  Given 
individuals’ limited ability to process several issues simultaneously, evaluation of problems and 
opportunities utilises organisational memory to draw on standard operating procedures, routines, 
past actions and learned activities, which enhances selective attention of decision-makers, directing 
action only towards specific issues (Ocasio 1997).  
 Literature differentiates between controlled and automatic attentional processing (Shiffrin 
and Schneider 1977). While controlled processing mode requires high levels of attentional capacity 
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and results in cautiously considered actions, automatic processing is a product of past learning 
activities and leads to habitual and routinised behaviours. To control attentional processing of 
individual decision-makers, firms put in place procedural and communication channels (Ocasio 1997). 
Such channels are made up of concrete activities, interactions, and communications which comprise 
formal and informal meetings, reports and administrative protocols and play a gate-keeping role of 
attention allocation on issues that require organisational action.  
 The availability and saliency of issues and answers in procedural and communication channels 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) are controlled by organisational contexts through three mechanisms: 
spatially, they restrict the amount of incoming information; temporally, they restrict the timings of 
decision-making; while procedurally, they restrict the patterns of attention of decision-makers 
(Stinchcombe 1968). As such, procedural and communication channels facilitate creation of attention 
structures to direct foci of organisational decision-makers and regulate evaluation, legitimisation and 
interpretation of issues and answers (March and Olsen 1976).  
 The firm’s rules, resources and social relations structure attention in organisations by 
generating a set of values, under which issues and answers with greater legitimacy, importance and 
relevance receive greater levels of attention (Ocasio 1997). While the repertoire of available responses 
is determined through routines and standardised operations, it is also applied to new issues by 
drawing analogies with prior responses, situations and activities (March and Olsen 1976). Finally, 
decision-makers act upon only certain issues which results in a selected number of organisational 
moves, which subsequently have an effect on the selection of future organisational moves (Ocasio 
1997). 
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Table 3-6: Summary of the main propositions of Ocasio's (1997) model of situated attention and firm behaviour 
Theoretical 
Principles  
Level Description Components Mechanisms 
Focus of 
attention 
Individual 
(Simon 1947) 
Attentional processes 
focus the energy and 
effort on a limited set of 
issues and answers that 
enter into consideration, 
which generates selective 
attention, facilitating 
perception and action 
only towards some 
specific issues. 
Repertoire of issues 
and answers 
selected through 
focused attention 
 
 embodiment of issues and 
answers in firm’s activities 
Situated 
attention 
Social 
cognition 
(Fiske and 
Taylor 1991) 
Decision-makers’ focus of 
attention and resulting 
actions vary depending on 
the particular situation 
they are located in. This 
principle highlights the 
role that the link between 
the organisation and its 
environmental context 
plays in shaping 
individuals’ focus of 
attention and action.  
Environment of 
decision: 
 economic and 
financial markets  
 resources 
 technology 
 institutional norms 
 previous 
organisation 
moves 
 environmental stimuli 
 cultural and institutional tool kits 
 environmental embeddedness  
Procedural and 
communication 
channels 
 availability and saliency of issues 
and answers 
 interactions of decision-makers 
Structural 
distribution 
of 
attention 
Organisational 
(Simon 1947) 
Attentional processes of 
individual and group 
decision-makers are 
distributed through 
organisational functions, 
with different 
communications and 
procedures requiring 
different foci of attention. 
Attention structures  valuation of issues and answers 
 channelling of decision-making 
 structuring of interest and 
identities  
 structuring of participation 
 enactment of issues and answers  
 selection of organisational moves 
 effects on subsequent moves 
 
Relevance of Attention-Based View to the Current Study 
 
 The opponents of real options theory argue that its validity may be abused by investors’ 
bounded rationality leading to flawed decision-making (Driouchi and Bennett 2012). To account for 
the fact that decision-makers’ time and cognitive capacities are constrained (March and Simon 1958; 
Simon 1947), theoretical tenets of the attention-based view are integrated in the present study.  
 The primary notion of the attention-based view is that decision-makers, given their bounded 
rationality, have limited ability to respond to a universe of external and internal stimuli present in their 
immediate environment (Barnett, 2008). While ROR refers to the logic that investors follow to 
generate a portfolio of strategic options, an ABV helps understand why investors choose to enact 
some options but not the others, and brings the investors’ evaluation process into the spotlight 
(Barnett, 2008). Therefore, under the ABV of ROR, to avoid downside losses and capture upside 
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potential of the options in the portfolio (McGrath 1999; Bowman and Hurry 1993), decision-makers 
must notice and react to signals that they receive. However, given the multitude of projects in the 
portfolio requiring regular reviews, investors can only attend to selected incoming information to 
justify their resource allocation decisions and develop reviewing routines to conserve attention 
(Nelson and Winter 1982). As a result of this, investors’ views simplify and narrow (Levinthal and 
March 1993), which leads to focused attention.  
 In his paper, Ocasio (1997) noted that the limited capacity for controlled attentional 
processing highlights the necessity of strategic focus on attention regulation. In an attempt to manage 
temporal and attentional constraints of decisions-makers, firms develop formal structures and 
procedures for strategic evaluations (Barnett 2008). The cue approach and decision-making heuristics 
are known to be widely used procedures by firms practicing ROR. The cue approach centred on the 
use of heuristics meets the demand of the fast-changing environment in which financial and time 
resources for complex evaluations are limited, and windows of opportunities are short.  
 Heuristics are mental algorithms used to find appropriate solutions to real-time problems 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001). Consisting of two district elements—cognition and rules of search—
heuristics have been referred to as procedural search (Simon 1969). However, heuristics have a limited 
computational ability because the search algorithm cannot generate an optimal solution in a limited 
timeframe. In reality, the search for optimal answers is often affected by the most recent information 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001). As such, heuristics are driven by a trade-off between simplicity and 
accuracy, rather than optimality and because not all opportunities can be measured, such a trade-off 
is often arbitrary and is based on the best perceived decision heuristic (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994a). 
Although established project evaluation disciplines cannot prevent decision-makers from mistakenly 
allocating resources to failing projects (Type I error) or from discontinuing projects that could thrive 
in the future (Type II error), they help balance the trade-off (Barnett 2008). 
 Prior literature has attempted to integrate the attention-based view with the signalling theory 
in the context of investment decision-making. For example, Gulati and Higgins (2003) suggested that 
investors’ attention is affected by contextual factors in the market such as signals of endorsements 
and partnerships of the potential borrower firm and found support that ties to different external 
capital providers have different signalling effects under favourable versus unfavourable market 
conditions. Similarly, studies provided evidence that firm’s prior experience with reputable private 
equity investors (Janney and Folta 2006) or firm’s bundling of private equity with research 
partnerships (Janney and Folta 2003) are perceived as a positive signal by future potential investors, 
thereby attracting their attention. Prior empirical findings also indicate that evaluation of strategic 
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investment options is driven by decision-makers’ intuition (Bowman and Hurry 1993; Slater et al. 
1998). 
 Following the logic of existing scholarly work, in the present study, attention-based view is 
applied to interpretation of received signals. By integrating the concept of situated attention under 
the ABV, the aim is to explain how attributes of received signals help focus attention of boundedly 
rational decision-makers and affect their ability to notice, encode and transform signals into a limited 
set of actions which results in the portfolio of real options (Ocasio, 1997; Barnett, 2008).  
 The view adopted here is that attention of investors is narrowed through the combination of 
disciplined evaluation protocols and decision-making heuristics, which represent Ocasio’s (1997) 
structural and cognitive processes, respectively. As such, structural processes will control the 
availability and saliency of information to decision-makers at any given point in time, while cognitive 
processes will shape their rules of thumb for making judgements and choices. Therefore, formal 
evaluation practices encourage decision-makers to use heuristics in order to focus their attention and 
act upon a set of specific issues. However, despite perceived strategic benefits of sustained focusing 
of attention and effort, unless the procedural and communication channels are designed so that 
attention of decision-makers is concentrated on appropriate issues and answers, selective attention 
may actually inhibit decision-making optimality, potentially leading to bias (Ocasio 1997). 
 
3.5 Complementarity of Theoretical Perspectives to the Current Study 
 
 Since the seminal work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), a significant stream of research has been 
directed at explaining organisation theories under the notion of paradigms—scholarly assumptions, 
practices and agreements. After significant effort has been made to outline the processes of theory 
building from different paradigms, there has been a call for metatriangulation—a strategy of applying 
diverse paradigms to gain in-depth insights (Gioia and Pitre 1990), which resulted in a proliferation of 
multiparadigm studies. Multiparadigm inquiry has been noted to offer immense potential for 
employing a combination of heuristics engrained in varied philosophical stances for theory-building, 
aiding in understanding of complex organisational phenomena (Lewis and Grimes 1999). 
Metatriangulation is especially useful for examining the most disputable realms of organisation 
theory—by inflicting a unified framework built upon contrasting paradigm lenses, it can help enrich 
ongoing debates and clarify ambiguous findings (Lewis and Grimes 1999).  
 As has been expressed by Cannella (2004 p.73), a series of theoretical papers and dialogues 
on ROR emerged in the Academy of Management Review 2004 issue, resulted in “a set of truly diverse 
views about real options and their use in strategic decision making”, that are expected to “do much to 
spur the development of both empirical and theoretical work on real options”. To add to the ongoing 
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debate in the ROR field, the present work attempts to implement the multiparadigm approach to 
investigate the studied phenomena by empirically applying divergent theoretical lenses to examine 
insights derived from a multiparadigm review of extant scholarly work (Lewis and Grimes 1999). Such 
approach is expected to contribute to the body of literature by acknowledging the primary premises 
and limitations of existing theories in order to compare and contrast them with the findings gained 
from a new empirical setting. An end goal is to understand theoretical confrontations and disparate 
findings through a novel combination of paradigms. In particular, through a sequence of empirical 
studies, the present research project intends to link lenses provided by diverse paradigms in a 
complementary fashion in an effort to grasp the organisation phenomena. 
 Organisational research integrating financial and behavioural theories is scarce, and little 
progress has been made towards understanding decision-making processes underpinning innovation 
investment outcomes (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). The options approach makes an important 
contribution to the strategic management literature by incorporating four significant theoretical 
streams in a cohesive framework, proposed by Bowman and Hurry (1993). On the one hand, resource 
allocation and strategic positioning are related to financial content-oriented frameworks; on the other 
hand, sense-making and organisational learning are reflected in behavioural process-oriented 
frameworks (Bowman and Hurry 1993). Two empirically and conceptually relevant theoretical themes 
have been adopted from Bowman and Hurry’s framework in the present study; namely, resource 
allocation and sense-making and they focus on explaining the aspects of organisational processes 
related to the present. Strategic positioning and learning theories related to future-oriented processes 
were outside of the scope of the study.  
 Resource allocation is concerned with efficient utilisation of practices aimed at output 
maximisation to achieve organisational goals and objectives (Bowman and Hurry 1993), whereas 
sense-making is a naturally occurring form of decision-making directed to inform strategic action 
(Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). Sense-making is a resulting product of decision-makers’ interpretation, 
intuition and cognition which are underpinned by experiences and the system of values and beliefs 
(Miller 1993). As such, boundedly rational decision-making heuristics that play a profound role in the 
functioning of organisations (Simon 1991), can undermine the optimality of efficiency-driven resource 
allocation. Hence, normative financial models that are grounded in notions of efficiency and rationality 
have a limited ability to explain organisational phenomena (Dixit 1992).  Real options lens offers a 
means to merge the more prescriptive economic logic of financial models with decision-making 
actuality of behavioural perspectives. 
 The study builds on extant theoretical and empirical literature to detect investment patterns 
consistent with ROR (e.g. Hurry et al. 1992; McGrath and Nerkar 2004) and then investigates whether 
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these patterns are also evident in the context of government venture funding. The present research 
project extends this growing body of work by testing the propositions of ROR in the context of 
government venture funding. The findings of such inquiry will help to find out whether ROR has to 
contribute to investment theory in the field of government venture funding. 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
 This chapter presented an overview of conceptual underpinnings guiding the current research 
project. The study draws upon the real options reasoning perspective as a dominant theoretical lens, 
and uses signalling theory and attention-based view to complement understanding of the ROR. First, 
the study assumes that investors in the present empirical setting follow the explicit ROR structure to 
sequence the process of potential value creation. Then, to investigate whether the actual investment 
behaviour is consistent with the theoretically predicted with regards to exercising options, the study 
utilises signalling theory to understand the evaluation process that investors go through. Finally, 
understanding of behavioural aspects guiding allocation of funding is enhanced by incorporating ideas 
prescribed by the attention-based view of the firm.
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 Conceptual Framework and Research Hypotheses 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 To reflect the objectives pursued in the present study, theoretical developments comprise 
three parts. Part I is designed to test the propositions of real options reasoning in the context of 
government venture funding by analysing the consequences of resource allocation decisions. Part II is 
intended to examine the tenets of signalling theory and attention-based view in the context of 
government venture funding by investigating the antecedents of funding decisions. Part III is aimed to 
assess the complementarities of ROR and signalling theories in predicting anticipated performance 
effects. As such, theoretical foci presented here relate to two different types of risk inherent in all 
investment projects—strategic and tactical (Chatterjee et al. 1999). As Chatterjee et al. (1999) noted, 
strategic risks concern market imperfections related to making resource allocations without 
understanding their potential to enhance performance outcomes, while tactical risks are driven by 
firm-specific uncertainties associated with information asymmetry.  
 In line with the theoretical directions outlined above, the section comprises three parts. First, 
each part presents relevant theoretical constructs and their conceptualisations derived from extant 
literature. Then, these constructs are linked to the original research questions, resulting in a set of 
emerged research hypotheses which are discussed in light of adopted theoretical lenses. Finally, 
configurations of relationships are depicted in corresponding conceptual models. 
 
4.2 Part I:  Analysis of Consequences of Government Venture Funding from the Real 
Options Reasoning Perspective 
 
 The primary research question posed in this part is: ‘Does an additional unit of government 
investment at time t lead to a better stream of social value from the private sector at time t+1?’. More 
specifically, the same question can be formulated as ‘What effect do different outcomes of 
government venture funding decision-making have on long-term performance?”. To address this 
question, the first step is to theoretically conceptualise possible outcomes of government venture 
funding from the ROR perspective. The next step is to understand what effects these financing 
decisions might have on differences in firms’ performance. 
 The stagewise nature of the real options approach, which combines strict screening and 
filtering criteria in early financing rounds in order to justify subsequent larger resource commitments, 
fits well with the corporate processes of resource allocation (Adner 2007). In reality, however, there 
often exists a discrepancy between the prescribed allocation logic and practised reallocation actuality 
(McGrath and Nerkar 2004). Technically, venture capital setting, with its structure of explicitly 
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demarcated financing rounds, should present the most disciplined execution of real options reasoning 
logic in practice (Guler 2007a; Guler 2007b). Neutral venture capitalists have a stringent screening 
discipline and an incentive to terminate financing those externally sourced projects which do not 
promise expected returns on investment, lowering the level of potential escalation of commitment of 
project champions (Adner 2007). In the real world scenario, though, the strength of political and social 
ties between project champions and project funders in the venture capital industry might lead to the 
rational escalation of commitment in light of sunk capital and jeopardise the disciplined selection and 
funding allocation mechanisms required by ROR (Guler 2007b). What remains unclear, then, is how 
closely ideas upon which ROR is predicated reflect the organisational reality. Additionally, current 
evidence of whether following ROR investment logic leads to improvements in performance remains 
scant (Krychowski and Quelin 2010) and inconclusive (Li et al. 2007), with findings of scholarly work 
either indicating a positive association (Levitas and Chi 2010) or no association at all (Reuer and 
Leiblein 2000). 
 To explore these gaps, the objectives of Part I are twofold. The first objective is to find out 
whether explicit real options structure of the government venture capital programme is also 
manifested in explicit or implicit real options logic. Then, the focus is to test whether propositions of 
ROR reflected in the investment pattern of the government venture funding scheme have an effect 
on anticipated long-term performance. 
 
Relationship between Resource Allocation Outcomes and Long-term Performance 
 
 The essence of real options reasoning is expressed in its proposed approach for informing 
resource allocation decisions in organisations, which is built on a number of fundamental assumptions 
intended to guide the logics of such processes (Adner 2007). These assumptions concern two types of 
decisions—initial resource allocation and subsequent resource reallocation, and the correspondence 
of these decisions distinguishes real options decision-making from sequential decision-making (Adner 
and Levinthal 2004b; Adner and Levinthal 2004a; Adner 2007). Therefore, to differentiate between a 
coherent and disciplined decision-making prescribed by real options reasoning and a path-dependent 
decision-making under other sequential approaches, it is important to disentangle distinct elements 
comprising resource allocation processes (Adner 2007; Klingebiel and Adner 2015). From the 
arguments described in the previous chapter, constructs relevant to a strategic theory of investment 
incorporating ROR were identified as initial commitment, discontinuation and sequencing. Literature 
indicates that real options approach matches these elements in a way that allows to distinguish it from 
other resource allocation regimes (Klingebiel and Adner 2015). 
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 One of the primary assumptions is that funding decisions undertaken in line with the ROR 
approach, that is when investment behaviour is marked by a structured and sequential pattern, lead 
to improvements in corporate performance (Kumar 2005). Investors allocate financial resources to 
projects they expect to yield returns above sunk costs (Dixit 1992). Bowman and Hurry (1993) 
described efficient resource allocation as a function of instantaneous cost-benefit judgement and 
option value, with performance being its by-product arising as a result of lagged interaction with the 
environment. Investments placed in time t-1 through their ongoing interaction with the environment 
create an opportunity in time t, which may or may not yield growth in time t+1 (Bowman and Hurry 
1993 p.775). Hence, initial investments exposed to potential interactions with the environment are 
equivalent to the exploration of opportunities (Bowman and Hurry 1993), while subsequent exercising 
of options is equivalent to the exploitation of opportunities  (Luehrman 1998a). By extension, the 
entire chain of explore-exploit options stimulates learning from prior investments, building a stock of 
unique resources and capabilities, which can be leveraged in novel domains, leading to performance 
advantages.  
 The classical theory of investment postulates that rational decision-making follows two 
equally important criteria: profit maximisation and market value maximisation (Modigliani and Miller 
1958). In other words, an option is worth acquiring if it will increase the net profit of the owners of 
the firm and/or the value of the owners of the option; that is, if its expected rate of return, or yield, 
exceeds the costs of acquisition. Accordingly, the profit and value maximisation criteria of the 
investment model tend to evolve into utility maximisation function and what the option adds can be 
assessed in terms of the stream of value it generates (Modigliani and Miller 1958). Under this 
approach, any investment project must raise the private and public value of the firm's performance 
(Modigliani and Miller 1958). Following this line of reasoning, real options are expected to offer 
performance advantages to both project initiators and project funders, whereby the former can enjoy 
effects of iterative learning and incremental capability building, while the latter can benefit from 
improved resource allocation decisions offered by the flexibility of ROR. Consequently, outcomes of 
investment were conceptualised from two perspectives—investors’ and firms’.  
 The primary objectives pursued by the government investment programmes are to increase 
commercialisation, encourage entrepreneurship and stimulate innovation. To reflect this, anticipated 
performance outcomes of real options investments were conceptualised along three dimensions as 
post-funding sales performance, employment creation and innovation activity. Accordingly, yield on 
investment denotes the funders’ desired outcomes, and absolute performance denotes firms’ desired 
outcomes. 
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 To sum, in line with previous literature (Klingebiel and Adner 2015), the study proposes that 
distinct elements of real options reasoning—initial funding commitment, funding continuation, 
funding sequencing, and fit of funding decisions—might have differential effects on investment yield 
and long-term firm performance. The hypothesised links between different elements of ROR and 
anticipated performance outcomes are discussed in detail below. 
 
Resource Allocation to an Individual Option 
 
Initial Commitment 
 
 The initial investment signifies a strategic decision because it creates an opportunity for 
subsequent moves (Luehrman 1998a). By rationing the investment fund into smaller grants, the 
options approach allows to pursue a wider range of opportunities concurrently with the same amount 
resources, learn quicker about the promising projects, and rule out the rest (McGrath and Nerkar 
2004). In this respect, initial investments grant the right to pursue opportunities in the future, while 
keeping initial capital commitments low minimises downside risk, making abandonment of options 
more viable (Kogut 1991). As such, initially small irreversible sunk investments are equivalent to 
opportunity costs of waiting (Folta et al. 2006). As pointed by Barnett (2008 p.619), the primary idea 
behind keeping initial investments low is “to establish toeholds - not make large footprints” until the 
uncertainty is reduced. 
 Hence, stagewise exploration of multiple options via small rather than large investments 
allows managing the risks associated with uncertainty, before embarking on full-scale commitments 
at a later point in time (Bowman and Hurry 1993). When the portion of uncertainty about the option 
is reduced through a trial investment, the opportunity can be further exploited with a larger 
investment.  Given that potential loss-making from investments is limited to their sunk costs a priori, 
smaller initial financial instalments activate learning, experimentation and development of capabilities 
necessary to explore the potential opportunity (Hurry et al. 1992).  
 As Bowman and Hurry (1993) argued, real options logic adds value to the investment process 
when initial investments are low and are followed by exercising of options via larger resource 
commitments. Such chains of ‘learning’ enabled through ‘incremental commitment’ options are 
especially effective in the contexts of novel technological areas, new ventures and new markets. 
Therefore, the expectation is that keeping initial commitments low will have a positive effect on 
performance. For firms, performance outcomes are likely to be enhanced through learning and 
capability building facilitated by option-like explorations of multiple potential avenues, while funders 
are likely to improve returns on investment by allowing firms to grow and develop at a small cost. 
Conversely, upward deviations of initial commitments will be negatively associated with anticipated 
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performance. 
 H1-1: The magnitude of initial funding commitment has a negative effect on investment yield—
(a) sales yield, (b) employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance—(d) sales performance, 
(e) employment performance, (f) innovation performance. 
 
Discontinuation 
 
 As was described in the earlier chapter, the call options embedded in investment projects 
grant flexibility for the exercise decision, whereas the put options grant flexibility for the 
abandonment decision (Trigeorgis 1996). Abandonment, also referred to as withdrawal or 
discontinuation, is another element pertaining to real options investments. Abandonment allows 
discontinuing a stream of investments in response to new unfavourable information (Adner and 
Levinthal 2004b) and convert an active project into an idle one (Dixit 1989). Consequently, it has been 
defined as “the indirect result of the decision to deny resource allocations.” (Barnett 2008 p.621). 
 To gain from flexibility offered by ROR, options not only have to be effectively selected from 
a pool of opportunities and exercised, but also abandoned in a timely fashion when they go down in 
value (Barnett 2008). When exploration of technological opportunities to determine their future 
potential is carried out over the extended period of time, it reduces organisational focus and 
eventually the cumulative performance (Miller and Arikan 2004). Hence, the decision to defer 
exercising the option incrementally decreases its value over time (Trigeorgis 1996).  
 Investment logic dictates that to increase future potential advantages from financing 
activities, losses should be incurred in the short-term (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994b). However, this logic 
goes counter to investments in R&D projects and new ventures, which tend to require infusions of 
capital over a prolonged period of time before they can generate any paybacks in the future. 
Withdrawal of funding offers flexibility to restrict investment costs to irreversible sunk capital 
allocated to an R&D project (McGrath 1997). It also creates pressure for investors to strike a balance 
in a portfolio of explore-exploit options, and to make rational decisions regarding the conclusion of 
exploration of existing R&D projects and reallocation of resources to other options (McGrath and 
Nerkar 2004). Isolated projects are easier to discontinue, which indicates that abandonment decision 
is concerned with balancing a trade-off between the ease of withdrawal and the potential for future 
value creation (Adner 2007). As was pointed out by Adner and Levinthal (2004b), lack of explicit 
rationale for justifying abandonment decisions challenges the ability of organisations to benefit from 
the sequential option-like investment structure. Since abandonment refers to the decision to 
discontinue allocation of resources to an unpromising option, without a structured and regular review 
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discipline, it would not be possible to determine which options no longer merit further flow of 
resources (Barnett 2008). 
 The above arguments indicate that discontinuation is a challenging decision to make due to 
the difficulty of strategic refocusing in light of sunk costs associated with initial information processing, 
inertial tendencies induced by rigid organisational routines, and competing pressures of balancing 
escalation and underinvestment (Ghemawat and Costa 1993; Coff and Laverty 2001). However, the 
following conjecture is built upon the reasoning that continued investment in opened R&D options 
can increase their value through the accumulation of relevant knowledge and path-dependent 
learning (Nelson and Winter 1982). Conversely, discontinuation of investment in opened R&D options 
ceases the knowledge accumulation process which may conclude the development of the project 
(Trigeorgis 1996)17. In line with this logic is the expectation that discontinuation of an individual project 
will have a detrimental effect on performance because it might bring the firm’s chain of learning to an 
end, subsequently reducing potential return on investment. 
 H1-2: Funding discontinuation has a negative effect on investment yield—(a) sales yield, (b) 
employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance—(d) sales performance, (e) employment 
performance, (f) innovation performance. 
 
Fit of Funding Decisions 
 
 Correspondence of decisions concerning the initial allocation of resources and subsequent 
reallocation of resources is what implicitly differentiates ROR logic from other regimes (Adner 2007). 
The promise offered by ROR to enhance performance is contingent upon the match between early-
stage and late-stage decisions (Klingebiel and Adner 2015).  
 As suggested by Adner (2007), organisations demonstrate adherence to real options logic 
when initial resource allocation entails low financial commitment and is followed by subsequently 
disciplined exclusion of projects from a portfolio; or, when initial resource allocation entails high 
financial commitment and is followed by subsequent exploitation of projects in a portfolio. As such, 
the discontinuation decision is informed by the magnitude of initial funding allocation, making it more 
                                                          
17 By analogy with private VC, government VC finances a number of projects in every single round, creating a 
rolling portfolio of options (Cumming 2006). The value of an individual option is assessed in relation to other 
options in the portfolio (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). Therefore, exercising the abandonment option through 
discontinuation of funding does not necessarily signify an absolute unattractiveness of the option, but instead 
implies its relative unattractiveness given other options in the portfolio. Consequently, discontinuation of 
funding by itself may not lead to the permanent termination of the project and is a distinct outcome from a 
natural exit through the IPO (Brander et al. 2002; Gompers and Lerner 2000) or bankruptcy (Gimeno et al. 1997). 
Instead, the entrepreneur may choose to proceed with the project by accessing capital elsewhere, such as 
through private VC (Li and Chi 2013). Due to data constraints, it was outside the scope of the study to account 
for such potential behaviour of entrepreneurs in the present setting. 
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feasible to discontinue low-cost options, and to continue with high-cost options. In line with the 
conceptualisation adopted by Klingebiel and Adner (2015), such pattern of options matching is 
referred to as fit of funding decisions and is expected to have a positive effect on anticipated 
performance outcomes. 
 H1-3: Fit of funding decisions, i.e. low initial funding commitment and discontinuation or high 
initial commitment and continuation, has a positive effect on investment yield—(a) sales yield, (b) 
employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance— (d) sales performance, (e) employment 
performance, (f) innovation performance. 
 
Resource Allocation to a Portfolio of Options 
 
 In assessing the effect of ROR on performance, it is important to differentiate between the 
possible and probable application of real options logic to strategic decision making (Adner 2007). The 
debate on the applicability of ROR to strategy concerns the consistency between the prescribed 
approach and organisational reality (Adner and Levinthal 2004b). Hence, to extend the previous 
conjecture, the expectation is that correspondence of resource allocation decisions under ROR will 
have a stronger effect at the portfolio level. 
 H1-4: The performance effect of fit of funding decisions is greater at the at the cumulated 
portfolio level than at the individual option level. 
 
Sequencing 
 
 Strategic execution of projects involves a sequence of important decisions, some of which are 
taken instantly, while others are put on hold until time resolves a major part of associated uncertainty   
(Luehrman 1998b). Sequencing plays a critical role in breaking down the project development 
challenge into more milestone-oriented, iterative and manageable stages (McGrath 1997). 
Additionally, sequential development allows reducing uncertainty early on through learning and 
experimentation, without requiring financial commitments at later stages, supporting resource 
redirection regimes implemented in the form of discontinuation of less promising projects.  
 Sequencing makes option-like investments attractive because unlike financial commitment 
made for early stages of development, commitment for later stages of development can be reversed, 
making costs incurred in the initial resolution of technical uncertainty more controllable and plausible 
(McGrath 1997). Subsequently, sequencing of financial resources enables greater flexibility to cope 
with the unfolding project development process, stimulating iterative learning and efficiency, allowing 
to respond to emerging information with a timely discontinuation of projects and reallocation of 
scarce resources to more promising alternatives (Bowman and Hurry 1993). Evidence supports the 
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notion that sequentiality offered by the option-like approach enhances capability building and 
evolutionary learning (Chang 1995; Chang and Rosenzweig 1998; McGrath and Nerkar 2004). 
Sequencing wins venture capitalists time to obtain and assess new information, which significantly 
minimises investment risks (Sanders and Boivie 2004).  
 The primary idea behind real options is that if low-probability projects can be discontinued at 
minimal costs, the value of remaining projects in the portfolio increases (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000). 
Hence, the larger the number of early stage projects, the more technical uncertainty can be resolved 
sooner, enhancing strategic value of option-like investments. Sequential resource allocation helps 
firms in innovation-driven industries to position their R&D portfolios in line with emerging market 
demands, facilitating commercialisation of successful new products (Klingebiel and Adner 2015). The 
intuition hereby is that propensity to sequence too many projects in the portfolio will erode the value 
of flexibility offered by the ROR approach. In other words, the more projects will be allocated late-
stage funding, the lower will be the effect of sequencing on anticipated performance. 
 H1-5: For firms with prior awards, high rate of funding sequencing has a negative effect on 
investment yield—(a) sales yield, (b) employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance—(d) 
sales performance, (e) employment performance, (f) innovation performance. 
 
Boundary Conditions: Portfolio Effects 
 
 The flexibility inherent to real options decision-making is more valuable in relation to a 
collection of options rather than individual options (Trigeorgis 1993). Scholars refer to a number of 
individual investment projects as a portfolio of real options (Bowman and Hurry 1993; Luehrman 
1998b). If options have comparable properties such as expiration date, price and cost, keeping options 
in a bundle has a strategic value because the development of options increases economies of scope 
due to their complementarity (Bowman and Hurry 1993). Otherwise, individual options offer a greater 
strategic flexibility to increase upside benefits and decrease downside risks when kept separately and 
independent of each other.  
 The case when the portfolio is worth less than the sum of its individual options has been 
coined non-additivity (Trigeorgis 1993), suboptimality (McGrath 1997), or subadditivity (Vassolo et al. 
2004). Belderbos et al. (2014 p.90) expressed subadditivity of options A and B in a portfolio as V(A, 
B)<V(A)+V(B), where V(A, B) refers to the value of the entire portfolio, while V(A) and V(B) refer to the 
value of the two individual options. Extant research pointed that multiple options may be subject of 
subadditivity due to their interactions effects causing overlaps in investments, driving down the 
overall value of the portfolio (Trigeorgis 1993). Therefore, the marginal value of every newly opened 
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option declines the larger is the size of an existing portfolio of options, indicating that adding up values 
of individual options will result in overestimation of the value of the portfolio (Trigeorgis 1993). 
 Existing literature differentiates between two conceptualisations of subadditivity: one stream 
of research focuses on the correlations between options (Vassolo et al. 2004; Belderbos et al. 2014), 
while another refers to the number of options in the portfolio (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). The present 
study follows intuition of the latter group of researchers and expects that because R&D options may 
interact in a subadditive manner requiring a greater stock of resources, increasing the number of 
investments granted to the same firms will decrease the expected benefit of such investments and 
the value of the entire portfolio. 
 To investigate portfolio effects, the sample is split into two clusters indicating whether or not 
firms had awards prior to receiving the focal award. The objective of such inquiry is to test the 
expectation of portfolio subadditivity. 
 H1-6: An opening of a new individual project has a positive effect on investment yield—(a) sales 
yield, (b) employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance—(d) sales performance, (e) 
employment performance, (f) innovation performance of firms with no prior awards, but an addition 
of a new individual project to the portfolio of firms with prior awards has no effect. 
 
Part I Conceptual Model 
 
The following conceptual model (Figure 4-1) depicts a set of hypotheses consistent with the 
expectations that the presence of ROR in investment decisions will be reflected in a propensity to keep 
initial commitment and sequencing low to minimise downside risks, and to continue projects with high 
initial commitment and discontinue projects with low initial commitment. 
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Figure 4-1: Conceptual model I 
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4.3 Part II: Analysis of Antecedents of Government Venture Funding from Signalling 
Perspective and Attention-based View  
 
 The principal research question this part aims to address is: ‘Which signals affect funders’ 
decisions to determine the magnitude of initial commitment and are associated with increased 
likelihood of subsequent funding discontinuation?’. Additionally, the intention is to examine ‘Which 
attributes or categories of signals receive higher levels of funders’ attention and, therefore, have a 
stronger effect on funding allocation decisions?”.  
 To articulate these inquiries into the filtering process of government decision-makers, the 
initial stage of conceptual model building is focused on understanding the selection criteria that 
government venture funders use. Once established, these criteria are then matched with theoretical 
constructs derived from existing literature. Next, anticipated effects of selection criteria on funding 
allocation decisions are expressed in a set of research hypotheses testing propositions of signalling 
theory and attention-based view in the context of government venture funding. 
 Table 4-1 shows a list of scored review criteria used by government venture capital decision-
makers when assessing new applications for funding and their corresponding theoretical 
counterparts. Signalling constructs relevant to investment decision-making and conceptual indicators 
making up these constructs were drawn from theoretical arguments discussed in the previous chapter 
and the review of the extant empirical literature. In line with entrepreneurship research, the focus is 
placed on legitimacy and capabilities pertaining to the manager and the principal investigator, project 
attributes and efficacy.  
 The logic for selecting these constructs is that legitimacy and capabilities are relevant to the 
intangible assets necessary to proceed in innovation activity, project attributes are relevant to the 
individual R&D proposition, while efficacy is relevant to the activities of the firm as a whole as well as 
the viability of the R&D option to reach the commercialisation stage. Therefore, selected signalling 
constructs represent three levels of factors relevant to analysing the nascent firms’ potential to 
develop a real R&D option. Although selected constructs are proxies, it is believed that they reflect 
the underlying logic of the review criteria used by investors. 
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Table 4-1: Matching of scored review criteria with theoretical constructs and conceptual indicators 
 
Scored Review Criteria Theoretical Construct as Signal Category Conceptual Indicators 
Overall impact on the research field Existing portfolio characteristics (i.e. 
history of obtaining funding) 
Initial commitment 
Sequencing 
Fit 
Project significance 
 
Project appeal characteristics Project programme type  
Commercial potential 
 
Project appeal characteristics Project scope  
Suitability of TMT in terms of 
experience, expertise and record of 
accomplishments 
 
Role legitimacy 
 
 
 
Executive’s functional role 
Organisational tenure 
Technical experience 
Entrepreneurial experience 
Resource legitimacy Elite education 
Advanced technical education 
Advanced business education 
Academic seniority 
Intellectual legitimacy  Inventive capacity 
Academic competence 
Abstract readability 
Capabilities R&D capability 
Intellectual capability 
Managerial capability 
Novelty & innovativeness of project 
for research and/or practice 
Efficacy Post-funding innovation activity 
Strategic approach to accomplish 
aims of the project 
Efficacy Post-funding project duration 
 
Conducive research and scientific 
environment 
Network ties & social capital  
Innovative environment 
Academic affiliations 
State innovativeness 
 
Effect of Attention-Regulating Signal Attributes and Categories on Funding Allocation Decisions  
 
 As was noted by Kogut (1991), prior research on cue processing has been predominantly 
directed at understanding biases involved in information interpretation rather than information 
selection. However, empirical evidence showed that decision-making efficiency may be weakened due 
to biases in information selection, in particular triggered by salience and availability of information 
(Kogut 1991). Such findings imply that investors’ decisions are cued by more observable, more salient 
and more relevant signals. 
 
Observability, Salience and Relevance 
 
 The primary notion behind an ABV is that “focused attention both facilitates perception and 
action towards those issues and activities that get noticed, and inhibits perception and action towards 
those that do not” (Ocasio 1997 p.190). In other words, decision makers only respond to information 
which is visible to them within their attention domain. 
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 Boundedly rational decision-makers within organisations can only attend to a portion of 
information cues that they receive (Cohen et al. 1972). An ABV articulates how organisational 
structures impact decision-makers’ ability to respond to a selected number of stimuli. Attentional 
structures, which are regulated by adhering to organisational goals, stimulate actions of decision-
makers towards more salient cues and divert their attention from less salient cues (Barnett 2008). 
Sociologists note that perceptual salience increases attention towards information which is more 
relevant to the decision-making process (Fiske and Taylor 1991). For instance, firm’s recent 
experiences and actions are more salient due to their temporal relevance and decrease the 
receptiveness of risks associated with option-like decision-making (Barnett 2008). Therefore, investors 
may develop ideas about the importance of specific signals and apply higher weights to such signals 
during the evaluation process (Ehrhart and Ziegert 2005).  
 Following this line of reasoning, the hypotheses outlined in subsequent sections express the 
expectation that signals which are perceived by investors as more observable, more salient and more 
relevant will have stronger attention-regulating effects and will bear greater weights on funding 
allocation decisions. 
 
Relationship between Top Management Team Legitimacy and Funding Allocation Decisions  
 
 Success of new ventures is often a result of collective effort of a team of individual 
entrepreneurs whose heterogeneous experiences and abilities contribute to the achievement of 
organisational goals (Unger et al. 2011). Hence, complementarity and diversity of skills of team 
members lead to superior venture performance (Ensley et al. 2002). TMTs of small firms have to take 
diverse functional roles, for which they need to possess both technology- and business-specific 
knowledge (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005). Therefore, it is important that TMT members’ backgrounds 
are aligned with different functions which need fulfilling within the team (Ferguson et al. 2016). 
Entrepreneurial teams of small research-focused firms usually comprise academic scientists who bring 
with them specific technological competences and some of them may also have managerial 
experience (Murray 2004; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005). Likewise, in the present context, the TMT 
comprises a manager who fulfils the leadership role and a principal investigator who fulfils the 
scientific role. 
 At the heart of institutional theory is the proposition that legitimacy enhances organisational 
performance and reduces the chances of failure (Eisenhardt 1988; Barringer and Milkovich 1998; 
Eberhart et al. 2014; Khaire 2010). Therefore, by signalling organisational legitimacy firms can attract 
external funding (Certo 2003; Becker-Blease and Sohl 2015). As was noted previously, under 
conditions of information asymmetry, markets attend to observable characteristics of firms to infer 
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their unobservable but desirable attributes (Sanders and Boivie 2004). Two important attributes are 
associated with organisational quality and value, and shape perceptions of legitimacy, namely 
reputation and status.  
 The conventional definition of organisational reputation refers to the quality of company’s 
past performance outcomes (Podolny and Phillips 1996). However, such view of reputation is difficult 
to apply to firms which have limited historical actions upon which their future prospects can be judged. 
Literature suggests that in nascent firms founding team’s reputation is equivalent to organisational 
reputation (Cohen and Dean 2005). Particularly in smaller firms, status and skill set of TMT tend to 
become analogous with that of the firm (Zhang and Wiersema 2009).  
 Similar to reputation, organisational status reflects social rank of its economic actors (Stern et 
al. 2008). In sociology, the status of economic actors is shaped through relational ties embedded in 
social systems and is determined by the quality of their affiliates (Stern et al. 2008). Status 
characteristics influence expectations of performance of assessed actors, and research shows 
evidence that higher status is associated with higher competences and capabilities, increasing odds of 
success (Berger et al. 1972).  
 Together, functional and educational background are related to relevant perspectives that can 
be applied to the task (Bell et al. 2011). Different dimensions of human capital manifested in 
educational attainments and professional experience of the main team members reflect conforming 
legitimacy (Tornikoski and Newbert 2007). Therefore, forming investor opinion around positive TMT-
level signals such as experience, education and professional competences is critical to the success of 
nascent ventures in obtaining capital (Zimmerman 2008).  
 Since legitimacy is an intangible organisational asset, it cannot be measured precisely, yet can 
be estimated through proxies (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). In the present context, all proxies of 
legitimacy refer to biographical information included in the application form and hence meet the 
signal observability criteria, as they are readily visible to decision-makers evaluating firms. In addition, 
legitimacy signals are credible as they are costly to imitate (Certo 2003). In line with Certo (2003), the 
primary prediction is that investor perceptions of organisational legitimacy will be affected by 
cumulated human capital.  
 According to existing literature, investors are likely to perceive organisational legitimacy as an 
additive function of individual legitimacy of each TMT member (Cohen and Dean 2005). Therefore, 
organisational legitimacy is an accumulation of individual legitimacy of team members which is shaped 
through their respective qualities. Like other types of signals, individual-level legitimacy has to be 
observable to outsiders and reveal the potential of TMT to create a financially viable business.  
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 In line with existing literature (Cohen and Dean 2005; Higgins and Gulati 2006), TMT legitimacy 
was conceptualised as a cumulative function of (i) role legitimacy, (ii) resource legitimacy and (iii) 
intellectual legitimacy, while indicators making up categories of legitimacy are expected to have a 
complementarity effect. In selecting these three types of legitimacy and indicators comprising 
respective categories, the extant scholarly work was reviewed on TMT characteristics and their 
relationship with firm performance. The underlying reasoning is that types of previous experience, 
advanced qualifications, affiliations with educational institutions and productive output of TMT 
members are associated with higher quality firms and enhance investors’ perceptions of legitimacy. 
 
Role Legitimacy Signals 
 
 Legitimacy literature postulates that reputation is a function of visible experience 
accumulated over the years (Janney and Folta 2006; Lange et al. 2011). One type of reputational 
organisational legitimacy has been termed role legitimacy. Role legitimacy is associated with TMT 
members’ capacity to assume certain positions within the firm and has been defined as the 
correspondence of top managers’ experience and expertise with key organisational functions (Higgins 
and Gulati 2006).  
 The breadth and type of TMT’s prior experience have been found to be statistically linked to 
young firms’ growth (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990), innovativeness (Bantel and Jackson 1989) 
and ability to raise funds (Walske and Zacharakis 2009). Previous related experience indicates to 
investors that TMT members have the functional expertise necessary to thrive in the uncertain 
environment as well as skills to manage and lead complex NPD projects. Additionally, relevant prior 
experience is a guarantee that the task can be managed appropriately because it is not new to the 
firm (Ferguson et al. 2016). Specifically, when backgrounds of top management match the assigned 
roles within the team, it enhances investors’ perception of TMT’s task competence and the ability to 
achieve the ultimate organisational goals. Here, role legitimacy is defined as a set of four indicators, 
namely executive’s functional role, organisational tenure, technical experience and entrepreneurial 
experience. 
 
Executive’s Functional Role 
 
 In small firms, individuals often have to fulfil more than one functional role. In particular, “top 
executives often have experience in multiple functions, although they may have dominant experience 
in one” (Hitt and Tyler 1991 p.334). Executives’ participation in more than one position within the 
TMT, the firm or the board, is known as CEO duality. The studies demonstrated inconclusive results 
concerning the strength and direction of CEO duality-performance relationship (e.g. Baliga et al. 1996; 
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Boyd 1995; Finkelstein and D’Aveni 1994), concluding that the impact of CEO participation can vary 
under different circumstances.  
 A stream of literature within the TMT framework suggested that the breadth of executive’s 
functional experience might explain the differences in the perceived impact of the CEO’s participation 
(Cannella et al. 2008). The upper echelons theory postulates that executive’s functional background 
influences their cognitive perceptions, analytical frameworks and strategic decision-making 
(Wiersema and Bantel 1992). The expectation hereby is that investors’ opinion about TMT’s legitimacy 
varies depending on the CEO’s functional role within the team; that is, whether the CEO is a broad 
generalist or a narrow functional specialist (Bunderson and Sutcliffe 2002). 
 Broader functional experience of executives enhances their strategic acumen, making them 
less risk-averse; while narrow functional experience results in the development of deeper perspectives 
within a specific domain of expertise (Geletkanycz and Black 2001; Cannella et al. 2008; Sine et al. 
2006). Kish-Gephart and Campbell (2015) found empirical evidence that CEOs with a general 
management career track tend to underestimate risks associated with new investments compared to 
their colleagues with a more narrowly defined functional background. Therefore, the proposition 
developed here is that the presence of more functionalist science-focused CEOs as opposed to 
management-focused CEOs (principal investigator-CEO vis-a-vis manager-CEO) will be associated with 
less potential strategic risk-taking behaviour and will subsequently reduce investor’s perceived 
uncertainty in firms’ prospects. 
 
Organisational Tenure 
 
 Upper echelons theory gives importance to TMT tenure. TMT tenure is increasingly used as a 
compound indicator of individuals’ task orientation and authority within the firm, which affects their 
cognitive and behavioural processes, and subsequently organisational outcomes (Hambrick and 
Fukutomi 1991) such as inventive activity (Wu et al. 2005), NPD experimentation (Miller and Shamsie 
2001), changes in corporate strategy (Wiersema and Bantel 1992), financial performance (Miller and 
Shamsie 2001) and performance conformity (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990).  
 In the signalling context, the tenure of TMT members is perceived by investors as a reliable 
proxy for credibility (Zhang and Wiersema 2009). Prior research found evidence that TMT tenure 
signals higher firm quality to financial markets at the time of IPO (Cohen and Dean 2005). Longer 
tenure is an indication of firm-specificity of skills (Harris and Helfat 1997). As such, firm’s performance 
is progressively influenced by task knowledge accumulated by the TMT (Hambrick and Fukutomi 
1991). The proposition hereby is that higher TMT tenure will signal higher firm-specific role legitimacy 
to investors. 
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Technical Experience 
 
 Functional background refers to an individual’s prior work history across different functional 
specialisations (Bunderson 2003). As such, functional background, which is accumulated through 
previous experiences, reflects expertise and knowledge of individuals in a specific field and shapes 
their attitudes and cognitive perspectives (Bantel and Jackson 1989).  
 The primary business function of research-focused biotech ventures concerns development 
not only of new products and technologies, but also drugs, medical instruments, therapies and 
diagnostic tools, which requires specialised technical expertise and cross-disciplinary knowledge 
(Deeds et al. 1999). As a result, in research-intensive industries, high level of technical knowledge 
indicates TMT’s ability to accurately assess commercial viability of new discoveries and divert limited 
resources towards the most promising ones (Deeds et al. 1999).  
 Relevant technical experience signals TMTs’ prior exposure to similar tasks (Bell et al. 2011). 
TMTs with relevant technical competency have field-specific practical experience and can efficiently 
process and react to functional information from within their domain of expertise (Ensley and 
Hmieleski 2005). Therefore, the presence of TMTs with technical experience signals to investors that 
the firm embodies functional domain-focused skills and competencies.  
 
Entrepreneurial Experience 
 
 Moreover, valuation of new ventures by external funding providers is influenced by TMT's 
prior founding experience. As noted by Hsu (2007), teams with previous start-up founding experience 
signal entrepreneurial quality. It was also acknowledged that previous start-up experience has a 
significant impact on entrepreneurs’ ability to successfully commercialise research and innovation 
(Markman et al. 2008) and achieve financial success (Zhao et al. 2013). 
 Prior scholarly work established that entrepreneurs learn management and operational skills 
through the experiential process (Politis 2005) and transfer those skills to subsequent start-ups 
(Ucbasaran et al. 2009). In addition to having enhanced human capital necessary to develop new 
ventures, habitual entrepreneurs also benefit from established social network ties which grant them 
access to extensive financial and managerial resources (Mosey and Wright 2007). Therefore, previous 
entrepreneurial experience signals that TMTs have acquired specific human and social capital 
necessary to lead the venture to success (Wennberg et al. 2011). 
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Resource Legitimacy Signals 
 
 Consistent with Higgins and Gulati (2006) the type of organisational legitimacy which is linked 
with access to strategic human and social capital resources is termed resource legitimacy. It is 
expected that certain attributes of TMT members such as academic statuses and affiliations, will signal 
availability of legitimate resources within the firm and will have a positive impact on investors’ 
decisions. The prestige of human capital is assessed through educational and employment academic 
statuses, such as advanced degrees and titles, which signal abilities of TMT. The prestige of social 
capital, on the other hand, is appraised through affiliations with high-status academic institutions, 
which signal quality of acquired knowledge as well as potential access to affiliated partners’ resources 
through network ties.  
 Signals of education are effective sorting mechanisms in resolving investors’ uncertainty 
regarding firms’ quality. Educational degrees are efficacious market signals as they are both easily 
observable and costly to obtain because in the absence of necessary abilities and qualities awards will 
not be confirmed by the issuing institution (Certo 2003). In person-perception research, individuals 
signal their social class through education (Kraus and Keltner 2009). Educational background is also 
believed to influence task-related attitudes and perspectives, which implies that educational 
heterogeneity within the team will improve task performance (Bell et al. 2011).  
 Organisational linkages with reputable institutions via certifications and endorsements have 
been found to enhance perceived legitimacy of firms in the eyes of external market observers (Baum 
and Oliver 1991; Booth and Smith 1986). In particular, ties with reputable institutions help resolve the 
portion of uncertainty when firms confront the liability of newness or smallness. It is well established 
that academic certifications granted by prior evaluators enhance the level of perceived legitimacy 
(Sanders and Boivie 2004). Therefore, investors use organisations’ affiliations with legitimate partners, 
such as academic institutions, in the evaluation process of nascent firms’ future potential (Janney and 
Folta 2006). 
 Through its linkage with knowledge, skills and cognitive ability, educational attainment is 
expected to be associated with legitimacy, while more advanced degrees or qualifications obtained 
from elite educational institutions will have an even stronger positive effect due to their perceived 
exclusivity (Cohen and Dean 2005). To reflect the above reasoning, in the present study resource 
legitimacy comprises four indicators—elite education, advanced business education, advanced 
technical education and academic seniority. 
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Elite Education 
 
 Prestigious persons involved in an organisation verify to the market its legitimacy and worth 
(Certo 2003). Prestigious human capital characteristics are costly to obtain and are therefore 
perceived as credible signals of quality. Empirical evidence exists that affiliations of TMT members 
with prominent institutions have a positive influence on investors’ perceptions, and enhance the level 
of trustworthiness they associate with the firms (Burton et al. 2002; Higgins and Gulati 2006; Sauer et 
al. 2010). Elite education also brings with it an improved access to resources from valuable 
connections on which to fall back in difficult times and easier formation of networks, leading to 
exposure of new ideas (Kish-Gephart and Campbell 2015 p.1620). Moreover, elite education forms a 
perception of the higher social status of individuals. 
 Prior studies have demonstrated that an educational degree from the elite institution can be 
an indication of ability (Wiersema and Bantel 1992). Higher status universities tend to have more 
rigorous admission processes based on potential students’ intelligence and achievement, which are 
human capital characteristics sought after during firms’ quality evaluation by financial markets 
(Podolny 2001; Gomulya and Boeker 2014). The anticipation thereby is that TMT members will be 
compared based on their affiliations with educational institutions. In line with prior studies (e.g. Stern 
et al. 2014), academic ranking of universities from which the member of TMT graduated is a direct 
signal of the status of academic affiliation. The higher is university’s rank, the more positive impact it 
will have on investors’ perceptions of firms’ legitimacy. 
 
Advanced Business Education 
 
 Research shows that managerial skills are favourably received by markets (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1989). Advanced education in business equips TMTs with knowledge about markets and 
industry-wide skills in disciplines such as finance, accounting, operations and leadership which can be 
applied in any sector (Patzelt et al. 2009). Wider knowledge broadens their exposure to business 
practices, forms strategic perspectives, as well as stimulates risk-taking behaviour. Based on their non-
industry-specific skills, MBAs are perceived by outsiders as broader generalists (Datta and Iskandar-
Datta 2014). The literature suggests that MBA-holders typically outperform their non-MBA TMT 
colleagues (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Custodio et al. 2013). Therefore, it is expected that overall 
TMTs with an MBA degree will help form a positive opinion around the firm’s legitimacy (Homburg et 
al. 2014).  
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Advanced Technical Education 
 
 Advanced technical degree holders develop a more science-oriented cognitive structure 
during their doctoral training, which subsequently affects individuals’ information processing and 
decision-making (Ding 2011). As a result of their scientific background, PhD-holding TMT members are 
better methodologically equipped to conduct cutting-edge research and turn it into innovation. PhD-
holders also have access to an extensive network of academic connections, which facilitates science- 
and entrepreneurship-oriented information exchange and knowledge sourcing (Liebeskind et al. 
1996). Overall, through its association with a higher professional status, TMT’s PhD training credentials 
will be positively received by venture capitalists. 
 
Academic Seniority 
 
 Another factor which is closely linked with legitimate human and social capital within the small 
venture is revealed by the presence of top academic scientists in the TMT. A number of studies showed 
that involvement of academic inventors is critical for the survival of nascent high-tech ventures 
(Jensen and Thursby 2001; Thursby and Thursby 2002).  
 Scientific discoveries originate from scientists. Since tacit knowledge is difficult to transmit to 
other parties and largely remains accessible to individuals, maintaining links with lead scientists 
guarantees continued access to intellectual human capital, which influences venture’s success (Darby 
and Zucker 2003). As Gittelman and Kogut (2003 p.380) observed, “bridging the disconnect between 
scientific knowledge and innovation appears to depend on access to individuals who perform both”.  
 Prior research showed that full-time commitment of academic entrepreneurs enhances firm 
performance, and increases private sector commercialisation, including patenting and product 
development activities (Zucker et al. 2002; Siegel et al. 2007), while their own research productivity 
also gets positively affected (Lowe and Gonzalez-Brambila 2007). Scholarly work also presented 
evidence that scientific status of team members’ signals quality of nascent firms to financial markets 
(Higgins et al. 2011). Therefore, in situations characterised by information asymmetry, the 
involvement of the senior academics will be perceived by outsiders as a signal of venture’s credibility 
(Toole and Czarnitzki 2007). Additionally, academic seniority is expected to signal access to a broader 
network of scientific resources.  
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Intellectual Legitimacy Signals 
 
 Knowledge created in SMEs largely remains tacit and embedded in its scientists (Agarwal and 
Shah 2014). However, the codification of tacit knowledge can be beneficial to scientists as it allows 
them to articulate their human capital explicitly in order to be recognised by members of the 
community (Thorpe et al. 2005). Prior research used two proxies of codified knowledge—publications 
(Audretsch and Lehmann 2005) and patents (Jaffe 1989; Acs et al. 1992). Literature suggests that 
external market actors evaluate young firms’ intellectual capital based on proxies which capture 
research output of the scientific team (Zucker et al. 1998). 
 A number of scholars pointed that competencies ingrained in the scientific team enhance 
product development outcomes (Leonard-Barton 1992; Henderson and Cockburn 1994). Basic 
scientific research facilitates product development in high-tech industries (Dasgupta and David 1994), 
and in particular in biotech, which is characterised by complex knowledge structures (Pisano 1994). 
Therefore, research productivity of a scientific team is a critical factor behind the firm’ 
commercialisation potential.  
 The proliferation of academic entrepreneurship triggered the development of a dual 
perspective towards research by university scientists—whereas traditional academic perspective 
stimulates publications in the field to establish reputation, an entrepreneurial perspective fosters 
commercialisation of knowledge and discoveries (Etzkowitz 1998). Thus, the propensity of scientists 
to concentrate on either publishing or patenting knowledge also signals their ‘academic orientation’ 
or ‘entrepreneurial orientation’. Individual scientists with high patenting and publishing productivity 
are often described as star scientists (Han and Niosi 2016).  
 Evidence exists that the presence of star scientists in the team increases firms’ innovative 
productivity (Kehoe and Tzabbar 2015). Similarly, entrepreneurial academics who engage in the 
commercialisation of research exhibit higher productivity in terms of journal publications, impact 
publications, research awards and patents in comparison to their non-entrepreneurial academic peers 
(Toole and Czarnitzki 2010). Their established reputation within the firm and connectedness to 
external knowledge networks, makes their involvement imperative for technological gatekeeping and 
controlling information flows within and between relevant knowledge domains (Tushman 1977). 
Therefore, academic entrepreneurs bridge discovery and innovation activities of firms (Gittelman and 
Kogut 2003).  
 Intellectual legitimacy reflects ventures’ propensity to engage in strategic behaviour to 
produce more tangible outputs in order to portray themselves as real operating organisations (Gartner 
et al. 1992). Consistent with prior studies (Tornikoski and Newbert 2007), with research publications 
and applications for patents TMTs can signal new ventures’ operational performance. Higher value 
99 
 
and productivity of intellectual capital are likely to have a greater appeal for investors due to 
associated underlying capability (Stern et al. 2008). Additionally, investors use written documents 
produced by TMT members as part of the application process to assess their intellectual ability to 
effectively communicate valuation-relevant information (Loughran and McDonald 2014). Hence, the 
hypothesis is that investors infer intellectual legitimacy of small ventures by attending to the TMT’s 
inventive capacity and academic competence as well as readability of the abstract describing aims and 
objectives of the project. 
 
Inventive Capacity 
 
 Inventors’ commercialised research output in the form of patents has potential economic 
value (Guerrero and Urbano 2014). Evidence exists that high impact research leads to higher patenting 
rates (Markman et al. 2008). Also, patenting is a result of inventor’s willingness to exploit the possible 
applications and market potential of novel knowledge, so is a signal of their entrepreneurial intentions 
and thinking (Qian and Acs 2013). As a result, patenting productivity is higher among scientists who 
engage in applied, as opposed to basic research (Calderini et al. 2007). Academic entrepreneurs often 
choose to establish their own firms to best appropriate the returns from the knowledge that they 
generated (Audretsch 2004). As such, TMT’s inventive capacity captured by their patenting activity is 
a signal of productive effort as well as entrepreneurial orientation. 
 
Academic Competence 
 
 Affiliation with the scientific community is contingent upon the members’ proven ability 
to generate new knowledge (Dasgupta and David 1994; McMillan et al. 1995). Publishing basic 
research allows entrepreneurs to demonstrate their high-status academic credentials and maintain a 
foothold in the scientific community, benefitting from access to knowledge networks within academic 
institutions (Ding 2011). Therefore, a publication record in academic journals is not only a signal of 
high-quality research but is also an indication of the membership in the ‘science club’, which allows 
keeping up to speed with advancements in science beyond the firm’s boundaries (Ding 2011). 
Exchange of externally-generated information through both formal and informal channels is 
particularly valuable in rapidly developing industries such as biotechnology (Pisano 1994). Therefore, 
TMT’s competence to publish their research is an indication of research quality and affiliation with the 
‘science club’. 
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Abstract Readability 
 
 Signalling theory is concerned not only with what types of information are transmitted, 
but also how. In his classic paper, Hayek (1945) defined dispersion of information as a key efficiency 
of economic systems. At the core of signalling theory is the notion that efficacious signals have to be 
both observable and costly to produce. However, there is a stream of scholars who indicated that 
ordinary, informal communication can have a signalling effect and reduce information asymmetry in 
the markets (Farrell and Rabin 1996; Almazan et al. 2008; Payne et al. 2013). Due to low costs 
associated with the production of such signals, they have been coined ‘cheap talk’ and have been 
shown in a formal economic model to be perceived as credible signals when senders and receivers 
have interests in common (Crawford and Sobel 1982). 
 Firms applying for external funding are required to produce narratives disclosing aims and 
objectives of projects. Despite being inexpensive to produce, such narratives can bear costs to 
signallers, as the inclusion of any false information concerning pursued entrepreneurial opportunities 
will be penalised by financial markets in the future once caught (Moss et al. 2015). Therefore, 
entrepreneurs have strong incentives to provide true and fair narratives.  
 In financial contexts, narrative statements signal entrepreneurs’ characteristics and intentions 
(Moss et al. 2015), while readability of statements can be used by investors to gauge the intellectual 
legitimacy of entrepreneurs. Following Loughran and McDonald (2014 p.1644), readability is defined 
as the ability to effectively communicate valuation-relevant information. Readability is conceptualised 
as the level of complexity of a written document and has been widely used in prior accounting and 
finance literature. The underlying assumption is that more effectively written texts reduce the level of 
valuation-associated ambiguity (Loughran and McDonald 2014). Hence, more readable texts signal the 
underlying intellectual ability of TMT members to communicate complex information in a clear way 
that can be easily understood by the non-specialist audience such as investors. 
 H2-1a: More observable signals of role legitimacy, resource legitimacy and intellectual 
legitimacy have a positive effect on the magnitude of initial funding commitment. 
 H2-1b: More observable signals of role legitimacy, resource legitimacy and intellectual 
legitimacy decrease the likelihood of funding discontinuation. 
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Relationship between Efficacy and Funding Allocation Decisions 
 
 Signal strength also depends on the extent to which it reflects changes in conditions and is 
time-relevant (Janney and Folta 2006). Since signal value erodes as the time passes, more recent 
signals should be perceived by investors as particularly strong and reliable because they transmit up-
to-date and timely information.  
 As was discussed in the previous chapter, signalling literature also defines signals in terms of 
their temporal attributes, and differentiates between the point and flow signals (DeKinder and Kohli 
2008). Since legitimacy categories refer to characteristics of TMT members at a certain point in time, 
they can be described as point signals. On the other hand, information that has been transmitted over 
a period of time relates to flow signals and is perceived as an indication of signallers’ intentions and 
abilities (DeKinder and Kohli 2008).  
 Consistent with prior studies (Janney and Folta 2003; DeKinder and Kohli 2008; Janney and 
Folta 2006), the proposition here is that since investment process related to new ventures is 
characterised by high uncertainty, assumptions made based on ‘snapshot’ information transmitted by 
point signals need to be supported by flow signals, which provide new and up-to-date information, 
and hence further help investors make conclusions about the quality of firms. New information 
conveyed through flow signals clarifies investors’ perspectives with regards to how the project is 
progressing (Janney and Folta 2003) and, therefore, indicates organisational efficacy in carrying out 
the R&D task.  
 Additionally, research conducted on goal and adaptive expectation theories suggests that 
decision-makers’ expectations are largely influenced by performance signals due to their perceived 
association with performance on comparable tasks in the future (Branzei et al. 2004). While signals of 
success stimulate further efforts towards achieving original goals, signals of failure or 
underperformance prompt discontinuation of such efforts or trigger reorientation of the initial 
decisions (Lant 1992; Lant et al. 1992). As such, signals of performance success can activate further 
support of original initiatives. Consequently, flow signals are hypothesised to be perceived as 
particularly strong and reliable, because they convey more recent information concerning efficacy and 
performance (Janney and Folta 2006). 
 
Post-funding Project Duration 
 
 The nature of the stagewise funding programme mandates that entrepreneurs receive initial 
investments to engage in experimentation. Early-stage experimentation allows estimating the 
prospects of potential future payoff from the project before embarking on larger late-stage financial 
commitments. Literature suggests that venture capitalists use milestones as an effective signalling 
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device and information acquired during experimentation is treated as a “continuous public signal that 
detects unprofitable projects with some probability” (Bouvard 2012 p.181). Thus, information acquired 
during experimentation enhances the efficiency of the investment decision-making (Chevalier-
Roignant et al. 2011).  
 Although longer experimentation may increase the accuracy of obtained results, it also defers 
the period of potential future payoff. In the optimal scenario, the marginal benefit of additional 
information should exceed the marginal cost of experimentation (Bouvard 2012). Therefore, the 
sooner the evidence on the potential profitability of the project can be gathered, the more certainly 
the project can be assessed, improving the overall investment process. In other words, longer project 
duration will be associated by investors with higher investment risks. 
 
Post-funding Invention Activity 
 
 Patent stock is indicative of the strength of the ventures’ intellectual property position (Shane 
and Stuart 2002) and is therefore widely used by venture capitalists in making funding allocation 
decisions (Baum and Silverman 2004; Lerner 1994). Prior studies found that filing patent applications 
is positively related to new ventures’ propensity to receive venture capital funding (Haeussler et al. 
2014). Haeussler and colleagues (2014) argued that information which emerges in the course of 
evaluation process is equally important and showed support that investors attend to the patenting 
activity to revise their conclusions about the abilities of nascent firms.  
 Moreover, Warner et al. (2006) noted that although patents do not guarantee future 
commercialisation success, they signal technical potential of the technology as well as firms’ intention 
to reduce uncertainty surrounding their productive credentials. Prior studies have shown empirical 
evidence that patents are significantly associated with the likelihood of funded firms’ success (Stuart 
et al. 1999) and failure (Shane and Stuart 2002). Therefore, patent applications convey intrinsic 
qualities of the projects as well as the new ventures. Patenting activity is particularly important for 
firms that had no prior awards in the past as the initial investment was intended to help R&D activities 
take off and develop relevant technical knowledge. The proposition is hereby that firms that seek to 
reduce uncertainty by engaging in patenting activity are positively viewed by investors. 
 H2-2: More recent signals of efficacy have a stronger effect on the likelihood of funding 
discontinuation than signals of legitimacy. 
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Relationship between Capabilities and Funding Allocation Decisions  
 
 Real options reasoning offers a unique heuristic applicable to detecting and assessing 
capabilities related to exploratory activities which create future opportunities (Bowman and Hurry 
1993; Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994b; Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001). Evidence exists that firm-level 
capabilities have a strong effect on strategic boundary choices (e.g. Leiblein and Miller 2003). Hence, 
the resource-based and knowledge-based view can enrich real options theory by explaining how firm-
level heterogeneity impacts option value (Folta and O’Brien 2004).  
 The resource-based view postulates that to create positions for sustained competitive 
advantages firms need to develop a set of unique and inimitable resources, competences and 
capabilities (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Barney 1991). It was noted that strategic options emerge 
through a combination of existing investments, knowledge assets, capabilities and market conditions 
(Bowman and Hurry 1993; Zhao et al. 2013). Subsequently, under real options theory, organisational 
capabilities are viewed as strategic platforms for investment in future opportunities (Kogut and 
Kulatilaka 1994b). Although reputation and expertise are both difficult to build, they are necessary yet 
not sufficient ingredients for long-term yield from investments in opportunities. Capabilities, on the 
other hand, can be viewed as a function of both accumulated reputation and expertise, demonstrated 
through a consistent ability to utilise skills and resources for the achievement of organisational goals 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994b). Firm’s ability to assimilate and exploit relevant knowledge to meet its 
organisational goals reflects its efficiency in absorbing useful information and has been coined 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
 The resource-based view extends real options theory by proposing that the benefits of option-
like investments in R&D projects are enhanced through learning platforms which they create with the 
foresight to build up technical expertise (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994b). Such expertise not only enables 
accumulation of core competencies in specific technologies (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) but is also 
linked with wider organisational capabilities for long-term strategic gains, such as the capacity to 
effectively develop and commercialise new products (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994b). According to 
Bowman and Hurry (1993), organisational capabilities developed through learning routines, impact 
sense-making and recognition of shadow options. Therefore, the ability to recognise shadow options 
is shaped through a combination of organisational learning and strategic choices. Consequently, firms 
with greater absorptive capacities are expected to learn more from sequential option-like investments 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
 The above theoretical arguments were summarised by Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994b p.70): 
“Flexibility [of option-like investments] is of no value in the absence of the resources required for 
execution… learning new capabilities is ultimately the most critical investment in opportunity for the 
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long haul.” Following this line of logic is the conjecture that investors will attribute perceived 
differences in firms’ absorptive capacities to their differential abilities to recognise and generate 
options, which will have an impact on investment patterns. However, because capabilities are not 
easily observable signals, their impact on investment decisions is expected to be weak. 
 In his paper, Collis (1994) summarised the definitions employed in extant literature to describe 
the concept of organisational capabilities into three broad categories. The first category defines 
organisational capability as an ability to carry out key functional activities; the second category relates 
to the ability to dynamically improve; while the third category refers to the ability to recognise new 
strategic opportunities (Collis 1994 p.145). To capture these dimensions of organisational capability, 
three relevant types of capabilities that have received the most attention in the literature dedicated 
to resource-based theory (Collis 1994; Teece et al. 1997; Zollo and Winter 2002) were identified as 
R&D capability, intellectual capability and managerial capability, respectively.  
 According to Collis (1994 p. 145), one of the elements that comprises the definition of 
capability is that “it involves the transformation of physical inputs into outputs inside the ‘black box’ of 
the firm”. As such, capabilities create value by governing technological efficiency of production 
activities within firms (Collis 1994). Consistent with such logic, the present research adopts the input-
output approach to define the concept of capabilities (Dutta et al. 1999). Under this perspective, firm’s 
activities are modelled as a transformation function of operational resources into practical objectives. 
High transformational ability is attributable to high functional efficiency, which is equivalent to 
functional capabilities (Dutta et al. 1999). As was suggested by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), in addition 
to firm’s knowledge stocks, firm’s absorptive capacity also comprises absorptive capacities of its 
individual members. In line with this reasoning, R&D capability reflects firms’ absorptive capacity, 
intellectual capability reflects principal investigators’ absorptive capacity, while managerial capability 
reflects managers’ absorptive capacity. That is, R&D capability relates to firm-specific ability to carry 
out functional processes, intellectual capability refers to lead scientists’ ability to dynamically deploy 
their own knowledge stocks, while managerial capability denotes the managers’ ability to dynamically 
recognise new opportunities and implement strategic change. The underlying rationale guiding 
conceptualisations of each capability is discussed in detail consecutively. 
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R&D Capability 
 
 Functional capabilities develop within specialised domains and operational activities of firms 
(Amit and Schoemaker 1993) and reflect the firms’ ability to do specific things (Hall 1993). Hence, 
functional capabilities utilise local knowledge and abilities embedded in firms’ daily processes 
(Henderson and Cockburn 1994). Research and development is a type of functional capability (Verona 
1999), and because of its development within the firm-specific context, it creates a form of 
competitive advantage which is difficult to replicate (Barney 1991).  
 Empirical evidence demonstrated the positive effect of R&D, or technological, capability on 
performance outcomes such as innovation (Yeoh and Roth 1999), start-ups’ performance expressed 
as sales growth (Lee et al. 2001), entrepreneurial wealth (Deeds 2001), and the amount of capital 
raised during the initial public offering (Deeds et al. 1997). In addition, prior scholarly work 
demonstrated that firm’s innovative output positively affects financing decisions of capital markets 
(Atanassov et al. 2007; Liu and Wong 2011).  
 R&D capabilities have been defined as a unique combination of accumulated patents, 
technological know-how and operational skills (Lee et al. 2001) that enhance product development 
outcomes (Henderson and Cockburn 1994; Verona 1999). Such capabilities are core to the success of 
technology-intensive firms (Henderson and Clark 1990; Tushman and Anderson 1986) and start-ups in 
particular (Chandler and Hanks 1994; Shrader and Simon 1997).  
 The uniqueness of R&D capabilities is attributed to the role of learning-by-doing, which makes 
such capabilities difficult to imitate (Irwin and Klenow 1994), thereby creating performance 
advantages (Dutta et al. 1999). An importance of firm’s previously accumulated tacit knowledge 
suggests that R&D capability is a manifestation of firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990). Consistent with this view, the conceptualisation adopted here expresses R&D capability as an 
absorptive capacity which allows to turn research into innovation and then marketable products. 
 
Principal Investigator’s Intellectual Capability 
 
 Intellectual capital has been described by prior research as cumulated knowledge, expertise, 
intangible assets and know-how that firms employ to gain sustained competitive advantage (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal 1998; Youndt et al. 2004; Teece 1998). It has been defined as “resource and capability for 
action based in knowledge and knowing” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998 p.245). Existing literature has 
postulated that embeddedness of dynamic capabilities in firms’ operational procedures triggers 
knowledge creation through a learning process (Huber 1991). Therefore, the ability to learn creates a 
link between intellectual capital and dynamic capability, whereby efficient transformation of 
knowledge leads to performance improvements (Hsu and Wang 2012).  
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 Theories of intellectual capital tend to delineate the concept as comprising three distinct yet 
interrelated elements, namely human, organisational and social capital, which operationally refer to 
individuals, organisational processes and networks as units of analysis, respectively (Subramaniam 
and Youndt 2005; Reed et al. 2006). Combinations of knowledge stock and skill set possessed by 
individuals are associated with stronger cognitive ability, which leads to productivity and efficiency in 
task completion (Davidsson and Honig 2003; Hitt et al. 2001).  
 Knowledgeable employees are a unique asset in high-tech firms, and their effective decision-
making processes lead to sustained firms’ performance (Hsu and Wang 2012). Enhancement of human 
capital through the accumulation of firm’s individual members’ specialised know-how first increases 
job performance and then firm’s performance (Hsu 2007). As such, intellectual capability, or 
‘smartness’, refers to “the intelligent mobilisation of cognitive capacities” for the successful operation 
of organisations (Alvesson and Spicer 2012 p.1195).  
 Based on the above reasoning and in line with the theory of entrepreneurial absorptive 
capacity proposed by Qian and Acs (2013), the conceptualisation of intellectual capability adopted 
here reflects the absorptive capacity of a lead scientist within the firm to dynamically capitalise and 
improve available intangible resources and know-how for generation of new valuable knowledge. 
 
Managerial Capability 
 
 Early work on managerial capabilities defined such competence as a combination of 
complementary analytical and intuitive skills (Stamp 1981 p.19). Managerial capability enables 
orchestration of organisational processes of integration, direction, utilisation and reconfiguration of 
resources (Day 1994; Henderson and Cockburn 1994). Although the concept of managerial capabilities 
has been examined from multiple theoretical and empirical angles, the research has converged on one 
universal conclusion—managerial capabilities are a source of sustained competitive advantage (Hall 
1993; Fortune and Mitchell 2012).  
 Managerial capability manifested through the ability to direct organisational mission has been 
found to have a positive impact on research productivity (Henderson and Cockburn 1994), innovation 
(Yeoh and Roth 1999), financial performance (Zollo and Singh 2004) and new product development 
(Iansiti and Clark 1994). Capabilities comprise a number of distinct knowledge dimensions, including 
employee-specific skills, technical systems developed through organisational routines and managerial 
systems (Leonard-Barton 1992). It is the role of managerial systems to interpret and integrate 
individual and technical knowledge dimensions into a cohesive whole, which suggests a higher-order 
capability (Day 1994).  
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 Managerial capability has been attributed to the ability to dynamically recognise new strategic 
opportunities (Collis 1994). Consequently, the body of work that drives the conceptualisation adopted 
in present research is that of dynamic managerial capability. First, dynamic managerial capabilities are 
unequivocally linked to the principles of entrepreneurship (Helfat and Martin 2015) because 
entrepreneurially minded managers create markets by reconfiguring organisational resources and 
routines (Teece 2012; Zahra et al. 2006). Secondly, dynamic managerial capabilities share the same 
characteristics with the broader concept of capabilities (Helfat and Martin 2015). A capability is 
defined as “the capacity to perform a particular activity in a reliable and at least minimally satisfactory 
manner” (Helfat and Winter 2011 p.1244). By extension, a dynamic managerial capability is directed 
towards achieving an intended organisational goal through orchestration and reconfiguration of 
resources and routines and deliberate deployment of skills (Helfat and Martin 2015).  
 H2-3a: In contrast to more observable signals of legitimacy, less observable signals of R&D, 
intellectual and managerial capability have no effect on the magnitude of initial funding commitment. 
 H2-3b: In contrast to more observable signals of legitimacy, less observable signals of R&D, 
intellectual and managerial capability have no effect on the likelihood of funding discontinuation 
 
Effect of Attention-Distorting Signal Categories on Funding Allocation Decisions 
 
 Boisot and Canals (2004) in their paper on information theory developed theoretical 
propositions concerning how data are converted into information and then knowledge. According to 
the authors, the behaviour of economic agents is driven by the principles of least action and rational 
deployment of scarce resources. Economic agents first use perceptual filters to attend to certain 
stimuli in a given situation, which then get registered as data and converted to information through 
conceptual filters (Boisot and Canals 2004).  
 Both perceptual and conceptual filters are shaped by a combination of cognition, 
expectations, prior knowledge, memories, values and emotional dispositions. Agents’ information 
processing capacity is located in a situation, which they subjectively interpret by applying those filters. 
Hence, selection of stimuli is likely to be hindered by personal style and preference more than by 
decision rules (Boisot and Canals 2004 p.54). Also, signalling properties are known to be amenable to 
agents’ critical reception (Lampel and Shamsie 2000). When there is an established system of 
preconceived beliefs concerning the importance of certain signals, decision-makers may gravitate 
from intended signals and cognitively weaken their signalling power in favour of more salient, 
attention-distorting signals (Branzei et al. 2004).  
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 The proposition asserted here is that investors are more receptive to information which is 
relevant to their internal agenda, such as project and portfolio characteristics. These factors are 
expected to be perceived as more salient and, therefore, act as distortion mechanisms, diverting 
funders’ attention from other signals. 
 
Project Appeal Characteristics 
 
 Scholarly work on signalling theory postulates that among other factors, interpretation of 
signals is also influenced by the receivers’ schemata, which is predominantly constructed by analysing 
competition and is rigid to incorporating changes that occur in the signalling environment (Heil and 
Robertson 1991). Therefore, the assertion being made is that certain types of projects will be 
perceived as more appealing based on expectations formed through the historical performance of 
market incumbents that certain categories of projects tend to perform better than others.  
 Alternatively, evaluators may seek to fund certain types of projects which have been outlined 
in the government’s agenda as priority areas for research. Either way, the underlying conjecture is 
that projects’ scope and category are more likely to get selected by decision-makers’ perceptual filters 
due to their salience. 
 
Project Scope 
 
 The value of options is determined by the scope of opportunities they open (Kogut and 
Kulatilaka 1994b). Project scope reflects depth and breadth of prospective opportunities as well as 
firm’s expertise in leveraging such opportunities (Sorescu et al. 2003). Subsequently, project scope 
signals potential attractiveness and competitiveness of the product being developed by the nascent 
firm (Tornikoski and Newbert 2007). As such, investment choices are to an extent dependent on 
project scope, which defines target markets and technical boundaries of R&D initiatives (Adner and 
Levinthal 2004b).  
 Broad project scope is an indication of greater chances for successful commercialisation as 
innovation efforts can be translated to a wider number of applications (Sorescu et al. 2003). Narrow 
project scope, on the other hand, signals a distinct yet restricted stock of core capabilities that can 
impose rigidities on innovation activities (Leonard-Barton 1992). Therefore, investors may infer that 
narrow project scope is a result of firm’s limited expertise. When investors have explicit 
commercialisation agenda in place, projects with a broader set of potential applications are more 
valuable than projects with a narrow set of applications (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994b). 
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Project Category 
 
 Membership in certain categories can also have signalling properties, even if such properties 
are not intentional signals, but taken-for-granted attributes (Negro et al. 2014). Belonging to a 
category can have strong signalling value and be relevant in particular situations such as during the 
screening process (Negro et al. 2014).  
 Prior research found that category signalling is explained by the theory of collective 
reputation, whereby firms belonging to certain groups may benefit or suffer from historical quality 
attributed to their predecessors (Tirole 1996). Such studies posit that collective reputation is more 
salient than individual reputation and, therefore, has a stronger signalling value (Negro et al. 2014). 
Also, prior research found that the evaluation of economic actors is shaped through the process of 
actuarial prejudice, whereby their perceived chances of success are determined by the perceived 
chances of success of a group to which they belong (Kiesler 1975). Following this logic is the assertion 
that certain categories of projects will be viewed by investors as more appealing than others. 
 H2-4a: Directly relevant project appeal characteristics have a stronger effect on the magnitude 
of initial funding commitment than legitimacy signals.  
 H2-4b: Directly relevant project appeal characteristics have a stronger effect on the 
likelihood of funding discontinuation than legitimacy signals.  
 
Existing Portfolio Characteristics 
 
 Moreover, portfolio structure may have a significant signalling effect. Decision makers’ 
attention is directed not only to potential new options, but also pre-existing and ongoing options in 
the portfolio (Barnett 2008). Under ROR, the value of a new option is determined in light of pre-
existing options in the portfolio. For investors, firms with previously created options might be 
positively perceived due to their prior experience developing similar R&D options, which might have 
scope-increasing potential (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). Such competing demands for the limited 
attention of decision-makers tend to crowd out the exploration of new opportunities in support of 
exploitation of existing strengths (March 1991).  
 Prior funding allocation is a strong contextual cue indicating that government venture 
capitalists have evaluated the firm previously and came to the conclusion that it is worth an 
investment. This proposition is consistent with prior findings (Bowman 1963) that own past decisions 
tend to be incorporated into a system of present decisions, whereby decision rules are derived from 
past behaviour. As noted by Bowman and Hurry (1993 p.766), organisational investment behaviour 
contains an element of inertia triggered by hysteresis—the spillover effect of past investments. 
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Therefore, through intuitive sense-making in the presence of sunk costs, investors are inclined to hold 
on to pre-existing investments and decline new investments (Dixit 1992).  
 H2-5a: Previous funding allocation decisions have a stronger positive effect on the magnitude 
of initial funding commitment than legitimacy signals. 
 In addition to portfolio effects, the magnitude of initial commitment in the opened option is 
expected to have an effect on the subsequent funding allocation decisions. Existing studies on real 
options indicate that propensity of making the withdrawal decision is lower when initial sunk costs are 
large (O’Brien and Folta 2009), when environmental uncertainty and market volatility are high 
(Belderbos and Zou 2009; Moel and Tufano 2002), or when options in the portfolio are correlated and 
create economies of scope for learning through simultaneous exploration (Vassolo et al. 2004). 
 With regards to R&D projects specifically, the continuation decision will be influenced by the 
magnitude of incurred development costs, the expected future cash flows, determined by perceived 
market size and share, as well as on updated information indicating the value of the R&D project 
(Newton et al. 2004). 
 H2-5b: Previous funding allocation decisions have a stronger negative effect on the likelihood 
of funding discontinuation than legitimacy signals. 
 
Part II Conceptual Models  
 
 To sum up, the primary proposition developed in Part II analysis is that TMTs’ different 
characteristics signal their legitimacy which minimises investors’ uncertainty in firms’ underlying 
quality. First, TMTs signal the availability of necessary human and social capital resources via academic 
statuses and affiliations. Second, TMTs signal their ability to fulfil managerial and scientific roles within 
the firm via previous experience and relevant expertise. Third, TMTs signal their intellectual capability 
through research output and ability to effectively communicate valuation-relevant information. Taken 
together, these signals of legitimacy enhance investors’ perceptions of firms’ potential to thrive in 
volatile conditions (Suchman 1995). Figure 4-2 depicts a configuration of tested relationships related 
to investors’ Phase I decision-making, whilst Figure 4-3 concerns the decision-making process at Phase 
II, which also includes signals of efficacy. 
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Figure 4-2: Conceptual model IIa 
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Figure 4-3: Conceptual model IIb 
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4.4 Part III:  Analysis of Complementarities of Real Options Reasoning and Signalling 
Perspectives to Explain Consequences of Government Venture Funding 
 
 The primary objective of the present section is to combine Part I and Part II analyses presented 
earlier in a coherent model. As such, Part III tests complementarities of ROR and signalling theories in 
predicting investment yield and long-term firm performance in the context of government venture 
funding. The core research questions addressed in Part III are: (i) ‘Do effects of ROR elements hold in 
the presence of firm-level factors?’, (ii) ‘How accurate are signals used as selection criteria for funding 
allocation decisions at predicting investment yield and long-term firm performance?’ and (iii) ‘Which 
configurations of capabilities affect performance?”. In addressing these questions, the underlying 
conceptual foundations have been explicated in the following three sections. 
 
Effect of Funding Allocation Outcomes on Long-term Performance in the Presence of Firm-level 
Factors 
 
 There is an increasing appreciation in the literature on ROR that present statistical models 
predicting performance implications of real options investments tend to omit firms’ skills, 
competences and capabilities which are also determinants of competitive advantage in firms (Driouchi 
and Bennett 2012). Reuer and Tong (2007) posited that performance outcomes of real options are 
influenced by real options investment decisions as well as the implementation of real options, which 
can have independent and combined effects. The empirical evidence demonstrated that firm-level 
heterogeneity in skills and capabilities creates differences in management and implementation of real 
options, which significantly contributes to the variance in the value created by options (Tong and 
Reuer 2006).  
 Although managerial and organisation capabilities influence implementation of real options, 
the current state of research is limited in understanding their role in affecting prescriptions of the 
investment theory, calling for more work outlining boundaries of real options reasoning from the 
practical perspective (Reuer and Tong 2007). In particular, firms that had previously opened options 
might have acquired real options management knowledge and developed a specific set of skills and 
capabilities necessary for their successful implementation. Therefore, the unequivocal inclusion of 
firm-level differences such as intangible assets and tacit knowledge in the economic model can project 
a coherent view of real options performance implications in the organisational setting. 
 Whereas Part I looks at how the presence, absence and structuring of real options affects 
performance, Part III extends such inquiry by explicitly incorporating firms’ skills and capabilities. Part 
III analysis merges financial theory with a resource-based view of the firm in a unified model to 
examine their simultaneous impact on performance heterogeneity of real options. As such, the 
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intention is to test whether real options theory predictions hold in a more ‘practical’ setting, which 
also takes account of firm-level factors. Therefore, the key objective here is to move beyond the 
isolated testing of core elements of ROR and conduct an additional robustness test of insights derived 
in Part I analysis, thereby showing further support of propositions of ROR. Despite the apparent 
association of firms’ attributes with competitive advantage, the assertion is made that the 
predisposition of resource allocation outcomes to affect performance in specific ways established in 
Part I analysis, is unlikely to change significantly in the scenario which closer reflects real life. 
 H3-1: Effects of ROR elements on investment yield and firm performance continue to remain 
significant in the presence of firm-level factors. 
 
Relationship between Signals and Long-term Performance 
 
 Signals communicate useful information about economic agents’ underlying qualities. 
However, interpretation of signals can be complicated by contextual factors as well as recipients’ 
experience and frames of reference. In particular, interpretation of signals transmitted by firms 
operating in nascent or niche industries is problematic. The early years of nascent firms are 
characterised by fluid entrepreneurial processes which emerge as a result of learning-by-doing. Thus, 
as Sapienza and Gupta (1994) noted, task uncertainty, defined as the discrepancy between required 
information and possessed information necessary to perform a task, is greater for early-stage ventures 
working on highly innovative projects.  
 Such emergent nature of entrepreneurial practices coupled with task uncertainty makes it 
difficult to define ex-ante the desired list of skills and abilities of economic players in nascent 
industries, further magnifying information asymmetry (Zahra and Filatotchev 2004). Given that 
emerging industries face greater unresolved uncertainties, evaluators try to project their future course 
of development by relying on memories of historical performance of established industries (Zahra and 
Filatotchev 2004). However, emerging sectors and industries often take their own development path, 
shaped through interactions of nascent social actors, which may be independent of the rules of the 
game followed by established industries. Nevertheless, research suggests that receivers are inclined 
to attend to the same signals upon which they informed their prior choices and decisions (Cohen and 
Dean 2005). The propensity to imitate past decisions, driven by organisational routines, can impose a 
so-called ‘bandwagon effect’ on interpretation practices of signals, which may or may not be accurate 
(McNamara et al. 2008). As a result, overreliance on prior knowledge leads to misconceptions and 
subsequent misinterpretation of signals. 
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 Ambiguity involved in new ventures’ evaluation makes investors predisposed to heuristics and 
biases. Despite their ability to operate efficiently under time constraints (Payne et al. 1988), heuristics 
can also introduce errors (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). One of the most prevalent biases in 
investment context is that of overconfidence, which can be manifested in the increased propensity to 
overestimate the likelihood of occurrence of future outcomes or validity of own knowledge, resulting 
in impaired decision-making (Griffin and Varey 1996). Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) showed 
evidence that overconfidence negatively affects venture capitalists’ decision accuracy. Among other 
factors, the authors found that overconfidence can surge when decision-makers automatically process 
familiar information relevant to the decision and refrain from questioning existing knowledge and 
seeking new information (Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001). A study by Shepherd (1999) also provided 
empirical evidence that the accuracy of venture capitalists’ introspection is limited.  
 Following this line of inquiry, investors’ decision-making is analysed to determine its accuracy. 
In sum, the expectation is that there is a discrepancy between expected and real association of firms’ 
attributes with anticipated performance outcomes, which adversely affects decision accuracy and 
subsequently upside potential of investments. 
 H3-2: There is a discrepancy between perceived and actual effects of signals on investment 
yield and firm performance. 
 
Relationship between Interactions of Capabilities and Long-term Performance  
 
 The classical theory of organisational rationality postulates that firms’ three major 
components—input activities, technological activities and output activities—are interconnected and 
require tailored aligning (Thompson 1967). That is, “the inputs acquired must be within the scope of 
the technology, and it must be within the capacity of the organisation to dispose of the technological 
production” (Thompson 1967 p.19). The capabilities investigated in this study reflect these three 
component activities: intellectual capability of the PI represents a critical input to the entrepreneurial 
value-creating process, R&D capability relates to the technological scope, whilst managerial capability 
is directed at producing outputs. 
 Similar to other organisational processes and activities, functional and managerial capabilities 
interact in a complementary yet subordinate manner (Fortune and Mitchell 2012). Amit and 
Schoemaker (1993) expressed that complementarity of capabilities occurs when the magnitude of one 
capability increases the strategic value of another, whereas substitution occurs when the magnitude 
of one capability decreases the strategic value of another. 
 In the resource-based view of the firm, the rent producing capacity of organisations is 
contingent upon the unique combination of resources and capabilities and the extent to which they 
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overlap (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Barney 1991). However, complex interactions between 
capabilities, although difficult to imitate by competitors, sometimes cannot be apprehended even by 
the firms possessing them, increasing ambiguity of organisational processes (Reed and DeFillippi 
1990). 
 As a result, the broad assertion presented here is that capabilities may have a direct as well 
as an interactive effect on superior firm performance, with unique combinations causing 
complementarity or substitution effects. Given the expectation that firms will need different 
configurations of capabilities depending on their experience in implementing real options, the posited 
hypothesis is non-directional. 
 H3-3: The interactions between capabilities have both complementarity and substitutions 
effects on investment yield and long-term firm performance. 
 
Part III Conceptual Model 
 
 Figure 4-4 presents the conceptual model guiding Part III analysis. It combines propositions 
of ROR and signalling theories in a unified framework to investigate their simultaneous effects on 
investment yield and firm performance, and specifically investigates direct as well as interaction 
effects of three types of capabilities. 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 This chapter presented theoretical frameworks guiding the present research. To address 
different directions of research questions, analytical foundations are elaborated in three separate 
parts. First, hypotheses pertaining to real options theory are developed to investigate the role of 
distinct ROR elements in influencing long-term performance. Next, the conceptual model examining 
the effects of signals and attention-regulating mechanisms on funding allocation outcomes is 
expressed in a series of conjectures. The final part presents a unified framework to test the impact of 
financial decisions and firm-level heterogeneity on performance. 
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Figure 4-4: Conceptual model III 
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 Research Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 With philosophical assumptions informing the choice of methodological approach, this 
chapter first outlines the premises of the driving scientific research paradigm, which formed the basis 
for the research design formulation. Next, the sampling and database development procedure is 
described, followed by the explanation of operationalisations and measures used to construct 
variables. The chapter concludes with a section on analytical approaches and statistical tools that were 
employed to examine collected data. 
 
5.2 Scientific Research Paradigm 
 
 Questions pertaining to the philosophical understanding of the social world cannot be 
separated from the principles of how business research is conducted (Bryman and Bell 2011). 
Therefore, the first step to devising a research methodology requires delineation of researcher’s 
philosophical positions that place the project in context and that way inform the choice of research 
design and strategy decisions. 
 
Research Philosophy – Post-positivism 
 
 Research is a complex process of knowledge development and at multiple stages of that 
process, the researcher needs to make assumptions about the nature of knowledge. These 
assumptions are crucial in dictating the choice of research strategy and method, and because they are 
inherent to the researcher’s understanding of surrounding reality, they represent the philosophical 
position (Deshpande 1983). Two fundamental components comprise the research philosophy—
namely, ontology and epistemology, and their understanding helps researchers select and justify the 
most suitable methodology and develop a coherent research strategy and design.  
 Ontology refers to the lens through which the researcher perceives the world. Fundamentally, 
there are two ways to view reality—through the objectivist lens, which stipulates that social 
phenomena have the exogenous existence of the social elements affected by it, and through the 
subjectivist lens, which maintains that social phenomena are shaped through interpretations of the 
social actors (Saunders et al. 2012). Epistemology, on the other hand, is concerned with what type of 
knowledge is viewed as acceptable in a respective research field (Bryman and Bell 2011).  
 The four most widely adopted philosophies in the business and management area are 
positivism, realism, interpretivism and pragmatism. In comparison to the other three paradigms, 
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pragmatism is not dominated by any particular philosophical stance, but instead the choice is driven 
by whether a certain ontological or epistemological position helps achieve research objectives and 
dictates the methodology that better fits the nature of the research questions and context (Saunders 
et al. 2012). As such, pragmatism is driven by the practicality of applied research and is based upon 
multiple mixed positions. Table 5-1 summarises the underlying principles of three distinct research 
paradigms.  
 
Table 5-1: Summary of the dominant philosophical paradigms of business and management research 
 Positivism Post-positivism Interpretivism 
Ontology: 
nature of 
reality 
• Naïve realism 
• External 
• Objective 
• Independent 
• Critical realism 
• Imperfectly external 
• Modified objective 
• Interpreted by social actors 
• Constructivism/Relativism 
• Subjective 
• Socially constructed 
Epistemology: 
nature of 
knowledge 
• Observable phenomena 
• Data and facts 
• True results 
• Causality 
• Law-like generalisations 
• Observable phenomena 
• Data and facts 
• Probabilistically true results 
• Multiplicity of theories for 
the same fact 
• Laws context-specific and 
open to revision 
• Subjective meanings 
• Social phenomena 
• Details of situation 
• Opportunity structures 
• Ideal types 
Axiology: 
nature of 
values 
• Dualism: observer-
observed independent 
• Detachment 
• Researcher is value-
free and objective 
• Dualism: observer-observed 
independent 
• Detachment 
• Researcher is value-laden 
and biassed 
• Non-dualism: observer-
observed interdependent 
• Interaction 
• Researcher is value-
bound, part of the 
phenomenon 
Goal • Explanation • Explanation • Understanding 
Methodology • Observation 
• Quantitative 
• Mostly induction 
(knowledge produced) 
• Observation 
• Mixed methods 
• Mostly deduction 
(knowledge derived) 
• Interpretation 
• Qualitative 
• Mostly inuction 
(knowledge emergent) 
Data analysis • Analysis ‘by variables’ 
• Structured 
• Large samples 
• Analysis ‘by variables’ 
• Mixed tools 
• Analysis ‘by cases’ 
• In-depth 
• Small samples 
Source: Adapted from Saunders et al. (2012 p. 140) and Corbetta (2003 p.14) 
 The current research project is built on the premise that no philosophy is superior or inferior 
to any other. Although each school of thought has a point to make, each suffers from certain 
limitations that have implications for knowledge accumulation in the field of management science (Gill 
and Johnson 1997). Hence, the choice of philosophical position largely depends on the research 
problem and its objectives. 
 One of the proposed ways of looking at the philosophical paradigms is by distinguishing 
between the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches by reference to the objectives of the pursued 
scientific inquiry (Hollis 2006). The schemata presented in Figure 5-1 encapsulates competing 
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traditions of social science, with deterministic ‘explanation’ and interpretative ‘understanding’ on the 
vertical axis, and ‘individualism’ and ‘holism’ on the horizontal axis. Whereas ‘individualism’ reflects 
actions of agents, ‘holism’ refers to the way of perceiving individual agents as part of the holistic 
whole. ‘Systems’ and ‘individual agents’ feature in philosophical positions, which are concerned with 
explanations of the social world, while paradigms encapsulating ‘games’ and ‘actors’ are concerned 
with the understanding of the social world (Hollis 2006). 
 
Figure 5-1: Matrix view of the social world 
 
Source: Adopted from Hollis (2006 p.19) 
 Given that the current study is evaluative in nature and aims to explain what is happening, 
seeks new insights, assesses phenomena in a new light and expects to clarify understandings of the 
problem by addressing the “what” type of questions, the research philosophy reflects the principles 
of objectivism (Saunders et al. 2012). Specifically, the intention to examine the collective role of 
individual decision-makers in the government venture capital context, suggests the ‘top down’ 
explanation approach. Such approach accounts for individual actions within a holistic working system, 
which can also have its contribution to the social world independent of the individual agents. However, 
by comprehending that both systems and individual agents must be present to explain the social 
worlds, the dividing line becomes blurry (Hollis 2006), calling for a more outward-looking philosophical 
position. 
 The adopted objectivist philosophical stance is based on the assumption that social 
phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is rule-governed and separate from social 
actors (Bryman and Bell 2011). Under this view, the researcher is seen as independent of the studied 
phenomenon. By adopting the objectivist stance, the study holds that the way firms and individuals 
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behave is driven by their adherence to certain structures and procedures, and although there is 
internally imposed heterogeneity among social actors, the essence of their functioning is universal 
across all industries and countries.  
 Although objectivity is an ultimate ideal goal, it is recognised that researcher’s experience and 
interpretation of the surrounding world can have an effect on research outcomes (Hunt 1993). As 
such, the position adopted in the current project reflects the principles of the critical realist ontology, 
which evolved from naïve realist thinking of logical positivism (Corbetta 2003). The positivist doctrine 
assumes complete and unbiased objectivity of the researcher during the process of gathering and 
analysis of facts necessary to provide the basis for the generation of laws (Bryman and Bell 2011). In 
contrast, by acknowledging that it is impossible to fully exclude own values because they are deeply 
embedded in cognitive processes, the present piece of work adopts a post-positivist logic. Here, the 
step is taken away from the claims under a value-free perspective and instead the emphasis is placed 
on achieving value-neutrality as a result of comprehension that interpretation is biassed and theory-
laden (Hunt 1993). As such, under the critical realist ontology, cause-effect relationships exist in the 
external reality, but that reality is imperfectly knowable and objective knowledge can only be 
approximately achieved (Corbetta 2003). On the epistemological side of the philosophical position, 
the process of knowledge derivation is enabled through rationalisation and formal logical reasoning 
and organisations are seen as aggregations of nested levels of stable constructs (Donaldson 1996). 
However, while both positivist and post-positivist schools of thought agree on the nature of theory, 
describing it as systematically connected laws, critical realists postulate that it is not only an observed 
regularity of the studied phenomena, but rather a causality, which may vary across different contexts 
(Hunt 1983). Therefore, the process of knowledge derivation is focused on exploring the links between 
multiple theories that are believed to contribute to the studied phenomenon. 
 
Approach Selection – Deduction 
 
 When designing the research strategy, explicit reasoning concerning the development of 
theory needed to be adopted. Two approaches to differentiating between true and false facts are 
referred to as induction and deduction: the former approach utilises empirical findings to make 
conclusions, while the latter uses logical reasoning (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). As depicted in Figure 
5-2, induction is concerned with inferring facts and ideas that precede theory building, whereas 
deduction is interested in scrutinising the consequences of a theory to confirm or refute its validity in 
relation to a specific phenomenon or context. The fact that theories tested in the current research are 
derived from existing academic literature and research propositions are developed a priori indicates 
that a hypothetico-deductive approach is followed (Hunt 1983).  
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Figure 5-2: The logic of the research process 
 
Source: Adopted from De Vaus (2001 p.8) 
 
 Deduction entails a number of important attributes (Saunders et al. 2012; Bryman and Bell 
2011). First, causal relationships between concepts and variables are sought to be explained by the 
use of a highly structured methodology to enable replication and warrant reliability. Then, concepts 
need to be operationalised in a way that allows to measure them via facts and quantitative data. 
Operationalisation is informed by precise definitions of the phenomena and by breaking down the 
research problem into smaller more easily understood elements.  Such reductionist approach is 
necessary to observe how the variables in question are behaving in a simplified real-world 
environment (Remenyi et al. 1998). After reducing the problem, the representative sample of 
appropriate size needs to be selected through techniques such as probability sampling to ensure 
generalisability of findings. However, the findings of the deductive research will not be generalisable 
unless the research has been replicated a number of times in different relevant contexts (Remenyi et 
al. 1998). 
 Deductive reasoning is concerned with drawing logical conclusions from observed evidence. 
Hence, the research strategy was structured in the following steps: (i) deduce a hypothesis from the 
theory, (ii) express the relationships in operational terms, (iii) test the hypothesis, (iv) examine the 
outcome, and finally, (v) modify the theory in light of the findings (Saunders et al. 2012).  In this 
respect, deduction reflects the principles of scientific approach which emphasises the centrality of 
theory and its empirical testing (Donaldson 2005) and hence goes in line with the post-positivist 
position adopted in current research.  
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5.3 Research Design  
 
 Once the underlying philosophy and research approach have been established, the next step 
is to outline research design and strategy. Each element of the methodology was carefully formulated 
as to accommodate the post-positivist epistemology and objectivist ontology embedded in the nature 
of the research phenomenon, while research design decisions and tactics reflect the overarching 
principles of the scientific paradigm. 
 
Methodology Selection – Quantitative 
 
 The choice between qualitative and quantitative methods reflects different perspectives on 
the nature of knowledge and the purpose of research (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). Positivist 
epistemology and deductive approach, often mandated through the use of thoroughly planned data 
generation procedures, are closely associated with quantitative research methods. The studied 
phenomenon is expressed numerically through variables, and the relationships between these 
variables are being tested and verified using statistical techniques (Bryman and Bell 2011). Hence, 
quantification in the collection and analysis of data was a necessary step to serve the explanatory 
purpose pursued by the present research and to aid examination of causal relationships between 
constructs.  
 
Research Strategy Selection – Archival Research 
 
 A research strategy can be defined as a plan of action to achieve project’s aims and objectives, 
and is a methodological tool that bridges the philosophical assumptions with data collection and 
analysis techniques (Saunders et al. 2012). As such, a carefully designed research strategy guarantees 
coherence between posed research questions and end goals, and helps address the practicalities of 
research such as time and resource constraints. 
 Although the research design strategies are not mutually exclusive, specific scientific 
paradigms and subject disciplines lend themselves to the use of particular research strategies more 
than others. So, for example, experiments and surveys tend to be associated with quantitative 
methodology; ethnography, action research, grounded theory and narrative inquiry with qualitative 
methodology; while archival research and case studies with the mixed methods approach (Saunders 
et al. 2012).  
 Two research design strategies that were considered for the current project were a survey 
and archival research. Survey is the most widespread strategy in deductive business and management 
research and is utilised to gather quantitative data for subsequent statistical analysis (Gill and Johnson 
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1997). Advantages associated with surveys include collection of standardised data to aid 
comparability, easier and cost-effective access to larger samples, and high level of control over 
designing research process. Most importantly, surveys allow finding out opinions of the population on 
specific subject matters.  Nonetheless, survey design requires careful sampling and thorough planning 
of targeted questions and development of accurate instruments to address these questions. Lack of 
control over the collection process and response rate are recognised as the main challenges associated 
with the survey research (Bryman and Bell 2011).  
 Archival research, on the other hand, uses secondary data from existing documents and 
records as the primary information source. One of the key strengths of archival research is that data 
depict a high level of objective reality because they were collected for administrative and not research 
purposes in the first place (Saunders et al. 2012). As a result, it helps investigate events retrospectively 
and how they change over time. However, it is inevitable that archival research is constrained by the 
nature and availability of public information sources and secondary data. Therefore, boundaries need 
to be established early on to find out what type of questions and topics can be answered by accessing 
specific public data sources. Despite some of its limitations, archival research was chosen as the most 
appropriate strategy for investigating the development of events as it allows gaining powerful insights 
from a prolonged time horizon of data. 
 
Data Selection – Secondary Longitudinal Data 
 
 The emergence of technologies, Internet and freedom of information legislation created a 
shift in how data are collected and stored, which facilitated the spread of and access to data, and 
offered new avenues of potential data sources to social scientists. As a result, there has a been an 
increased appreciation that secondary sources need to be exhausted before embarking on any 
primary data gathering (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). Increasingly, many governmental, commercial 
and academic institutions are willing to share their detailed sets of data with the wider public. Such 
datasets eliminate the need for collection of primary data and allow to investigate wholly or in part a 
range of research topics. In particular, governmental databases, dedicated data archives, companies’ 
websites and social networking platforms allow open access to rich data.  
 Secondary data can be both quantitative and qualitative, coming in its raw or compiled form. 
Social scientists tend to classify secondary data into documentary, survey and multi-source categories 
(Saunders et al. 2012). Documentary secondary data include textual, multimedia and visual material 
from companies’ internal databases, as well as web and press sources, while survey-based secondary 
data included censuses and questionnaires of public and private research bodies. Multi-source 
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secondary data refer to sources that compile databases and listings on a broad range of information 
and material types.  
 One of the key advantages offered by multi-source secondary data is that quite often it is of 
longitudinal nature. It was recognised that because time is a crucial dimension of everyday life, 
understanding how organisational processes occur and unfold over time is of practical and applied 
significance to researchers (Dansereau and Yammarino 2003 p.313). As Pettigrew (1990 p.269) 
emphasised, longitudinal research design is “contextualist and processual in nature” and “draws on 
phenomena at vertical and horizontal levels of analysis and the interconnections between those levels 
through time”. 
 As a result, multi-source data was deemed most appropriate for present research purposes as 
it allows access to historical data collected over an extended period of time and hence research can 
be conducted from a ‘diary’ perspective (Saunders et al. 2012). Also, use of secondary data saves time 
resources as it eliminates the need to collect primary data and offers particularly extensive insights 
into research projects that require national and international comparisons. Financial benefits can also 
be achieved—while some databases may charge a subscription fee, others may be completely free. 
Moreover, projects conducted using secondary data are believed to conform with research integrity 
and transparency standards because all datasets can be easily accessed by anyone so that the study 
can be replicated with ease. Finally, the use of secondary data allows to step away from a pre-defined 
conceptual framework and explore the patterns in the data that can uncover unanticipated 
relationships, which normally go unnoticed in survey research which forces answers to a number of 
specific questions.  
 One of the major drawbacks associated with using secondary data relates to thoroughness 
and suitability of methodology with which original data was gathered (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002). 
The researcher has limited means of assuring that the data provider adhered to robust collection and 
analysis standards and that data in the database are accurate and representative. Additionally, some 
data may prove unsuitable for research purposes due to higher-level aggregations and definitions 
inconsistent with the ones adopted by the project. 
 In fact, research design followed in the present project can be more accurately described as 
multi-source data gathering of relevant information from multi-source databases and listings. That is 
to say, secondary data were collected by the researcher from a range of secondary multi-source 
databases and then compiled in a single dataset. Availability of relevant secondary data to answer the 
research questions of the current project, as well as the breadth of potential sources was established 
by consulting literature in strategic management and marketing fields that used secondary data in the 
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past. Additionally, library resources were thoroughly investigated to locate relevant datasets and 
finally, Google search was utilised to find useful sources information using specific search terms. 
 
Measurement Approach – Multi-level 
 
 Another important aspect in devising a research methodology is related to the concept level, 
which refers to the primary unit of measurement and analysis (Bryman and Bell 2011 p.67). Given that 
the choice of research design is a link between the conceptual and empirical levels (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug 2002), data measurement approach has to address the multi-level theoretical framework 
proposed in the present project. 
 Multi-level research is an important and widely accepted approach to investigating 
organisational issues. This perspective increasingly dominates the positivist research, which treats 
multi-level phenomena as occurring in organisations naturally and independently of any observers. 
These levels are stable and legitimate elements, which, despite having their own standalone existence, 
are also hierarchically nested (Heracleous and Jacobs 2008). Hence, individuals comprise groups that 
make up organisations which then form industries, and ‘scientific’ knowledge is gained by 
understanding interactions that occur between these levels (Heracleous and Jacobs 2008). 
Traditionally, the multi-level approach has been concerned with creating a link between micro- and 
macro-level organisational phenomena (Mossholder and Bedeian 1983; Staw et al. 1981). Micro-
perspective includes individual and group-level effects, while macro-level perspective is concerned 
with wider institutional and economic environment such as strategy and industry dynamics, and the 
dominant assumption is that organisations function at more than one level (Heracleous and Jacobs 
2008).  
 A primary goal of multi-level research has been to advance the theoretical, conceptual and 
methodological treatment of data through making statistical inferences from low and high levels of 
analysis (Rousseau 1985). In this context, methodological consistency can be achieved by specifying a 
priori levels of constructs, model, and sample, and by using statistical tests to analyse distinct level 
effects (Klein and Kozlowski 2000). Under this view, sampling and statistical analysis are devised in line 
with how the level of a theoretical construct fits the conceptual framework (Heracleous and Jacobs 
2008). To reflect the latter, the stages of data collection and measurement of variables incorporated 
the multi-level nature of the theoretical model and data were generated at individual-, project-, firm- 
and industry-levels. Hence, the first two levels present the micro-perspective, while the latter two 
levels present the macro-perspective of the organisational phenomena. 
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Research Ethics 
 
 Light touch review mandated by the Ethics Research Framework of the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) was undertaken using a pre-defined checklist to estimate the level of 
potential risk to studied subjects. It was concluded that datasets employed were uncontroversial, and 
data collected were not sensitive, which indicated no further ethical implications (approved Ethics 
Form can be found in Appendix 2). Additionally, because the present project utilised publicly available 
data that anyone has open and unlimited access to, full ethical approval procedure was unnecessary. 
Nevertheless, current research was conducted under the strict ethical principles and with adherence 
to a professional code of conduct and Data Protection Act as to respect to studied subjects’ privacy. 
The general ethical considerations concerned avoidance of intentional embarrassment, pain, harm, 
breach of privacy or any other disadvantage to the subjects studied here (Saunders et al. 2012; 
Churchill and Iacobucci 2002). As a result, no names or identities of firms or individuals, nor any other 
personally identifiable information were disclosed or used for purposes other than empirical scientific 
investigation. 
 Present research is conducted with a clear understanding that no research methodology can 
guarantee absolute findings. Instead, care was taken to devise such a research strategy as to minimise 
room for potential error and obtain tentative and qualified results. The quality of research was sought 
by maintaining integrity and objectivity during data collection and analysis, and by abiding by ‘scientific 
canons of inquiry’—namely, reliability and validity principles (Saunders et al. 2012).  Reliability is 
concerned with consistency and replicability, and calls for methodological rigour, attention to detail, 
sound logic, as well as open disclosure of steps followed. Validity is the second element of research 
quality and relates to the accuracy of operationalisation and measurement of constructs, 
determination of sound causal relationships between variables, and generalisability to other relevant 
contexts. The issue of reliability was addressed by devising and following a strict research protocol, 
which documented every step that was taken during data gathering and data analysis stages. Validity 
was controlled for through a thorough review of the peer-reviewed literature to compile a list of 
measures and operationalisations that could be adopted for the purposes of the present project. After, 
measures extracted from prior literature were mapped over conceptual definitions of constructs used 
in the model to determine which ones help answer the research questions better. 
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5.4 Database Development 
 
Empirical Setting 
 
 The previous section described the chosen elements of research design that best reflect the 
researcher’s overarching philosophical principles and help to answer the questions posed in this study. 
This section outlines how the target population was identified and how the sample frame was 
selected. 
 
Target Population – Database Consideration and Selection  
  
 An important and overriding condition for primary database selection was that data were 
available: (i) on pre-commercialisation activities, (ii) at project-level, (iii) by the phase of development. 
Also, it was a requirement that the chosen database could be supplemented with additional public 
sources.  
 Additionally, given the research focus, projects had to be funded by external sources. 
Databases containing venture capital deals have been ruled out because they tend to include 
information at the aggregated firm level, while the aim was to obtain data at the project level. For this 
reason, databases containing government-funded R&D and innovation projects were deemed the 
most suitable target population.     
 A number of government initiatives have been discovered and further investigations identified 
three potential databases: SBIR & STTR programme in the United States, SMART programme in the 
United Kingdom and Eurostars-Eureka programme in the European Union. These databases matched 
the following main criteria:  
1. They provided data on separate phases of project development, such as proof-of-concept, 
concept development and commercialisation. 
2. The projects under development followed clearly defined phases that characterise a 
structured process (e.g. Stage-Gate process of Cooper (2008)) in many respects. 
3. Data on projects were well documented at all stages, were reliable and reflected transparent 
processes. 
 However, after a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of potential databases 
summarised in Table 5-2, it was decided that the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) database 
is the most suitable option because it allows to follow projects through phases, offers a longitudinal 
dataset, and the disadvantages associated with its use are minimal and can be overcome.  
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Table 5-2: Comparison of potential databases 
Database Advantages Limitations 
Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) and Small 
Business Technology Transfer 
(STTR) programme, US-based 
• Phases: I and II  
• Timeframe: 1983-present 
• Additional sources of 
information available 
• Sample is limited to small private US-
based firms which do not have to file 
financial information 
• Phase III is not captured in the 
database 
SMART programme of the 
Technology Strategy Board, 
UK-based 
• Phases: proof of market, 
proof of concept, prototype 
development 
• Timeframe: 2011-present 
• Projects do not follow through 
phases consecutively 
• Insufficient data on projects that 
went through one phase to another 
• No data on project outcomes 
Eurostars-Eureka programme, 
EU-based 
• Phases: complete, withdrawn, 
running, on hold, not started 
• Timeframe: 2007-present 
• International projects led by 
R&D performing SMEs 
• Complicated network of participants 
• Not enough on data on 
unsuccessfully completed or 
terminated projects 
• Limited additional data sources 
Source: Author’s analysis of SBIR, SMART and EUROSTARS online platforms 
 The SBIR initiative is administered through the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and 
is funded by one of the eleven Federal Agencies. The programme is structured in three phases and 
aims to fuel the growth of the U.S. economy by encouraging small businesses to explore their 
entrepreneurial and technological potential, stimulating commercialisation of the technology, 
product, or service spurring from R&D and innovation activities. All proposals are peer-reviewed and 
awards are granted on a competitive basis based on scientific and technical merit and commercial 
potential (SBIR 2015). Table 5-3 presents a summary of the main elements of the SBIR programme and 
Figure 5-3 depicts a sequence of phases followed by the initiative. The scope of the current study only 
includes projects that participated in Phase I and Phase II of the programme. 
  
130 
 
Table 5-3: Summary of the main elements of the SBIR programme 
Programme Element  Description 
Objectives • Stimulate technological innovation; 
• Meet federal research and development needs; 
• Increase private sector commercialisation of innovations developed through 
federal R&D funding; 
• Foster and encourage participation in innovation and entrepreneurship by socially 
and economically disadvantaged persons and women-owned small businesses. 
Eligibility criteria • Qualify as Small Business Concern;   
• Have not more than 500 employees; 
• Be organised for profit and have a legal company form; 
• Operate primarily within the U.S.; 
• Be more than 50% owned by and controlled by one or more citizens of the U.S. 
Three-Phase 
Programme 
Phase I - Feasibility and Proof of Concept: 
• Objective: establish the technical merit, feasibility, and commercial potential of 
the proposed R/R&D efforts and determine the quality of performance of the 
small business organisation prior to providing Phase II award; 
• Budget: up to $150,000 per project; 
• Duration: 6 months (SBIR) to 1 year (STTR); 
Phase II - Research/Research and Development: 
• Objective: continue the R&D efforts initiated in Phase I. Funding is based on the 
results achieved in Phase I and the scientific and technical merit and commercial 
potential of the project proposed in Phase II. Only Phase I awardees are eligible 
for a Phase II award;  
• Budget: up to $1 million per project; 
• Duration: up to 2 years. 
Phase IIB - Bridge Award:  
• Objective: address the funding gap between the end of the SBIR Phase II award 
and the subsequent round of financing needed to advance a product or service 
toward commercialisation. The Bridge Award is designed to incentivise 
partnerships between SBIR Phase II awardees and third-party investors and/or 
strategic partners;  
• Budget: up to $1 million per project per year; 
• Duration: up to 3 years. 
Phase III - Commercialisation: 
• Objective: pursue commercialisation objectives resulting from the Phase I & II;  
• Budget: the SBIR/STTR programs do not fund Phase III. 
Source: SBIR 
Figure 5-3: Phases of the U.S. SBIR/STTR programme 
 
Source: SBIR 
 
 Figure 5-3 shows that the SBIR initiative stipulates clearly defined phases of a structured 
process. Appendix 3 presents a schemata which shows how the SBIR programme maps onto 
different new project development models. 
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Sample Frame – Agency Consideration 
 
 Having selected the most suitable database to address the research needs, the next stage was 
to limit the number of cases in the population by clusters contained within the sample frame 
(Saunders et al. 2012 p.262).  
 As a first step of the sampling procedure, to reduce the heterogeneity among projects in the 
sample frame, it was necessary to choose one of eleven participating federal agencies18.  
Table 5-4: Top five SBIR/STTR programme funding federal agencies – 2012 performance 
Federal Agency Total Awards 
(million $) 
Success Rate Cost per Project 
(‘000 $) 
Cost per Project 
(2006-12 % CAGR) 
 Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II 
DOD 237.5 573.7 19% 73% 120.3 413.9 5.1% -7.3% 
HHS 217.1 244.9 18% 48% 227.8 765.4 4.9% -5.1% 
DOE 66.9 145.2 16% 43% 180.8 1,009.9 10.2% 9.8% 
NASA 36.8 71.4 16% 21% 123.3 728.5 9.2% 3.7% 
NSF 35.4 65.4 11% 43% 147.5 480.8 7.1% -7.7% 
Total of 11 613.3 1,139.7 17% 56% 152.6 530.1 5.9% -4.9% 
Note: Success rate is calculated as the ratio of the number awards granted to the number of applications 
received. 
Source: SBIR 2006-2012 annual reports, author’s analysis 
 
 First, top five agencies were selected by size and then further narrowed down by their 
propensity to fund projects that are high-tech and have a strong incentive to commercialise. Having 
examined objectives and portfolios of the agencies, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) were 
identified as the most relevant for the research project. 
 Next, a pilot study was conducted to establish the feasibility of data gathering execution task 
from secondary sources. To assess the level of difficulty of retrieving relevant information, five SBIR-
funded projects were selected from each of two agencies and data were collected on a number of set 
dimensions. Further to this exercise, it was concluded that the NIH offers a more sophisticated and 
easy-to-navigate repository of SBIR-funded projects, Research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools 
(RePORT), and the nature of firms participating in the scheme allows supplementing the main 
database with reliable additional sources.  
 As a second step of the sampling procedure, the sample frame was further narrowed down 
by clusters that make up the NIH. The NIH comprises 27 institutes and centres, each with focused 
                                                          
18 Eleven agencies participating in the SBIR / STTR programme are: Department of Agriculture (NIFA), 
Department of Commerce (NIST & NOAA), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Education (ED/IES), 
Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), Department of Transportation (DOT), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and National Science Foundation (NSF). 
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research agenda on specific diseases (NIH 2015). For the purpose of this study, the sample was limited 
to the projects funded by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) because (i) it is the second largest funder 
in terms of the number of projects and total budget; (ii) projects have the lowest success rate, 
although the total cost per project has increased by 4.6% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in the 
period 2008-12, as demonstrated in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5: Top five SBIR/STTR programme funding NIH institutes19 – 2012 performance 
Institutes 
and Centers 
Total Awards 
(million $) 
Total 
Awards 
Success 
Rate 
Cost per Project 
(‘000 $) 
Cost per Project 
(2006-12 % CAGR) 
 Phase I Phase II Phase I&II Phase I&II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II 
NIAID 44.1 73.6 254 20% 272.0 855.5 8.8% 7.4% 
NCI 24.0 47.5 190 12% 220.0 709.5 4.6% 4.6% 
NHLBI 23.8 43.9 167 21% 264.3 719.3 -2.7% -2.0% 
NIGMS 20.2 36.5 168 24% 222.0 588.6 3.7% 0.6% 
NIDDK 13.0 33.7 100 14% 289.8 701.5 12.0% 8.7% 
Total of 27 217.0 411.9 1,668 19% 235.4 653.7 4.8% 4.1% 
Note: Success rate is calculated as the ratio of the number awards granted by the number of applications 
received. 
Source: NIH report, author’s analysis 
 
 Although oncology research has evolved separately yet in parallel with drug development 
technological platforms (Sosa 2009), it forms the basis for the market of anticancer drugs and 
treatments, and there is a prominent link between research competence, product quality and 
resulting firm profitability (Lu and Comanor 1998). The latter characteristic was important given that 
the present study focuses on the connection between R&D and commercialisation activities.  
 
Sampling 
 
 The current section describes the sampling strategy followed to arrive at the final sample used 
in the analysis. The sample is based on all Phase I and Phase II projects that were funded under the 
SBIR/STTR programme between 2006 and 2012. The choice of the timeframe was driven by the fact 
that to be able to obtain supplementary information from the secondary sources, the projects studied 
had to be relatively recent.  Hence, it was decided that the time horizon of seven years was deemed 
sufficient for current research purposes. 
 First, two separate lists of participants were retrieved—one containing all awards by the HHS 
from the SBIR database and another by the NCI from the RePORTER database of the NIH. Neither 
                                                          
19 Top five SBIR/STTR programme funding NIH institutes are: National Cancer Institute (NCI); National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID); National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS); National 
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI); National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases 
(NIDDK). 
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database was an ideal choice: while the SBIR database only allowed limiting the search by the funding 
federal agency (i.e. HHS) and not by the funding institution (i.e. NCI), NIH RePORTER database had 
some missing information and awards were not clearly reported by funding phase. As a result, it was 
decided to cross-check the SBIR list of projects against the NIH Reporter database to make sure that 
only NCI-funded projects get included and then merge both databases by matching project titles in 
order to compile one exhaustive dataset.  
 In line with one of the primary research objectives to examine the effects of funding 
continuation, the next step was to code all Phase I projects according to whether they proceeded to 
Phase II or not. To do that, the dataset was screened to find matching Phase I - Phase II pairs of 
projects.  Discontinuation of Phase I was coded as 1 and continuation of Phase I was coded as 0. If the 
Phase I project did not have a corresponding Phase II project in the dataset within four years20 of Phase 
I award receipt date, it was coded as discontinuation. 
 As Table 5-6 shows, it was possible to classify 72% of projects from the initial database of 
3,006 projects funded by the NCI in the period 2006-2012. Of these, 72% were Phase I projects and 
28% Phase II projects. The coding procedure revealed that the success rate of Phase I projects in the 
given timeframe was 22%, while the non-progression rate was at 78%. 
 
Table 5-6: Overview of the initially retrieved sample before and after coding procedure 
Stage  Count % 
Before coding Number of Phase I projects 2,171 72% 
Number of Phase II projects 834 28% 
Total number of Phase I and II projects 3,006 100% 
After coding Projects classified as ‘proceed to Phase II’ 491 22% 
Projects classified as ‘do not proceed to Phase II’ 1,668 78% 
Total number of classified projects 2,159 100% 
(72% of all projects) 
 
 To accommodate the unequal occurrence rates of projects with progression versus non-
progression to Phase II, it was decided that the current research would benefit from a sample of 
relatively equal number of projects that proceeded to the second stage of funding and the ones that 
did not.  
                                                          
20 According to sbir.gov, duration of a typical Phase I SBIR project is 6 months, and 12 months of the STTR project. 
All proposals for Phase II have to be submitted within 6 receipt dates (21 months), while decisions on whether 
or not the project will receive Phase II award take up to 9 months to make. So, the usual leeway between Phase 
I award and successful Phase II is 3 years for SBIR awards and 3.5 years for STTR awards, which was increased to 
4 years to ensure accuracy of the coding procedure. 
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 The aim was to have a sample of 383 observations because statistically such size presents 
characteristics of the population of 100,000 cases at 95% confidence level21 (Saunders et al. 2012 
p.266). The projects were randomly selected using the ‘rand’ function in Excel, which generated a 
sample of 383 projects, of which 186 were ‘continue’ cases and 197 ‘discontinue’ cases. 
 
Data Generation 
 
 As has been described in the earlier section, multi-level measurement approach was adopted 
and implemented at the data generation stage. Multi-level data generation approach refers to the 
case when predictors are measured at more than one level of aggregation (Cohen et al. 2003).  
 Therefore, data were collected on three levels of characteristics relevant to the current 
research project—project-level characteristics, individual-level characteristics and firm-level 
characteristics. 
 
Project-level Characteristics 
 
 All project-level data were collected on Phase I awards because of truncation of projects non-
continuing to Phase II, for which no information was available. SBIR and NIH databases were used to 
compile a primary dataset, from which meaningful information related to projects was coded as 
dummies and categories, and abstracts describing projects were analysed. In addition to collecting 
data on the individual project level, data on firms’ projects were also collected at the portfolio level in 
order to investigate aggregated effects of prior funding. 
 
Individual-level Characteristics 
 
 Individual-level characteristics capture two important units of analysis—manager and principal 
investigator. The manager was defined as the person whose name appears in the database as the 
‘main contact’, while the principal investigator is the scientist responsible for the execution of the 
project. Data provided by the SBIR and NIH databases were used as a starting point to get a list of 
individuals’ names and then supplemented by a number of other publicly available secondary data 
sources. 
 LinkedIn was employed to collect data on social capital characteristics for the individual-level 
analysis. LinkedIn is the world’s largest professional network consisting of more than 400 million 
members in over 200 countries, and intends to stimulate information exchange among its members, 
by requesting to share current and past educational and employment background, location, 
                                                          
21 For the population of 2,000 cases, which is representative of the current study, the sample size could be safely 
reduced to 322 observations.  
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professional interests, news, and other relevant information. The LinkedIn social media platform is 
used by organisations as a marketing, recruitment, PR, analytical and networking tool, which make 
the website not only a legitimate but also a high-involvement setting for business professionals (Mintz 
and Currim 2013).  
 Apart from being used to post study invitations and solicit surveys (Cholakova and Clarysse 
2015; Butts et al. 2015), LinkedIn has gained popularity in recent years in business research as a 
reliable secondary source to collect data on people’s biographies, including educational background 
and work experience (Gomulya and Boeker 2014; Byrne and Shepherd 2015; Dokko and Gaba 2012; 
Reyt and Wiesenfeld 2015) and social network connections (Colombo et al. 2015). A search of LinkedIn 
was conducted based on the person’s name along with the company’s name to make sure that profiles 
of the right individuals were located and retrieved for further analysis. LinkedIn profiles were also 
supplemented by biographies published on companies’ websites.  
 When a person did not have a LinkedIn profile or it was incomplete, following Gomulya and 
Boeker (2014) and Graffin et al. (2013), several additional websites were used that list information on 
the companies and their employees, including ZoomInfo and Bloomberg Business Week. For 
completeness, the search was also conducted via Google engine by entering the name of the company 
along with the name of the individual in question and screening the first five pages of returned results 
to complete data gathering effort on educational background and work experience. Altogether, the 
data collection task has been exercised with the thorough attention which indicates a high degree of 
data reliability and comprehensiveness. 
 Also, Elsevier’s Scopus database of peer-reviewed literature was used to collect data on 
individuals’ academic performance as assessed by publications and citations from journals, books and 
conference proceedings. Scopus was chosen over Web of Science because it has an author 
identification tool which helps locate the right people, covers the majority of scientific journals and 
has an easy to navigate interface. Authors were searched by name, and once the right person was 
located, information was retrieved from the profile, such as the number of publications total and by 
type, as well as citations, self-citations and h-index.  
 
Firm-level Characteristics 
 
 Firm-level data gathering was focused on firms’ attributes such as size, age, business activity 
and patenting activity. 
 Participants of the SBIR programme are small private firms, so obtaining data on firm size was 
a major challenge because in the United States such firms are not legally required to report their 
financial performance. Therefore, it was not possible to collect data on firm size from conventional 
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databases such as COMPUSTAT or EDGAR database of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Instead, Hoover’s Online database, which covers small and private companies, was utilised to 
capture the most recently reported figures on sales and number of employees, as well industry codes. 
Hoover’s database has been extensively used in prior research, particularly in the marketing field, to 
obtain objective data on small private firms (Aboulnasr et al. 2008; Boyd et al. 2010; Cui and O’Connor 
2012; Dotzel et al. 2013; Morgan and Rego 2009; Rego et al. 2013; Vorhies et al. 2010). If the company 
was not reported in the Hoover’s database, several additional websites were used beyond the focused 
Hoover’s searches such as ZoomInfo, Manta, Find the Company, SalesSpider, PrivCo and 
CorporationWiki. 
 PatBase database was used as the primary source to collect data on firm’s patenting activity, 
including patent applications and publications of firms and individuals, but also to analyse patents in 
detail, reporting data on patent classes, invention team, countries and claims. PatBase is an online 
comprehensive patent database, and apart from having wide global coverage, it offers such 
advantages as convenient navigation of the search engine and a sophisticated analysis tool. When 
information on PatBase was unavailable or incomplete, Espacenet database of the European Patent 
Office (EPO) was used as a complimentary resource.  
 
5.5 Operationalisation and Measurement of Constructs  
 
Performance Measures 
 
 As described in Chapter 4, outcomes of investment were conceptualised from two 
perspectives—investors’ and firms’. Accordingly, the measures of performance were structured in line 
with objectives pursued by the SBIR investment programme; that is, increase commercialisation, 
encourage entrepreneurship and stimulate innovation, which in current research are equated to post-
funding sales performance, employment creation and innovation activity, respectively. Subsequently, 
measures of absolute performance were used to reflect the firms’ perspective and measures of yield 
on investment were used to reflect the funders’ perspective. Prior research found empirical evidence 
in support of two indicators of venture performance, namely growth and business volume, which offer 
advantages such as good availability, internal consistency, relative objectivity and content validity 
(Chandler and Hanks 1993). The measure of growth tends to be captured in terms of change in market 
share, cash flow and sales; while business volume is typically expressed as earnings, sales and net 
worth (Chandler and Hanks 1993).  
 There is a consensus that sales are the most favoured indicator of growth and financial 
performance of firms (e.g. Hoy et al. 1992). First, the measure of sales applies to the majority of 
businesses (Davidsson and Wiklund 2000). Second, it is relatively capital insensitive (Delmar et al. 
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2003). Third, it is a result of firms’ natural evolutionary processes (Delmar 1997). And finally, it is an 
indicator of market acceptance of a venture’s commercialisation efforts (Clarysse et al. 2011). 
However, the measure of sales suffers from market fluctuations and also there may be an indefinite 
time lapse until the firms start to realise sales from any start-up of new activities (Delmar et al. 2003). 
Hence, it is crucial to also evaluate the ventures’ performance on a non-financial basis (Clarysse et al. 
2011).  
 The indicator that is immune to the limitations of the sales measure is that of employment. 
Employment better captures organisational complexity (Churchill and Lewis 1983), which is directly 
linked to the resource-based view of the firms (Kogut and Zander 1992). Moreover, the accumulation 
of employees has both managerial and macroeconomic implications, being related to venture growth 
(Chandler and Hanks 1993) and job creation (Picot and Dupuy 1998) respectively. In the high 
technology sectors, growing rate of employment is an indicator of the value of a start-up (Davila et al. 
2003) and a signal of better access to new and control of existing capabilities (Guedj and Scharfstein 
2004). However, it has been noted that a firm can realise efficiency-related gains in production output 
and capital without having to increase its stock of personnel (Delmar et al. 2003).  
 To overcome this potential drawback, the study introduces the third dimension of firm’s 
performance—innovation activity. The notion of differential inventiveness has been linked in the 
economic literature to sources of economic growth, the rate of technological change, the competitive 
position of different firms and countries, and dynamics of alternative industries (Griliches 1990). 
Because there are no direct measures to capture any of the aspects related to inventiveness, patent 
statistics have been recognised as an objective and widely available proxy (Griliches 1990). Findings of 
prior studies indicate a strong, nearly proportional relationship between R&D expenditures and a 
number of patents, implying heterogeneity in inventive activity across firms; and such pattern is 
especially prevalent among firms of smaller size (Griliches 1990). Additionally, empirical evidence 
exists that there is a positive association between firm’s patent stock and new product development 
outcomes (McMillan et al. 2003). Given that one of the objectives of the present research is to analyse 
whether additional R&D awards lead to improvements in commercialisation performance, patent 
statistics present an important metric. 
 Consistent with prior work in organisational studies (Benner and Waldfogel 2008; Benner and 
Tushman 2002; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001), patent data measured innovative and inventive activity. 
R&D investments generate knowledge output in the form of patent applications, which after some 
time are published and then knowledge they contain becomes available for use by the wider public 
(Ramani et al. 2008). Therefore, patenting is seen as the first step towards commercialisation 
(McGrath and Nerkar 2004).  
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 Taking into account the timing issues of the patenting process, prior research tends to 
differentiate between patent publications and grants on the one hand, and patent applications on the 
other hand. The number of patent applications is arguably an indicator of inventive activity because it 
is the first statement of new knowledge (Hsu and Ziedonis 2013). In contrast, the number of patent 
publications and grants is a better indicator of innovative activity and technological base (Hsu 2007; 
Zucker et al. 2002) and its availability to public domain makes it possible to assess the value of new 
knowledge through the number of citations (Deeds et al. 1997). Nevertheless, such distinction is rather 
ambiguous in empirical studies and researchers use both patent applications and publications 
interchangeably to refer to both inventive and innovative activity. Therefore, for current purposes, 
patent applications were used throughout the study except when the measure needed to be quality-
adjusted, patent publications and their citations were used. In line with previous literature, the flow 
of recent patent applications was used to proxy inventive productivity (Hsu and Ziedonis 2013; 
Haeussler et al. 2014; Heeley et al. 2007). 
 To sum up, the current project focuses on sales, employment and innovation because the 
following measures are the most widely used in empirical growth research (Delmar et al. 2003) and 
entrepreneurship literature (Murphy et al. 1996; Sobel 2008; Gartner and Shane 1995). Also, these 
indicators are the only ones available in the present study for all of the firms of interest.  
 
Absolute Performance 
 
 Following the logic explained in the previous paragraph, sales performance was measured as 
the firm’s revenue in million dollars in t2014; employment performance was measured as the number 
of people employed by the firm in t2014; and innovation performance was measured as the cumulative 
count of firm’s patent applications since the project award year, that is, in the period from t until t2014. 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡2014  
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡2014 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡,𝑡+1,…𝑡2014 
 
 It can be acknowledged that absolute performance variables may also be indicators of 
organisational size and organisational resources, and, given the theoretical objective of this project, 
which is to focus more on the evolutionary dynamics of change than on a complete and detailed 
representation of a firms’ operational performance, selection of such measures was purposeful (Zott 
2003).  
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Yield on Investment 
 
 The rate of return on investment (ROI) is a fundamental concept used for financial efficiency 
evaluation of a single investment project or of a number of projects, and is most commonly expressed 
as the gain-to-cost ratio: 
𝑅𝑂𝐼 =
(𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑡
 
 The logic of the ROI is further narrowed down to the notion of yield on the government 
investment, conventionally measured as the change in the social value of a unit of private sector firm’s 
performance from an investment which takes place in the following period (Bradford 1975). Such 
change is operationalised as a one-period rate of return rt from t to t2014. 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡2014
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡,𝑡−1…𝑡−𝑛
 
 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑡2014
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡,𝑡−1…𝑡−𝑛
 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡,𝑡+1,…𝑡2014
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡,𝑡−1…𝑡−𝑛
 
 
where total prior investment refers to the cumulative dollar amount received for all prior SBIR / STTR 
grants. 
 Historical sales and employment figures for year t were not available in the Hoover’s or any 
other known database, indicating that the measures of sales and employment yield could be 
overstated. Since only the closing sales and employment figures were known, it was not possible to 
calculate the change for the period, resulting in the maximum yield measure. The 100%-growth yield 
measure was included in the main analysis and is, in fact, the best yield that the funders could possibly 
achieve. It means that the relationships between independent variables and 100%-growth yield 
measures would depict the strongest possible association.  
 Although the assumption that the sales and employment have grown by 100% since year t 
may be correct given that many funded firms are start-ups, to make sure that the results were not 
affected by the limitation of data availability, the value maximisation criterion was extrapolated and 
used to perform sensitivity checks in the extension analysis. According to Sageworks’ Private Company 
Report (Forbes 2014), small private firms in the U.S. experienced growth of 8.9% in 2012 and 9.6% in 
2011. Informed by these statistics, the measures of sales and employment yield were then reduced to 
a more realistic 10% rate of sales and employment growth. As a result, the sales and employment 
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figure in the opening period was assumed to be 90% of the closing period figure. The measure of 
innovation activity refers to the number of applied patents after project start and hence, represents a 
change in patent applications stock since year t, which indicates that the measure did not suffer from 
possible overstatement and did not merit inclusion in the sensitivity analysis. 
 
Real Options Reasoning Elements 
 
Initial Commitment 
 
 Initial funding commitment refers to the resource allocation at the point of investment 
decision. In the current context, it was examined from two angles—single project and cumulated 
portfolio.  
 Initial commitment at the individual project level was operationalised as the dollar amount of 
Phase I award granted to an individual project in the database. Initial commitment at the cumulated 
portfolio level was operationalised as the average dollar amount the firm received across all prior 
Phase I awards funded under the scheme. The figures of financial value and count of Phase I awards 
were retrieved from the SBIR database. 
 Both variables were measured on a continuous scale to test the expectation proposed in the 
hypotheses that the higher is initial funding commitment, the higher is the negative effect on desired 
outcomes of the ROR investment logic. Consistent with Klingebiel and Adner (2015), for robustness 
checks only, initial commitment was also measured on a binary scale, whereby low initial commitment 
was coded as 1 when values lied below the mean value of initial commitment of the sample and high 
initial commitment was coded as 0 when values were equal to or above the mean value of initial 
commitment. 
 
Discontinuation 
 
 Funding discontinuation reflects a propensity to reallocate resources from less promising 
projects to guarantee financial flow to projects with higher potential (Klingebiel and Adner 2015).  
Funding discontinuation was measured at the individual project level and operationalised as a binary 
variable, i.e. whether or not Phase I project received subsequent Phase II funding. The dummy variable 
was coded as 1 for non-progression from Phase I to Phase and 0 for progression. 
 
Sequencing 
 
 Funding sequencing assesses the extent of consecutive allocation of funding resources to 
projects across stages of development (Klingebiel and Adner 2015). Such measure is fundamental in 
understanding the dynamics of portfolio-level project interactions (Girotra et al. 2007). It was 
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measured at the cumulated portfolio level as Phase II Transition Rate, which was operationalised as a 
ratio of a number of previously received Phase II awards per total received Phase I awards. Similar to 
initial commitment, as an alternative measure for robustness checks, sequencing was also 
operationalised as a dummy, with low sequencing coded as 1 to include values below the mean value 
of sequencing of the sample and high sequencing coded as 0 to include values equal to or above the 
mean value of sequencing. 
 
Fit of Funding Decisions 
 
 The fit of funding decisions is designed to measure the consistency of resource allocation 
decisions and to what extent the elements of the ROR elements match under the overarching logic. 
That is, real options logic implicitly mandates that efficient funding regimes are the ones where low 
initial commitment is followed by funding discontinuation and high initial commitment is followed by 
funding continuation (Adner 2007). 
 The variable was investigated at both single project and cumulated portfolio levels and was 
operationalised as an interaction of initial commitment and reallocation. At the single project level, 
initial commitment was transformed from a continuous to binary scale, whereby low initial 
commitment category captured values below the mean sample initial commitment, and high initial 
commitment category captured values including and above the mean initial commitment. 
Subsequently, fit of funding decisions was coded as Low initial commitment x Discontinue / High initial 
commitment x Continue and was given a dummy value of 1, while no-fit of funding decisions was 
coded as Low initial commitment x Continue / High initial commitment x Discontinue, and was given 
a dummy value of 0.  
 At the cumulated portfolio level, initial commitment was coded into the low and high category 
as described above. Then, to capture the propensity to discontinue funding at the portfolio level, 
Phase II Transition Rate equal to zero was equated to Discontinue, while Phase II Transition Rate above 
zero was equated to Continue. Fit and no-fit of funding decisions were coded in the same way as the 
project-level variable: the value of 1 was given to Low average initial commitment x No Sequencing / 
High average initial commitment x Sequencing, while the value of 0 was given to Low average initial 
commitment x Sequencing / High average initial commitment x No Sequencing. 
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Role Legitimacy Signals 
 
Executive’s Functional Role 
 
 Duality is a term used to signify that one individual occupies two positions (Sanders and 
Carpenter 1998). Executives’ functional role was expressed as their position in the firm. Consistent 
with prior research (e.g. Boone et al. 2004), position in the firm was measured as a dummy variable of 
whether the manager and the principal investigator was the CEO (1) or not (0) at the award date. 
 
Organisational Tenure 
 
 Longer-tenured TMTs in new firms are perceived to be better equipped to grasp, shape and 
control processes that improve functional and operational capabilities (Patel and Jayaram 2014). In 
line with prior studies (Sanders and Carpenter 1998; Hughes et al. 2010; Zhang and Wiersema 2009; 
Wu et al. 2005; Zhang 2006), tenure in firm was measured on a continuous scale as the total number 
of years the manager and the principal investigator had been working in the firm at the award date. 
 
Technical Experience 
 
 Technical skill is one of the most crucial competences of TMT members (Katz 1982) and 
denotes the level of experience in different functional roles (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005). Technical 
experience was operationalised in prior research as a number of years spent in research, 
development, engineering, and other technical positions (Minola and Giorgino 2008). Following the 
logic, technical experience was measured on a continuous scale as the total number of years the 
manager and the principal investigator had served in technical positions in the same sector as the firm 
before award date. 
 
Entrepreneurial Experience 
 
 Prior research has approached the measurement of the concept of entrepreneurial 
experience from different angles. Kirsch et al. (2009), and Tornikoski and Newbert (2007) 
operationalised entrepreneurial experience as the total number of past claimed start-up experiences, 
Wennberg et al. (2011) as the number of prior years, while Minola and Giorgino (2008) used a dummy 
to code whether the member of the TMT had previous start-up experience or not. The continuous 
scale was preferred over other alternatives as it allows capturing more information on the studied 
phenomenon. Hence, entrepreneurial experience was measured on a continuous scale as the total 
number of years the manager and the principal investigator had accumulated in starting up activities 
in any sector before award date. 
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Resource Legitimacy Signals 
 
Elite Education 
 
 Elite education refers to the rated prestige of the academic institutions a focal TMT member 
attended and is a proxy for the status of an educational affiliation (Stern et al. 2008). Elite education 
has been operationalised as a categorical measure coding whether undergraduate or graduate schools 
were elite (Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993). 
 For present purposes, it was decided to concentrate on the latest academic institution that a 
TMT member attended because it is the most recent in time and hence the most relevant to the 
evaluation of social capital. Elite education was measured in two steps. First, the name of the latest 
university the manager and the principal investigator attended was recorded. Then, it was allocated a 
score from the Top 100 worldwide universities ranking. Universities not in the top 100 received a score 
of zero. Hence, the present measure of elite education not only differentiates between elite and non-
elite schools but also compares elite institutions to each other by using objective scores. Historical 
data were available, so the scores were applied from the ranking table published in the same year as 
the Phase I award was announced.  
 The ranking table was retrieved from the Academic Ranking of World Universities 
(ARWU) published by Shanghai Ranking Consultancy (Shanghairanking 2013). This source was chosen 
over the other alternatives, such as the World University Rankings by The Times Higher Education, QS 
and the U.S. News, because ShanghaiRanking Consultancy is a fully independent organisation on 
higher education information and is located outside of the United States and Europe, two educational 
powerhouses, which adds credibility to the source. Additionally, the ARWU, conducted by researchers 
at the Centre for World-Class Universities of Shanghai Jiao Tong University (CWCU), uses a robust 
methodology. Over 1000 global universities are ranked on four categories of academic and research 
performance and scores for each indicator are then weighted to determine the highest scoring 
institution which is assigned a score of 100, and other institutions are calculated as a percentage of 
the top score (Figure 5-4). The final league table includes the scores and ranks of the best 500 
institutions. 
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Figure 5-4: Indicators and weights for ARWU 
Criteria Indicator Code Weight 
Quality of Education Alumni of an institution winning Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals Alumni 10% 
Quality of Faculty Staff of an institution winning Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals Award 20% 
Highly cited researchers in 21 broad subject categories HiCi 20% 
Research Output Papers published in Nature and Science22 N&S 20% 
Papers indexed in Science Citation Index-expanded and Social 
Science Citation Index 
PUB 20% 
Per Capita Performance Per capita academic performance of an institution PCP 10% 
Total   100%  
Source: Shanghai Ranking 
 
Advanced Business Education 
 
 MBA degree was used as a proxy of advanced business education. Education has been 
frequently operationalised as a dichotomous variable in prior studies (e.g. Tornikoski and Newbert 
2007). Similarly, MBA degree was measured as a dummy variable of whether the manager and the 
principal investigator had an MBA title (1) or not (0). 
 
Advanced Technical Education 
 
 Advanced technical education was operationalised in terms of the presence of a doctorate 
degree. As in previous studies (e.g. Gruber et al. 2013), doctorate degree was measured as a dummy 
variable of whether the manager and the principal investigator had a doctorate title (1) or not (0). The 
doctoral title included the PhD and MD degrees. 
 
Academic Seniority  
 
 Academic seniority was operationalised in terms of a professorship status. Professorship was 
measured as a dummy variable of whether the manager and the principal investigator held a 
professorship position (1) or not (0). 
  
                                                          
22 For institutions specialised in humanities and social sciences, the weight of N&S is relocated to other 
indicators. 
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Intellectual Legitimacy Signals 
 
Inventive Capacity 
 
 The research concluded that individual inventors are valuable to firms (Gruber et al. 2013) 
because they are effective at recombining existing knowledge from different domains to generate new 
ideas, inventions and innovations (Glynn 1996; Hargadon and Sutton 1997; Gupta et al. 2006; Taylor 
and Greve 2006). The inventive output is often used as a proxy to measure the capability to increase 
the quantity and quality of knowledge stock (Grigoriou and Rothaermel 2014). Inventive capacity 
demonstrates the ability to translate advances in academic work as well as R&D activities into practical 
technological applications, creating a scope of innovation opportunities. As a result, such output-
based measure can also be used as a proxy for inventor’s ability (Conti et al. 2014) and individual-level 
assimilative capacity (Banerjee and Campbell 2009). 
 Inventive capacity refers to the breadth and depth of inventors’ expertise and experience (Boh 
et al. 2014) and has been measured by the cumulated stock of patents previously applied for by the 
inventor (Singh and Fleming 2010; Conti et al. 2014). Following from this, inventive capacity was 
operationalised as the total number of patent applications the manager and the principal investigator 
had filed before award date.  
 
 Academic Competence 
 
 Prior research indicated that both publications and patent productivity are complementary 
productivity outcomes of individuals in the life-sciences industry (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998). Prior 
studies used the total number of publications of the scientists as a measure of their research 
productivity (Bercovitz and Feldman 2008) and as a proxy for scientific reputation (Stern et al. 2008). 
As a result, academic competence was constructed as the total number of documents the manager 
and the principal investigator had published before award date. Published documents included journal 
articles, conference papers, books, and other work, such as meetings, reviews, corrections, clinical 
trials, editorials, and letters. 
 
 Abstract Readability 
 
 Readability reflects firms’ effectiveness in communicating information relevant to assessing 
applications for funding (Loughran and McDonald 2014). The Gunning-Fog score, also known as the 
Fog Index, is often applied in textual analysis to evaluate the extent of document readability and its 
compliance with the plain English rules (Loughran and McDonald 2014). Other commonly used 
readability measures are the Flesch–Kincaid measure, the Flesch Reading Ease Score, Coleman-Liau 
146 
 
Index and McLaughlin’s SMOG Index. As opposed to the Fog Index, which is built upon a binary 
classification of complex words (i.e. more or less than two syllables) (Gunning 1952), both Flesch 
measures use an exact count of syllables in their readability formulas (Flesch 1948). In addition, while 
the Fog Index and Flesch Reading Ease Score create numeric estimates, the Flesch–Kincaid measure 
produces scores on a scale from 0 to 100. On the other hand, the SMOG Index estimates the number 
of years in education needed to comprehend a piece of written text and counts the number of 
polysyllables (words of three or more syllables) in three samples of ten sentences (McLaughlin 1969). 
 Unlike other measures, Coleman-Liau Index measures word length in characters rather than 
syllables, which enables easier calculation using devices to scan hard-copy text instead of electronic 
text on computers  (Coleman and Liau 1975).  
 Although all alternatives are evidently very similar, the Fog Index was employed in this study 
because this measure is more widespread and more often used in finance and accounting literature 
(F. Li 2008; Biddle et al. 2009; Lehavy et al. 2011; Lawrence 2013; Loughran and McDonald 2014). 
 The Gunning-Fog readability measure was adopted to evaluate the complexity of the abstract 
provided in the Phase I project application and the scores were obtained using an online calculator 
(ReadabilityScore 2015) which utilises the following formula: 
𝐺𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐹𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 0.4 × (𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) 
where average words per sentence refers to the number of words in the abstract divided by the total 
number of sentence termination characters; percent of complex words refers to the percentage of 
words with more than two syllables. Higher values of the Fog Index imply less readable text. 
 
Efficacy Signals 
 
Post-funding Project Duration 
 
 Speed is an important concept in assessing organisational problem-solving ability and 
efficiency, and it refers to how quickly the firm can transition a product or project from one stage of 
development to another (Chandy et al. 2006). Hereby, project duration was measured as the total 
length of time taken to complete the Phase I of the project and was operationalised as the number of 
days elapsed between Phase I project start and end date. 
 
Post-funding Invention Activity 
 
 Consistent with the logic adopted in the section describing performance measures, invention 
activity was evaluated as firm’s propensity to apply for patents. Post-funding invention activity was 
operationalised as the number of patent applications a firm filed in a 3-year window following a Phase 
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I award. A window of 3 years reflects the average time between Phase I and Phase II commencement, 
and hence is a proxy for firm’s efficiency to exploit funds to convert ideas into patentable innovations. 
The measure is in line with other studies in the venture capital context. For example, Guler (2007) 
calculated the number of acquired patents between the first and final investment rounds to infer the 
progress of the firm in the funding process. 
 
Project Appeal Characteristics 
 
 Project Scope 
 
 It was suggested that product scope is more than an indication of an extent of firm’s product 
portfolio diversification, and also signifies the breadth of expertise and depth of knowledge that 
evolve as a result of engagement in multiple innovation domains (Sorescu et al. 2003). 
 In the present research, project scope refers to the breadth of initial application for funding 
and was operationalised as whether a project targets a specific cancer type or multiple cancer types. 
The broad scope was coded as 1 when a project targeted multiple cancer types, while the narrow 
scope was coded as 0 when a project targeted a specific cancer type. To assign a project into the 
relevant category, description of cancer types being targeted was derived from abstracts of projects. 
 
 Project Category 
 
 Project category refers to the type of the federal programme that the project is assigned under 
the SBIR initiative, as outlined in the Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA). CFDA 
categories were coded as follows: Cancer Cause and Prevention Research was coded as 1, Cancer 
Detection and Diagnosis Research was coded as 2, Cancer Treatment Research was coded as 3, Cancer 
Biology Research was coded as 4.  
 
Capabilities  
 
 There is a stream of literature that has inferred superior firms’ capabilities from a sustained 
superior performance by investigating how heterogeneity in unique capabilities and routines that are 
hard to imitate drives heterogeneity in performance which subsequently leads to sustained 
competitive advantage (Winter 1971; Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Levinthal 1997). However, there has 
been criticism that such view of capabilities may be theoretically and empirically tautological, whereby 
superior capabilities may not necessarily be an indicating prerequisite of observed superior 
performance (Powell 2001; Priem and Butler 2001; Durand 2002; Denrell 2005; Durand and Vaara 
2009;). Another group of researchers proposed that superior competitive advantage can be explained 
by managerial competence and the role of chance and luck (Barney 1986; Arthur 1989; Denrell 2004). 
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Within this tradition, superior performance is explained by incumbency advantages which accumulate 
through random mechanisms stimulated by path dependency (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Arthur 1989). 
 More recently, there has been an attempt to bridge both views by acknowledging that both 
differences in capabilities and random events have an impact on performance over time (Denrell et 
al. 2013). Denrell et al. (2013) proposed the Bayesian approach as the most suitable method for 
inferring capabilities from observed data. Most importantly, by accounting for underlying stochastic 
processes, Bayesian models can separately investigate elements of sustained competitive advantage 
and compute conditional probabilities of the role of firm-dependent components versus components 
dependent on accumulated prior performance. 
 One of the key methodological strengths of Bayesian analysis is that it recognises the 
confounding effect of stochastic factors affecting performance. However, it was not possible to adopt 
such approach in the present research because Bayesian models tend to measure superior 
performance over multiple periods of time in order to estimate its sustainable nature (Hansen et al. 
2004; Hahn and Doh 2006; Denrell et al. 2013; Powell 2001), for which the current project had no such 
data. 
 The use of advanced econometric methods in investigating the role of heterogeneity in 
capabilities is not limited to the Bayesian approach. Another group of RBV scholars employed ideas of 
production economics to study the role of capabilities in explaining differences in firms’ performance 
(Dutta et al. 1999; Dutta et al. 2005). Production economics literature proposed to measure firms’ 
performance as a ratio of productivity comparing the level of input resources that are necessary to 
yield a certain level of outputs (Coelli et al. 2005; Fried et al. 2008). A firm that can attain a maximum 
output level with a set of certain inputs creates a technological best-practice benchmark in the 
industry, a so-called production frontier, and firms that operate below this frontier are defined as 
technically inefficient (Coelli et al. 2005). As such, measurement of efficiency implies a comparison of 
actual performance with maximal performance located on the production frontier (Fried et al. 2008) 
and is an “empirical estimation of the extent to which the observed agents achieve the theoretical 
ideal” (Greene 2008 p.93). 
 Using the core input-output concept of the economic theory of production, Dutta et al. (1999) 
suggested that capabilities can be operationalised and measured as a function of production 
efficiency. Following seminal work by the authors (Dutta et al. 1999), there has been a stream of 
research that took the same path (Narasimhan et al. 2006; Xiong and Bharadwaj 2011; Bahadir et al. 
2008; Feng et al. 2015; Mahmood et al. 2011). Under the input-output perspective, capabilities refer 
to the efficient deployment of a set of available resources to attain specific organisational goals (Dutta 
et al. 2005). Estimation of capabilities using the input-output framework offers two significant 
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advantages. Operationally, it enables to infer capabilities as a function of transformational efficiency, 
while methodologically, it allows using secondary and archival data to perform the calculation 
procedure (Dutta et al. 1999). 
 The estimation of technical and efficiency change can be carried out empirically using one of 
the two known benchmarking approaches, namely Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) mathematical 
technique and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) econometric technique. There is a constant academic 
dispute about the validity and suitability of the non-parametric DEA versus the parametric SFA 
technique (Fried et al. 2008). Although the DEA is a less data-sensitive approach because its linear 
specification can handle zero-valued inputs and outputs, or multiple outputs in a single equation, it is 
merely a mathematical calculation which does not account for the random error of the studied 
phenomenon (Fried et al. 2008). To overcome this significant limitation of the non-parametric 
productivity analysis, Simar and Wilson (1998) developed a procedure for constructing the confidence 
intervals using the bootstrap method to correct for the bias of the DEA estimators which arises due to 
the inability of the data envelopment method to incorporate statistical noise. However, despite such 
methodological advancement, implementation of bootstrap methods for inference in frontier 
methods remains challenging, and misspecification of restrictions in the estimation model will 
generate inconsistent results if the data already contain noise (Simar and Wilson 2008).  
 The frontier approach, on the other hand, is an econometric method which offers a way to 
estimate the stochastic component of the transformation efficiency, but requires the data to fit a 
number of underlying statistical assumptions, which creates room for specification error (Fried et al. 
2008). The Cobb-Douglas and translog models prevail the econometric inefficiency estimation 
literature, although their logarithmic specification cannot accommodate zero-valued inputs and 
outputs. The primary assumption is that no output can be produced unless all inputs are above zero 
(non-negativity, weak essentiality and monotonicity assumptions23), and the firm becomes infinitely 
inefficient as soon as a single input or output becomes zero (Greene 2012 p.174). However, in reality, 
this assumption may not necessarily hold—a firm may still be able to achieve a certain level of 
production output even when one of its inputs is absent. Because of its ability to calculate the random 
noise similar to the Bayesian approach, the SFA was deemed a more sophisticated method for the 
current estimation procedure than the DEA. It is also a preferred tool in the marketing field, which 
further supports the decision in favour of the use of the econometric rather than a mathematical 
approach for estimating efficiency. The inability of the stochastic frontier estimation procedure to 
accommodate zero values was dealt with via data transformation, whereby a small constant was 
                                                          
23 According to Chambers (1988) production functions must meet the following four underlying assumptions: (i) 
non-negativity – the value of input x is a positive number; (ii) weak essentiality – production of output requires 
at least one input x; (iii) monotonicity – inputs x are non-decreasing; (iv) concavity – inputs x are non-increasing. 
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added to all values to be able to apply a logarithmic specification. Such technique is widely used in 
statistics and econometrics and is considered a valid approach in dealing with the problem of zero 
values when a logarithmic function is to be used (Cohen et al. 2003). Data transformations are 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Additionally, data were inspected for the presence of any 
significant outliers which could bias the estimates, which is of vital importance in any frontier 
modelling method (Simar and Wilson 2008). 
 Stochastic Frontier Production function developed independently by Aigner et al. (1977), and 
Meeusen and Broeck (1977) is an extension of a classical regression model and is based on the 
theoretical notion that a production function “represents an ideal, the maximum output attainable 
given a set of inputs” (Greene 2008). The function can be written as the following model with a simple 
exponential specification (Battese and Coelli 1992; Battese and Coelli 1995): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑡;  𝛽)exp(𝑣𝑖𝑡− 𝑢𝑖𝑡) 
where  
yit = output of firm 𝑖 in time 𝑡 
f(xit; β) = function of a vector 
xit = factor inputs 
β = vector of unknown parameters 
vit = random error that accounts for statistical noise and can be positive or negative 
uit = non-negative random variable of the N(μ,σ2) distribution associated with technical 
inefficiency in which μ is an unknown scalar parameter 
 
 Thus, the random components 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 determine the stochastic nature of the frontier 
models and μ and σ2 parameters define firm-varying effects (Battese and Coelli 1992). 
 Typically, stochastic frontier analysis is conducted by using the Cobb-Douglas logarithmic 
function, so the above model can be rewritten as follows (Coelli et al. 2005): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥1) + 𝛽2 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥2) + …  𝛽𝑛 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥𝑛) ×  exp (𝑣𝑖𝑡) × exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡) 
 
 
 The estimation procedure of the above function required that the random terms 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 
meet assumptions similar to those of the conventional linear regression model: the terms must be 
distributed independently of each other and be uncorrelated with xi factor inputs, while the 
inefficiency component 𝑢𝑖 must meet an additional criterion of strict non-zero mean (Coelli et al. 
2005).  
deterministic frontier noise inefficiency 
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 Much of the stochastic frontier analysis is aimed at estimating the inefficiency component. 
The most widely used output-oriented measure of technical efficiency is calculated as the ratio of the 
firm’s output relative to the potential output of a fully-efficient firm given the same set of input 
factors, which determines the production frontier (Coelli et al. 2005). Hence, the function of technical 
efficiency (TE) can be expressed in the following way (Coelli et al. 2005): 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 =  
exp(𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖)
exp(𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖)
= exp (−𝑢𝑖) 
 The SFA procedure was carried out in the ‘Frontier’ package of the R-studio statistical 
programme. First, maximum likelihood estimates were produced under the Error Components 
Frontier specification (Battese and Coelli 1992). These estimated parameters are starting values to 
determine the stochastic production frontier (Coelli et al. 2005). Next, technical efficiencies were 
predicted in relation to the maximum achievable output, indicating that inefficiency decreases the 
output variable. One of the most important parameters of the log-likelihood estimation is gamma, 
which can be expressed as 𝛾 =  𝜎𝑢
2 𝜎2⁄ , and high values of gamma indicate that the inefficiency 
component accounts for a large proportion of the variation in the error term (Coelli et al. 2005). The 
measure of technical efficiency takes the value between zero and one, and can also be expressed as a 
percentage, with 100% attained by the best-performing firm. The summary of stochastic frontier 
estimation results is reported in Appendix 4. 
 The definition of capability employed in the present research refers to the ability to transform 
resources through the efficient productive activity to achieve higher-order goals (Dutta et al. 2005). 
Three types of capabilities, namely managerial, intellectual and R&D capabilities were utilised in the 
conceptual framework, and their transformational functions are described in detail below. 
 
 Managerial Capability 
 
 Prior literature outlined three pillars of dynamic managerial capabilities, which can also be 
referred to as managerial operational capabilities (Helfat and Martin 2015)—managerial cognition, 
social capital, and human capital (Adner and Helfat 2003). These categories of managerial resources 
have distinct as well as interaction effects on managerial capabilities (Adner and Helfat 2003) and draw 
on previous experience (Helfat and Martin 2015). These three underpinning components form the 
basis for empirical measurement of managerial capabilities.  
 Some of the empirical approaches employed in previous research were criticised for an 
overarching tautological assumption that managerial capabilities directly measure firm performance 
(Helfat and Martin 2015). To overcome this limitation, more recent studies proposed to follow a chain-
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of-effects empirical approach, whereby the impact of managerial capabilities is expressed as strategic 
change, which presents an intermediary outcome leading to firm performance (Martin 2011). 
 Managerial capabilities display path dependency (Teece et al. 1997) and develop through 
learning (Zollo and Winter 2002). A recent review of managerial dynamic capabilities literature by 
Helfat and Martin (2015) provided a summary of variables used to measure three components of the 
construct; namely, managerial cognition, social capital, and human capital which can be utilised 
separately or in combination, as well as measures of strategic change (summary of measures is 
presented in Appendix 5). According to this review, there is a significant body of research that found 
evidence of the impact of human capital characteristics such as education and experience on strategic 
change efforts and outcomes (Helfat and Martin 2015). 
 Following the logic behind previous empirical studies, the present research operationalised 
managerial capability as a function of human capital resources that relate to strategic change. 
Strategic change was expressed in terms of international diversification, while human capital in terms 
of prior experience. International diversification is viewed as a complex strategic decision because of 
opportunities and threats associated with geographic expansion (Tihanyi et al. 2000). Management 
capability functions as a link between human capital and performance in dynamic environments (Hsu 
and Wang 2012). 
 The conceptualisation adopted by the current study implies the following managerial 
capability transformation function: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝑓(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
where 
Innovation proliferation = total number countries where the firm was granted patents in <t  
Commercial experience = total number of years of manager’s experience in commercial 
positions in any sector in <t  
Inventive capacity = total number of patent applications by the manager in year <t 
 Prior research has measured geographic diversification, or firm’s dispersion of activities, using 
patent statistics (Bergek and Bruzelius 2010). Grupp and Schmoch (1999 p.385) highlighted that 
“patent protection establishes market access barriers and, as a result, creates a temporary monopoly 
on product availability or facilitates a head start in application of technology”. The fact that patents 
are granted by national patent offices means that inventions are protected within boundaries of one 
country. Considering the time and financial resources necessary to file a patent, firms need to make 
intentional decisions on the territorial coverage of intellectual property rights and future markets of 
technology protection (Grupp and Schmoch 1999). Therefore, if the firm files a patent in the country 
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where it is headquartered, it indicates the pursuit of a domestic market strategy. On the other hand, 
filed patents in a number of countries demonstrate a firm’s intention to manufacture, market or 
license the invention in these countries (Grupp and Schmoch 1999).  
 Since all firms in the sample are classified as domestic, internationalisation of protective 
activities is not only necessary to protect against imitation in the global arena but is also a strategic 
move. Management literature has paid particular attention to strategic patenting and viewed 
intellectual property protection as a link with competitiveness and an outcome of effective 
management (Granstrand 1999). In the same vein, scholars have recognised that benefits of 
innovation can be realised through intelligent management of patenting activities (Teece 1986). 
Drawing on these arguments from prior research, present study expressed the output of managerial 
capability as innovation proliferation, which represents the motive to diversify internationally and is 
linked to the concept of strategic change. 
 Two input variables were determined as suitable measures of human capital characteristics. 
Evidence exists that managers’ commercial experience positively affects firm’s new product 
development capabilities (Deeds et al. 1999). Therefore, commercial experience is an important 
indicator of the quality of manager’s human capital. The measure of commercial working experience 
was adopted from prior literature (Minola and Giorgino 2008) as the number of years spent in 
managing positions, although it has also been measured as a dummy variable of whether or not the 
member of the TMT had prior management experience (Deeds et al. 1999). Operationalisation of the 
measure of inventive capacity, which is the second input variable, was described in the section above. 
 The above function can be rewritten as the Cobb-Douglas specification: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽2 ×
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) ×  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑉𝑖𝑡) × 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝑈𝑖𝑡)  
 
 Principal Investigator’s Intellectual Capability 
 
 Given that the sample is made up of small private firms, the role of each individual member 
involved in project development is critical. In particular, the purpose of principal investigators is to 
guide R&D efforts and achieve innovation outcomes. Therefore, present research measures 
intellectual capability at the individual level and uses principal investigator as the unit of analysis. 
Rooted in human capital literature, intellectual competence has been traditionally assessed in terms 
of knowledge, expertise and skills (Subramaniam and Youndt 2005). A study by Hsu and Wang (2012) 
has operationalised employee productivity as work ability and uniqueness of employees’ knowledge 
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as employee value added. In line with such reasoning, principal investigator’s output is expressed as 
an academic impact, which is an outcome of a combination of distinct specialised knowledge stocks.  
 In line with the definition of intellectual capability expressed as the intelligent deployment of 
cognitive capacities (Alvesson and Spicer 2012), the transformation function can be formulated as 
follows: 
𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡
= 𝑓(𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦­𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
where 
Academic impact = h-index of the principal investigator defined by Scopus in year t 
Quality-adjusted 
academic competence 
= citation-weighted publications of the principal investigator in year <t 
Knowledge 
appropriation 
= ratio of self-citations by total documents published by the principal 
investigator in year <t 
Inventive capacity = total number of patent applications by the principal investigator in 
year <t  
 H-index was retrieved from the Scopus database and is designed to measure both the 
productivity and impact aspects of the published scholarly work (Elsevier 2015). The measure was 
developed by Hirsch and is defined as “the number of papers with citation number higher or equal to 
h” (Hirsch 2005 p.1). In other words, an h-index of 10 would suggest that out of all publications, ten 
documents were cited ten times or more. 
 The literature on productive efficiency acknowledges that input and output variables may 
differ from one firm to another in terms of quality and recommends adjusting variables to account for 
quality differences by directly incorporating quality characteristics in the model or by attaching 
numerical weights to relevant variables (Coelli et al. 2005). To account for differences in the value of 
patented knowledge, scholars have developed measures that adjust patents by their quality 
(Trajtenberg 1990; Dutta and Weiss 1997; Levitas and McFadyen 2009). The measure of citation-
weighted publications was adopted from Dutta et al. (1999) and was computed in three steps. First, 
the average number of citations received by all documents published by all principal investigators in 
the sample was calculated. Then, the weight was determined as a ratio of the number of principal 
investigator’s citations to the sample average. This weight was then assigned as a multiplier to the 
total number of documents published by the principal investigator to arrive at the value of citation-
weighted publications.  
 The second input variable refers to knowledge appropriation. The topic of how firms 
appropriate value from their inventions has received significant attention in strategic management 
155 
 
field (Teece 1986). Effectiveness in translating ideas that constitute earlier inventions into the flow of 
future inventions has been coined generative appropriability and has been measured as the 
proportion of firm’s inventions, patents, products or citations that are generated from firm’s prior 
inventions or patents (Ahuja et al. 2013). In the same vein, because knowledge accumulation is 
embodied in patents and citations signify new knowledge that streams from these patents, the 
propensity of firms to cite their own patents indicates the creation of internal and firm-specific 
innovative knowledge stock (Wang et al. 2009). This logic was adopted to construct a measure of 
individual-specific knowledge assets. Knowledge appropriation was defined as the degree to which 
the individual is building upon its previous know-how. The variable was measured as the proportion 
of principal investigator’s self-citations that was exploited in total publications of the principal 
investigator. 
 Operationalisation of the measure of inventive capacity, which is the third input variable, was 
described in the section above. 
 The frontier function can be expressed as the Cobb-Douglas specification: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦­𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽2 ×
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽3 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) ×  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑉𝑖𝑡) × 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝑈𝑖𝑡)  
 
 R&D Capability 
 
 The purpose of R&D efforts is to generate technological innovations (Dutta et al. 1999). 
Innovative activities frequently call for complementary resources, such as capabilities (Teece 1986). 
Previous research suggested that path dependency is an important innovation mechanism, and firm’s 
prior knowledge stock is an essential prerequisite of inventive capability (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
Thus, a firm’s technological and knowledge stocks are necessary elements of R&D capability. As was 
noted previously, firm’s absorptive capacity depends on (although is not limited to) absorptive 
capacities of its individual members (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Therefore, in addition to firm’s 
accumulated knowledge, intellectual capability of a key scientist, i.e. principal investigator, is a key 
component of a firm’s innovative output. 
 Following the logic of the operationalisation proposed by Dutta et al. (1999, 2005), the 
measure of R&D capability can be expressed by the frontier function below: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 
=  𝑓(𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦­𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡ℎ, 𝑃𝐼′𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
where  
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Invention activity = total number of patent applications by firm in year t 
Quality-adjusted global 
patenting output 
= citation-weighted patent stock by firm in year <t 
 
Knowledge breadth = total number of patent classes firm has acquired in year <t 
PI’s intellectual 
capability 
= efficiency scores derived from stochastic frontier analysis 
(specification of the measure outlined above) 
 Patentable knowledge is a manifestation of inventive activity and serves three primary 
strategic purposes: protection of intellectual property, commercialisation of new know-how in the 
form of product innovation or licensing, and an indication of R&D performance (Blind et al. 2006). 
Here, inventive activity was operationalised as firm’s patenting performance, measured by the count 
of filed patent applications (Andries and Faems 2013). 
 Citation-weighted patent stock was calculated in the same way as principal investigator’s 
citation-weighted publications described in the previous paragraph, whereby weight was 
incorporated into the measure of patent stock to account for differences in quality. 
 Previous research operationalised the breadth of the firm's knowledge as the number of 
research domains the firm was active in (Al-Laham and Souitaris 2008) and an average number of 
patent technological subclasses of firm’s patents (Prabhu et al. 2005; Patel and Jayaram 2014; Vural 
et al. 2013). Global patenting offices use an international patent classifications (IPC) system to allocate 
patents to appropriate technological classes. The count of patent classifications has been used as a 
proxy to measure the breadth of knowledge contained in a patent, which indicates its quality and 
future potential value (Lerner 1995). Building on this argument, knowledge breadth was measured as 
the stock of firm’s IPCs. 
 The above frontier function can be formulated as the Cobb-Douglas econometric 
specification: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦­𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) + 𝛽2 ×
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽3 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝐼
′𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) ×  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑉𝑖𝑡) × 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝑈𝑖𝑡)  
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Controls 
 
Non-woman-owned 
 
 One of the goals of the SBIR and STTR programmes is to encourage participation in innovation 
and entrepreneurship by socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses and women-
owned small businesses (SBIR 2015). To qualify as a woman-owned small business, a firm must be at 
least 51% owned and controlled by one or more women, and primarily managed by one or more 
women who holds U.S. citizenship. To control for potential effects of such participants, woman-owned 
businesses were reverse-coded as a dummy variable of whether the firm is woman-owned (0) or not 
(1).  
 
Non-minority-owned 
 
 Some ethnic minority groups are presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged. To 
qualify as a minority-owned small business, the firm must be 51% or more owned and controlled by 
at least one member of one of the following groups: African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native 
Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, Subcontinent Asian Americans, Alaska Native Corporations, 
Indian Tribes, Native Hawaiian Organizations and Community Development Corporations. Minority-
owned businesses were reverse-coded as a dummy variable of whether the firm is minority-owned (0) 
or not (1). 
 
Non-HubZone-owned 
 
 The Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HubZone) programme helps small businesses 
in urban and rural communities gain preferential access to federal procurement opportunities. To 
qualify as a HubZone-owned small business, the firms’ principal office must be located in an area 
designated as a HubZone and in part employ staff who live in a HubZone. HubZone-owned businesses 
were reverse-coded as a dummy variable of whether the firm is located in a HubZone (0) or not (1). 
 
Industry Volatility 
 
 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) introduced two concepts of uncertainty relevant to the real options 
reasoning—technical and input uncertainty. While technical uncertainty is project-specific and can be 
resolved through investments, input uncertainty is external to the firms and is particularly manifested 
in the ROR logic by the relevance of the defer option, which allows waiting until more information 
becomes available to resolve exogenous uncertainty. To account for the type of uncertainty, which is 
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relevant in real options models and cannot be reduced through project-specific investments, a macro 
measure of industry-specific uncertainty was used as a control mechanism. 
 Industry stock return volatility was used as a proxy for industry risk (Peters and Wagner 2014). 
More volatile stock prices signal heterogeneity in technology and productivity levels of market 
participants, which cause demand shocks, potential changes in the industry environment and 
uncertainty in future business conditions (Peters and Wagner 2014). In real options theory, 
uncertainty is an important element in assessing the value of the financial or technology option as real 
options are perceived to be affected by the same factors as the stock price volatility (McGrath 1997). 
As such, by analogy with financial theory but counter to conventional logic, under the real options 
reasoning high uncertainty has a positive impact on investment opportunities that result from the 
flexibility to continue or discontinue the project (Trigeorgis 2005). With potential losses limited to the 
initial price of the option, the larger the variance of expected revenues and costs caused by uncertainty 
in the market, the greater the value of the option and total potential gains, making options 
investments more attractive (McGrath 1997). In other words, high market volatility increases the 
potential gain from holding an option, while low market volatility increases the potential gain from 
exercising an option (Bowman and Hurry 1993). 
 The variable construction procedure was adapted from the paper by Peters and Wagner 
(2014). First, industry classifications were recorded for each company in the sample from the Hoover’s 
database or firms’ LinkedIn profiles. Then, these industry classifications were matched with the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code list reported in the EDGAR database of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Next, four-digit SIC codes were grouped according to the Fama-
French classifications (Fama and French 1997) of 49 industries (Table 5-7). Finally, a list of market 
returns on a portfolio of 49 industries was retrieved from the Kenneth R. French Data Library (2015). 
To construct an industry-level measure of risk proxy, industry stock return volatility was computed 
using 5-year windows of the average equal-weighted annual returns of the Fama-French 49 industries. 
The variable was operationalised as the absolute deviation of the average annual equal-weighted 
returns in year t-1 from the average annual equal-weighted returns in the 5-year rolling window: 
𝐷𝑖 = |𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙­𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑡−1
− 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙­𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑡−1,𝑡−2…𝑡−5|  
 To address timing issues and reduce potential simultaneity concerns (Peters and Wagner 
2014), volatility instruments were lagged by one fiscal year of the award announcement date or 
reported sales date.  
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Table 5-7: Matching procedure of SIC industries in the sample with Ken French's industry classifications 
Ken French’s SIC 
Industry 
Definition 
Number of 
cases in the 
category 
SIC Industry SIC 
Code 
Number of 
cases in the 
industry 
Business Services 
 
203 Advertising Agencies 7311 1 
Computer Processing and Data Preparation and 
Processing Services 
7374 5 
Computer Related Services 7379 4 
Business Services 7389 5 
Engineering Services 8711 7 
Surveying Services 8713 1 
Commercial Physical and Biological Research 8731 122 
Commercial Economic, Sociological, and 
Educational Research 
8732 5 
Noncommercial Research Organizations 8733 35 
Testing Laboratories 8734 7 
Management Services 8741 1 
Management Consulting Services 8742 2 
Business Consulting Services 8748 6 
Services 8999 2 
Chemicals 1 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 2819 1 
Computer 
Software 
18 Computer Programming Services 7371 9 
Prepackaged Software 7372 2 
Computer Integrated Systems Design 7373 6 
Information Retrieval Services 7375 1 
Construction 7 Heavy Construction 1629 3 
Special Trade Contractors 1799 4 
Construction 
Materials 
1 Reconstituted Wood Products 2493 1 
Electronic 
Equipment 
4 Communications Equipment 3669 1 
Electron Tubes 3671 1 
Semiconductors and related devices 3674 2 
Healthcare 16 Offices and Clinics of Doctors of Medicine 8011 2 
Medical Laboratories 8071 10 
Home Health Care Services 8082 2 
Health and Allied Services 8099 2 
Measuring and 
Control 
Equipment 
11 Instruments for Measuring and Testing of 
Electricity and Electrical Signals 
3825 1 
Laboratory Analytical Instruments 3826 2 
Optical Instruments and Lenses 3827 3 
Measuring and Controlling Devices 3829 5 
Medical 
Equipment 
21 Surgical and Medical Instruments and Apparatus 3841 9 
X-Ray Apparatus and Tubes and Related 
Irradiation Apparatus 
3844 5 
Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus 3845 7 
Pharmaceutical 
Products 
68 Medicinal Chemicals and Botanical Products 2833 3 
Pharmaceutical Preparations 2834 27 
In Vitro and In Vivo Diagnostic Substances 2835 15 
Biological Products, Except Diagnostic Substances 2836 23 
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Retail  Optical Goods Stores 5995 1 
Miscellaneous Retail Stores 5999 2 
Wholesale 15 Computers And Computer Peripherals Equipment 
And Software 
5045 1 
Medical, Dental, and Hospital Equipment and 
Supplies 
5047 10 
Professional Equipment and Supplies 5049 1 
Drugs, Drug Proprietaries, and Druggists' Sundries 5122 3 
N/A 15 N/A N/A 15 
Total 383    
 
State Innovativeness 
 
 The theory of entrepreneurship posits that geographic location facilitates firm’s access to the 
skilled technical personnel and the streams of knowledge (Deeds et al. 1999). Therefore, geographic-
specific resources have an impact on firm’s innovation capacity. To control for location effects, the 
measure of U.S. states’ innovativeness was constructed to get a proxy for geographic attractiveness. 
The ranking list of the most innovative U.S. states was retrieved from Bloomberg’s Visual Data 
platform (2015). Bloomberg is widely used in financial and economics research as a reliable source of 
data and insights. For current purposes, the ranking table by Bloomberg was preferred over other 
sources due to the comprehensiveness of the methodology which evaluated the U.S. states and the 
District of Columbia on six innovation factors24 to arrive at the averaged final score expressed on the 
scale from 0 to 100 comprising the states’ innovation index. The data on six innovation factors stated 
in the report were collected from Bloomberg, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labour 
Statistics, National Science Foundation, U.S. Census, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Scores from 
the Bloomberg ranking table were applied to firms in the database by the state they are registered in, 
with higher scores indicating more innovative U.S. states. The downside of using Bloomberg 
Innovation Index was that historical data were not available, so only the scores from the most recently 
updated 2013 report could be used for the analysis. 
  
                                                          
24 1. Number of professionals in STEM as a percentage of the state's population; 2. STEM degree holders as a 
percentage of the state's population; 3. Patents for inventions granted by the state of origin as a percentage of 
the U.S. total; 4. State government R&D expenditure as a percentage of the U.S. total; 5. Productivity: (i) Gross 
state product per employed person; and (ii) three-year change in productivity; 6. Public technology companies 
in industries such as aerospace and defense, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, technology as 
a percentage of all public firms domiciled in the state. 
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Firm Age 
 
 Another factor that influences uncertainty surrounding small firms is their age (Sanders and 
Boivie 2004; Daily et al. 2005). Organisational ecologists demonstrated evidence that age can have a 
negative effect on survival rates of new and adolescent firms (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Brüderl and 
Schüssler 1990). Firm age affects the availability of historical information related to firms’ operational, 
financial and strategic performance. Since younger firms have little objective performance data to 
reveal to investors, their performance prospects are harder to estimate (Megginson and Weiss 1991; 
Mikkelson et al. 1997). Consequently, younger firms are associated with higher risk and uncertainty, 
which has an impact on investment patterns (Sanders and Boivie 2004). 
 In previous literature, firm age has been operationalised as the number of years from firm 
inception to a particular point in time or event of interest (Urbig et al. 2013; DeCarolis et al. 2009). 
Similarly, firm age was measured as the number of years that elapsed since the date the firm was 
founded until the project award date. Firm’s age was retrieved from companies’ websites, and, when 
not available, from firms’ LinkedIn profiles or Bloomberg Business Week. 
 
Project Cohort 
 
 In line with previous research, the control for timing of application was included (Kirsch et al. 
2009). Project cohort refers to the year in which the project was funded. Award years were coded as 
follows: 2006 as 1, 2007 as 2, 2008 as 3, 2009 as 4, 2010 as 5, 2011 as 6 and 2012 as 7. 
 
5.6 Analytical Approach 
 
 By its nature, statistical analysis is relevant to research projects that follow a positivistic 
strategy, and it is built on the fundamental notion of probability distributions of various outcomes 
(Remenyi et al. 1998). However, if collected data were simply run through a statistical package, it is 
unlikely that it would produce useful insights. Instead, gathered evidence first needs to be looked at 
to understand whether the expected patterns persist in the data. This stage entails univariate analysis 
and can be conducted using exploratory and descriptive statistics (Bryman and Bell 2011). Then, to 
ensure that the observed patterns occur not simply by chance, but reveal some underlying processes, 
more detailed statistical analysis should be performed (Remenyi et al. 1998). Hypothesis testing 
procedure calls for the mathematical logic of more robust statistical tools. As the first step, bivariate 
relationships between variables can be scrutinised using correlation analysis and contingency tables. 
Finally, multivariate analysis can be performed to examine the simultaneous effects and interactions 
of a number of variables on the dependent variable (Bryman and Bell 2011). 
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Data Analysis Tools  
 
 Multi-level data can be analysed using hierarchical linear modelling, structural equation 
modelling or multi-level analysis. Before any of these techniques can be used, data need to be 
evaluated for basic multi-level assumptions such as within and between group correlations using 
ANOVA (Dansereau and Yammarino 2006). In other words, to make valid statistical inferences from 
the multi-level analysis, there should exist between-level correlation of constructs  (Heracleous and 
Jacobs 2008).  
 Despite using multi-level data, multi-level modelling was beyond the scope of the current 
project because the sample size of the lower level project and individual variables was the main 
restricting factor from the applicability of multi-level modelling. While it is generally acceptable for 
multi-level models to have unbalanced sample sizes at each level, they should be of appropriate sizes 
(Snijders 2005). In the current case, however, the sample has been balanced in a way that for each 
firm there were only names of two individuals available, and between one and seven projects. Hence, 
it would not have been possible to determine the between-firm variances of effects between project-
level and individual-level variables. To estimate the multi-level model, instead of drawing a random 
sample of projects, the entire portfolio of firm’s projects should have been used. Even then, multi-
level modelling would have been limited in its ability to provide reliable estimations, because many 
firms that participated in the SBIR initiative only had one Phase I award. 
 Because the aim of the project is to investigate the outcomes of government venture funding, 
the ROR model has multiple measures of performance. Hence, the data analysis method had to be 
chosen based on its ability to calculate regression estimates for different equations with multiple 
dependent variables.  
 One such modelling approach is the systems method, which instead of estimating parameters 
of each equation separately, estimates all theoretically relevant structural equations as a set (Kennedy 
2003). Simultaneous equations procedures have been the main point of difference between 
econometrics and traditional statistics (Kennedy 2003). However, the simultaneous equations models 
have been criticised for often producing inconsistent forecasts and unreasonably narrow confidence 
intervals (Kennedy 2003). Additionally, it was recognised that equations may be connected not 
through their direct simultaneous interaction, but because of the interaction of their error terms 
(Kennedy 2003). To address such cases, Zellner (1962) proposed a technique called seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) which offers a number of benefits. First, theoretically related sets of 
equations can be modelled jointly. Second, the method produces more consistent and efficient 
estimates because it allows for contemporaneous correlation of error terms across multiple 
equations. To compare, while OLS equation by equation can also be used for hypothesis testing, it only 
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allows to estimate coefficients within an equation but does not take into account cross-equation 
restrictions (Wooldridge 2010). 
 SUR can be expressed as a set of individual equations written in one macro equation: 
[
𝑦1
𝑦2
𝑦𝑛
] =  [
𝑥1
𝑥2
𝑥𝑛
] [
𝛽1
𝛽2
𝛽𝑛
] + [
𝑒1
𝑒2
𝑒𝑛
] 
or       𝑌𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 
where there are N equations, subscript 𝑖 refers to the 𝑖th equation. 
 The equation explains the principle underlying the name of the seemingly unrelated 
regression method: because each equation has its own vector 𝛽𝑖, it seems that equations are not 
related; however, correlated error terms provide links between different equations which improves 
efficiency of estimation (Wooldridge 2010). 
 Because of these major advantages, the econometrics field has been in favour of the use of 
seemingly unrelated regression estimation method (Wooldridge 2010). Seemingly unrelated 
regression has also gained popularity in marketing literature (e.g. Vorhies et al. 2009) because it allows 
capturing the simultaneous and sequential nature of underlying strategic processes. 
 Nevertheless, for this method to be more efficient over OLS equation by equation, it has to 
meet one of the two underlying conditions: either (i) 𝑥𝑖 are all different, or (ii) the variance-covariance 
matrix of 𝑒𝑖 is not diagonal (Kennedy 2003). The Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier statistic 
provides means to test the second assumption by estimating whether the errors depict 
interdependency. If error terms of different equations are not correlated and if there are no 
endogeneity issues among variables, the equation by equation methods should be used instead to 
produce consistent and unbiased estimates (Kennedy 2003). 
 Even though structural equation modelling (SEM) technique can also be used to model a series 
of simultaneous equations, one of its significant limitations is that it cannot handle multiple categorical 
variables (Bollen 1989). Given that the conceptual model proposed in the current study required 
incorporation of nominal data, seemingly unrelated regression method was deemed the most 
appropriate method to perform regression procedure for the systems of equations.  
 Seemingly unrelated regression estimation procedure was carried out in STATA statistical 
package using the ‘sureg’ command, which is built on the feasible generalised least-squares (FGLS) 
algorithm outlined by Greene (2012). To test hypotheses of the signalling framework, however, 
equations did not need to be estimated simultaneously. Therefore, when the dependent variable was 
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continuous, the OLS method was used, while for binary dependent variable Logit models were 
employed. 
 Regression equations were modelled using standardised data to minimise heterogeneity 
across different units of measurement that varied across the constructs in the model (Vorhies et al. 
2009). Data standardisation procedure was carried out in STATA under the ‘egen’ command, which 
created metric variables with the mean value of 0 and standard deviation value of 1. 
 
5.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
 An overview of potential methodologies concluded that it is not possible to evaluate research 
approaches in any absolute terms, and each strategy has something to offer (Gill and Johnson 1997). 
Therefore, the research methodology was designed in a way that reflects the philosophical 
understanding of the research problem and helps answer the research questions in the most efficient 
manner. The positivistic research philosophy adopted by this study follows that of a natural scientist, 
whereby quantitative data were collected to establish cause and effect relationships between a 
number of variables that constitute the studied phenomena, hypotheses were generated to test 
theory and facts were gathered to provide the basis for variable operationalisations. Archival design 
was chosen to compile a multi-level longitudinal dataset from publicly available multi-source domains, 
which was analysed using econometric and statistical exploratory and regression techniques.  
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 Data Preparation & Descriptive Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 Methodological foundations discussed in detail in the previous chapter laid the basis for the 
formative data analysis. Having generated a workable dataset with operational variables, attention is 
now drawn to the issues concerning the data that will be used subsequently for model building. 
 The objective of this chapter is threefold. First, it outlines the steps taken to convert raw data 
into a working format. The steps include missing value analysis, imputation procedure and outlier 
analysis. Second, all the key assumptions underlying multivariate modelling techniques are tested and 
involve examination of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, multicollinearity and endogeneity. 
Finally, data undergoes preliminary exploratory analysis by examining descriptive and correlation 
statistics to get a feel for patterns in the sample and between individual variables. 
 
6.2 Data Preparation  
 
 After all variables were coded in line with operationalisations, raw data needed to be checked 
for credibility, consistency and completeness (Chatfield 1995) prior to applying measurement 
formulas and any statistical procedures. First, Excel spreadsheets containing data on different levels 
of measures were compiled into one macro dataset and then cleaned or formatted. Next, to check for 
any recording, typing, transcription, inversion or repetition errors (Chatfield 1995) data were 
examined visually and by computing the mean, minimum and maximum values to identify any cases 
that fall outside the logical range. Finally, all values that were detected as suspect were checked 
against the original data and corrections were made when necessary. 
 
Missing Value Analysis 
 
 Missing value analysis concerns the analysis of unobserved entries in the data matrix which 
consists of rows of observations, or cases, and columns of variables (Little and Rubin 2002). The initial 
sample database consisted of 383 cases and 48 variables, 15 of which were dummy variables, including 
one dependent dichotomous variable. Missing value analysis was conducted in the SPSS package to 
diagnose the extent, patterns and mechanisms of missing data in the initial sample. 
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Step 1: Determine the Extent of Missing Data 
 
 As suggested by Hair et al. (2010), cases or variables with 50% or more missing data should be 
deleted, while cases or variables containing between 15% and 50% of missing data require judgment 
on a case by case basis. As a first step, the amount of missing data were tabulated to establish the 
degree of missing data by case. 
 Appendix 6 displays that 7 cases had 40% or more missing data. These cases were identified 
for deletion due to an excessive number of missing values which ranged from 40.5% to 51.3%, leaving 
a sample of 376 observations. Next, after deletion of cases with the extremely great extent of missing 
values, data were analysed by variable. 
 As can be seen from Appendix 7 the extent of missing values ranged from 0% to 35.1%. Missing 
values were concentrated in a specific set of questions, mostly concerning individual-level 
characteristics, suggesting potential presence of a non-random pattern which merits further 
investigation.  
 
Step 2: Diagnose the Randomness of the Missing Data 
 
 Missing data is a widespread problem in all fields of the social sciences. The majority of 
statistical packages employ a complete-case analysis as a default approach and exclude observations 
and variables that have missing values from the analysis. Such approach was described as 
‘inappropriate’ because it does not allow to make statistical inferences from the entire population 
(Little and Rubin 2002). Therefore, to identify techniques that are more suitable than complete-case 
analysis in the presence of unobservable values, the patterns and mechanisms of missing data need 
to be specifically investigated for the presence of random distribution across the variables and cases 
(Little and Rubin 2002). The pattern of missing data refers to missing and observed values in the data 
matrix, while the mechanism of missing data denotes the relationship between the missingness 
pattern and the values of variables in the data matrix (Little and Rubin 2002). 
 First, to determine the pattern of missingness, the data were visually inspected using Multiple 
Imputation function in SPSS. The patterns chart in Appendix 8 depicts that missing values were 
concentrated in the lower right corner of the chart with some patches of non-missing values, and with 
non-missing data in the upper left portion. Thus, the data exhibited both monotone and general data 
missingness patterns, as demonstrated in Appendix 9. Monotone patterns usually arise in repeated-
measures or longitudinal research designs as a result of a respondent dropping out of the study, which 
causes attrition (Schafer 1997). Given that the latter is not the case in the present project as missing 
values can only be attributed to data unavailability in public sources, the monotone pattern was 
merely a result of reordering the variables according to their missingness rates by the statistical 
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package (Schafer 1997). Therefore, as in survey research design, the instance presented here is that 
of item nonresponse, which refers to missing values on a set of particular variables, and because of 
the random distribution of missing values, it is typically called a general missing data pattern (Little 
and Rubin 2002). Such pattern is best handled by imputation methods (Little and Rubin 2002). 
 Next, it is crucial to investigate the underlying mechanisms that cause missing data, in 
particular, the relationships between missing and non-missing data, because the mechanisms dictate 
the choice of remedies to handle a dataset with missing values (Little and Rubin 2002). A seminal paper 
by Rubin (1976) characterised three types of missing data mechanisms, which are depicted in Figure 
6-1. If missingness does not depend on both observed and non-observed values of the complete 
dataset, then the data are known as missing completely at random (MCAR). The second mechanism is 
a less restrictive case that denotes missingness which only depends on observed values of the dataset 
and is known as missing at random (MAR). Finally, if the distribution of the missing values depends on 
the missing values in the data matrix, then data are not missing at random (NMAR). Most remedies 
are suitable for MCAR and MAR mechanisms, but if the data are NMAR, the analysis will be biassed 
(Little and Rubin 2002). To identify the underlying mechanism behind missing data, two methods were 
employed. 
 
Figure 6-1: Graphical representation of missing data mechanisms25 
 
Source: Adopted from Schafer and Graham (2002 p.152) 
 First, t-test was conducted to examine the means between groups of missing and non-missing 
data. The results of the analysis can be found in Appendix 10. The pattern of significant t-values could 
be observed for a large number of variables, indicating the relationship between missing and non-
missing values, making it of some concern.  
 The second test intended to check whether data were missing completely at random (MCAR) 
or not, by comparing if the observed pattern in the data differs from a random pattern. A statistically 
significant level with p-values above 0.05 will indicate that the data are MCAR. In this instance, the 
                                                          
25 X represents variables that are completely observed, Y represents a variable that is partly missing, Z represents the 
component of the causes of missingness unrelated to X and Y, and R represents the missingness. 
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results of Little’s MCAR test were as follow: Chi-Square = 1988.423, DF = 1906, Sig. = 0.092. As can be 
seen, the result showed significant statistical levels larger than 0.05 but smaller than 0.1, indicating 
that an MCAR underlying missing data process was weak. Hence, data was classified as MAR, which 
assumes that the probability of the observation to be missing depends on the observation itself 
(Schafer 1997). 
 Summing up the results of diagnostic tests to find out the underlying randomness pattern of 
the missing data, the data were classified as MAR. When the data are not missing completely at 
random, it is not advisable to use methods such as listwise deletion of cases with missing values, 
weighting, averaging or use single imputation such as EM algorithm (Schafer and Graham 2002). In 
the case of MAR, a more advanced model-based multiple imputation technique needs to be used to 
input missing data for a complete dataset (Hair et al. 2010 p. 55), especially when dealing with 
secondary data as it allows to accommodate uncertainty about the missing data which the single 
imputation method such as EM does not offer (Wang et al. 1992). 
 
Imputation & Treatment of Multiple Imputed Data 
 
 Multiple imputation (MI) procedure was carried out in R-Studio statistical software using 
version II of ‘Amelia’ package, which is built on ideas proposed by Honaker and King (2010) and enables 
to implement the imputation procedure as well as diagnose imputed values. Despite some level of 
inconvenience associated with working with multiple datasets instead of a more conventionally 
accepted one, multiple imputation helps to reduce bias produced by such methods as listwise deletion 
and mean imputation (Honaker et al. 2012).  
 Multiple imputation simulates m number of versions for each missing value in the dataset to 
account for uncertainty related to missing data (Honaker et al. 2012). MI can produce accurate 
estimates without many repetitions of simulations and typically m = 5 is sufficient (Schafer and 
Graham 2002). The computational method used in Amelia combines the classic EM algorithm with 
bootstrap technique (EMB) to take draws from the posterior model specification, which allows 
simulating estimation uncertainty, thereby improving the accuracy of imputation procedure, 
increasing efficiency and reducing bias (Honaker and King 2010). After imputation, any statistical 
method can be used to build and estimate models, and the results from m datasets are combined 
using specific commands designed for that or manually by applying formulas. The steps involved in 
imputation procedure are shown in Figure 6-2. 
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Figure 6-2: A schematic of multiple imputation approach using EMB algorithm 
 
Source: Adopted from Honaker et al. (2012 p.6) 
 In addition to being classified as MAR, the data has to meet the multivariate normality 
assumption (Honaker et al. 2012). A preliminary visual check of outliers was carried out, as a result of 
that one case was deleted due to the presence of extreme values (case 141) which would distort the 
results of imputation, leaving a sample of 375 observations. The procedure also allows performing 
imputation-improving transformations of variables that do not meet the normality assumption. As a 
result, the imputation procedure was conducted twice—with original data and transformed data, 
whereby the most problematic variables were transformed into the logarithmic form. However, 
diagnostic tests, described in detail in the later section, demonstrated that untransformed data more 
closely fit the original data. Studies showed that Amelia tends to work well even for dichotomous or 
non-normal variables (King et al. 2001). 
 Considering that the estimation procedure is predictive in nature, it is important to include 
information on as many variables as possible in the imputation model to enhance its predictive power 
(Honaker et al. 2012). Thus, to increase the accuracy of the imputation model, data on all cases and 
variables were included in its original format, variables were categorised into nominal and ordinal 
scales, and upper and lower logical bounds were set to variables. When the data contain variables 
with great extent of missing values or intercorrelations, it is strongly recommended that a small ridge 
prior of up to 5% is included in the imputation model specification (Honaker et al. 2012). A ridge prior 
adds numerical stability by reducing covariates among the variables closer to zero, while leaving 
means or variances intact (Honaker et al. 2012). Following these recommendations, Amelia 
imputation code included 1% ridge prior. Finally, since data contained units that vary over time, a 
cross-sectional time-series option was specified to allow Amelia to add covariates to the model and 
create time index of polynomials, which allows cross-section units to change over time, thereby 
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improving imputation procedure (Honaker et al. 2012). The imputation model converged normally 
and the imputation procedure generated five datasets.  
 After, two diagnostic tests—density plots and overimputation—were performed to assess the 
level of accuracy of imputed values. The first test was used to check the density plots of variables, 
which directly compare the distribution of imputed versus observed data (Honaker et al. 2012). The 
red line on the graph represents the density of the mean imputation across the five generated 
datasets, while the black line plots the density of observed data (Abayomi et al. 2008). Although the 
nature of multiple imputation procedure makes it impossible for distributions to be identical to the 
observed data, visual inspection of density plots is helpful to flag up any odd distributions that fall 
outside of set bounds (Honaker et al. 2012). The density plots can be seen in Appendix 11. For most 
variables, the imputed red lines followed the observed black lines relatively closely, while the 
distribution smoothened and lost prominent peaks. The only notable exception was the ‘project 
duration’ variable, for which the imputed distribution of values was quite different from original 
values.  
 The second diagnostic tool used was overimputation, which allows assessing the overall fit of 
the imputation model (Honaker et al. 2012). The technique handles observed data as if they were 
missing and imputes hundreds of values for each observed data point based on the initial imputation 
model, which subsequently enables to generate confidence intervals in order to inspect whether 
imputed data fit in the bounds of observed data (Honaker et al. 2012). The diagonal line on the 
overimputation diagnostic graph represents the true values, so the proximity of imputed values to the 
line is an indicator of the accuracy of the imputation model. The dots represent the mean imputation, 
the vertical lines represent the 90% confidence intervals for imputations of each observed value, and 
the colours of the lines depicted in the legend apply to the fraction of missing observations (Honaker 
et al. 2012). The graphs for metric variables shown in Appendix 12 demonstrated that confidence 
intervals contained the diagonal line (the true observed values) in the majority of cases, suggesting 
the robustness of the imputation model.  
 In addition to diagnostic tests, sensitivity analysis, shown in Appendix 13, was performed to 
compare original and imputed data. Means and standard deviations were calculated for all imputed 
variables across all five datasets and compared against the mean and the standard deviation of the 
original dataset. The difference in values of mean and standard deviation between the average across 
five datasets and the original dataset of more than 1 was believed to merit attention. One variable—
namely, project duration—had a difference in both means and standard deviations of above the 
threshold of 1. As mentioned earlier, the density plot depicting project duration variable also showed 
that the line of imputed values did not follow the original line accurately. However, given that only 2, 
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or 0.5% of cases were missing, such inaccuracy was not of concern. Manager’s elite education and PI’s 
citations variables had a difference in means of more than 1. However, since both variables had 
standard deviations below the threshold of 1, no concerns were raised. Although PI’s citations variable 
had the highest difference in means, the fraction of missing values was only 2.1%, indicating that the 
variable will not be severely affected by the imprecision of imputation procedure.  
 Overall, both diagnostic and sensitivity analyses demonstrated that imputation procedure 
generated satisfactory results and none of the variables looked particularly troublesome, so imputed 
data can be safely used in subsequent stages.  
 Analyses described in the results chapter were carried out using the ‘mi’ command in STATA 
software package, which is designed to pool estimates obtained from 5 imputed datasets. The ‘mi’ 
procedure utilises formulas for combining multiple complete-data inferences described by Schafer 
(1997). The multiple-imputation regression coefficients are simply averaged, but variance estimation 
comprises within-imputation variance and between-imputation variance which produces more robust 
standard errors (Schafer 1997). 
 
Outliers 
 
 Outliers are “observations with a unique combination of characteristics identifiable as 
distinctly different from other observations” (Hair et al. 2010 p.64). Such observations are usually 
characterised by extremely low or high values identified on a single variable or as a combination across 
a number of variables, which makes them stand out from other observations (Hair et al. 2010). Outliers 
which are observations unrepresentative of the population may distort the results, and thus often 
need to be excluded, yet the influence of each case merits context-specific assessment (Hair et al. 
2010). Detection of outliers was conducted using univariate, multivariate and visual inspection tools 
described in detail below. 
 
 Univariate Detection of Outliers 
 
 The univariate identification method compares variables after the data have been 
standardised to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 and cases which are outside of the range 
of the distribution are considered as outliers (Hair et al. 2010). As a rule of thumb, if the sample size 
is larger than 80 cases, a case is considered an outlier if its standard score is ±4.0 or if it falls outside 
the range of 4 standard deviations (Hair et al. 2010 p.67). 
 Data were standardised in SPSS and obtained z-scores were analysed variable by variable to 
determine problematic cases. Appendix 14 shows potential candidates for deletion, sorted by the 
frequency of occurrence of z-scores above or below the recommended value of 4 in corresponding 
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variables. There were 4 cases identified as potential candidates for deletion as each affected over 10 
variables (cases 153, 152, 151 and 150) and other 7 required further consideration as they affected 
between 3 to 8 variables (cases 294, 268, 337, 282, 295, 115, 225, 188). 
 
 Multivariate Detection of Outliers 
 
 Although univariate and bivariate methods are useful as a starting point in outlier detection, 
they are limited in their ability to examine a combination of several variables, which is essential in 
multivariate analysis (Hair et al. 2010). Mahalanobis D2 statistic addresses this problem by measuring 
the multidimensional position of each observation across a set of variables as the distance of each 
observation from the mean centre of all observations (Hair et al. 2010). However, this metric only 
provides the overall evaluation of each case but gives no further detail on which variables contain 
problematic cases, which indicates complementarity of all methods of outlier detection (Hair et al. 
2010). 
 Mahalanobis D2 measure was calculated in SPSS by adding all metric independent variables to 
a linear regression model and setting firm age as an arbitrary dependent variable. Then, for 
interpretation purposes, obtained Mahalanobis D2 values were divided by degrees of freedom. In large 
samples of over 100 observations, the threshold value of the D2/df statistic is between 3 and 4. With 
this threshold, as Appendix 15 shows, four cases 225, 337, 268 and 153 were identified as significantly 
different based on their frequency of occurrence across all imputed datasets. However, only cases 
337, 268 and 153 that appeared in the multivariate outlier detection test were also identified as 
problematic in univariate and visual analyses. As a result, the identification of case 225 through 
multivariate analysis was interpreted as not worthy of concern, as this case is not unique on any single 
variable but instead is unique in combination. 
 
 Visual Detection of Outliers 
 
 Additionally, box plots were used to visually inspect variables for the presence of outliers. The 
results of visual outlier detection analysis have identified a number of extraordinary observations, 
presented in Appendix 16. Appendix 17 presents the summary of the visual analysis, which located 
several extreme cases affecting specific variables as potential candidates for deletion. 
To assess whether any of the problematic cases identified during univariate, multivariate or visual 
inspection should be deleted, the decision was based on the main inclusion criteria that were used to 
construct the initial sample. That is, in the present empirical setting, the main eligibility criterion for 
firms to participate in the SBIR programme is that their total size does not exceed 500 employees. 
Therefore, the extreme case 77 identified in employment performance variable was kept in the 
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dataset as it does not exceed the threshold of 500 employees. The extreme case 268 identified in sales 
performance variable, however, despite fitting the size criterion, was recognised as problematic across 
all three detection tests. Additionally, two outliers, cases 89 and 304 seemed to severely affect initial 
commitment (project-level) variable. Although the results of the box plot visual analysis revealed a 
number of outlying values, because they were not identified as problematic in other analyses and 
because they were believed to fit the selection criteria and the objectives of the research project, they 
were kept in the dataset.  
 To conclude, sensitivity analyses were performed with and without identified problematic 8 
outliers, namely cases 89, 150, 151, 152, 153, 268, 304 and 337 to see if they affect the results. 
Consequently, it was concluded that their presence inflates statistical effects, as a result of which they 
were deleted as significant outliers, leaving a working sample of 367 observations. 
 
6.3 Assumptions of Multivariate Analysis 
 
 While the earlier stages involved cleaning data for a workable format, the last stage in 
preparing data requires testing assumptions that underlie the statistical bases for multivariate analysis 
(Hair et al. 2010). Although inferences and results of some statistical techniques are prone to violations 
in these assumptions, it is still important to meet some of the assumptions to guarantee robustness 
of the estimation procedure and to understand any potential implications that they may have on the 
interpretation of the results (Hair et al. 2010). Four main assumptions, namely normality, 
multicollinearity, linearity and homoscedasticity that have an impact on every univariate and 
multivariate statistical method, are investigated in detail in the following sections. 
 
Normality and Transformations 
 
 Normality, one of the most crucial assumptions of statistical theory, is concerned with 
comparing the shape of the data distribution for every variable measured on a continuous scale 
against the normal distribution (Hair et al. 2010). Even though larger sample sizes minimise the 
negative effects of nonnormality of data, it is essential to investigate univariate normality as any large 
deviation from the normal distribution will result in biassed estimates of statistical tests (Hair et al. 
2010). The shape of the data distribution is assessed in terms of two measures—kurtosis and skewness. 
While the former reflects the height of the distribution, the latter refers to its centrality or symmetry 
(Hair et al. 2010). 
 Testing of normality assumptions tends to start with the basic visual examination of data using 
histograms and normal probability Q-Q plots which depict how close data are to a normal distribution. 
Obtained normal probability plots demonstrated departures of plotted data values from the straight 
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diagonal line, while histograms showed a significant number of skewed variables, indicating 
nonnormality (Appendix 18).  
 Although graphical examination of normality is useful, it does not tell by how much the data 
deviate from the normal distribution. To address this, statistical tests can be used to calculate the 𝑧 
values of kurtosis and skewness that underpin normality assumptions. Under symmetrical distribution, 
skewness value is zero or lies between -1 and +1, while kurtosis is expected to have a value of 3 
(StataCorp 2013). Therefore, values of skewness and kurtosis that exceed this threshold, indicate 
departures from normality. However, Kline (2011) suggested that variables with skewness score of 
above 3 are considered extremely problematic, while kurtosis score in the range from 8 to 20 indicates 
an extreme case. 
 Skewness and kurtosis scores for metric variables were calculated in STATA26. As can be seen 
from Table 6-1 skewness and kurtosis scores were above the proposed critical values, indicating that 
majority of variables lacked symmetry, and had peaked and right-tailed observed distribution.  
To mitigate the effect of positively skewed and peaked distributions, data can be transformed by 
applying the power function, of which logarithm is the most widely used form (Hair et al. 2010; Cohen 
et al. 2003). A logarithm is a nonlinear mathematical transformation that changes the relative spacing 
of scores on a scale (Cohen et al. 2003 p.253). For cases with severe positive skewness the logarithmic 
transformation with a higher base, such as log10 is a recommended remedy over the natural log 
transformation ln, or loge, which is more suitable for less severe cases (Kline 2011 p.63). Given that 
some variables had zero values which have a theoretical meaning, in order to keep all observations 
after the logarithmic transformation, it is advisable to add a small arbitrary constant to all values so 
that the lowest value is 1 (Kline 2011). Such remedy, referred to in the literature as ‘started logs’ or 
‘started powers’ (Cohen et al. 2003 p.235), was originally proposed by Mosteller and Tukey (1977) and 
is frequently used in business studies, especially when using patent statistics (e.g. Andries and Faems 
2013; Haeussler et al. 2014) or TMT backgrounds (e.g. Tornikoski and Newbert 2007) of nascent firms. 
 As a result, the transformation of log10(1+x) was chosen as the most optimal type of remedy 
and was applied to all variables to see if it improves skewness and kurtosis scores. The transformation 
did not improve the distribution of data for variables which had minimal deviations from ideal scores 
of skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, such variables were kept in their original format. The last two 
columns on the right-hand side of Table 6-1 report improved scores after the transformation was 
applied. To sum up, all variables used for subsequent analyses, had skewness values below 3 and 
                                                          
26 STATA uses a formula by Bock (1975) to calculate the value of kurtosis which adds a constant of 3 to the 
score. Klein, however, uses the formula by Snedecor and Cochran (1967) which calculates the kurtosis in the 
same way, but does not add the constant of 3. Therefore, critical values proposed by Kline can be increased by 
3 to account for differences in formulas. 
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kurtosis values below 8—the recommended thresholds—implying that normality assumption was 
met. 
Table 6-1: Skewness and kurtosis statistics of metric variables before and after transformations 
Variable Before Transformation After Transformation 
Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis 
Sales performance 3.400 15.349 1.530 4.609 
Employment performance 4.597 35.873 0.742 3.062 
Innovation performance 6.552 63.115 1.217 4.032 
Sales yield 7.107 60.793 1.740 6.421 
Employment yield 8.037 87.512 0.663 3.186 
Innovation yield 6.092 53.435 1.587 4.716 
Initial commitment (project) 2.280 10.563 1.883 7.955 
Initial commitment (portfolio) 2.206 11.062 1.589 7.263 
Sequencing 1.853 7.518 1.228 3.927 
Manager’s firm tenure 1.673 6.534 - - 
PI’s firm tenure 1.476 5.199 - - 
Manager’s technical experience 0.478 2.347 - - 
PI’s technical experience 0.505 2.892 - - 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience 1.228 4.476 - - 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience 1.570 5.376 - - 
Manager’s commercial experience 0.510 2.546 - - 
Manager’s elite education 0.721 2.706 - - 
PI’s elite education 0.794 3.109 - - 
Manager’s patents 4.290 29.434 0.663 2.393 
PI’s patents 6.652 57.125 0.794 3.346 
Manager’s publications 2.946 14.533 -0.075 1.725 
PI’s publications 2.230 8.187 -0.383 2.896 
Abstract readability 1.294 6.975 0.568 4.356 
Project duration 0.593 2.464 - - 
Invention activity 4.154 25.883 0.908 2.993 
R&D capability 0.307 3.093 - - 
Managerial capability 1.357 3.919 - - 
Intellectual capability 0.347 4.102 - - 
State innovativeness -1.191 3.817 - - 
Industry volatility (2014) -1.495 4.059 - - 
Industry volatility (t) 1.033 4.077 - - 
Firm age 1.534 5.329 -0.240 2.606 
 
Linearity 
 
 Another critical assumption to check is that correlational measures, which form the basis for 
all multivariate analyses, present the linear association (Hair et al. 2010). Linearity represents the 
change in the dependent variable for each unit increase in the independent variable, and if such 
association is nonlinear in nature, the strength of the relationships will be underestimated, 
undermining the predictive power of the multivariate model and estimated parameters (Hair et al. 
2010). 
 The most widely used methods to determine whether the variables show a curvilinear 
relationship is to either visually examine scatterplots of the pairs of metric variables or the residual 
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plots of the dependent variable after every regression equation. If the results depict the violation of 
the assumption, to achieve linearity, the most common remedy is to transform the variables by adding 
polynomial terms.  
 Linearity assumption was tested using a visual examination of augmented component-plus-
residual plots in STATA using the ‘acprplot’ command. The method was initially proposed by Mallows 
(1986) and is known to be sensitive to identifying nonlinearity as it enables examination of the 
functional form of the data because of its ability to present multidimensional data in a two-
dimensional format. Residuals for all metric variables are obtained in the regression analysis and then 
the regression line takes a slope equal to the estimated coefficient of the independent variable in the 
original regression model. All graphs include a median spline to assist visual interpretation of how 
closely the regression line fits the data. The plots were generated for every regressor in each equation 
and can be seen in Appendix 19. The lines in some plots appeared curvilinear; however, upon closer 
inspection, it became apparent that such effect was driven by a few outliers in the data. As a result, it 
was concluded that the plots did not exhibit any significant deviations from the linearity assumption. 
Hence, no remedies were necessary. 
 
Homoscedasticity 
 
 The next important test relates to the dependence relationships, as expressed by the constant 
variance of individual variables or their combination (Wetherill 1986). This assumption relates to 
homoscedasticity and is essential so that dependent variables display a relatively equal degree of 
variance across all explanatory variables (Hair et al. 2010 p.74). The case when the variance of the 
dependent variable is determined by only a few explanatory variables, indicating that conditional 
spread of dispersion is not constant and non-linear, is known as heteroscedasticity (Chatfield 1995). 
The presence of heteroscedasticity is related to increased predictive power of certain relationships 
incorporated in the multivariate model and, although parameter estimates will remain unbiased, it 
may undermine the accuracy of the standard errors and interpretation of hypothesis tests (Hair et al. 
2010). Heteroscedasticity may be a result of the presence of types of variables which either have an 
inherent propensity towards dispersion, such as percentages or variables with a broad range of 
increasing values, or have a skewed distribution (Hair et al. 2010). 
 In multiple regression, it is important to examine the effect of the linear combination of 
independent variables in explaining the dependent variable collectively, which can be assessed 
through the derived variate of the estimated regression model. The error of the variate is estimated 
as the difference between observed and predicted, or fitted values for the dependent variable, and 
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the homoscedasticity assumption can be tested by plotting and examining the pattern of the error 
term, also known as the residual (Hair et al. 2010 p.183). 
 To examine whether the error term exhibits the constant variance, residuals were plotted 
against the fitted dependent value and compared to the null plot to see the pattern. When all the 
assumptions are met, the pattern should resemble the null plot, in which the residuals are distributed 
randomly, relatively equally around the zero line and with no prominent tendencies towards either 
side (Hair et al. 2010 p.183). The plots shown in Appendix 20 further confirmed the above conclusion 
that that data met the linearity assumption. However, some plots depicted the pattern of variation in 
the residuals, indicating heteroscedasticity.  
 In addition to the visual inspection, Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White’s tests for 
heteroscedasticity were carried out for each regression equation used in the model, which test the 
null hypotheses that the error variances are equally distributed, i.e. are homoscedastic. Whereas the 
former test can only detect linear forms of heteroscedasticity, the latter can also test for non-linear 
forms of heteroscedasticity and can relax the assumption that the residuals are normally distributed 
(Greene 2012). The results of Breusch-Pagan test summarised in Table 6-227 further supported the 
above conclusion that the data in the regression equations did not meet the homoscedasticity 
assumption, which was rejected at statistically significant probability levels. White’s test, however, did 
not flag any violations of the homoscedasticity assumption.  
 The results of the visual inspection and one out of two statistical tests reveal that 
heteroscedasticity is present. Taking into consideration the fact that the variables had been already 
transformed, the best possible remedy to deal with the problem of heteroscedasticity is to estimate 
robust standard errors, which produce unbiased p-values in the presence of dependent and unequally 
distributed residual terms (Allison 1999). Hence, to avoid any potential misinterpretation of 
hypotheses tests, robust standard errors were reported after each regression model in the subsequent 
results chapters.  
                                                          
27 Statistical methods are currently unable to test equations with binary dependent variables. Hence, the 
equation from the Signalling conceptual model with Discontinuation as dependent variable is not included in 
the table. 
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Table 6-2: Results of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and White's tests for heteroscedasticity 
Model Equation Breusch-Pagan Test White’s Test 
Chi2 Prob>Chi2 Chi2 Prob>Chi2 
ROR Sales Yield, no prior awards 20.45 0.0000 67.79 0.6811 
Sales Yield, with prior awards 43.17 0.0000 148.03 0.0696 
Employment Yield, no prior awards 7.31 0.0069 80.28 0.2889 
Employment Yield, with prior awards 4.25 0.0393 141.02 0.1407 
Innovation Yield, no prior awards 7.06 0.0079 90.24 0.0984 
Innovation Yield, with prior awards 59.50 0.0000 101.53 0.9306 
Sales Performance, no prior awards 45.01 0.0000 73.54 0.4931 
Sales Performance, with prior awards 30.54 0.0000 133.14 0.2712 
Employment Performance, no prior awards 12.28 0.0005 67.97 0.6753 
Employment Performance, with prior awards 6.62 0.0101 137.80 0.1873 
Innovation Performance, no prior awards 12.87 0.0003 83.06 0.2205 
Innovation Performance, with prior awards 23.84 0.0000 112.79 0.7554 
Signalling Initial Commitment, no prior awards 21.60 0.0000 128.00 0.4336 
Initial Commitment, with prior awards 47.77 0.0000 239.00 0.5061 
ROR and 
Signalling 
Sales Yield, no prior awards 16.35 0.0004 128.00 0.4584 
Sales Yield, with prior awards 70.02 0.0000 239.00 0.4696 
Employment Yield, no prior awards 1.65 0.1991 128.00 0.4584 
Employment Yield, with prior awards 7.84 0.0051 239.00 0.4696 
Innovation Yield, no prior awards 8.77 0.0031 128.00 0.4584 
Innovation Yield, with prior awards 42.81 0.0000 239.00 0.4696 
Sales Performance, no prior awards 53.19 0.0000 128.00 0.4584 
Sales Performance, with prior awards 18.67 0.0000 239.00 0.4696 
Employment Performance, no prior awards 8.66 0.0033 128.00 0.4584 
Employment Performance, with prior awards 1.66 0.1970 239.00 0.4696 
Innovation Performance, no prior awards 12.95 0.0003 128.00 0.4584 
Innovation Performance, with prior awards 36.49 0.0000 239.00 0.4696 
  
Multicollinearity 
  
 The cases when two or more independent variables are strongly correlated are known as 
collinearity and multicollinearity, respectively (Cohen et al. 2003). High degree of intercorrelations 
between independent variables makes it problematic to interpret the extent to which any single 
independent variable explains variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, to ensure that the 
interpretation of the regression variate is not affected by the interrelationships between independent 
variables, it is necessary to identify whether multicollinearity is an issue. The most obvious starting 
point is to examine the correlation matrix. As a rule of thumb, if the variables have a correlation of 0.9 
or higher, that indicates collinearity. However, as a precautionary measure, it is advisable to pay 
attention even to bivariate relationships that have a correlation of 0.7 and higher (Hair et al. 2010). 
 Correlation matrix can only identify bivariate collinearity in a pair of variables, but is unable to 
assess the combined impact of a set of independent variables on a single independent variable. To 
establish whether multicollinearity might be present, the variance inflator factor (VIF) can be 
measured. High values of the VIF statistic indicate the high impact of the multicollinearity on the 
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estimation procedure, including R2 and regression coefficients. Hair et al. (2010) proposed a threshold 
of the VIF value of 10 which indicates substantive multicollinearity levels. However, the extant 
literature on statistics recommends that even variables with the VIF between 3 and 5 should be given 
careful attention.  
 Condition index (CI) is another useful metric to determine the extent of multicollinearity. As a 
rule of thumb, the condition index of 15 signifies multicollinearity, while the condition index of over 
30 implies a severe problem (StataCorp 2013). Taking into account that multicollinearity is the data-
related problem, the most logical remedy is to re-specify the model by omitting highly collinear 
variables. However, this solution may result in the specification error. 
 Diagnosis of collinearity was carried out by examining the bivariate correlations (reported 
later in Table 6-20) and the VIF statistics. Initial results of the correlation matrix revealed that 
manager’s firm tenure is highly correlated with firm age. As a result, it was necessary to omit this 
independent variable from all equations comprising conceptual model. The VIF statistics were 
obtained by running the ‘collin’ command in STATA after each regression equation used in the 
conceptual model. The first run of collinearity diagnostics revealed that the Condition Index is above 
100 which indicates a potential collinearity, although VIF statistics were all well below 5, with the 
average of less than 2. Given that the VIF does not show which variables are correlated or are causing 
the problem, an extension analysis was carried out using the ‘coldiag2’ command in STATA, which 
allows diagnosing condition indexes and variance-decomposition proportions of individual 
independent variables. The results of the latter test revealed that the collinearity problem was 
associated with the constant term, and its presence was inflating the overall condition index. Since 
the constant has no theoretical meaning in the present model, it was decided that it can be safely 
excluded from the diagnosis of multicollinearity. Therefore, multicollinearity was performed on the 
equations exclusive of the constant term, or intercept. The summary of results is depicted in Table 
6-3, while more detailed results can be found in Appendix 21. The statistics were within acceptable 
limits, with the mean VIF of 1.8 and CI of 5, indicating that multicollinearity was not a problem. 
Table 6-3: Summary of multicollinearity diagnostics 
Model Equation Mean 
VIF 
Condition 
Number 
Signalling Initial Commitment 1.84 5.1685 
Discontinuation 1.88 5.2159 
ROR and 
Signalling 
Sales Yield 1.86 5.2830 
Employment Yield 1.88 5.3443 
Innovation Yield 1.79 5.2754 
Sales Performance 1.85 5.1361 
Employment Performance 1.86 5.1384 
Innovation Performance 1.79 5.1379 
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Endogeneity 
 
 Following Shaver's (1998) seminal work on the role of endogeneity in affecting statistical 
findings, there has been a call in strategic management field to reduce the potential detrimental 
effects of endogeneity by using appropriate techniques (e.g. Bascle 2008; Hamilton and Nickerson 
2003). Endogeneity is the term used to refer to the situation when an independent variable in an 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression is correlated with the residual (Kennedy 2003). Under such 
situation, error terms do not vary randomly, which violates the main assumption necessary for 
efficient estimation under the OLS regression model (Kennedy 2003). Erroneous inclusion of the 
correlation between the independent variable and residuals results in the estimation of biassed 
coefficients for relationships in the OLS model (Semadeni et al. 2014). Econometric literature 
identified four potential sources of endogeneity in OLS models: measurement error, autoregression, 
omitted variables and simultaneous causality (Kennedy 2003).  Considering that endogeneity may bias 
the parameter estimates and interpretation of statistical inference tests, endogeneity should be 
explicitly investigated (Semadeni et al. 2014). Two most widely used remedies for endogeneity are the 
instrumental variables and the two-stage least square (2SLS) models, often used interchangeably 
(Semadeni et al. 2014). The instrument is a variable which is correlated with the endogenous variable 
but is exogenous to the model, and 2SLS is the technique to estimate instrumental variables regression 
model. 
In line with the analytical road map proposed by Bascle (2008), the initial stage in examining 
the endogeneity problem is to identify whether it is even relevant in the given study. First, it is 
necessary to check whether OLS or 2SLS produces more consistent and robust estimates. Therefore, 
a specification test needs to be conducted to investigate the underlying assumptions of these two 
techniques (Wooldridge 2010). If the underlying assumption is that all explanatory variables are 
exogenous, then it is possible to allow one or more variable to be endogenous as an alternative 
assumption in order to test the difference between OLS and 2SLS (Wooldridge 2010).  
Regression-based endogeneity tests offer convenience and ease of computation by directly 
comparing 2SLS and OLS, with Hausman statistic (Hausman 1978) being the most widely used test for 
the appropriateness of the random effects specification (Wooldridge 2010; Kennedy 2003). 
Investigation of whether some explanatory variables are endogenous was tested using the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test, which is based on the difference between 2SLS and OLS, and is carried out in 
several steps (Wooldridge 2010). 
In the equation 𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 +  𝛽2𝑥2 +  𝛼1𝑧1 +  𝑢1 there is an assumption that 𝑧1 and 
𝑢1might be correlated. Then, instruments 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5 are identified for 𝑧1 and 𝑧1 is regressed on all 𝑥 
variables to obtain the residuals 𝑣2 from the reduced form OLS equation. Finally, 𝑣2 is included in the 
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initial OLS equation in order to get the t-statistic on 𝑣2. If the p-value is at 10% significance level, then 
2SLS may be a good alternative; if the p-value is 10% or more, then the null hypotheses that 𝑧1 is 
exogenous cannot be rejected and OLS is deemed robust (Wooldridge 2010). 
Endogeneity was hypothesised to be possible for two reasons. Empirically, a number of 
theoretically relevant variables were omitted from the model as they were causing multicollinearity.  
Theoretically, there might exist selection bias as a result of government venture funders’ favouritism 
towards certain types of firms. As a number of authors cautioned, receiving government subsidies may 
be endogenous to a firm’s R&D activities (Wallsten 2000) or their prospects for commercialisation 
(Link and Ruhm 2009). Both possibilities indicate that endogeneity may be associated with the reverse 
causality problem (Brander et al. 2014), as a result of which fixed effects models may overestimate 
the degree to which external funding causes improvements in performance. 
To estimate the effect of potential endogeneity problem, the instrumental variables approach 
was used. Specifically, the assumption was that Phase I and Phase II funding outcomes, namely initial 
commitment and discontinuation variables might be endogenous as they can be influenced by 
unobservable selection effects. The major difficulty in using such approach is in identifying valid 
instruments. Relevant instruments were identified among the omitted variables, which were 
correlated with the hypothesised endogenous variables but were unrelated to the dependent 
variables. Two types of instruments were selected, which related to the availability of government 
funding (measured by the total budget, applications received and grants awarded) and the quality of 
firms’ patenting. Then, the procedure described above was performed on all equations of the 
combined ROR and signalling model (Part III) using relevant selected instruments to arrive at the 
Hausman test statistic.  
Table 6-4: Summary of results of the Hausman test28 
Equation Initial Commitment Discontinuation29 
F-value Prob>F F-value Prob>F 
Sales Yield, full sample 1.33 0.2541 0.16 0.6938 
Sales Yield, no prior awards 0.04 0.8424 0.00 0.9556 
Sales Yield, with prior awards 4.86 0.0324 3.03 0.0854 
Employment Yield, full sample 0.58 0.4492 0.42 0.5236 
Employment Yield, no prior awards 0.39 0.5385 0.56 0.4594 
Employment Yield, with prior awards 1.40 0.2386 1.23 0.2691 
Innovation Yield, full sample 0.03 0.8584 0.03 0.8610 
Innovation Yield, no prior awards 0.15 0.7043 0.99 0.3229 
Innovation Yield, with prior awards 0.91 0.3425 0.02 0.8800 
Sales Performance, full sample 0.22 0.6442 0.23 0.6309 
                                                          
28 The tests were performed on pooled multiply imputed datasets using the ‘mi’ command in STATA. 
29 For the results reported in the table, the first stage estimation was carried out using the Probit model as it 
produces more efficient estimates for binary variables, such as in the case of the hypothesised endogenous 
discontinuation variable. For robustness, for the binary endogenous variable, the first stage tests were also 
conducted using OLS which produced results consistent with the Probit procedure.   
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Sales Performance, no prior awards 0.88 0.3619 0.45 0.5118 
Sales Performance, with prior awards 0.18 0.6691 0.18 0.6724 
Employment Performance, full sample 0.07 0.7900 0.08 0.7767 
Employment Performance, no prior awards 1.40 0.2479 1.45 0.2397 
Employment Performance, with prior awards 0.47 0.4961 0.43 0.5145 
Innovation Performance, full sample 1.05 0.3074 0.54 0.4620 
Innovation Performance, no prior awards 0.03 0.8549 0.66 0.4206 
Innovation Performance, with prior awards 0.24 0.6274 0.00 0.9695 
 
 The results in Table 6-4 show that only one of all tested equations may have a potential 
endogeneity problem: the null hypothesis that the hypothesised independent variable is exogenous 
was rejected for initial commitment equation at 5% significance level and discontinuation at 10% 
significance level. However, while the test on the full sample indicated no potential problem, it was 
concluded that endogeneity has little effect on the main estimates. Therefore, the use of the random 
effects model (2SLS) as an alternative method to the fixed effects model (OLS) to produce more 
efficient estimates, did not merit further attention. To conclude, although the Hausman test 
procedure did not find evidence that endogeneity may bias the estimates, the issue remains 
potentially relevant. 
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6.4 Summary of Constructs 
 
 To assist with the interpretation of subsequent descriptive and correlation analyses, the 
current section presents a series of tables (Table 6-5, Table 6-6, Table 6-7 and Table 6-8) summarising 
constructs used in the study: their operationalisations, measures and sources that were discussed in 
greater detail in the Research Methodology chapter as well as transformations that were applied as a 
result of testing of multivariate assumptions. 
Table 6-5: Summary of dependent variables 
Variable Operationalisation Source Transformation 
Sales 
Performance 
Firm sales in t2014, $ million 
 
Hoover’s Online log10(1+x) 
Employment 
Performance 
Number of employees in t2014 Hoover’s Online log10(1+x) 
Innovation 
Performance 
Patents application stock in the period from t until t2014 Patbase & 
Espacenet 
log10(1+x) 
Sales Yield Sales2014 / ∑t, t-1…t-n Total Prior Investment Hoover’s Online, 
SBIR data 
log10(1+x) 
Employment 
Yield 
Employees2014 / ∑t, t-1…t-n Total Prior Investment Hoover’s Online, 
SBIR data 
log10(1+x) 
Innovation 
Yield 
Patent applications t, t+1,…t2014/ ∑t, t-1…t-n Total Prior 
Investment 
Patbase & 
Espacenet,  
SBIR data 
log10(1+x) 
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Table 6-6: Summary of independent variables – real options reasoning constructs 
Theoretical 
Construct 
Definition Level of 
Analysis 
Independent 
Variable 
Operationalisation Measurement Timing Source Transformation 
Initial 
commitment 
(project-level 
funding) 
Organisational commitment to 
projects at the point of initial 
resource allocation (Klingebiel 
and Adner 2015) 
Project Initial 
commitment 
(project-level) 
Success magnitude: $ amount of Phase 
I award granted to an individual project 
in the database 
Number retrieved from the SBIR database t  SBIR 
data 
log10(1+x) 
Discontinuation 
(project-level 
funding) 
Resource reallocation, or the 
reassignment over time of 
resources from deteriorating 
projects to more promising 
ones (Adner 2007) 
Project  Discontinuation 
(project-level) 
Phase II outcome: whether or not 
Phase I project in the database later 
received Phase II funding, dummy 
Coding:  
Discontinue = 1 
Continue = 0 
 
t+n 
 
SBIR 
data 
none 
Fit  
(project-level 
funding) 
Consistency of resource 
allocation decisions (Klingebiel 
and Adner 2015; Adner 2007) 
Project  Fit of funding 
decisions 
(project-level) 
Fit is an interaction of initial 
commitment and reallocation. 
Low initial commitment: <mean 
High initial commitment:- >=mean 
Coding: 
Low initial commitment x Discontinue / 
High initial commitment x Continue = 1 (fit) 
High initial commitment x Continue / Low 
initial commitment x Discontinue = 0 (no-fit) 
t, t+n  SBIR 
data 
none 
Initial 
commitment 
(portfolio-level 
funding) 
Same as above Portfolio Initial 
commitment 
(portfolio-level) 
Average $ amount the firm received for 
cumulated prior Phase I awards  
E.g., if the firm received a total of $0.75 
million for 7 Phase I awards, then average 
prior Phase I $ award is 0.75/7=0.11  
t-1 
 
SBIR 
data 
log10(1+x) 
Sequencing 
(portfolio-level 
funding) 
Continuous allocation of 
project resources over several 
steps (Tong and Reuer 2007) 
Portfolio Sequencing 
(portfolio-level) 
Phase II transition rate: a ratio of a 
number of received Phase II awards per 
Phase I awards  
E.g., if the firm received 2 Phase II awards 
and 10 Phase I awards, then the Phase II 
transition rate is 2/10=0.2 
t-1 
 
SBIR 
data 
log10(1+x) 
Fit 
(portfolio-level 
funding) 
Same as above Portfolio  Fit of funding 
decisions  
(portfolio-level) 
Fit is an interaction of initial 
commitment and reallocation. 
Low initial commitment: <mean 
High initial commitment: >=mean 
Discontinue: Phase II transition rate = 0 
Continue: Phase II transition rate > 0 
Coding: 
Low initial commitment x Discontinue / 
High initial commitment x Continue = 1 (fit) 
High initial commitment x Continue / Low 
initial commitment x Discontinue = 0 (no-fit) 
 
t-1 SBIR 
data 
none 
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Table 6-7: Summary of independent variables – signalling constructs 
Theoretical 
Construct 
Level of 
Analysis 
Independent Variable Operationalisation Measurement Timing Source Transformation 
Executive’s 
functional role 
 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Manager CEO 
PI CEO 
Whether or not the person is a 
CEO, dummy 
Coding: 
CEO = 1 
Non-CEO = 0 
t LinkedIn None 
Organisational 
tenure 
Principal 
investigator 
PI’s firm tenure Tenure with the firm at the award 
date 
Number of years, count t LinkedIn None 
Technical 
experience 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
PI’s technical experience 
Experience in technical positions in 
the same sector of the start-up 
before award date 
Number of years, count t-1 LinkedIn None 
Entrepreneurial 
experience 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
Entrepreneurial experience in any 
sector before award date 
Number of years, count t-1 LinkedIn None 
Elite Education Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Manager’ elite education 
PI’s elite education 
A score of the last attended 
university from the Top 100 
worldwide universities ranking. 
Universities not in the top 100 
received a score of zero 
Scores retrieved from Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (ARWU)   
t Shanghai 
Ranking 
None 
Advanced 
business 
education 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Manager’s MBA  
PI’s MBA 
Whether or not the person has an 
MBA degree, dummy 
Coding: 
MBA = 1 
No MBA = 0 
t LinkedIn None 
Advanced 
technical 
education 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Manager’s PhD 
PI’s PhD 
Whether or not the person has a 
doctorate degree, dummy 
Coding: 
Dr = 1 
Mr/Ms = 0 
t LinkedIn None 
Academic 
seniority 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Manager’s professorship 
PI’s professorship 
Whether or not the person is a 
professor, dummy  
Coding: 
Professor = 1 
Not Professor = 0 
t LinkedIn None 
Inventive capacity Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Manager’s patents 
PI’s patents 
How many patent applications the 
person had prior to award date 
Number of patent applications, count t-1 Patbase log10(1+x) 
Academic 
competence 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Manager’s publications 
PI’s publications 
How many published documents 
the person had prior to award date  
Number of published documents, count 
(includes journal articles, conference papers, books, and 
other, such as meeting, review, correction, clinical trial, 
editorial, and letter) 
t-1 Scopus log10(1+x) 
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Abstract 
readability 
Project Abstract readability Gunning-Fog score (Fog Index) of 
the abstract provided in the Phase 
I project application 
Readability measure: 0.4*(average number of words per 
sentence + percent of complex words). High values of the 
Fog Index imply less readable text. 
t SBIR data log10(1+x) 
Post-funding 
project duration 
Firm Project duration How much time elapsed between 
Phase I project start and project 
end date  
Number of days, count t SBIR data None 
Post-funding 
invention activity 
Firm Invention activity How many patents applications the 
firm filed in a 3-year window 
following Phase I award 
Number of patent applications from Patbase, count t+1, t+2, t+3 Patbase log10(1+x) 
Project scope Project Project scope Whether the project targets a 
specific cancer type or multiple 
Coding:  
Multiple cancer types targeted = 1 (broad) 
Specific cancer type targeted = 0 (narrow) 
t SBIR data None 
Project category Project Federal program type Federal programme type by 
assigned category from the 
Catalogue of Federal Domestic 
Assistance (CFDA)  
Coding: 
Cancer Cause and Prevention Research = 1 
Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research = 2  
Cancer Treatment Research = 3 
Cancer Biology Research = 4 
t SBIR data None 
R&D capability Firm R&D capability Technical efficiency of converting 
inputs into outputs 
SFE Equation: 
Output (Invention Activityt) = Input 1 (Quality-Adjusted 
Patenting Output) + Input 2 (Knowledge Breadth) + Input 3 
(PI’s Intellectual Capability)   
t SFA None 
Managerial 
capability 
Manager 
 
Managerial capability Technical efficiency of converting 
inputs into outputs 
SFE Equation: 
Output (Innovation Reach) = Input 1 (Commercial 
experience) + Input 2 (Intellectual Competence) 
t SFA None 
PI’s Intellectual 
capability 
Principal 
investigator 
Intellectual capability Technical efficiency of converting 
inputs into outputs  
 
SFE Equation: 
Output (Academic Impact) = Input 1 (Quality-Adjusted 
Academic Competence) + Input 2 (Knowledge 
Appropriation) + Input 3 (Intellectual Competence)   
t SFA None 
R&D X Managerial 
capability 
Firm & 
Manager 
 
R&DCapXManCap Interaction of R&D and managerial 
capabilities 
Multiplication of mean-centred variables t SFA None 
R&D X Intellectual 
capability 
Firm & 
Principal 
investigator 
 
R&DCapXIntCap Interaction of R&D and PI’s 
intellectual capabilities 
Multiplication of mean-centred variables t SFA None 
Intellectual X 
Managerial 
capability 
Principal 
investigator & 
Manager 
IntCapXManCap Interaction of PI’s intellectual and 
managerial capabilities 
Multiplication of mean-centred variables t SFA None 
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Table 6-8: Summary of control variables 
Independent Variable Level of Analysis Operationalisation Measurement Timing Source Transformation 
Non-woman-owned Firm Whether or not the firm is woman-owned, 
dummy 
Coding:  
Non-woman-owned = 1 
Woman-owned = 0 
t SBIR data None 
Non-minority-owned Firm 
 
Whether or not the firm is minority-owned, 
dummy 
Coding: 
Non-minority-owned = 1 
Minority-owned = 0 
t SBIR data None 
Non-HubZone-owned Firm Whether or not the firm is HubZone-owned, 
dummy 
Coding: 
Non-HubZone-owned = 1 
HubZone-owned = 0 
t SBIR data None 
Industry volatility (2014) Environment Industry volatility for a 5-year rolling 
window, lagged by 1 year 
Industry stock return volatility computed as 
standard deviation from average annual 
equal-weighted returns of the Fama and 
French (1997) 49 industries 
2013  Ken French Data 
Library 
None 
Industry volatility (t) Environment Industry volatility for a 5-year rolling 
window, lagged by 1 year 
Industry stock return volatility computed as 
standard deviation from average annual 
equal-weighted returns of the Fama and 
French (1997) 49 industries 
t-1  Ken French Data 
Library 
None 
State innovativeness Environment Innovation Scores of US States The ranking list retrieved from Bloomberg’s 
Visual Data platform 
t Bloomberg None 
Firm age Firm Firm age at project start Number of years, count t Company website; 
Bloomberg Business 
Week 
log10(1+x) 
Project cohort Project Year of Phase I award, dummy Coding: 
2006 = 1 
2007 = 2 
2008 = 3 
2009 = 4 
2010 = 5 
2011 = 6 
2012 = 7 
t SBIR data None 
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6.5 Descriptive Analysis 
 
 This section is designed to examine sample characteristics, distribution of individual variables 
as well as well their bivariate relationships, which is an important preliminary stage before embarking 
on more complex multivariate modelling. All relevant metrics and descriptive statistics were first 
averaged for each individual imputed dataset and then the results were pooled to arrive at the single 
average figure. Sample characteristics were expressed as counts and proportions of subgroups within 
the data; descriptive statistics encompassed central tendency, spread and range of data; bivariate 
relationships were analysed through the correlation matrix. For variables which underwent a 
transformation in order to normalise the data, statistics were reported before and after 
transformation. This was done because data before transformation provide more meaningful insights 
during the exploratory analysis, but it is also necessary to examine the data in the form that was used 
for regression analysis, that is, in a transformed form.  
 
Sample Characteristics 
 
 As can be seen from Table 6-9, the sample was split into modelling scenarios to differentiate 
between the firms that had prior funding (239 cases) versus the ones that did not (128 cases).  
Table 6-9: Summary of final sample and modelling scenarios 
Sample Sample Size Definition 
All cases 367 This sample includes all projects of firms 
With no prior awards 128 This sample includes only projects in year t of firms that had no 
Phase I and Phase II awards prior to that year 
With prior awards 239 This sample includes only projects in year t of firms that had 
Phase I and Phase II awards prior to that year 
 
 Table 6-10 shows that the final sample comprises 367 projects from 275 firms, 77% of these 
firms had 1 project in the sample, and the remaining 23% had more than 1 participating project. 37% 
of projects were conducted by young firms between 4-9 years old, and 29% of projects were 
performed by start-ups; only 18% of participating projects were from established firms. Project cohort 
refers to the year t in which the focal Phase I award was granted. A cohort of 2008 presents the highest 
proportion of participating projects in the sample, followed by 2007, and 2006. Total investment refers 
to U.S. dollar amount in millions received by each firm under the SBIR scheme as of year t. Nearly half 
of all participating projects (48%) are from firms that received up to $1 million worth of funding, 32% 
received more than $1 but less than $5 million, and the remaining 20% received over $5 million worth 
of SBIR awards. 
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Table 6-10: Descriptive characteristics of the sample – projects per firm, firm age, project cohorts and total 
SBIR investment 
# of 
Projects 
per Firm 
Count % Firm 
Age 
Count % Project 
Cohort 
(t) 
Count % Total SBIR 
Investment 
($ million) 
Count % 
1 
2 
3 
4+ 
213 
42 
15 
5 
77% 
15% 
5% 
2% 
0-3 
4-9 
10-15 
16-20 
21-40 
107 
137 
67 
22 
34 
29% 
37% 
18% 
6% 
9% 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
201230 
61 
79 
125 
47 
48 
6 
1 
17% 
22% 
34% 
13% 
13% 
2% 
0% 
0.10-0.99 
1.00-2.99 
3.00-4.99 
5.00-6.99 
7.00-9.99 
10.00-19.99 
20.00+ 
177 
74 
44 
15 
32 
15 
10 
48% 
20% 
12% 
4% 
9% 
4% 
3% 
 
 The data displayed in Table 6-11 put firms into a wider environmental context. The majority 
of projects in the sample were run by firms registered in the state of California (23%), followed by 
Massachusetts (13%). Representation of firms from other states was quite small, yet almost equal 
(between 2% and 7%).  Over half of all projects in the sample (53%) were conducted by firms primarily 
engaged in business services, which relates to research and development activities for commercial 
and non-commercial purposes. The second largest category of projects (17%) represented 
pharmaceutical industry, followed by medical equipment (6%). Whereas business services and 
medical equipment experienced quite volatile environments in 2013 and 2014, pharmaceutical 
products category was stable. 
Table 6-11: Descriptive characteristics of the sample – location and industry 
U.S. 
State 
Count % Industry31 Count % Industry 
Volatility 
2014 Rank 
Industry 
Volatility 
2013 Rank 
CA 
MA 
TX 
MD 
NY 
NC 
WI 
PA 
CO 
WA 
OH 
Other 
85 
47 
24 
22 
21 
15 
15 
14 
11 
9 
9 
95 
23% 
13% 
7% 
6% 
6% 
4% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
26% 
Business Services 
Pharmaceutical Products 
Medical Equipment 
Computer Software 
Healthcare 
Wholesale 
Measuring and Control Equipment 
Construction 
Electronic Equipment 
Retail 
Construction Materials 
N/A 
195 
62 
21 
18 
16 
15 
11 
7 
4 
3 
1 
14 
53% 
17% 
6% 
5% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
0% 
4% 
8 
10 
4 
1 
11 
5 
7 
2 
9 
3 
6 
N/A 
4 
11 
6 
1 
10 
5 
8 
3 
2 
9 
7 
N/A 
 
                                                          
30 Although only 1 case was randomly drawn for the 2012 cohort, it was decided to keep it in the sample in 
order not to lose the data, although the dummy was omitted from regression-based models due to insufficient 
size of cases in the category.  
31 Ken French’s classification was used - more detail on categorisation procedure was provided in the previous 
chapter. 
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 Although all firms should qualify as a Small Business Concern (SBC) to be able to participate in 
the SBIR programme, some variation in size characteristics of applicants is apparent. As can be seen 
from Table 6-12, 64% of projects were conducted by firms with sales of up to $1 million, employing 
no more than 10 people. 31% of projects were from medium-sized firms with sales between $1 and 
$11 million and between 11 and 100 employees. Only around 5%-6% of projects were from large firms 
with sales of more than $11 million and over 100 employees. In a similar vein, firms’ innovation activity 
corresponded to firms’ size, with 64% of projects coming from firms with no more than 5 patent 
applications, followed by 33% of projects from firms with medium patenting activity between 6 and 
60 patents, and only 4% of projects from heavily patenting firms. 
Table 6-12: Descriptive characteristics of the sample – firm size and performance 
2014 
Sales ($ million) 
Count % 2014 
Employees 
Count % 2014 
Patent Stock32 
Count % 
0.00-0.49 
0.50-0.99 
1.00-1.99 
2.00-2.99 
3.00-4.99 
5.00-10.99 
11.00-19.99 
20.00-30.00 
146 
89 
41 
21 
25 
23 
14 
8 
40% 
24% 
11% 
6% 
7% 
6% 
4% 
2% 
1-5 
6-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-70 
71-100 
101+ 
149 
85 
56 
24 
11 
13 
10 
19 
41% 
23% 
15% 
7% 
3% 
4% 
3% 
5% 
0 
1-5 
6-10 
11-15 
16-20 
21-30 
31-60 
61-100+ 
98 
135 
56 
24 
10 
18 
12 
14 
27% 
37% 
15% 
7% 
3% 
5% 
3% 
4% 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Performance Constructs 
 
 As can be observed from Table 6-13, the mean values of sales performance and employment 
performance are 2.46 and 19.95 respectively, which is in line with the insights drawn from the above 
table that the majority of firms were at the lower side of the size spectrum. The mean of innovation 
performance is 2.84, which refers to the average number of patent applications following funding 
allocation at Phase I. The means of yield measures are higher than the corresponding measures of 
actual performance, indicating that although the mean of total investment received is $3.39 million, 
majority of firms received smaller grants of under $1 million, which was also discussed in the previous 
sub-section. Standard deviations appear widely spread due to the large range between the minimum 
and maximum values, but transformation significantly improved the distribution of the data.  
 
                                                          
32 Please note that the measure of innovation stock was only used in this section as an indicator of firm size, the 
measure of innovation performance used in subsequent analyses as a dependent variable denotes patent 
application flow, as opposed to the overall accumulated stock. For more detail, please refer to the research 
methodology chapter. 
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Table 6-13: Descriptive statistics of performance constructs 
Variable Before Transformation After Transformation 
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Sales Performance 0.0 27.7 2.46 4.93 0.00 1.46 0.34 0.35 
Employment Performance 1 400 19.95 37.07 0.30 2.60 0.99 0.49 
Innovation Performance 0 90 2.84 7.34 0.00 1.96 0.32 0.40 
Sales Yield 0.0 108.3 3.31 10.63 0.00 2.04 0.36 0.37 
Employment Yield 0.2 1200.0 30.25 89.32 0.06 3.08 1.01 0.58 
Innovation Yield 0.0 133.3 3.94 11.65 0.00 2.13 0.31 0.46 
Total Investment33 0.1 66.3 3.39 6.52     
 
Descriptive Statistics of Real Options Reasoning Constructs 
 
 The present sub-section explores variables used to measure ROR constructs. As seen from 
Table 6-14, the means of project-level and portfolio-level initial commitment are very similar, 0.18 and 
0.10, respectively. The mean of sequencing is 0.21, which can be interpreted that on average for every 
5 Phase I projects there is 1 Phase II project. Categorical variables are evenly represented between 
groups, although fit of funding decisions is less prevalent at the cumulated portfolio level than at the 
individual project level (43% versus 51% of cases). This statistic presents an important insight 
indicating that government venture funders implicitly follow ROR resource allocation logic in half the 
cases, which offers an opportunity to test empirically whether ROR investment pattern is associated 
with enhanced performance outcomes. The bottom part of Table 6-15 presents the alternative 
dummy operationalisations of selected variables, which were used for robustness checks only. On 
average two-thirds of observations fall in the ‘low’ category, while the remaining one-third falls in the 
‘high’ category, which provides further confirmation that government venture funders implicitly 
follow ROR logic.  
Table 6-14: Descriptive statistics of ROR constructs – metric variables 
Variable Before Transformation After Transformation 
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Initial Commitment (project-level) 0.06 0.75 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.24 0.07 0.03 
Initial Commitment (portfolio-level) 0.00 0.86 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.27 0.04 0.04 
Sequencing 0.00 2.00 0.21 0.30 0.00 0.48 0.07 0.09 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Total investment refers to U.S. dollar amount in millions received by each firm under the SBIR scheme as of 
year t. This variable was not included in subsequent analyses but is reported here because it was used as a 
denominator to calculate yield measures and hence provides useful insights. 
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Table 6-15: Descriptive statistics of ROR constructs – categorical variables 
Discontinuation Count % Fit (project-level) Count % Fit (portfolio-
level) 
Count % 
Continue (0) 
Discontinue (1) 
180 
187 
49% 
51% 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
181 
186 
49% 
51% 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
208 
159 
57% 
43% 
Initial Commitment 
(project-level) 
Count % Initial Commitment 
(portfolio-level)34 
Count % Sequencing Count % 
High (0) 
Low (1) 
139 
228 
38% 
62% 
High (0) 
Low (1) 
74 
165 
31% 
69% 
High (0) 
Low (1) 
65 
174 
27% 
73% 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Signalling Constructs 
 
 In comparison to managers, principal investigators had a higher mean technical experience 
(14.90 versus 16.90). On the contrary, managers had a higher mean entrepreneurial experience in 
comparison to principal investigators (6.90 versus 4.55). More managers appear to have attended elite 
educational institutions than principal investigators, as demonstrated by the means 29.62 and 26.58, 
respectively. Additionally, Table 6-16 shows that principal investigators had higher mean intellectual 
legitimacy, with a higher mean number of patents and publications in comparison to managers. Phase 
I project duration ranged from the minimum of 56 days to the maximum of 1096 days, with the 
average duration of 435 days. The mean of post Phase I invention activity is 2.79, with the maximum 
of 45 patent applications. The lowest score for abstract readability, which refers to the Fog Index, is 
13.9, denoting projects with more readable text, while the highest score is 38.30. The mean readability 
score of 20.39 indicates that an average project was closer to the more readable end of the spectrum. 
 Capabilities were estimated using the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) technique, which 
generates scores on a scale from 0 to 1. Therefore, efficiency scores can also be expressed as 
percentages, with the maximal 100% obtained by the most efficient firm. According to Table 6-16, all 
firms operated below the most efficient frontier of 1, with the maximum achieved efficiency scores of 
0.42, 0.93 and 0.88 for R&D, managerial and intellectual capabilities, respectively. Managerial 
capability is the most widely dispersed measure of all three estimations, with the highest maximum 
of 0.93 and the lowest mean of 0.16, which may be attributed to the heterogeneity of managers’ skills 
and strategic orientation. The highest mean of 0.34 for intellectual capability indicates that principal 
investigators are more efficient at transforming resources into a production output, than managers 
(0.16) or firms more generally (0.19). The fact that mean efficiencies are so low can be explained by 
the fact that 66% of projects in the sample were run by start-ups and young firms up to 10 year’s old 
(Table 6-10), so technical efficiencies are still underdeveloped. Interactions of capabilities were mean-
                                                          
34 Average prior Phase I $ award and Phase II Transition Rate are only related to the cluster of firms with prior 
awards, hence the sample here is 239. 
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centred before being multiplied; as a result, these variables have a mean of exactly zero, although 
their frequency distribution remained unchanged. 
Table 6-16: Descriptive statistics of signalling constructs – metric variables 
Variable Before Transformation After Transformation 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
PI’s firm tenure 0 28 5.57 5.32     
Manager’s technical experience 0 54 14.90 12.18     
PI’s technical experience 0 50 16.90 9.82     
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience 0 35 6.90 7.50     
PI’s entrepreneurial experience 0 34 4.55 5.84     
Manager’ elite education 0 100 29.62 28.70     
PI’s elite education 0 100 26.58 25.60    
Manager’s patents 0 61 3.71 6.67 0.00 1.79 0.42 0.44 
PI’s patents 0 162 5.61 14.40 0.00 2.21 0.50 0.46 
Manager’s publications 0 285 25.39 38.54 0.00 2.46 0.95 0.72 
PI’s publications 0 196 30.19 36.61 0.00 2.29 1.22 0.53 
Project duration 56 1096 434.94 218.34     
Invention activity 0 45 2.79 5.43 0.00 1.66 0.36 0.40 
Abstract readability 13.9 38.30 20.39 3.16 1.17 1.59 1.33 0.06 
R&D capability 0.02 0.42 0.19 0.09     
Managerial capability 0.00 0.93 0.16 0.22     
Intellectual capability 0.00 0.88 0.34 0.16     
R&D X Managerial capability -0.07 0.08 0.00 0.02     
R&D X Intellectual capability -0.10 0.09 0.00 0.02     
Intellectual X Managerial capability -0.10 0.29 0.00 0.04     
 
 Table 6-17 provides further detail on signalling constructs which were operationalised as 
categorical variables. CEO variable is reversed, with 62% of managers having a leading position in 
comparison to 38% of principal investigators. The majority of members of the TMT did not hold an 
MBA degree, although managers presented a higher proportion of MBA holders, 17% in comparison 
to only 6% among principal investigators. On the contrary, 94% of principal investigators had doctorate 
degrees, compared to 64% among managers. The proportion of principal investigators holding a 
professorship was only marginally higher in comparison to managers, 33% versus 29%. The projects 
with narrow and broad project scope were almost proportionally represented, with most projects 
focused on cancer detection and diagnosis research (41%) and cancer treatment research (37%). 
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Table 6-17: Descriptive statistics of signalling constructs – categorical variables 
Manager CEO Count % PI CEO Count % 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
141 
226 
38% 
62% 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
226 
141 
62% 
38% 
Manager’ MBA Count % PI’ MBA Count % 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
303 
64 
83% 
17% 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
344 
23 
94% 
6% 
Manager‘ PhD Count % PI’s PhD Count % 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
133 
234 
36% 
64% 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
24 
343 
6% 
94% 
Manager’s 
Professorship 
Count % PI’s  
Professorship 
Count % 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
261 
106 
71% 
29% 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
247 
120 
67% 
33% 
Project Scope Count % Project Category Count % 
Narrow (0) 
Broad (1) 
174 
194 
47% 
53% 
Cancer Cause and Prevention Research (1) 
Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research (2) 
Cancer Treatment Research (3) 
Cancer Biology Research (4) 
48 
151 
134 
34 
13% 
41% 
37% 
9% 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Controls 
 
 As is apparent from Table 6-18, the measure of industry volatility which refers to year t has a 
much wider range and dispersion in comparison to the measure of industry volatility which refers to 
year 2014. This is because year t includes multiple project cohorts as described in Table 6-10. The 
average firm age is 8.7 years, which is consistent with the discussion above. The mean of state 
innovativeness score is 67.55 and is relatively close to the maximum of 83.25. The reason behind this 
is that projects from California and Massachusetts, which make up 33% of the sample, represent the 
second and third most innovative states in the U.S. Representation of woman-, minority- and 
HubZone-owned firms is proportionally small, with 8%, 3% and 5% respectively, as seen from Table 
6-19. 
Table 6-18: Descriptive statistics of controls – metric variables 
Variable Before Transformation 
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Industry volatility (2014) 0.00 22.20 18.24 6.30 
Industry volatility (t) 0.00 103.53 28.93 23.35 
State innovativeness 20.95 83.25 67.55 15.50 
Firm age 0 40 8.70 7.69 
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Table 6-19: Descriptive statistics of controls – categorical variables 
Non-Woman-
Owned 
Count % Non-Minority-
Owned 
Count % Non-HubZone-
Owned 
Count % 
Yes (0) 
No (1) 
28 
339 
8% 
92% 
Yes (0) 
No (1) 
12 
355 
3% 
97% 
Yes (0) 
No (1) 
17 
350 
5% 
95% 
 
6.6 Correlation Analysis 
 
 Correlation coefficient r, invented by Pearson, is a standard measure of association between 
two variables (Cohen et al. 2003). It takes the value between -1 and +1 when one variable perfectly 
estimates another, with 0 suggesting no linear relationship. As such, the sign of the coefficients gives 
an indication of the tendency for a positive or negative increase in one variable as a result of an 
increase in another variable. 
 Correlation matrices are a widely used tool for discovering bivariate relationships between 
individual variables, both predictor-response and predictor-predictor pairs. Although the correlation 
matrix is merely a preliminary step before executing multivariate modelling, it offers significant 
insights on the directionality and the strength of effect sizes of the linear relationships between the 
variables (Cohen et al. 2003). 
 Multiple-imputation estimate of the correlation matrix was performed in STATA on the sample 
of 367 observations. To estimate the magnitude of effect sizes, correlations were compared with 
Cohen's (1992) guidelines: if r < 0.30, the effect size is considered small; if 0.30 < r < 0.50, it is medium; 
and if r > 0.50, it is large. As Table 6-20 depicts, most effect sizes are small. However, dependent 
variables are highly intercorrelated, which further supports the use of the SUR modelling technique 
that accounts for interrelationships between variables.  
 The correlation matrix reveals a strong significant association between all ROR constructs 
except discontinuation and project-level fit, and dependent variables, validating the relevance of 
stated hypotheses. Both project-level and portfolio-level initial commitment, as well as sequencing, 
have a negative relationship with investment yield. On the other hand, portfolio-level initial 
commitment (r = 0.11 and r = 0.14) and sequencing (r = 0.19 and r = 0.20) have a positive association 
with sales and employment performance. The directionality of relationships is reversed for the 
portfolio-level fit, which is positively associated with investment yield and negatively associated with 
firm performance. As can be seen, fit measures are strongly correlated with the variables that were 
used to construct the interaction. However, as the VIF analysis demonstrated, such association did not 
cause multicollinearity.  
 Project-level and portfolio-level initial commitment have a significant positive association (r = 
0.25, p < 0.01), suggesting funder’s propensity for decision-making inertia. Similarly, portfolio-level 
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initial commitment has a positive relationship with sequencing (r = 0.25, p < 0.01), which indicates 
that the magnitude of prior investment has an effect on the likelihood of later-stage funding 
continuation. Firm age has a positive association with portfolio-level initial commitment and 
sequencing (r = 0.24 and r = 0.34), and a strong negative association with portfolio-level fit (r = -0.42), 
which clearly indicates that matching of funding decisions in line with the ROR logic, gives younger 
candidates preferential access to capital.  
 The same pattern is evident from the association of portfolio level fit with TMT characteristics, 
with members with shorter tenure and less entrepreneurial experience having a favourable access to 
external funding under the ROR logic. Also, the implicit following of the ROR logic can be observed 
from the strong negative relationship between industry volatility and discontinuation (r = -0.20), 
implying that higher uncertainty increases the value of the option to ‘hold’.   
 Relatively few of the hypothesised predictors have a significant association with dependent 
variables used in the signalling model (Part II). Manager’s technical and entrepreneurial experience 
has a negative relationship with initial commitment (r = -0.12 and r = -0.16), whereas PI’s CEO and 
professorship statuses have a negative association with discontinuation (each r = -0.18). Paradoxically, 
project duration has a medium-size positive association with both initial commitment and 
discontinuation (r = 0.25 and r = 0.21). This finding implies that firms that receive larger initial grants 
engage in longer experimentation; however, longer experimentation reduces the likelihood of 
receiving subsequent later-stage funding.  
 Firm age has a strong significant medium size relationship with sales and employment 
performance (each r = 0.48, p < 0.01), and a weaker relationship with innovation performance                   
(r = 0.13). On the other hand, firm age is negatively associated with employment and innovation yield 
(r = -0.15 and r = -0.20). These findings suggest that as firms get more experienced, they become more 
successful, but present less lucrative targets for investment. 
 Post-funding invention activity has a strong positive association with innovation yield (r = 0.43, 
p < 0.01), sales (r = 0.43, p < 0.01), employment (r = 0.44, p < 0.01) and innovation performance                
(r = 0.77, p < 0.01). The latter large effect size indicates a potential multicollinearity problem since 
patent-based variables are tautological because of timing issues. As a result, to avoid possible 
confounding effects, post-funding invention activity was omitted as a predictor from equations where 
innovation yield and innovation performance measures are dependent variables.  
 Additionally, managerial capability has a strong positive association with sales (r = 0.37, p < 
0.01), employment (r = 0.41, p < 0.01) and innovation performance (r = 0.42, p < 0.01), while other 
types of capabilities have a much weaker correlation, which suggests that managerial capability is an 
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important intangible asset. All three capabilities have positive association with innovation yield and 
performance, indicating that heterogeneity of skills and competences is conducive to R&D success. 
 Managerial capability has a high effect size with post-funding invention activity (r = 0.65, p < 
0.01). This is because managerial efficiency transformation function was expressed in terms of 
strategic change, or managers’ ability to achieve higher innovation proliferation, measured by patents. 
Therefore, there is a strong association with the patent-based post-funding invention activity 
measure. However, the results of multicollinearity analysis carried out earlier confirmed that inclusion 
of both variables does not have a detrimental effect on regression models, hence both variables were 
kept in the equations as significant potential explanatory factors. 
 Industry volatility measured in year t has a large effect size with year dummies (r = 0.70, p < 
0.01), which is not surprising as industry volatility relates to each project cohort and, hence, the same 
year. Among other relationships with large effect sizes that are worthy discussion are between PI’s 
tenure and PI’s entrepreneurial experience (r = 0.65, p < 0.01) and between manager’s technical 
experience and entrepreneurial experience (r = 0.59, p < 0.01). The former relationship can be 
explained by the fact that many PIs are founders of firms in the sample; hence, their tenure with the 
firm is associated with their entrepreneurial experience. Similarly, other types of experience are 
intercorrelated because they tend to be accumulated simultaneously, though at different levels. 
Taking into account that the VIF and CI analysis in the earlier section confirmed that their joint 
presence in the regression model does not cause multicollinearity, it was decided that it is safe to keep 
them in the model.  
 
6.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
 This chapter gave an account of empirical procedures carried out to prepare and investigate 
the data before the multivariate analyses. In particular, care was taken to make sure that data are 
complete, and that underlying assumptions are not violated. Additionally, insights into data were 
gained through descriptive and correlation analyses, setting the basis for subsequent regression 
modelling.  
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Table 6-20: Correlation matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
(1) Sales yield 1.00                       
(2) Employment yield 0.90 1.00                      
(3) Innovation yield 0.38 0.38 1.00                     
(4) Sales perform. 0.45 0.30 0.10 1.00                    
(5) Employment perform 0.43 0.38 0.10 0.91 1.00                   
(6) Innovation perform. 0.13 0.06 0.69 0.42 0.38 1.00                  
(7) Initial comm. (proj.) -0.18 -0.22 -0.05 0.10 0.09 0.07 1.00                 
(8) Discontinuation (proj.) -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 1.00                
(9) Fit (project) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.24 1.00               
(10) Initial comm. (portf.) -0.35 -0.45 -0.19 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.25 0.07 -0.05 1.00              
(11) Sequencing  (portf.) -0.35 -0.47 -0.24 0.19 0.20 0.07 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.25 1.00             
(12) Fit (portfolio) 0.31 0.40 0.21 -0.24 -0.25 -0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.33 -0.52 1.00            
(13) Manager CEO -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.31 -0.32 -0.16 -0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.09 1.00           
(14) PI CEO 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.17 -0.17 -0.14 -0.07 -0.18 0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.22 1.00          
(15) PI’s firm tenure -0.13 -0.23 -0.18 0.10 0.11 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.29 -0.32 -0.02 0.20 1.00         
(16) Manager’s tech. exp. -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.10 -0.06 0.28 0.11 0.27 1.00        
(17) PI’s tech. exp. -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.12 -0.04 0.08 0.15 0.40 0.39 1.00       
(18) Manager’s entrep. exp. -0.01 -0.10 -0.11 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.16 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.14 -0.16 0.33 0.10 0.38 0.59 0.23 1.00      
(19) PI’s entrep. exp. -0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.07 0.01 0.17 -0.18 0.12 0.43 0.65 0.30 0.45 0.44 1.00     
(20) Manager’s elite educ. -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.10 -0.13 0.07 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.19 -0.02 1.00    
(21) PI’s elite educ. 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.08 0.02 -0.20 -0.01 -0.16 0.06 0.35 1.00   
(22) Manager’s MBA 0.13 0.14 0.12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.15 -0.14 0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.19 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.09 0.03 1.00  
(23) PI’s MBA -0.07 -0.07 0.02 -0.10 -0.11 0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.10 0.00 0.25 1.00 
(24) Manager’s PhD -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.15 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.22 0.14 -0.01 0.45 0.03 0.10 0.06 -0.07 -0.11 -0.37 -0.09 
(25) PI’s PhD -0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.04 -0.14 -0.11 0.06 0.07 -0.10 -0.19 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 -0.09 
(26) Manager professor -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.08 0.25 0.14 0.06 0.41 0.14 0.24 0.10 -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.07 
(27) PI professor -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.06 -0.18 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.33 0.06 0.16 -0.09 0.07 -0.06 -0.09 
(28) Manager’s patents -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.15 -0.12 -0.01 -0.08 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.28 0.16 0.13 0.39 0.17 0.20 0.17 -0.02 -0.09 -0.12 -0.03 
(29) PI’s patents -0.02 -0.04 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.32 0.06 0.25 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.09 
(30) Manager’s publications -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.24 0.14 0.06 0.59 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.08 -0.12 -0.28 -0.07 
(31) PI’s publications -0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.17 -0.03 -0.12 0.01 0.04 0.09 -0.03 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.23 0.47 0.07 0.14 0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.12 
(32) Abstract readability 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.04 -0.11 -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.18 -0.14 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 
(33) Project duration  -0.17 -0.22 -0.11 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.25 0.21 -0.04 0.14 0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.17 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 
(34) Invention activity 0.11 0.05 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.77 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.16 -0.11 -0.24 -0.11 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.09 0.02 -0.04 
(35) R&D capability 0.08 0.11 0.20 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.08 -0.14 -0.07 -0.08 -0.14 -0.08 -0.17 -0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06 -0.11 
(36) Managerial capability 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.10 -0.12 -0.31 -0.12 0.13 -0.11 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.04 -0.06 
(37) Intellectual capability -0.07 -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.15 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.09 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 
(38) Project scope 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.05 -0.13 -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.09 -0.09 -0.07 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.23 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.11 -0.09 -0.17 
(39) Project category 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.03 -0.10 0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.06 
(40) Non-woman-owned 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.13 -0.08 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.03 
(41) Non-minority-owned 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.15 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.09 -0.03 -0.12 0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.03 
(42) Non-HubZone-owned -0.09 -0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 -0.07 0.09 -0.13 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 
(43) Industry volatility (2014) -0.19 -0.13 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.14 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.15 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02 -0.25 -0.11 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.02 
(44) Industry volatility (t) -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 0.13 -0.20 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 
(45) State innovativeness -0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.14 0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.24 0.16 0.04 -0.04 
(46) Firm age -0.02 -0.15 -0.20 0.48 0.48 0.13 0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.24 0.36 -0.42 -0.15 -0.10 0.62 0.20 0.19 0.36 0.32 0.13 -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 
(47) Year dummies -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.11 -0.15 -0.18 0.10 -0.16 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.13 -0.09 -0.01 0.03 
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Table 6-20: Correlation matrix (continued) 
  (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) 
(24) Manager’s PhD 1.00                        
(25) PI’s PhD 0.24 1.00                       
(26) Manager professor 0.38 0.10 1.00                      
(27) PI professor 0.05 0.09 0.36 1.00                     
(28) Manager’s patents 0.34 0.09 0.18 -0.05 1.00                    
(29) PI’s patents 0.02 0.10 -0.08 0.09 0.36 1.00                   
(30) Manager’s public. 0.60 0.14 0.51 0.09 0.53 0.03 1.00                  
(31) PI’s public. 0.11 0.24 0.20 0.39 0.12 0.37 0.26 1.00                 
(32) Abstract readabil. 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.02 1.00                
(33) Project duration  0.01 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.03 1.00               
(34) Invention activity -0.12 0.12 -0.15 -0.10 0.09 0.32 -0.02 0.14 -0.09 0.02 1.00              
(35) R&D capability -0.01 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.33 1.00             
(36) Managerial capab. -0.21 0.10 -0.16 0.00 -0.07 0.27 -0.20 0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.65 0.22 1.00            
(37) Intellectual capab. 0.07 0.23 0.10 0.13 -0.07 -0.01 0.17 0.29 -0.08 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.05 1.00           
(38) Project scope 0.04 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 0.05 -0.13 0.03 -0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 1.00          
(39) Project category 0.12 0.14 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.00 1.00         
(40) Non-woman 0.06 0.11 0.03 -0.07 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.04 -0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 -0.11 -0.05 0.08 1.00        
(41) Non-minority 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.12 -0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.18 1.00       
(42) Non-HubZone -0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 1.00      
(43) Ind. volatil. (2014) 0.02 0.16 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.02 -0.10 0.18 0.14 0.00 0.07 1.00     
(44) Ind. volatil. (t) 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.07 -0.11 0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.18 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.09 0.00 0.07 0.07 1.00    
(45) State innovativ. -0.09 0.08 -0.18 -0.12 0.09 0.10 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.17 -0.01 0.11 -0.09 0.03 -0.05 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.15 -0.02 1.00   
(46) Firm age -0.13 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.26 -0.11 0.34 -0.07 0.05 -0.11 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 1.00  
(47) Year dummies 0.05 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07 -0.23 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.21 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.70 -0.04 -0.02 1.00 
Bold values indicate significant correlations (2-tailed) 
Significance levels (0.11≤r<0.14 at p<0.05, 0.14≤r at p<0.01) 
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 Results & Discussion (I): Testing Hypotheses of the Real 
Options Reasoning Model 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter reports results of Part I analysis produced using SUR (GLS) procedure in STATA. 
Simultaneous equations were modelled using standardised data. The Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence of residuals was performed to test the null hypothesis of no contemporaneous 
correlation. The results of the Breusch-Pagan test for all systems of equations were statistically 
significant at p<0.001, indicating that the residuals are not independent, so the null hypothesis that 
correlation is zero could not be rejected. Given the presence of correlated error terms, it was 
confirmed that gains can be realised from the SUR procedure as it will produce more robust 
estimations (Kennedy 2003). 
 Under SUR GLS, R-squared is not a well-defined concept (Greene 2012). However, it can be 
used for descriptive purposes to get an insight into what percentage of variance in the dependent 
variables is explained by the predictors. R2 for individual equations ranged from 0.13 to 0.41, while 
adjusted R2 lied between 0.01 and 0.33, which indicates that the proportion of variance explained by 
individual variables was higher in some equations than in others. 
 The following sections present the results of hypotheses testing, and their validity is also 
discussed in light of robustness checks and sensitivity analyses. Then, the findings are interpreted and 
the main insights summarised.  
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7.2 Hypotheses Testing 
 
 Table 7-1  reports estimated coefficients and t-values for the full sample main regression 
model of Part I analysis, Table 7-2 for the cluster with no prior awards and Table 7-3 for the cluster 
with prior awards. The results are interpreted in relation to individual hypotheses subsequently. 
 Besides the focal hypothesised predictors, firm age is a significant control factor for firms from 
both clusters and is significantly and positively associated with firm performance. For firms with no 
prior awards, firm age also positively affects sales and employment yield, which demonstrates that 
established first-time award holders represent candidates for higher yield on investment to funders. 
The findings imply that the real options investments have a limited ability in explaining innovation 
yield and performance, as demonstrated by low R2 of corresponding equations, indicating that 
allocation of external funding per se does not improve innovation outcomes. However, innovative 
credentials of the state the firm is located in overall tend to have a positive and significant impact on 
innovation performance. This is in line with existing evidence that cluster membership, network ties 
and geographic proximity to innovation resources and R&D partners, can have a positive effect on 
innovation (e.g. Almeida and Kogut 1997; Almeida and Kogut 1999; Deeds et al. 1999). Additionally, 
innovation performance tends to spur in non-minority-owned firms, suggesting that socially and 
economically disadvantaged businesses may have a lack of resources necessary to advance R&D 
activities.  
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Table 7-1: System of equations (SUR) results – full sample 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment 
Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation 
Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment -0.19 -3.62*** -0.24 -4.51*** -0.06 -1.23  0.08  1.67  0.05  1.11  0.05  0.91 
Discontinuation -0.06 -0.52 -0.06 -0.51 -0.16 -1.40  0.02  0.16 -0.03 -0.29 -0.20 -1.86* 
Fit -0.11 -0.93 -0.13 -1.22 -0.02 -0.18 -0.08 -0.75 -0.09 -0.91 -0.02 -0.18 
Portfolio-level constructs             
Fit  0.28  2.40**  0.31  2.81***  0.14  1.27 -0.03 -0.31 -0.01 -0.08  0.12  1.11 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.45  1.51  0.46  1.93  0.20  0.99  0.27  1.08  0.40  1.75*  0.25  1.27 
Non-minority-owned -0.11 -0.28 -0.23 -0.71  0.38  1.33  0.06  0.17  0.01  0.02  0.57  2.03** 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.41 -1.60 -0.52 -2.02** -0.18 -0.75 -0.05 -0.20 -0.11 -0.44  0.12  0.48 
Industry volatility -0.21 -2.66*** -0.12 -1.61  0.03  0.36 -0.04 -0.55  0.05  0.73  0.06  0.90 
State innovativeness -0.05 -0.96 -0.06 -1.12  0.04  0.79  0.02  0.49  0.03  0.69  0.12  2.36** 
Firm age  0.02  0.32 -0.11 -2.04** -0.18 -3.34***  0.46  9.60***  0.47  9.63***  0.13  2.56** 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.12   0.15   0.09   0.26   0.29   0.12  
Adjusted R2  0.08   0.12   0.05   0.23   0.26   0.08  
  N= 367 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 7-2: System of equations (SUR) results – cluster with no prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment 
Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation 
Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment -0.43 -3.75*** -0.41 -4.76*** -0.09 -0.61 -0.14 -1.86* -0.19 -2.31**  0.01  0.10 
Discontinuation -0.35 -1.68* -0.27 -1.74* -0.50 -1.88* -0.18 -1.36 -0.25 -1.67 -0.26 -1.68* 
Fit  0.21  1.10  0.22  1.55  0.13  0.51  0.12  0.95  0.20  1.42  0.05  0.34 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.46  0.95  0.68  2.23**  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.49  0.59  2.01** -0.07 -0.21 
Non-minority-owned -0.08 -0.11 -0.24 -0.52  0.80  1.15  0.09  0.21 -0.01 -0.03  0.55  1.34 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.11 -0.28 -0.20 -0.69 -0.26 -0.58 -0.10 -0.36 -0.26 -0.88 -0.12 -0.46 
Industry volatility -0.21 -1.26 -0.06 -0.49  0.10  0.71 -0.12 -1.17 -0.01 -0.08  0.09  0.99 
State innovativeness  0.03  0.26  0.02  0.25  0.08  0.67  0.02  0.30  0.01  0.19  0.05  0.78 
Firm age  0.49  4.30***  0.37  4.30*** -0.06 -0.49  0.30  4.32***  0.36  4.20*** -0.01 -0.10 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.37   0.41   0.13   0.37   0.33   0.19  
Adjusted R2  0.28   0.33   0.01   0.28   0.24   0.08  
  N= 128 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 7-3: System of equations (SUR) results – cluster with prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment 
Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation 
Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment -0.03 -0.69 -0.08 -1.66 -0.02 -0.37  0.15  2.46**  0.13  2.22**  0.05  0.79 
Discontinuation  0.07  0.65  0.03  0.28 -0.02 -0.21  0.06  0.39  0.00  0.03 -0.21 -1.43 
Fit -0.02 -0.16 -0.07 -0.66  0.01  0.11 -0.18 -1.39 -0.23 -1.85* -0.04 -0.31 
Portfolio-level constructs             
Initial commitment -0.13 -2.19** -0.15 -2.40** -0.11 -2.01** -0.09 -1.06 -0.05 -0.65 -0.06 -0.70 
Sequencing -0.19 -3.96*** -0.24 -4.95*** -0.15 -3.21*** -0.01 -0.20 -0.01 -0.13 -0.03 -0.46 
Fit  0.17  1.74*  0.15  1.43  0.14  1.46 -0.11 -0.82 -0.14 -1.09  0.16  1.09 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.10  0.37  0.02  0.08  0.23  1.39  0.36  1.16  0.35  1.25  0.46  1.81* 
Non-minority-owned  0.01  0.03 -0.11 -0.37  0.34  1.39  0.12  0.29  0.05  0.13  0.69  1.89* 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.24 -0.95 -0.39 -1.40  0.10  0.40 -0.10 -0.28 -0.11 -0.31  0.28  0.75 
Industry volatility -0.07 -0.69  0.01  0.08 -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.30  0.05  0.43 -0.03 -0.28 
State innovativeness  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.14  0.04  0.90  0.01  0.19  0.03  0.51  0.13  1.81* 
Firm age  0.08  1.31  0.04  0.69 -0.09 -1.46  0.52  6.23***  0.50  6.29***  0.16  1.89* 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.16   0.18   0.13   0.25   0.27   0.13  
Adjusted R2  0.10   0.12   0.06   0.20   0.22   0.06  
  N= 239 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Resource Allocation to an Individual Option 
 
 H1-1: The magnitude of initial funding commitment has a negative effect on investment yield—
(a) sales yield, (b) employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance—(d) sales performance, 
(e) employment performance, (f) innovation performance. 
 Testing Hypothesis 1-1 demonstrates overall support for the predicted relationship between 
initial funding commitment and performance, although variation exists between different samples 
and for different types of performance. The results from the full sample show a strong negative effect 
of the magnitude of initial funding on (a) sales yield (β = -0.19, t = -3.62) and (b) employment yield  
(β = -0.24, t = -4.51), but not for other types of performance. For firms with no prior awards, the effect 
of the magnitude of initial commitment is negative and significant at p<0.05 on (a) sales yield (β = -
0.43, t = -3.75), (b) employment yield (β = -0.41, t = -4.76) and (e) employment performance  
(β = -0.19, t = -2.31); and at p<0.1 on (d) sales performance (β = -0.14, t = -1.86), but is insignificant on 
(c) innovation yield and (f) innovation performance. For firms with prior awards, contrary to 
expectations, the effect of the magnitude of initial commitment is positive and significant at p<0.05 
on (d) sales performance (β = 0.15, t = 2.46) and (e) employment performance (β = 0.13, t = 2.22), but 
no effect is observed on other types of performance, which is mostly in accord with Hypothesis 1-6, 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  
 The interpretation of the findings is threefold. First, the results confirm that high initial 
commitment diminishes sales and employment performance of firms with no prior awards from both 
investment and corporate point of view. Firms with no prior awards are associated with higher risks 
because their profiles as borrowers are uncertain. Therefore, allocation of higher initial commitment 
to a new enterprise which has questionable chances of success, involves higher potential losses, 
increasing overall downside risks. Also, the propensity of investors to allocate larger initial grants to 
certain projects signifies their higher stake in those projects, which may be driven by investors’ 
opportunism. As a result, the tendency to magnify initial commitment offsets the potential flexibility 
benefits. When sunk costs are high, it is more difficult to discontinue failing projects, increasing the 
chances of potential escalation of commitment (Adner and Levinthal 2004b). Taken together, higher 
potential loss-making, opportunistic behaviour and escalation of commitment, put higher pressure on 
the overall government venture capital budget, which can result in allocation of even smaller or no 
grants to other potentially promising projects, minimising potential upward gain offered by ROR logic, 
which allows to explore multiple opportunities concurrently at a low cost. 
 At the corporate level, higher allocation of initial capital decreases firms’ productivity and 
efficiency, so firms can achieve more with fewer resources through incremental learning and 
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experimentation. The reason behind such phenomenon may be explained by a variety of underlying 
business start-up motives, which are not always linked to economic rationality, so entrepreneurial 
behaviour may be non-utility-maximisation driven (Scheingberg and MacMillan 1988; Birley and 
Westhead 1994), in which case fewer resources can yield better results (Burke et al. 2000). Second, 
contrary to the hypothesis, the effect of the magnitude of initial commitment has a positive effect on 
sales and employment performance of firms with prior awards. Although extra cash from individual 
project awards might advantage continuing participants of the programme, such awards have no 
effect on the overall yield for investors, jeopardising the rationale for funding. Finally, the magnitude 
of initial commitment has no effect on innovation outcomes, implying that the size of the financial 
award is unrelated to inventive capacity. This finding is consistent with the evidence from the study 
by Klingebiel and Adner (2015), which also found no association between low initial commitment and 
innovation performance.  
  H1-2: Funding discontinuation has a negative effect on investment yield—(a) sales yield, (b) 
employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance—(d) sales performance, (e) employment 
performance, (f) innovation performance. 
 Testing Hypothesis 1-2 on the full sample and the sample with prior awards shows no support 
for the predicted relationship between discontinuation and performance. However, the effect of 
discontinuation on performance of firms with no prior awards is negative yet weak on (a) sales yield 
(β = -0.35, t = 1.68), (b) employment yield (β = -0.27, t = -1.74), (c) innovation yield (β = -0.50, t = -1.88) 
and (f) innovation performance (β = -0.26, t = -1.68). Hence, overall Hypothesis 1-2 is partially 
supported. 
 It was noted that discontinuation can potentially add value to the investment process only if 
there are other options in the portfolio (Klingebiel and Adner 2015). As such, the results demonstrate 
that first-time award holders tend to suffer more from the decision to discontinue funding in 
comparison to their established counterparts because they have no other options to explore in the 
portfolio. Another thought-provoking insight is related to the finding that unlike the magnitude of 
initial commitment, discontinuation has a negative effect on innovation performance. As was stated 
in the previous chapter, R&D process calls for extended funding to enable capability building  (Kogut 
and Kulatilaka 1994b), so untimely seizure of funding will interrupt the process of learning and 
experimentation necessary for the advancement of innovation activity (Trigeorgis 1996). 
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 H1-3: Fit of funding decisions, i.e. low initial funding commitment and discontinuation or high 
initial commitment and continuation, has a positive effect on investment yield—(a) sales yield, (b) 
employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance—(d) sales performance, (e) employment 
performance, (f) innovation performance. 
 No support was found for Hypothesis 1-3. The proposed benefits of matching resource 
allocation decisions in a way that corresponds to the prescribed ROR logic were not observed at the 
individual option level in neither full nor split samples. 
 
Resource Allocation to a Portfolio of Options 
 
 H1-4: The performance effect of fit of funding decisions is greater at the at the cumulated 
portfolio level than at the individual option level. 
 Although the effect of fit of funding decisions is not visible for individual options and split 
samples, fit has a strong positive effect on (a) sales yield (β = 0.28, t = 2.40) and (b) employment yield 
(β = 0.31, t = 2.81) at the portfolio level for a full sample, which indicates the importance of consistency 
and correspondence of decisions at the macro level on investment outcomes. Hence, Hypothesis 1-4 
is mostly supported. 
 The finding offers a critical insight for the theory of investment under ROR. Despite the lack of 
apparent gains associated with matching funding allocation decisions at the individual option level, 
significant benefits can be realised when matching is practised consistently and in relation to the entire 
portfolio. Recall from the preceding chapter that SBIR government venture capital implicitly applies 
ROR logic of fitting funding allocation decisions in relation to half of projects in the sample. The results 
demonstrate that matching resource allocation decisions in a manner that distinguishes ROR from 
sequential decision-making has a strong impact on return on investment from commercialisation and 
employment creation activities. In other words, when fit is achieved by aligning low initial 
commitment and discontinuation, it enhances the propensity to abandon unpromising low-stake 
projects. On the other hand, when fit is achieved by aligning high initial commitment and continuation, 
it indicates that when projects are associated with higher future potential from the outset, moving 
them through the stages increases chances of realising investment benefits from promising high-stake 
projects. 
 The finding conflicts with the result reported by Klingebiel and Adner (2015), who found a 
significant and positive effect of fit on innovation performance. In contrast, the present study found 
no impact of fit on innovation outcomes, but on sales and employment yield. The disparity might be 
contextual. In the case of government venture funding, the underlying intuition is that ROR logic, 
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although might enhance corporate benefits, is essentially an investment tool, which, when exercised 
properly, promises higher returns to budget holders. 
 H1-5: For firms with prior awards, high rate of funding sequencing has a negative effect on 
investment yield—(a) sales yield, (b) employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance—(d) 
sales performance, (e) employment performance, (f) innovation performance. 
 The results show strong support for Hypothesis 1-5. Higher propensity to sequence has a 
significant negative effect on investment outcomes, namely, (a) sales yield (β = -0.19, t= -3.96), (b) 
employment yield (β = -0.24, t = -4.95) and (c) innovation yield (β = -0.15, t = -3.21), but not on firm-
level outcomes. 
 The findings demonstrate that inconsistent application of the ROR logic, whereby too many 
projects are sequenced from early to late stages, erodes strategic value offered by option-like 
investments. The logic dictates that unpromising projects should be discarded early on, and only the 
most promising projects should be selected for subsequent funding stages. Hence, increased 
propensity to sequence is a direct result of an inability to discontinue failing projects, which 
undermines the successful execution of decision-making under the ROR approach.  
 H1-6: An opening of a new individual project has a positive effect on investment yield—(a) sales 
yield, (b) employment yield, (c) innovation yield, and firm performance—(d) sales performance, (e) 
employment performance, (f) innovation performance of firms with no prior awards, but an addition 
of a new individual project to the portfolio of firms with prior awards has no effect. 
 In the presence of existing portfolio configurations, there were no effects from additional 
individual options on investment yield, indicating that new options are subadditive, supporting 
Hypothesis 1-6. In addition to the strong negative effect of sequencing (H1-5), the magnitude of initial 
commitment at the cumulated portfolio level has a significant and negative effect on (a) sales yield    
(β = -0.13, t = -2.19), (b) employment yield (β = -0.15, t = -2.40) and (c) innovation yield (β = -0.11, t = 
-2.01), further corroborating Hypothesis 1-1.  
 The following results show that there is a delusion effect of perceived benefits of additional 
funding: while established awardees manage to convert extra cash from additional projects into 
increasing sales and number of employees, possibly by engaging into marketing and hiring activities, 
there are no gains from the investment point of view. Financing of more projects does not increase 
the value of the portfolio, indicating that additional individual options are non-additive. 
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7.3 Robustness Checks 
 
Alternative Operationalisations of Real Options Reasoning Constructs 
 
 As was discussed in the research methodology chapter, ROR constructs can be operationalised 
either on the continuous or binary scale. Because continuous scale offers richer data to gain insights 
into the phenomenon, it was decided to be more suitable for the main analysis. However, alternative 
binary operationalisation can be used for robustness checks. To check the robustness of the primary 
findings, the base model was estimated using the second operationalisation of ROR constructs; 
namely, initial commitment at both project and portfolio levels, and sequencing. For both variables, 
low values were coded as a base category of 1. 
 Results of SUR estimation with the alternative operationalisation of ROR constructs are 
reported in Table 7-4 for the full sample, in Table 7-5 for the cluster with no prior awards and in Table 
7-6 for the cluster with prior awards. 
 Effect of all predictors included in the full sample model remained unchanged. In the sample 
of firms with no prior awards, effects of two focal relationships have changed. First, initial commitment 
for sales and employment performance became insignificant. Second, discontinuation became 
insignificant for sales yield and employment yield, but is significant at p<0.1 for innovation outcomes. 
These findings further confirm that a) the effect of ROR elements is strongest on investment yield and 
b) the effect of discontinuation, although weak, is most profound on innovation outcomes. They add 
to the conclusion that in the absence of other alternatives in the portfolio, premature termination of 
R&D projects is likely to have detrimental effects on innovation activity of firms. 
 In the sample of firms with prior awards, low initial commitment of an individual option has a 
positive effect on sales and employment yield, but not on sales and employment performance, which 
is the opposite in the base model. This indicates that individual options are additive to the portfolio 
only if initial commitment is low. Next, in contrast to the base model, low initial commitment and low 
sequencing at the portfolio level individually have no direct effect on innovation yield, but have a 
significant and positive effect when matched. Overall, fit is positive and significant for all yield 
measures. 
 Although some differences exist between the base model and the model with alternative 
operationalisations, essentially, the results of both models agree that initial commitment and 
sequencing have a positive impact on investment yield when low, or when matched. Additionally, 
discontinuation has a negative, though weak effect on innovation outcomes, when firms have no other 
R&D options in the pipeline. 
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Table 7-4: Robustness check – system of equations (SUR) results – alternative operationalisation of ROR constructs – full sample 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment 
Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation 
Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment (dummy)  0.36  3.29***  0.44  4.08***  0.07  0.64 -0.12 -1.19 -0.09 -0.90 -0.11 -1.06 
Discontinuation -0.05 -0.44 -0.04 -0.40 -0.15 -1.38  0.01  0.13 -0.03 -0.31 -0.21 -1.89* 
Fit -0.10 -0.84 -0.12 -1.10 -0.01 -0.12 -0.08 -0.80 -0.09 -0.95 -0.02 -0.19 
Portfolio-level constructs             
Fit  0.25  2.13**  0.27  2.44**  0.13  1.13 -0.02 -0.15  0.00  0.02  0.13  1.18 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.48  1.60  0.49  2.07**  0.20  1.00  0.27  1.05  0.39  1.72  0.24  1.22 
Non-minority-owned -0.08 -0.21 -0.20 -0.61  0.38  1.33  0.05  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.56  1.99** 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.36 -1.41 -0.46 -1.79* -0.17 -0.68 -0.07 -0.29 -0.12 -0.50  0.11  0.44 
Industry volatility -0.22 -2.85*** -0.14 -1.85*  0.02  0.25 -0.03 -0.43  0.05  0.81  0.06  0.93 
State innovativeness -0.05 -0.89 -0.05 -1.03  0.04  0.79  0.02  0.46  0.03  0.67  0.12  2.33** 
Firm age  0.01  0.23 -0.11 -2.17** -0.18 -3.41***  0.46  9.69***  0.47  9.71***  0.13  2.57** 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.12   0.15   0.09   0.26   0.29   0.12  
Adjusted R2  0.08   0.11   0.05   0.23   0.26   0.08  
  N= 367 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 7-5: Robustness check – system of equations (SUR) results – alternative operationalisation of ROR constructs – cluster with no prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield  
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment 
Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation 
Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment (dummy)  0.44  3.49***  0.48  3.53*** -0.08 -0.32 -0.06 -1.61  0.16  1.37 -0.15 -0.98 
Discontinuation -0.29 -1.35 -0.21 -1.31 -0.49 -1.85* -0.17 -1.30 -0.23 -1.49 -0.27 -1.73* 
Fit  0.15  0.79  0.17  1.17  0.10  0.42  0.10  0.83  0.17  1.21  0.04  0.29 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.45  0.92  0.66  2.10**  0.01  0.01  0.17  0.50  0.59  1.98** -0.06 -0.19 
Non-minority-owned -0.08 -0.11 -0.21 -0.45  0.75  1.07  0.07  0.16 -0.02 -0.05  0.51  1.24 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 -0.37 -0.24 -0.54 -0.08 -0.29 -0.21 -0.73 -0.12 -0.46 
Industry volatility -0.21 -1.25 -0.06 -0.50  0.11  0.72 -0.12 -1.17 -0.01 -0.08  0.09  1.01 
State innovativeness  0.02  0.18  0.01  0.13  0.08  0.67  0.02  0.29  0.01  0.14  0.05  0.80 
Firm age  0.50  4.18***  0.37  4.21*** -0.07 -0.53  0.30  4.29***  0.36  4.16*** -0.01 -0.16 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.32   0.36   0.13   0.28   0.31   0.19  
Adjusted R2  0.23   0.27   0.01   0.18   0.22   0.08  
  N= 128 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 7-6: Robustness check – system of equations (SUR) results – alternative operationalisation of ROR constructs – cluster with prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment 
Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation 
Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment (dummy)  0.16  1.73*  0.22  2.19**  0.10  1.01 -0.22 -1.63 -0.20 -1.62 -0.03 -0.21 
Discontinuation  0.07  0.68  0.04  0.33 -0.01 -0.13  0.03  0.18 -0.02 -0.16 -0.21 -1.47 
Fit -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.53  0.02  0.27 -0.18 -1.37 -0.23 -1.87* -0.03 -0.24 
Portfolio-level constructs             
Initial commitment (dummy)  0.21  1.75*  0.28  2.27**  0.11  1.00  0.20  1.21  0.16  1.09 -0.06 -0.35 
Sequencing (dummy)  0.25  2.35**  0.31  2.76***  0.17  1.65  0.17  1.20  0.15  1.12  0.09  0.62 
Fit  0.26  2.56**  0.27  2.46**  0.20  2.07** -0.05 -0.36 -0.09 -0.68  0.15  1.05 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.12  0.41  0.04  0.17  0.23  1.34  0.34  1.09  0.34  1.21  0.43  1.68* 
Non-minority-owned -0.01 -0.03 -0.13 -0.41  0.31  1.24  0.12  0.29  0.06  0.14  0.67  1.83* 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.31 -1.22 -0.45 -1.60  0.04  0.14 -0.18 -0.53 -0.17 -0.50  0.21  0.57 
Industry volatility -0.05 -0.53  0.02  0.20  0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09  0.07  0.63 -0.03 -0.27 
State innovativeness -0.01 -0.23 -0.01 -0.10  0.03  0.56  0.01  0.15  0.03  0.52  0.12  1.61 
Firm age  0.06  1.07  0.02  0.29 -0.09 -1.49  0.52  6.27***  0.49  6.28***  0.18  2.11** 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.14   0.15   0.10   0.24   0.27   0.12  
Adjusted R2  0.07   0.08   0.03   0.19   0.22   0.06  
  N= 239 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Robust Standard Errors 
 
 The tests reported in the previous chapter indicated that the data might suffer from 
heteroscedasticity. To control for possible effects of this problem, it is necessary to estimate robust 
standard errors which produce unbiased p-values in cases when residual terms are unequally distributed. 
Hence, to avoid any potential misinterpretation of hypotheses tests, Seemingly Unrelated Estimation 
(SUEST) procedure was carried out in STATA for each regression model. Like SUR, SUEST produces 
estimations for a series of simultaneous equations and then combines parameter estimates with 
associated variance matrices to return robust standard errors (StataCorp 2013).  
 Results of SUEST estimation are reported in Appendix 22 for the full sample, in Appendix 23 for 
the cluster with no prior awards and in Appendix 24 for the cluster with prior awards. As Allison (1999) 
pointed out, the use of robust standard errors does not change coefficient estimates but produces more 
accurate p-values. As a result, coefficient estimates produced under SUEST are identical to the ones 
produced under SUR, but t-values and corresponding p-values have changed to reflect robust standard 
errors. 
 Estimates of t-values of the full and split sample models have only changed slightly under SUEST, 
and respective variables retained statistically significant effects on tested dependent variables. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the interpretation of hypotheses remains unchanged even when robust standard 
errors are used. 
 
 
 
  
214 
 
7.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
 Recall from the research methodology chapter that the measures of sales and employment yield 
might suffer from overstatement bias because they do not reflect the change over the period from t to 
t2014, but instead, refer to the closing period. This means that the measures of sales and employment yield 
included in the base SUR model represent 100% growth, which may inflate parameter estimates. To 
address this problem, sensitivity analyses were conducted using a more realistic 10% growth rate of sales 
and employment since year t. 
 Appendix 25 shows how estimates change when sales and employment yield is reduced from 
100% growth to 10% growth. Since other dependent variables in the model were unaffected by potential 
overestimation bias, only two equations from respective samples are presented in Appendix 25. In the 
full sample, all main effects remained unchanged, except two controls in the employment yield equation 
became statistically insignificant. In the sample with no prior awards, the effect of discontinuation on 
sales and employment yield changed from significant at p<0.10 to insignificant. In the sample with prior 
awards, the effect of portfolio level fit has a weak positive significant effect on employment yield in 
comparison to no effect under the base model. Additionally, Appendix 26 presents t-values based on 
robust standard errors for equations with adjusted sales and employment yield as dependent variables. 
None of the hypothesised relationships significantly changed their effects. In fact, in the sample with prior 
awards, the effect of portfolio level fit has a significant positive effect at p<0.05 on employment yield 
which has not been revealed under the base model. The latter suggests that the chosen primary 
estimation method of SUR produces the most conservative estimation parameters. 
 Overall, the differences in estimates produced by the base model and the adjusted model are 
minute, which signifies that the findings are not sensitive to potential variations in the dependent 
variables, so hypotheses testing holds true.  
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7.5 Summary 
 
 Table 7-7 presents a summary of findings from the base SUR model in relation to hypotheses 
tested in Part I analysis. Literature investigating effects of distinct ROR elements on performance is sparse. 
For example, a recent study by Klingebiel and Adner (2015) tested the effect of low initial commitment, 
discontinuation, sequencing and fit on innovation performance. The authors found a strong positive 
impact of sequencing and fit on innovation performance. However, low initial commitment and 
discontinuation showed no direct effect on performance, so it was concluded that these elements have 
no direct relationship with performance in general.  
 The results presented in this section extend the empirical inquiry into the relationship between 
the distinct elements mandated by the ROR logic and performance. First, the study found that the 
magnitude of initial commitment and high rate of sequencing have a diminishing effect on investment 
yield. The value from the investment process can be extracted when positioning trial commitments are 
small, and follow-up funds are allocated to selected projects only. That is, discontinuation decision has to 
be exercised in a disciplined manner. Second, discontinuation has a negative, yet weak effect on 
investment yield and innovation performance, when there are no other options in the portfolio, such as 
in the case of first-time award holders. Accounting for the fact that development of R&D options involves 
extensive learning, firms with no prior awards should have a priority for follow-on funding to maximise 
the chances of successful innovation and commercialisation. Third, fit of funding decisions has a 
significant and positive effect on investment yield exclusively at the cumulated portfolio level, indicating 
that long-term investment gains from matching funding allocation decisions under the ROR approach can 
only be realised when implemented consistently and across the entire portfolio of options. Finally, the 
study found evidence that the overall portfolio is subadditive with regard to the value of individual 
options. For firms that previously received funding, the effect of opening new options on performance is 
cancelled in the presence of existing options in the portfolio, unless the initial commitment to the 
additional option is small, as demonstrated by robustness checks. Overall, the results show a strong effect 
of ROR elements on investment outcomes, but very limited effect on firm-level outcomes. At its core, real 
options logic is a strategic investment tool which benefits decision-makers. In the present empirical 
context, the effect of explicitly following ROR logic is more pronounced in relation to investors because 
they are decision-makers. 
 In sum, the findings presented here simultaneously validate a direct positive impact of real 
options logic and delineate its boundary conditions in the context of government venture funding. The 
analysis confirms that distinct ROR constructs have differential effects on (i) different types of 
performance, i.e. sales, employment versus innovation; (ii) investors versus firms, (iii) whether the firm 
had other options in the portfolio or not. The results of hypotheses are consistent with estimations based 
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on robust standard errors and not sensitive to a potential overstatement of dependent variables. It can 
be concluded that the overall positive effects of allocated funding on investment yield tend to decrease 
the more money or, the more grants the firms receive.
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Table 7-7: Summary of Part I hypotheses testing results 
Hypothesis Hypothesised relationship Level Full Sample Firm Cluster: No prior awards Firm Cluster: With prior awards 
  β t-value Result  β t-value Result  β t-value Result 
H1-1a Initial commitment -> Sales Yield Project -0.19 -3.62*** S -0.43 -3.75*** S -0.03 -0.69 NS 
H1-1b Initial commitment -> Employment Yield Project -0.24 -4.51*** S -0.41 -4.76*** S -0.08 -1.66 NS 
H1-1c Initial commitment -> Innovation Yield Project -0.06 -1.23 NS -0.09 -0.61 NS -0.02 -0.37 NS 
H1-1d Initial commitment -> Sales Performance Project  0.08  1.67 NS -0.14 -1.86* PS  0.15  2.46** CF 
H1-1e Initial commitment -> Employment Performance Project   0.05  1.11 NS -0.19 -2.31** S  0.13  2.22** CF 
H1-1f Initial commitment -> Innovation Performance Project  0.05  0.91 NS  0.01  0.10 NS  0.05  0.79 NS 
H1-2a Discontinuation -> Sales Yield Project -0.06 -0.52 NS -0.35 -1.68* PS  0.07  0.65 NS 
H1-2b Discontinuation -> Employment Yield Project -0.06 -0.51 NS -0.27 -1.74* PS  0.03  0.28 NS 
H1-2c Discontinuation -> Innovation Yield Project -0.16 -1.40 NS -0.50 -1.88* PS -0.02 -0.21 NS 
H1-2d Discontinuation -> Sales Performance Project   0.02  0.16 NS -0.18 -1.36 NS  0.06  0.39 NS 
H1-2e Discontinuation -> Employment Performance Project -0.03 -0.29 NS -0.25 -1.67 NS  0.00  0.03 NS 
H1-2af Discontinuation -> Innovation Performance Project -0.20 -1.86* PS -0.26 -1.68* PS -0.21 -1.43 NS 
H1-3a Fit -> Sales Yield Project -0.11 -0.93 NS  0.21  1.10 NS -0.02 -0.16 NS 
H1-3b Fit-> Employment Yield Project -0.13 -1.22 NS  0.22  1.55 NS -0.07 -0.66 NS 
H1-3c Fit -> Innovation Yield Project -0.02 -0.18 NS  0.13  0.51 NS  0.01  0.11 NS 
H1-3d Fit -> Sales Performance Project -0.08 -0.75 NS  0.12  0.95 NS -0.18 -1.39 NS 
H1-3e Fit -> Employment Performance Project -0.09 -0.91 NS  0.20  1.42 NS -0.23 -1.85* CF 
H1-3f Fit -> Innovation Performance Project -0.02 -0.18 NS  0.05  0.34 NS -0.04 -0.31 NS 
H1-4a Fit -> Sales Yield Portfolio  0.28  2.40** S - - NA  0.17  1.74* PS 
H1-4b Fit-> Employment Yield Portfolio  0.31  2.81*** S - - NA  0.15  1.43 NS 
H1-4c Fit -> Innovation Yield Portfolio  0.14  1.27 NS - - NA  0.14  1.46 NS 
H1-4d Fit -> Sales Performance Portfolio -0.03 -0.31 NS - - NA -0.11 -0.82 NS 
H1-4e Fit -> Employment Performance Portfolio -0.01 -0.08 NS - - NA -0.14 -1.09 NS 
H1-4f Fit -> Innovation Performance Portfolio  0.12  1.11 NS - - NA   0.16  1.09 NS 
H1-5a Sequencing -> Sales Yield Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.19 -3.96*** S 
H1-5b Sequencing -> Employment Yield Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.24 -4.95*** S 
H1-5c Sequencing -> Innovation Yield Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.15 -3.21*** S 
H1-5d Sequencing -> Sales Performance Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.01 -0.20 NS 
H1-5e Sequencing -> Employment Performance Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.01 -0.13 NS 
H1-5f Sequencing -> Innovation Performance Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.03 -0.46 NS 
H1-6a Initial commitment -> Sales Yield Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.13 -2.19** S 
H1-6b Initial commitment -> Employment Yield Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.15 -2.40** S 
H1-6c Initial commitment -> Innovation Yield Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.11 -2.01** S 
H1-6d Initial commitment -> Sales Performance Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.09 -1.06 NS 
H1-6e Initial commitment -> Employment Performance Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.05 -0.65 NS 
H1-6f Initial commitment -> Innovation Performance Portfolio - - NA - - NA -0.06 -0.70 NS 
              Notes:  S – supported, NS – not supported, PS – partially supported, CF – contrary finding, NA – not applicable;  
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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 Results & Discussion (II): Testing Hypotheses of the 
Signalling and Attention-Based View Models 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
 The focus of the present chapter is to convey the findings of Part II analysis obtained from OLS 
and Logit regression models in STATA using standardised data. Specifically, OLS model was used to 
test hypotheses related to the effects of signalling constructs on the magnitude of initial commitment, 
while Logit model was used to test hypotheses related to the effects of signalling constructs on the 
likelihood of subsequent funding discontinuation.  
 As in the previous results chapter, the analysis was conducted for the full sample as well as 
for the split samples comprising a cluster with no prior awards and a cluster with prior awards. R2 for 
three OLS models were 0.20, 0.34 and 0.27 and adjusted R2 were 0.10, 0.04 and 0.11, while Pseudo R2 
for Logit models were 0.22, 0.35 and 0.30, respectively. This indicates that individual variables explain 
up to a third of the variance in the dependent variables; however, when adjusted for the number of 
independent variables in the model, their contribution reduces by a third.  
 Subsequent sections discuss the results of hypotheses testing, and then present robustness 
checks to scrutinise the validity of findings. To sum up the chapter, conclusions are drawn from Part 
II analysis and the primary insights outlined. 
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8.2 Hypotheses Testing 
 
 Table 8-1 reports estimated coefficients and t-values for the full sample OLS regression model 
on initial commitment, Table 8-2 for the cluster with no prior awards and Table 8-3 for the cluster with 
prior awards. Moreover, Table 8-4 displays estimated coefficients and t-values for the full sample Logit 
regression model on discontinuation, Table 8-5 for the cluster with no prior awards and Table 8-6 for 
the cluster with prior awards. To test for the independent effects of each signal category, the variables 
measuring each construct were included separately in Models 1 through 4, concluding with the full 
model. Model 1 includes the variables representing more observable signals, i.e. TMT legitimacy and 
efficacy; Model 2 includes less observable signals, i.e. capabilities; Model 3 includes attention-
distorting signals, i.e. project appeal characteristics and existing portfolio characteristics respectively; 
Model 4 is a full model which includes all categories of signals. The results are discussed in light of 
original hypotheses in the following sections. 
 Firm age is a significant control factor for a full sample of firms and is positively associated 
with the magnitude of initial funding commitment. This result is consistent with findings of prior 
studies that investors favour older firms because they are perceived as less risky (Sanders and Boivie 
2004; Daily et al. 2005). On the other hand, state innovativeness is a significant controlling variable in 
the Logit model which increases the likelihood of discontinuation, particularly for firms with prior 
awards. It may be, that availability of geographic-specific innovation resources reduces the 
importance of government venture funding continuation as support can be received elsewhere in the 
state.  
 Overall, the findings imply that signalling constructs have a limited ability in explaining funding 
allocation decisions, as demonstrated by the small number of statistically significant independent 
variables, indicating that allocation of external funding may be driven by other factors which have not 
been captured by the model. In particular, firms with no prior awards remain a ‘black box’. 
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Table 8-1: Ordinary leasts squares (OLS) model results – full sample – DV: initial commitment 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:         
Role legitimacy          
Manager CEO -0.05 -0.35     -0.05 -0.38 
PI CEO -0.04 -0.30     -0.02 -0.12 
PI’s firm tenure -0.21 -2.38**     -0.23 -2.62*** 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
-0.13 -1.30     -0.11 -1.18 
PI’s technical experience  0.15  1.98**      0.10  1.28 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.17 -1.82*     -0.14 -1.48 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
       0.05  0.57 
Resource legitimacy   0.04  0.44       
Manager’s elite education  0.14  1.65      0.12  1.33 
PI’s elite education -0.10 -1.35     -0.07 -0.84 
Manager’s MBA -0.17 -0.88     -0.20 -1.11 
PI’s MBA  0.15  0.64      0.06  0.24 
Manager’s PhD  0.14  0.91      0.13  0.81 
PI’s PhD  0.06  0.19     -0.01 -0.04 
Manager’s professorship  0.10  0.62      0.12  0.70 
PI’s professorship  0.26  1.54      0.29  1.72 
Intellectual legitimacy         
Manager’s patents -0.09 -1.00     -0.10 -1.05 
PI’s patents  0.16  2.36**      0.15  2.03** 
Manager’s publications  0.01  0.13      0.01  0.08 
PI’s publications -0.18 -2.17**     -0.17 -2.01* 
Abstract readability  0.25  0.25      0.06  0.06 
Capabilities         
R&D capability    0.73  1.19    0.56  0.90 
Managerial capability    0.42  1.43   -0.01 -0.02 
Intellectual capability   -0.24 -0.63   -0.19 -0.40 
Project appeal         
Project scope (broad)     -0.30 -2.81*** -0.29 -2.36** 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     0.22  1.30  0.24  1.33 
Cancer treatment research      0.20  1.16  0.20  1.03 
Cancer biology research      0.58  2.54**  0.56  2.37** 
Control variables:         
Non-woman-owned  0.06  0.26  0.11  0.53  0.14  0.67 -0.01 -0.03 
Non-minority-owned  0.15  0.49  0.14  0.46  0.16  0.55  0.16  0.55 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.13 -0.47 -0.27 -1.05 -0.29 -1.16 -0.12 -0.45 
Industry volatility -0.04 -0.27  0.05  0.42 -0.01 -0.11 -0.09 -0.69 
State innovativeness  0.04  0.59  0.02  0.33  0.02  0.35  0.03  0.55 
Firm age  0.20  2.60**  0.04  0.71  0.08  1.51  0.23  2.73*** 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   
R2  0.16   0.05   0.08   0.20  
Adjusted R2  0.08   0.01   0.04   0.10  
 N= 367 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 8-2: Ordinary least squares (OLS) model results – cluster with no prior awards – DV: initial commitment 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:         
Role legitimacy          
Manager CEO -0.11 -0.56     -0.14 -0.67 
PI CEO  0.18  0.91      0.24  1.16 
PI’s firm tenure -0.35 -1.92*     -0.34 -1.83* 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
-0.04 -0.28     -0.02 -0.17 
PI’s technical experience  0.03  0.28      0.00  0.03 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.15 -1.19     -0.19 -1.29 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
 0.09  0.60      0.13  0.76 
Resource legitimacy          
Manager’s elite education -0.04 -0.29     -0.07 -0.52 
PI’s elite education -0.05 -0.52     -0.06 -0.56 
Manager’s MBA -0.11 -0.48     -0.09 -0.34 
PI’s MBA  0.29  0.78      0.16  0.40 
Manager’s PhD  0.04  0.13      0.03  0.10 
PI’s PhD  0.27  0.80      0.33  0.81 
Manager’s professorship -0.06 -0.25     -0.10 -0.37 
PI’s professorship  0.47  2.24**      0.51  2.16** 
Intellectual legitimacy         
Manager’s patents -0.01 -0.05      0.01  0.03 
PI’s patents  0.08  0.76      0.09  0.75 
Manager’s publications -0.15 -1.05     -0.22 -1.37 
PI’s publications -0.13 -1.29     -0.11 -0.86 
Abstract readability  0.04  0.03     -0.19 -0.12 
Capabilities         
R&D capability    0.81  1.11    0.27  0.31 
Managerial capability   -0.26 -0.57   -1.01 -1.74* 
Intellectual capability   -0.57 -0.98   -0.15 -0.17 
Project appeal         
Project scope (broad)     -0.19 -1.14 -0.10 -0.48 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
    -0.10 -0.41  0.06  0.18 
Cancer treatment research     -0.10 -0.38  0.15  0.47 
Cancer biology research      0.25  0.69  0.21  0.51 
Control variables:         
Non-woman-owned  0.06  0.37 -0.11 -0.31 -0.03 -0.09  0.15  0.37 
Non-minority-owned  0.21  0.51  0.30  0.66  0.20  0.44  0.28  0.53 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.03  0.33 -0.24 -0.81 -0.22 -0.74 -0.01 -0.04 
Industry volatility -0.08  0.17 -0.15 -0.92 -0.17 -1.04 -0.06 -0.33 
State innovativeness  0.04  0.08  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.15  0.04  0.46 
Firm age  0.19  0.12  0.02  0.26  0.03  0.39  0.25  1.88* 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    
R2  0.30   0.11   0.10   0.34  
Adjusted R2  0.06  -0.01  -0.03   0.04  
 N= 128 
 *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 8-3: Ordinary least squares (OLS) model results – cluster with prior awards – DV: initial commitment 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3-1) Distortions (3-2) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:           
Role legitimacy            
Manager CEO -0.02 -0.10       -0.10 -0.47 
PI CEO -0.17 -0.85       -0.16 -0.79 
PI’s firm tenure -0.16 -1.19       -0.16 -1.14 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
-0.12 -0.88       -0.10 -0.77 
PI’s technical experience  0.20  1.75*        0.16  1.25 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.21 -1.65       -0.15 -1.12 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
 0.03  0.21        0.05  0.42 
Resource legitimacy            
Manager’s elite education  0.18  1.62        0.16  1.43 
PI’s elite education -0.10 -0.88       -0.04 -0.40 
Manager’s MBA -0.17 -0.51       -0.19 -0.56 
PI’s MBA -0.03 -0.09       -0.20 -0.53 
Manager’s PhD  0.22  0.97        0.14  0.58 
PI’s PhD -0.16 -0.31       -0.29 -0.52 
Manager’s professorship  0.19  0.72        0.15  0.54 
PI’s professorship  0.12  0.52        0.16  0.72 
Intellectual legitimacy           
Manager’s patents -0.14 -1.20       -0.19 -1.68 
PI’s patents  0.19  1.99**        0.17  1.76* 
Manager’s publications  0.06  0.45        0.11  0.79 
PI’s publications -0.22 -1.86*       -0.23 -2.02** 
Abstract readability  0.70  0.54        0.18  0.14 
Capabilities           
R&D capability    0.61  0.67     -0.03 -0.03 
Managerial capability    0.59  1.48      0.20  0.45 
Intellectual capability   -0.19 -0.40     -0.19 -0.32 
Project appeal           
Project scope (broad)     -0.34 -2.30**   -0.35 -2.10** 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     0.36  1.54    0.21  0.80 
Cancer treatment research      0.38  1.60    0.16  0.59 
Cancer biology research      0.63  2.10**    0.67  2.06** 
Prior funding decisions           
Initial commitment 
(portfolio) 
       0.22  2.50**  0.22  2.32** 
Sequencing (portfolio)       -0.02 -0.27 -0.02 -0.24 
Fit (portfolio)        0.35  2.31**  0.28  1.79* 
Control variables:           
Non-woman-owned  0.17  0.57  0.25  0.92  0.21  0.77  0.27  1.02  0.09  0.30 
Non-minority-owned  0.17  0.41  0.10  0.25  0.12  0.31  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.26 -0.56 -0.38 -0.96 -0.51 -1.30 -0.49 -1.26 -0.31 -0.69 
Industry volatility  0.03  0.14  0.16  0.95  0.05  0.26  0.12  0.70 -0.11 -0.58 
State innovativeness  0.01  0.18  0.00  0.01  0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 -0.05 -0.60 
Firm age  0.09  0.72 -0.09 -0.93 -0.03 -0.40  0.06  0.73  0.15  1.08 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    
R2  0.17   0.07   0.10   0.11   0.27  
Adjusted R2  0.05   0.01   0.04   0.06   0.11  
   N= 239 
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 8-4: Logit model results – full sample – DV: discontinuation 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:         
Role legitimacy          
Manager CEO -0.13 -0.39      0.01  0.03 
PI CEO -1.06 -3.28***     -1.01 -2.98*** 
PI’s firm tenure  0.30  1.16      0.37  1.43 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
 0.19  0.79      0.26  1.04 
PI’s technical experience -0.22 -0.93     -0.23 -0.93 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.04 -0.17     -0.08 -0.28 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.01 -0.02     -0.07 -0.26 
Resource legitimacy          
Manager’s elite education  0.03  0.16      0.02  0.10 
PI’s elite education  0.10  0.57      0.17  0.96 
Manager’s MBA  0.15  0.30      0.12  0.22 
PI’s MBA -1.17 -1.32     -1.19 -1.25 
Manager’s PhD  0.24  0.49      0.36  0.74 
PI’s PhD  0.07  0.09     -0.32 -0.42 
Manager’s professorship -0.05 -0.12     -0.05 -0.11 
PI’s professorship -0.57 -1.51     -0.58 -1.43 
Intellectual legitimacy         
Manager’s patents  0.31  1.54      0.31  1.52 
PI’s patents  0.19  1.08      0.14  0.79 
Manager’s publications -0.25 -1.01     -0.23 -0.86 
PI’s publications -0.24 -1.32     -0.28 -1.29 
Abstract readability -0.07 -0.53     -0.09 -0.63 
Efficacy         
Project duration   0.33  2.45**      0.37  2.51** 
Invention activity -0.31 -1.82*     -0.65 -3.06*** 
Capabilities         
R&D capability   -0.05 -0.45    0.00  0.00 
Managerial capability    0.16  1.21    0.52  2.60*** 
Intellectual capability   -0.02 -0.15    0.10  0.45 
Project appeal         
Project scope (broad)      0.14  0.56  0.07  0.22 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     0.82  2.18**  0.90  1.95* 
Cancer treatment research      0.91  2.36**  0.72  1.56 
Cancer biology research      0.92  1.83*  0.98  1.67 
Prior funding decisions           
Initial commitment (project)      0.03  0.23 -0.04 -0.26 
Control variables:         
Non-woman-owned -0.24 -0.42  0.14  0.30  0.02  0.05 -0.45 -0.75 
Non-minority-owned -0.20 -0.26 -0.26 -0.41 -0.30 -0.47 -0.32 -0.39 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.50  0.78  1.03  1.92  0.95  1.76*  0.69  1.02 
Industry volatility -0.21 -0.62 -0.25 -0.88 -0.35 -1.20 -0.34 -0.96 
State innovativeness  0.24  1.63  0.21  1.74*  0.24  2.01**  0.28  1.81* 
Firm age -0.12 -0.62 -0.04 -0.29  0.03  0.22 -0.21 -0.99 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.   Incl.    Incl.  
Pseudo R2  0.19   0.09   0.10   0.22  
   N= 36035  
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
                                                          
35 The sample size is smaller because the model omitted observations for which year cohort categories had an insufficient 
number of observations for the analysis. The same applies to the split sample models. 
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Table 8-5: Logit model results – cluster with no prior awards – DV: discontinuation 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:         
Role legitimacy          
Manager CEO  0.42  0.50      1.23  1.05 
PI CEO -1.51 -2.14**     -2.34 -2.01* 
PI’s firm tenure  0.72  1.14      0.96  0.91 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
 0.41  1.01      0.61  1.28 
PI’s technical experience  0.03  0.06     -0.37 -0.62 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.14 -0.36      0.01  0.02 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.13 -0.25     -0.42 -0.46 
Resource legitimacy          
Manager’s elite education -0.04 -0.08      0.04  0.07 
PI’s elite education  0.10  0.28      0.58  1.59 
Manager’s MBA -0.35 -0.44     -0.82 -0.80 
PI’s MBA -1.80 -1.23     -2.42 -1.39 
Manager’s PhD -0.50 -0.63     -0.28 -0.22 
PI’s PhD -0.02 -0.02     -0.63 -0.40 
Manager’s professorship  0.37  0.42      0.75  0.60 
PI’s professorship -0.81 -0.81     -1.12 -0.69 
Intellectual legitimacy         
Manager’s patents  0.06  0.12      0.37  0.54 
PI’s patents  0.27  0.77      0.27  0.61 
Manager’s publications -0.03 -0.05     -0.34 -0.38 
PI’s publications -0.26 -0.80      0.24  0.42 
Abstract readability  0.04  0.12     -0.22 -0.57 
Efficacy         
Project duration   0.43  1.42      0.77  1.95* 
Invention activity -0.07 -0.17     -0.28 -0.55 
Capabilities         
R&D capability    0.11  0.59    0.44  1.45 
Managerial capability   -0.02 -0.07    0.62  1.31 
Intellectual capability   -0.38 -1.52   -0.90 -1.51 
Project appeal         
Project scope (broad)     -0.51 -1.06 -0.91 -1.32 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     1.21  1.67*  1.81  1.43 
Cancer treatment research      1.39  1.92*  1.41  1.25 
Cancer biology research      2.42  2.26**  4.17  2.37** 
Prior funding decisions         
Initial commitment (project)     -0.12 -0.44 -0.17 -0.32 
Control variables:         
Non-woman-owned  0.78  0.51  1.52  1.23  1.56  1.24  0.22  0.11 
Non-minority-owned -0.88 -0.50 -1.58 -1.08 -1.69 -1.11 -0.43 -0.20 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.15  0.15  0.91  1.15  1.06  1.30  0.08  0.05 
Industry volatility -0.67 -0.92 -0.33 -0.69 -0.49 -1.00 -0.97 -1.02 
State innovativeness  0.07  0.25  0.04  0.18  0.16  0.71  0.08  0.22 
Firm age -0.65 -1.51 -0.30 -1.19 -0.17 -0.73 -0.62 -0.93 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.    Incl.   Incl.    
Pseudo R2  0.24   0.13   0.15   0.35  
   N= 12436 
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
                                                          
36 The estimates were pooled across 3 out of 5 imputed datasets because omitted categorical variables varied across 
imputed datasets. 
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Table 8-6: Logit model results – cluster with prior awards – DV: discontinuation 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3-1) Distortions (3-2) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:           
Role legitimacy            
Manager CEO -0.47 -0.99       -0.49 -0.93 
PI CEO -1.14 -2.41**       -1.01 -2.02** 
PI’s firm tenure  0.15  0.40        0.46  1.20 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
 0.17  0.51        0.25  0.62 
PI’s technical experience -0.44 -1.41       -0.47 -1.22 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
 0.01  0.03        0.02  0.05 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
 0.20  0.62        0.06  0.17 
Resource legitimacy            
Manager’s elite education  0.07  0.25        0.06  0.19 
PI’s elite education  0.09  0.42        0.17  0.70 
Manager’s MBA  0.53  0.61        0.54  0.57 
PI’s MBA -0.74 -0.72       -1.05 -0.86 
Manager’s PhD  0.39  0.55        0.71  0.99 
PI’s PhD  0.18  0.15       -0.31 -0.25 
Manager’s professorship -0.02 -0.04       -0.11 -0.19 
PI’s professorship -0.76 -1.49       -0.96 -1.72* 
Intellectual legitimacy           
Manager’s patents  0.55  2.02**        0.66  2.04** 
PI’s patents  0.18  0.76        0.08  0.31 
Manager’s publications -0.33 -0.83       -0.36 -0.75 
PI’s publications -0.36 -1.40       -0.43 -1.53 
Abstract readability -0.17 -0.88       -0.13 -0.65 
Efficacy           
Project duration   0.22  1.23        0.32  1.58 
Invention activity -0.41 -1.72*       -0.78 -2.51** 
Capabilities           
R&D capability   -0.22 -1.20     -0.28 -1.14 
Managerial capability    0.21  1.22      0.61  1.93* 
Intellectual capability    0.04  0.24      0.32  1.02 
Project appeal           
Project scope (broad)      0.32  1.04    0.27  0.64 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     0.66  1.37    0.43  0.65 
Cancer treatment research      0.72  1.46    0.42  0.62 
Cancer biology research      0.38  0.63   -0.22 -0.27 
Prior funding decisions             
Initial commitment 
(project) 
       0.04  0.29  0.04  0.21 
Initial commitment 
(portfolio) 
       0.01  0.05 -0.11 -0.47 
Sequencing (portfolio)       -0.32 -2.12** -0.24 -1.22 
Fit (portfolio)       -0.01 -0.04  0.28  0.66 
Control variables:           
Non-woman-owned -0.57 -0.78 -0.04 -0.07 -0.23 -0.40 -0.17 -0.31 -0.35 -0.39 
Non-minority-owned -0.13 -0.12  0.17  0.21  0.11  0.14  0.43  0.54 -0.33 -0.28 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.19  0.17  0.85  1.07  0.78  0.98  0.88  1.10  0.41  0.34 
Industry volatility  0.01  0.01 -0.27 -0.71 -0.34 -0.88 -0.31 -0.81 -0.09 -0.17 
State innovativeness  0.40  2.00**  0.27  1.68*  0.32  2.04**  0.33  2.08**  0.53  2.21** 
Firm age -0.01 -0.02  0.01  0.07  0.09  0.51  0.15  0.80 -0.26 -0.75 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   
Pseudo R2  0.24   0.11   0.11   0.12   0.30  
   N= 236 
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Relationship between Top Management Team Legitimacy and Funding Allocation Decisions  
 
 H2-1a: More observable signals of role legitimacy, resource legitimacy and intellectual 
legitimacy have a positive effect on the magnitude of initial funding commitment. 
 Testing Hypothesis 2-1a demonstrates mixed support for the predicted relationship between 
TMT legitimacy and the magnitude of initial funding commitment, and inter- and intra-variations exist 
for distinct categories of legitimacy signals within different samples.  
 The results of Model 1 of the full sample show that role legitimacy and intellectual legitimacy 
signals have an impact on the magnitude of initial funding commitment, while resource legitimacy has 
no impact. In the role legitimacy signal category, PI’s organisational tenure and manager’s 
entrepreneurial experience have a negative effect on the magnitude of initial funding (β = -0.21,                 
t = -2.38) and (β = -0.17, t = -1.82) respectively, while PI’s technical experience has a positive effect on 
the magnitude of initial commitment (β = 0.15, t = 1.98). In the intellectual legitimacy signal category, 
PI’s patents have a positive effect (β = 0.16, t = 2.36), while PI’s publications have a negative effect     
(β = -0.18, t = -2.17) on the magnitude of initial funding commitment. In other words, PI’s technical 
competence (experience and inventive capacity) is associated with the higher amount of initial 
funding, while PI’s tenure and academic competence are associated with the lower amount of initial 
funding. This suggests that PI’s technical expertise is a strong signal of legitimacy that the top scientist 
within the team has relevant task-specific skills to successfully develop an innovation project. PI’s 
longer tenure, on the other hand, informs investors’ that the scientist is prone to the ‘status quo’, 
making breakthrough innovation less likely to occur. High publication activity signals that the PI is a 
theoretician rather than a practitioner and dedicates a significant amount of time to academic 
research, therefore has lower chances of converting a project into a commercial success. The negative 
albeit weak effect of manager’s entrepreneurial experience is counterintuitive. It may be, that 
investors deliberately allocate smaller amounts of initial funding to firms with higher entrepreneurial 
credentials knowing that they already have the necessary social capital for potential commercial 
success. In the full model, PI’s technical experience and manager’s entrepreneurial experience 
become statistically insignificant, but remaining variables continue to be significant. 
 For firms with no prior awards in Model 1, the effect PI’s organisational tenure has a weak 
negative effect (β = -0.35, t = -1.92) and PI’s professorship a strong positive effect (β = 0.47, t = 2.24) 
on the magnitude of initial commitment, representing role legitimacy and resource legitimacy 
respectively. As expected, the presence of top academic scientists in the team signals credibility and 
access to a network of scientific resources and therefore helps attract a higher amount of initial 
funding. The independent variables remain significant in the full model. 
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 For firms with prior awards in Model 1, intellectual legitimacy bears the strongest weight on 
initial funding commitment, with PI’s patents having a strong and positive association (β = 0.19,                 
t = 1.99) and PI’s publications having a weak negative association (β = -0.22, t = -1.86). This indicates 
that PIs who engage in applied research as opposed to basic academic research have better chances 
of receiving higher initial funding. Additionally, PI’s technical experience which forms part of the role 
legitimacy category has a weak positive effect on initial funding (β = 0.20, t = 1.75), which confirms the 
above finding that overall technical expertise of the lead scientist tends to be favourably perceived by 
investors. Nevertheless, the latter independent variable is insignificant in the full model. 
 H2-1b: More observable signals of role legitimacy, resource legitimacy and intellectual 
legitimacy decrease the likelihood of funding discontinuation. 
 Results of Hypothesis 2-1b testing show weak support that observable signals of legitimacy 
decrease the likelihood of discontinuation. Statistically significant independent variables are identical 
in Model 1 and Model 4. 
 In the full sample, only one indicator of the role legitimacy category is statistically significant, 
namely PI as a CEO decreases the likelihood of discontinuation (β = -1.06, t = -3.28). Likewise, in the 
cluster with no prior awards, PI as a CEO has a significant negative effect on discontinuation (β = -1.51,  
t = -2.14). In addition to the strong significant effect of the same predictor (β = -1.14, t = -2.41), in the 
cluster of firms with no prior awards, manager’s patents increase the likelihood of discontinuation      
(β = 0.55, t = 2.02). For all samples, executive’s functional role as a PI increases chances for continued 
funding of innovation projects, which indicates that CEO’s participation in technical roles is positively 
viewed by investors. The positive effect of manager’s inventive capacity on the likelihood of 
discontinuation may be explained by the fact that patenting is a technical task and is considered by 
investors to be outside the scope of direct managerial responsibilities, which should instead be 
focused on strategic aspects of venture development. Hence, manager’s high patenting activity signals 
to the capital market that functional roles within the team are misaligned.  
 Overall, the results demonstrate that observable signals of TMT legitimacy are weak 
predictors of funding allocation decisions, so support for Hypothesis 2-1 is limited. 
 
Relationship between Efficacy and Funding Allocation Decisions 
 
 H2-2: More recent signals of efficacy have a stronger effect on the likelihood of funding 
discontinuation than signals of legitimacy. 
 There is a strong overall support for Hypotheses 2-2, as observed from the results of the full 
sample analysis in Model 1, which reveal that both indicators of efficacy have a statistically significant 
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impact on discontinuation and directions of relationships match initial expectations. Project duration 
(β = 0.33, t = 2.45) increases the likelihood of discontinuation, whereas invention activity (β = -0.31,    
t = 1.82) decreases the likelihood of funding discontinuation. The results are supported by the full 
model.  
 The effect of efficacy signals on Phase II funding allocation decision is less prominent in the 
split sample analysis. In Model 4, project duration (β = 0.77, t = 1.95) weakly increases the likelihood 
of discontinuation for firms with no prior awards, whereas invention activity (β = -0.78, t = -2.51) 
decreases the likelihood of funding discontinuation for firms with prior awards. This finding suggests 
that when evaluating efficacy credentials, investors expect new programme participants to 
demonstrate their ability to keep experimentation time low, and experienced programme participants 
to develop patentable technologies as a result of Phase I allocated funding. Overall, the findings 
suggest that the temporal relevance of post-funding efficacy has an impact on investment decision-
making as such flow-type signals convey up-to-date operational information and help update 
investors’ perspectives on firms’ potential. 
 
Relationship between Capabilities and Funding Allocation Decisions  
 
 H2-3a: In contrast to more observable signals of legitimacy, less observable signals of R&D, 
intellectual and managerial capability have no effect on the magnitude of initial funding commitment. 
 Testing Hypothesis 2-3a in Model 2 and Model 4 demonstrates strong support for the 
predicted relationship between capabilities and the magnitude of initial funding commitment in both 
full and split samples.  
 H2-3b: In contrast to more observable signals of legitimacy, less observable signals of R&D, 
intellectual and managerial capability have no effect on the likelihood of funding discontinuation. 
 Likewise, as per Hypothesis 2-3b, capabilities have no effect on the likelihood funding 
discontinuation in both full and split samples. Only in Model 4 of the full sample managerial capability 
has a strong positive effect on discontinuation and a weak positive effect in the cluster with prior 
awards. The positive effect on discontinuation could perhaps suggest that firms with strong 
managerial capability opt from applying for Phase II funding.  
 Overall, the findings related to Hypothesis 2-3 indicate that despite the expected positive 
impact of capabilities on firms’ future potential for success, capabilities have no direct effect on 
funding allocation decisions because they happen inside the ‘black box’ of the firm, and hence are 
difficult to observe as signals without explicitly measuring them. This finding offers support for both 
signalling theory and attention-based view of the firm. It confirms that for signals to be efficacious, 
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they need to be visible to outsiders, while decision-makers only respond to those cues which they can 
notice.  
 
Effect of Attention-Distorting Signal Categories on Funding Allocation Decisions 
 
 H2-4a: Directly relevant project appeal characteristics have a stronger effect on the magnitude 
of initial funding commitment than legitimacy signals.  
 The findings of Model 3 offer support for Hypothesis 2-4a. Both indicators representing 
project appeal category are statistically significant in the full sample and the cluster with prior awards. 
Contrary to the initial expectation, broad project scope diminishes the magnitude of initial funding 
commitment in the full sample (β = -0.30, t= -2.81) and in the sample with prior awards (β = -0.34,     
t = -2.30). Moreover, projects focused on cancer biology research are more likely to receive higher 
initial funding commitment than projects focused on cancer cause and prevention research, as seen 
in the full sample (β = 0.58, t = 2.54) and in the sample with prior awards (β = 0.63, t = 2.10). 
Additionally, as evident by the results of Model 4, the presence of project appeal characteristics diverts 
decision-makers’ attention from intended legitimacy signals, as demonstrated by their lower weights 
in the full model. No support for Hypothesis 2-4a is offered by results of the cluster with no prior 
awards. 
 Overall, the findings suggest that investors have funding agenda in place which favours 
projects with a narrow scope and dedicated to cancer biology research. Hence, these characteristics 
are stronger cues in comparison to other indirect cues such as legitimacy and efficacy as they are 
directly relevant to evaluators’ agenda. Hence, decision-makers’ attention is concentrated in 
communication channels located in application forms, making them notice and react to specific 
project characteristics, applying higher weights to those factors they are looking for.   
 H2-4b: Directly relevant project appeal characteristics have a stronger effect on the likelihood 
of funding discontinuation than legitimacy signals.  
 Partial support for Hypothesis 2-4b is observed in the full sample and the sample of firms with 
no prior awards. Although the effect of project scope is statistically insignificant, the membership of 
projects in specific categories increases their likelihood of funding discontinuation. Specifically, as seen 
in Model 3-1, projects focused on cancer detection and diagnosis research (β = 0.82, t = 2.18;   β = 
1.21, t = 1.67), cancer treatment research (β = 0.91, t = 2.36; β = 1.39, t = 1.92), and cancer biology 
research (β = 0.92, t = 1.83; β = 2.42, t = 2.26) are more likely to experience funding discontinuation 
than projects focused on cancer cause and prevention research, as seen in the full sample and the 
sample of firms with no prior awards, respectively. However, the effect of these project categories is 
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less profound in the full model. Also, project appeal characteristics have no effect on discontinuation 
among firms with prior awards.  
 Overall, the findings mostly confirm Hypothesis 2-4 that project appeal characteristics have a 
strong effect on funding allocation decisions and also divert decision-makers’ attention from other 
categories of signals. In other words, evaluators pay more attention to those projects which meet their 
internal funding agenda. 
 H2-5a: Previous funding allocation decisions have a stronger positive effect on the magnitude 
of initial funding commitment than legitimacy signals. 
 Testing Hypothesis 2-5a in Model 3-2 shows evidence for the distorting effect of prior 
portfolio-level funding allocation decisions. Higher prior portfolio-level initial commitment (β = 0.22, t 
= 2.50) and prior fit of funding decisions (β = 0.35, t = 2.31) have a strong and positive effect on the 
magnitude of initial commitment. This suggests that investors follow their prior decision-making 
patterns, and when they allocated higher amounts of initial commitment, they will also do so for the 
new option. Also, matching of previous funding decisions in line with the ROR logic is also positively 
associated with the magnitude of initial commitment. The results remain statistically significant in the 
full model. 
 H2-5b: Previous funding allocation decisions have a stronger negative effect on the likelihood 
of funding discontinuation than legitimacy signals. 
 There is partial support for Hypothesis H2-5b at the portfolio-level. The results show that high 
sequencing rate of previous projects in the portfolio (β = -0.32, t = -2.12) reduces the likelihood of 
discontinuation of new projects. In other words, when investors allocated funding to Phase II projects 
in the past, they will also do so in the future. However, the effect of sequencing is insignificant in the 
full model. Also, there is no effect of the magnitude of initial funding commitment to an individual 
project.
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8.3 Robustness Checks 
 
 As in Part I analysis, robustness checks were performed to check for potential negative effects 
of heteroscedastic data. To control for this problem, robust standard errors were estimated for each 
model using the ‘vce’ specification in STATA, which generated more robust confidence intervals and 
p-values.  
 The results of robustness checks of the OLS regression model on initial commitment are 
reported in Appendix 27 for the full sample, Appendix 28 for the cluster with no prior awards and 
Appendix 29 for the cluster with prior awards. Results of robustness checks of the Logit regression 
model on discontinuation appear in Appendix 30 for the full sample, Appendix 31 for the cluster with 
no prior awards and Appendix 32 for the cluster with prior awards. 
 The results of robustness checks are in line with the results reported in the main model. 
Independent variables explaining variance in the dependent variables remained statistically significant 
under robust standard errors, confirming the validity of hypotheses testing. 
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8.4 Summary 
 
 The results presented in this chapter contribute to the understanding of venture funding 
decision-making process. Specifically, they provide insights into the funding allocation process of the 
government capital providers.   
Table 8-7 presents a summary of the findings from OLS and Logit models in relation to 
hypotheses tested in Part II analysis. Although overall the effects of signals are rather low on both 
funding allocation outcomes, partial support for hypotheses is still evident, and a number of important 
conclusions can be drawn.  
Table 8-7: Summary of Part II hypotheses testing results 
Hypothesis Hypothesised relationship Hypothesised 
effect 
Full sample Cluster:  
with no 
prior awards 
Cluster:  
with prior 
awards 
H2-1a Legitimacy signals -> Initial commitment   Positive PS, CF PS, CF PS, CF 
H2-1b Legitimacy signals -> Discontinuation Negative PS PS PS, CF 
H2-2 Efficacy signals -> Discontinuation Both S NS PS 
H2-3a Capability signals -> Initial commitment   No effect S S S 
H2-3b Capability signals -> Discontinuation  No effect S S S 
H2-4a Project appeal signals -> Initial commitment   Positive S, CF NS S, CF 
H2-4b Project appeal signals -> Discontinuation Positive PS PS NS 
H2-5a Distortion signals -> Initial commitment   Positive NA NA S 
H2-5b Distortion signals -> Discontinuation Negative NA NA PS 
   Notes: S – supported, NS – not supported, PS – partially supported, CF – contrary finding, NA – not applicable;  
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 First, TMT legitimacy signals have mixed effects on funding allocation outcomes. In isolation, 
role legitimacy and intellectual legitimacy affect the magnitude of initial funding commitment of all 
firms in the sample. The results show that generally PI’s technical and inventive competence helps 
attract a higher amount of initial funding, while PI’s tenure and academic competence decrease the 
amount of initial funding. A similar pattern is observed among firms with prior awards. This suggests 
that investors have positive perceptions of TMTs in which top scientists have proven functional skills, 
manifested by technical experience and patents, are not absorbed in excessive publication activity and 
can bring in fresh perspectives to the NPD process from other organisations. In contrast, for firms with 
no prior awards, resource legitimacy is the most important factor, with PI’s professorship being the 
strongest positive signal which magnifies initial funding commitment. The finding indicates that for 
existing award holders, narrow practical expertise in a relevant technical field is the most sought after 
attribute. New award holders, on the other hand, can signal their potential with the involvement of 
high-status academic scientists in the team, who contribute not only legitimate human capital but also 
social capital acquired through a network of institutional affiliations. At the same time, the explanatory 
power of legitimacy signals is weaker in relation to the funding discontinuation decision. For all 
samples, role legitimacy is a single strongest category. Specifically, executive’s functional role as a PI 
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minimises chances of funding discontinuation, suggesting that CEO’s participation in technical roles is 
positively perceived by investors.  
 Second, the likelihood of funding discontinuation is strongly affected by firms’ efficacy. In 
particular, new award holders’ ability to minimise project duration and existing award holders’ ability 
to commercialise technical knowledge by acquiring patents increases their chances for continued 
financial support from the government.  
 Third, more visible signals of TMT legitimacy and efficacy have a stronger overall effect on 
funding allocation outcomes, while subtler signals of capabilities have no effect as they are less visible, 
confirming the propositions of signalling theory and ABV that only observable information can trigger 
action of decision-makers. 
 Fourth, there is evidence that project appeal characteristics tend to affect the funding 
allocation decisions. The latter means that allocation of funds is hugely driven by the government’s 
research needs and priorities, rather than the firms’ perceived ability to carry out projects successfully 
based on their legitimacy characteristics.  
 Finally, previous portfolio-level funding outcomes affect current funding outcomes. 
Specifically, higher previous initial commitment and fit of funding allocation decisions are associated 
with a higher initial commitment for the new project. On the other hand, higher previous propensity 
to sequence projects in the portfolio increases chances of continued funding of new projects. These 
findings indicate that funders use their prior funding allocation decisions as cues to screen firms and 
allocate grants out of inertia. These findings suggest that investment decision-making is often 
informed by intuitively formulated heuristics which results in evaluation bias (Zacharakis and 
Shepherd 2001) and discrepancies between ‘in use’ and ‘espoused’ decision rules (Shepherd 1999).  
 In sum, the results of empirical inquiry confirm the primary expectations of signalling theory 
and attention-based view of the firm. Financial valuations often take account of firms’ both tangible 
and intangible assets (Busenitz et al. 2005). Although desirable, evaluation of different types of assets 
requires higher time and financial resources (Harvey and Lusch 1995). To be effective, a signal must 
be able to communicate differences among very competent and less competent new venture teams 
(Busenitz et al. 2005). However, when competencies are specific, complex and rare, assessing such 
differences becomes difficult (Gimmon and Levie 2010).  
 Signals are most credible when they indicate actions which are difficult to costlessly replicate 
by less competent agents (Morris 1987). As Tornikoski and Newbert (2007) pointed, markets rely less 
on passive resource endowments than on the proactive search for legitimacy, concluding that nascent 
firms can change external evaluators’ perceptions of organisational capabilities and credibility by 
engaging in operational behaviours. Recent research demonstrated that for finance providers to 
microenterprises, firms’ behavioural intentions are more meaningful signals than their static 
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attributes, and when lenders do not expect loan repayments, signals of legitimacy and trust become 
less important to the decision-making process (Moss et al. 2015).  
 Empirical evidence presented here confirms previous findings that static signals of conforming 
legitimacy are less powerful in influencing investors’ decision-making than flow signals of strategic 
legitimacy (Tornikoski and Newbert 2007; DeKinder and Kohli 2008). That is, from investors’ 
perspective, what economic agents do is more important than what backgrounds and capabilities they 
have. As a whole, financial decision-makers focus their attention on factors which they perceive to be 
more relevant to the evaluation process. Subsequently, more salient characteristics of projects and 
firms bear higher weights on funding allocation outcomes than observable characteristics, whereas 
less observable characteristics barely have any impact at all. 
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 Results & Discussion (III): Testing Hypotheses of the 
Complementarities of Real Options Reasoning and 
Signalling Models 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter presents the findings of simultaneous equations of Part III analysis. The estimates 
were produced under SUR (GLS) procedure in STATA using standardised data.  
Like in Part I analysis, the Breusch-Pagan test of independence of residuals was statistically significant 
at p<0.001 for all systems of equations, indicating that SUR is a comprehensive modelling procedure 
producing more robust estimations. 
 Under SUR GLS, R2 for individual equations took values between 0.24 and 0.68, while adjusted 
R2 ranged between 0.14 and 0.52. This shows that independent variables explain a significant 
proportion of variance in the dependent variables, although the model fit statistic exhibits significant 
heterogeneity between individual equations and between samples. 
 The forthcoming sections first report the results of full models and then interpret the findings 
in light of the hypotheses. Next, the validity of results is confirmed using the robustness checks and 
sensitivity analyses. To conclude the chapter, the main insights of Part III analysis are summarised.  
 
9.2 Hypotheses Testing 
 
 Table 9-1 reports estimated coefficients and t-values for the full sample SUR regression model 
of Part III analysis, Table 9-2 for the cluster with no prior awards and Table 9-3 for the cluster with 
prior awards. Next, the results are interpreted in relation to individual hypotheses. 
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Table 9-1: System of equations (SUR) results – full sample 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level funding             
Initial commitment -0.17 -2.99*** -0.22 -4.16*** -0.03 -0.48  0.03  0.60  0.02  0.38  0.03  0.66 
Discontinuation  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.05 -0.17 -1.56  0.07  0.70  0.03  0.35 -0.26 -2.60*** 
Fit -0.10 -0.89 -0.13 -1.25 -0.05 -0.47 -0.05 -0.53 -0.08 -0.93 -0.05 -0.56 
Portfolio-level funding             
Fit  0.22  1.92*  0.26 2.49**  0.08  0.78 -0.05 -0.48 -0.03 -0.27  0.07  0.70 
Role legitimacy              
Manager CEO -0.13 -0.82 -0.17 -1.04 -0.05 -0.38 -0.35 -2.42 -0.36 -2.50** -0.10 -0.78 
PI CEO  0.05  0.36  0.05  0.37 -0.15 -1.13  0.08  0.68  0.06  0.54 -0.11 -0.97 
PI’s firm tenure -0.35 -4.00*** -0.34 -4.24*** -0.08 -0.85 -0.19 -2.63** -0.19 -2.87***  0.02  0.23 
Manager’s technical experience  0.06  0.49  0.08  0.57  0.10  1.17 -0.03 -0.35 -0.05 -0.66  0.13  1.24 
PI’s technical experience  0.06  0.64  0.09  1.15  0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.47 -0.05 -0.72 -0.07 -0.96 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience -0.02 -0.16 -0.05 -0.38 -0.03 -0.30  0.03  0.33  0.02  0.25  0.04  0.45 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience  0.12  1.51  0.07  0.84  0.01  0.14 -0.12 -1.80* -0.09 -1.34 -0.11 -1.47 
Resource legitimacy              
Manager’s elite education -0.07 -0.97 -0.04 -0.55 -0.02 -0.39  0.12  1.57  0.11  1.42  0.11  1.81* 
PI’s elite education  0.05  0.74  0.07  1.10  0.05  0.84 -0.03 -0.34  0.02  0.40  0.00  0.06 
Manager’s MBA  0.42  1.91*  0.41  2.09*  0.16  0.68 -0.05 -0.31  0.03  0.21 -0.24 -1.25 
PI’s MBA -0.29 -1.21 -0.34 -1.40  0.04  0.14 -0.22 -1.08 -0.23 -1.14  0.19  0.88 
Manager’s PhD  0.02  0.12  0.10  0.47  0.11  0.59  0.05  0.36  0.09  0.58 -0.11 -0.72 
PI’s PhD -0.23 -0.65 -0.12 -0.50 -0.06 -0.22 -0.39 -0.97 -0.33 -1.03 -0.01 -0.05 
Manager’s professorship -0.11 -0.64 -0.13 -0.75  0.03  0.17 -0.10 -0.79 -0.01 -0.10  0.02  0.13 
PI’s professorship -0.09 -0.70 -0.04 -0.31 -0.41 -2.95***  0.13  1.02  0.13  0.92 -0.33 -2.72*** 
Intellectual legitimacy             
Manager’s patents -0.06 -0.77 -0.06 -0.85  0.02  0.24 -0.11 -1.75* -0.06 -0.90 -0.01 -0.09 
PI’s patents -0.06 -0.89 -0.05 -0.75  0.08  1.23 -0.03 -0.60  0.01  0.15  0.13  2.23** 
Manager’s publications  0.03  0.27 -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 -1.22  0.07  0.96  0.02  0.30 -0.04 -0.32 
PI’s publications  0.03  0.36  0.00  0.05  0.15  1.78*  0.07  1.08  0.09  1.30  0.17  2.12** 
Abstract readability  0.02  0.40 -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.20  0.02  0.41  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.06 
Efficacy             
Project duration  -0.14 -2.31** -0.18 -3.10*** -0.12 -2.16** -0.05 -0.97 -0.09 -1.78**  0.02  0.42 
Invention activity  0.12  1.58  0.08  1.15    0.18  2.36**  0.19  2.66**   
Capabilities             
R&D capability -0.01 -0.13  0.00 -0.02  0.03  0.44  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.21  0.12  1.85* 
Managerial capability  0.09  0.85  0.03  0.33  0.20  2.10** -0.03 -0.32 -0.01 -0.11  0.22  2.06* 
Intellectual capability -0.09 -1.33 -0.02 -0.38  0.08  1.18 -0.02 -0.34 -0.01 -0.23  0.08  1.30 
R&DCapXManCap  0.00 -0.06  0.00  0.03 -0.02 -0.40  0.05  1.03  0.02  0.35 -0.01 -0.22 
R&DCapXIntCap  0.01  0.06 -0.01 -0.14  0.06  0.74  0.01  0.18 -0.01 -0.18  0.03  0.45 
IntCapXManCap  0.00  0.03  0.07  0.85  0.01  0.09  0.09  1.26  0.08  1.17  0.14  1.73* 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.48  1.49  0.51  2.05*  0.03  0.16  0.24  0.88  0.33  1.28 -0.08 -0.46 
Non-minority-owned -0.40 -0.91 -0.52 -1.47  0.16  0.57 -0.39 -1.18 -0.41 -1.24  0.30  1.17 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.24 -0.75 -0.28 -0.99 -0.16 -0.67  0.00  0.01  0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.15 
Industry volatility -0.22 -2.85*** -0.16 -2.19** -0.05 -0.71 -0.07 -1.07  0.01  0.16 -0.04 -0.62 
State innovativeness -0.09 -1.56 -0.09 -1.79*  0.01  0.19 -0.02 -0.47 -0.02 -0.51  0.07  1.41 
Firm age  0.14  1.53  0.04   0.47 -0.20 -2.52**  0.52  6.79***  0.53  8.16*** -0.02 -0.36 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   
R2  0.27   0.31   0.24   0.49   0.50   0.38  
Adjusted R2  0.17   0.22   0.14   0.42   0.43   0.30  
   N= 367;   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 9-2: System of equations (SUR) results – cluster with no prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level funding             
Initial commitment -0.32 -2.42** -0.34 -3.77***  0.13  0.79 -0.10 -1.10 -0.14 -1.56  0.13  1.31 
Discontinuation -0.10 -0.41 -0.11 -0.75 -0.19 -0.76 -0.05 -0.29 -0.13 -1.00 -0.09 -0.59 
Fit -0.06 -0.37  0.03  0.22 -0.18 -0.74 -0.05 -0.47 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.83 
Role legitimacy              
Manager CEO -0.08 -0.37  0.01  0.09  0.22  0.76 -0.07 -0.55 -0.02 -0.12  0.09  0.45 
PI CEO -0.08 -0.39 -0.15 -0.97 -0.82 -2.42**  0.02  0.17 -0.17 -1.15 -0.44 -2.09** 
PI’s firm tenure -0.41 -1.70 -0.29 -1.80* -0.34 -1.22 -0.33 -2.33** -0.34 -2.30** -0.26 -1.55 
Manager’s technical experience -0.06 -0.32 -0.04 -0.36  0.29  1.55 -0.08 -0.63 -0.10 -0.90  0.12  0.98 
PI’s technical experience -0.15 -0.87 -0.01 -0.13 -0.08 -0.39 -0.11 -1.28 -0.06 -0.75 -0.04 -0.35 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience  0.35  1.79*  0.17  1.16  0.05  0.18  0.23  1.78*  0.17  1.12  0.05  0.31 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience  0.10  0.55  0.01  0.09  0.03  0.18  0.12  1.24  0.13  1.20  0.06  0.51 
Resource legitimacy              
Manager’s elite education  0.14  1.27  0.12  1.37  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.96  0.12  1.10 -0.05 -0.48 
PI’s elite education  0.06  0.56  0.11  1.48 -0.06 -0.42  0.04  0.50  0.10  1.14 -0.04 -0.47 
Manager’s MBA  0.52  1.90*  0.29  1.50  0.24  0.77  0.30  1.83*  0.20  0.98  0.12  0.62 
PI’s MBA  0.40  0.99  0.56  1.94*  0.26  0.39  0.02  0.10  0.30  1.05 -0.02 -0.05 
Manager’s PhD -0.36 -1.33 -0.30 -1.28  0.01  0.02 -0.20 -1.17 -0.34 -1.54 -0.01 -0.05 
PI’s PhD -0.06 -0.12  0.18  0.74 -0.13 -0.25 -0.02 -0.07  0.17  0.76 -0.12 -0.40 
Manager’s professorship  0.30  1.05  0.17  0.88  0.45  1.25  0.16  0.81  0.14  0.67  0.24  1.09 
PI’s professorship  0.20  0.73  0.24  1.15 -0.70 -1.89*  0.08  0.49  0.12  0.66 -0.45 -2.11** 
Intellectual legitimacy             
Manager’s patents  0.00 -0.01  0.02  0.13 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.26 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.22 
PI’s patents  0.16  0.95  0.13  1.32  0.48  2.91***  0.10  0.95  0.16  1.66  0.29  2.79*** 
Manager’s publications  0.29  1.14  0.23  1.19 -0.15 -0.69  0.22  1.50  0.27  1.52 -0.02 -0.17 
PI’s publications  0.11  0.69  0.04  0.33  0.16  0.74  0.06  0.76  0.04  0.53  0.06  0.48 
Abstract readability  0.10  0.98  0.03  0.48 -0.13 -1.04  0.09  1.40  0.09  1.31 -0.08 -1.06 
Efficacy             
Project duration  -0.18 -1.35 -0.17 -2.27** -0.46 -3.12*** -0.03 -0.30 -0.08 -1.12 -0.27 -2.93*** 
Invention activity -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05   -0.06 -0.54 -0.02 -0.21   
Capabilities             
R&D capability  0.12  0.80  0.09  0.91  0.34  1.91*  0.02  0.26  0.05  0.46  0.19  1.77* 
Managerial capability  0.86  2.90**  0.54  3.47***  0.34  0.79  0.58  3.20***  0.61  3.77***  0.14  0.57 
Intellectual capability -0.37 -1.97* -0.15 -1.20 -0.01 -0.06 -0.24 -2.15** -0.16 -1.37 -0.02 -0.16 
R&DCapXManCap -0.24 -1.77* -0.22 -2.46**  0.35  1.94* -0.15 -1.69 -0.24 -2.95***  0.26  2.41** 
R&DCapXIntCap -0.21 -1.81* -0.17 -2.23** -0.15 -1.13 -0.06 -0.95 -0.11 -1.57 -0.05 -0.66 
IntCapXManCap -0.38 -1.38 -0.04 -0.32 -0.66 -2.12** -0.26 -1.51 -0.06 -0.44 -0.37 -1.96* 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.41  0.95  0.67  2.45** -0.41 -0.75  0.09  0.27  0.52  2.03** -0.30 -0.92 
Non-minority-owned -0.38 -0.47 -0.46 -0.95  0.76  1.08 -0.10 -0.22 -0.23 -0.49  0.58  1.39 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.02  0.05 -0.10 -0.38 -0.37 -0.77  0.02  0.05 -0.13 -0.48 -0.12 -0.42 
Industry volatility -0.11 -0.62 -0.07 -0.50 -0.07 -0.35 -0.04 -0.34  0.00 -0.03  0.00  0.04 
State innovativeness -0.02 -0.20 -0.02 -0.30  0.14  1.31 -0.01 -0.13 -0.03 -0.42  0.10  1.45 
Firm age  0.47  2.50**  0.35  2.91** -0.03 -0.14  0.31  2.75**  0.35  2.95**  0.02  0.22 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.63   0.68   0.44   0.56   0.64   0.45  
Adjusted R2  0.44   0.52   0.16   0.34   0.46   0.17  
   N= 128;   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 9-3: System of equations (SUR) results – cluster with prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation Performance 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level funding             
Initial commitment -0.05 -0.96 -0.09 -1.84* -0.03 -0.70  0.08  1.20  0.08  1.28  0.00  0.02 
Discontinuation  0.12  1.10  0.08  0.74  0.01  0.11  0.16  1.29  0.09  0.72 -0.18 -1.48 
Fit -0.02 -0.21 -0.07 -0.76 -0.06 -0.70 -0.13 -1.16 -0.19 -1.87 -0.09 -0.75 
Portfolio-level funding             
Initial commitment -0.12 -2.00** -0.14 -2.21** -0.10 -1.78* -0.05 -0.67 -0.02 -0.27 -0.03 -0.46 
Sequencing -0.18 -3.73*** -0.25 -4.94*** -0.14 -3.29*** -0.02 -0.44 -0.03 -0.53 -0.01 -0.25 
Fit  0.15  1.55  0.13  1.28  0.12  1.39 -0.15 -1.28 -0.18 -1.46  0.13  1.06 
Role legitimacy              
Manager CEO -0.16 -1.03 -0.27 -1.69 -0.07 -0.59 -0.48 -2.55** -0.54 -2.97** -0.03 -0.20 
PI CEO  0.09  0.73  0.10  0.84  0.12  1.09  0.15  0.78  0.14  0.81  0.17  1.10 
PI’s firm tenure -0.21 -3.03*** -0.27 -3.43*** -0.04 -0.50 -0.14 -1.55 -0.14 -1.74*  0.09  0.93 
Manager’s technical experience -0.02 -0.26 -0.01 -0.12  0.03  0.44 -0.06 -0.60 -0.09 -0.99  0.23  1.53 
PI’s technical experience  0.05  0.74  0.05  0.68  0.01  0.07  0.02  0.19 -0.03 -0.32 -0.10 -0.95 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience -0.12 -0.94 -0.10 -0.76 -0.01 -0.16 -0.02 -0.17 -0.01 -0.08  0.02  0.23 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience  0.04  0.57  0.03  0.46  0.00  0.04 -0.29 -3.23*** -0.24 -2.78*** -0.19 -1.72 
Resource legitimacy              
Manager’s elite education  0.05  0.66  0.08  0.94  0.05  0.78  0.14  1.33  0.14  1.51  0.15  1.57 
PI’s elite education -0.06 -0.84 -0.04 -0.59  0.03  0.66 -0.10 -1.00 -0.05 -0.65  0.00  0.00 
Manager’s MBA  0.08  0.38  0.09  0.40 -0.12 -0.60 -0.32 -1.37 -0.20 -0.86 -0.57 -2.24** 
PI’s MBA -0.34 -1.49 -0.46 -2.00* -0.16 -0.75 -0.21 -0.78 -0.28 -1.08  0.06  0.18 
Manager’s PhD  0.03  0.16  0.17  0.88 -0.04 -0.24  0.02  0.11  0.13  0.68 -0.30 -1.23 
PI’s PhD -0.47 -1.30 -0.41 -1.51  0.10  0.43 -0.58 -1.00 -0.57 -1.16  0.17  0.41 
Manager’s professorship  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.19 -0.15 -1.13 -0.09 -0.52  0.07  0.40 -0.25 -1.50 
PI’s professorship -0.01 -0.06  0.02  0.10 -0.12 -1.04  0.19  1.10  0.16  0.95 -0.18 -1.16 
Intellectual legitimacy             
Manager’s patents  0.02  0.21  0.03  0.39  0.05  0.74 -0.08 -0.99 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.19 
PI’s patents -0.04 -0.69 -0.05 -0.71 -0.02 -0.29 -0.04 -0.63 -0.02 -0.34  0.07  0.93 
Manager’s publications -0.04 -0.51 -0.11 -1.40 -0.03 -0.33  0.04  0.47 -0.05 -0.57 -0.01 -0.07 
PI’s publications  0.03  0.51  0.04  0.56  0.15  2.39**  0.10  1.22  0.12  1.57  0.21  2.42** 
Abstract readability  0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.52  0.00  0.08 -0.02 -0.40 -0.06 -1.04  0.02  0.37 
Efficacy             
Project duration  -0.08 -1.46 -0.14 -2.55** -0.01 -0.18 -0.05 -0.84 -0.08 -1.38  0.09  1.49 
Invention activity  0.11  1.50  0.12  1.59    0.22  2.38**  0.25  2.97***   
Capabilities             
R&D capability  0.03  0.34  0.00  0.04  0.03  0.33  0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.48  0.19  1.98** 
Managerial capability -0.09 -0.99 -0.12 -1.38  0.09  0.92 -0.22 -1.99* -0.21 -2.04**  0.17  1.13 
Intellectual capability -0.02 -0.32  0.01  0.16  0.05  1.03  0.00  0.03  0.00 -0.08  0.08  1.12 
R&DCapXManCap  0.06  1.28  0.07  1.31 -0.02 -0.41  0.16  2.53**  0.14  2.21** -0.02 -0.31 
R&DCapXIntCap  0.03  0.38  0.02  0.22  0.11  1.44  0.05  0.50  0.05  0.48  0.06  0.54 
IntCapXManCap  0.07  1.09  0.09  1.38  0.15  2.19**  0.14  1.84*  0.10  1.36  0.24  2.24** 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.16  0.47  0.10  0.35  0.10  0.63  0.34  1.09  0.29  0.95  0.08  0.38 
Non-minority-owned -0.25 -0.89 -0.43 -1.46  0.23  0.99 -0.48 -1.34 -0.56 -1.55  0.50  1.57 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.06 -0.25 -0.12 -0.43  0.09  0.36  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.12 -0.03 -0.08 
Industry volatility -0.13 -1.25 -0.05 -0.63 -0.08 -1.34 -0.13 -0.98 -0.01 -0.13 -0.12 -1.41 
State innovativeness -0.03 -0.61 -0.03 -0.61 -0.02 -0.45 -0.05 -0.89 -0.03 -0.59  0.02  0.38 
Firm age  0.22  2.08  0.22  2.39** -0.17 -1.94  0.62  4.83***  0.59  5.50*** -0.09 -0.81 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   Incl.    Incl.  
R2  0.40   0.43   0.37   0.59   0.59   0.50  
Adjusted R2  0.25   0.30   0.23   0.50   0.49   0.39  
   N= 239;   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.
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Effect of Funding Allocation Outcomes on Long-term Performance in the Presence of Firm-level 
Factors 
 
 H3-1: Effects of ROR elements on investment yield and firm performance continue to remain 
significant in the presence of firm-level factors. 
 Table 9-4 compares the findings of Part I and Part III models. Overall, the effects of ROR 
elements on investment yield and firm performance continue to remain statistically significant in an 
extended model, thereby confirming Hypothesis 3-1. 
 The results further confirm the previous findings. First, the magnitude of initial commitment 
has a strong negative effect on investment yield and no effect on firm performance. Second, 
discontinuation has an overall strong negative effect on innovation performance, although the effect 
is no longer significant in the cluster with no prior awards. Third, fit of funding allocation decisions in 
line with the ROR logic has a positive effect on sales and employment yield at the portfolio-level. 
Fourth, high rate of funding sequencing has a strong negative effect on investment yield. Finally, for 
firms with prior awards, the addition of a new individual project to the portfolio has no effects on 
investment yield and firm performance, suggesting that new options are subadditive. Additionally, the 
results further confirm that ROR elements have a weak association with firm performance and 
innovation outcomes. 
 In sum, the results further confirm the robustness of the findings of Part I analysis and show 
overall support of the propositions of ROR. The magnitude and continuation of funding have a 
diminishing effect on return on investment, while consistent matching of funding decisions in line with 
prescriptions of the ROR logic across the entire portfolio of options has a positive impact on sales and 
employment yield.
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Table 9-4: Comparison of Part I and Part III ROR theory hypotheses testing results 
Hypothesis Hypothesised relationship Level Full Sample Firm Cluster: No prior awards Firm Cluster: With prior awards 
   Part I Part III Part I Part III Part I Part III 
   Result   β t-value Result Result   β t-value Result Result   β t-value Result 
H1-1a Initial commitment -> Sales Yield Project S -0.17 -2.99*** S S -0.32 -2.42** S NS -0.05 -0.96 NS 
H1-1b Initial commitment -> Employment Yield Project S -0.22 -4.16*** S S -0.34 -3.77** S NS -0.09 -1.84* PS 
H1-1c Initial commitment -> Innovation Yield Project NS -0.03 -0.48 NS NS  0.13  0.79 NS NS -0.03 -0.70 NS 
H1-1d Initial commitment -> Sales Performance Project NS  0.03  0.60 NS PS -0.10 -1.10 NS CF  0.08  1.20 NS 
H1-1e Initial commitment -> Employment Performance Project  NS  0.02  0.38 NS S -0.14 -1.56 NS CF  0.08  1.28 NS 
H1-1f Initial commitment -> Innovation Performance Project NS  0.03  0.66 NS NS  0.13  1.31 NS NS  0.00  0.02 NS 
H1-2a Discontinuation -> Sales Yield Project NS  0.00  0.01 NS PS -0.10 -0.41 NS NS  0.12  1.10 NS 
H1-2b Discontinuation -> Employment Yield Project NS  0.01  0.05 NS PS -0.11 -0.75 NS NS  0.08  0.74 NS 
H1-2c Discontinuation -> Innovation Yield Project NS -0.17 -1.56 NS PS -0.19 -0.76 NS NS  0.01  0.11 NS 
H1-2d Discontinuation -> Sales Performance Project  NS  0.07  0.70 NS NS -0.05 -0.29 NS NS  0.16  1.29 NS 
H1-2e Discontinuation -> Employment Performance Project NS  0.03  0.35 NS NS -0.13 -1.00 NS NS  0.09  0.72 NS 
H1-2f Discontinuation -> Innovation Performance Project PS -0.26 -2.60*** S PS -0.09 -0.59 NS NS -0.18 -1.48 NS 
H1-3a Fit -> Sales Yield Project NS -0.10 -0.89 NS NS -0.06 -0.37 NS NS -0.02 -0.21 NS 
H1-3b Fit-> Employment Yield Project NS -0.13 -1.25 NS NS  0.03  0.22 NS NS -0.07 -0.76 NS 
H1-3c Fit -> Innovation Yield Project NS -0.05 -0.47 NS NS -0.18 -0.74 NS NS -0.06 -0.70 NS 
H1-3d Fit -> Sales Performance Project NS -0.05 -0.53 NS NS -0.05 -0.47 NS NS -0.13 -1.16 NS 
H1-3e Fit -> Employment Performance Project NS -0.08 -0.93 NS NS -0.01 -0.07 NS CF -0.19 -1.87 NS 
H1-3f Fit -> Innovation Performance Project NS -0.05 -0.56 NS NS -0.12 -0.83 NS NS -0.09 -0.75 NS 
H1-4a Fit -> Sales Yield Portfolio S  0.22  1.92* PS NA - - NA PS  0.15  1.55 NS 
H1-4b Fit-> Employment Yield Portfolio S  0.26  2.49** S NA - - NA NS  0.13  1.28 NS 
H1-4c Fit -> Innovation Yield Portfolio NS  0.08  0.78 NS NA - - NA NS  0.12  1.39 NS 
H1-4d Fit -> Sales Performance Portfolio NS -0.05 -0.48 NS NA - - NA NS -0.15 -1.28 NS 
H1-4e Fit -> Employment Performance Portfolio NS -0.03 -0.27 NS NA - - NA NS -0.18 -1.46 NS 
H1-4f Fit -> Innovation Performance Portfolio NS  0.07  0.70 NS NA  - - NA  NS  0.13  1.06 NS 
H1-5a Sequencing -> Sales Yield Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA S -0.18 -3.37*** S 
H1-5b Sequencing -> Employment Yield Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA S -0.25 -4.94*** S 
H1-5c Sequencing -> Innovation Yield Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA S -0.14 -3.29*** S 
H1-5d Sequencing -> Sales Performance Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA NS -0.02 -0.44 NS 
H1-5e Sequencing -> Employment Performance Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA NS -0.03 -0.53 NS 
H1-5f Sequencing -> Innovation Performance Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA NS -0.01 -0.25 NS 
H1-6a Initial commitment -> Sales Yield Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA S -0.12 -2.00** S 
H1-6b Initial commitment -> Employment Yield Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA S -0.14 -2.21** S 
H1-6c Initial commitment -> Innovation Yield Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA S -0.10 -1.78* PS 
H1-6d Initial commitment -> Sales Performance Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA NS -0.05 -0.67 NS 
H1-6e Initial commitment -> Employment Performance Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA NS -0.02 -0.27 NS 
H1-6f Initial commitment -> Innovation Performance Portfolio NA - - NA NA - - NA NS -0.03 -0.46 NS 
   Notes: S – supported, NS – not supported, PS – partially supported, CF – contrary finding, NA – not applicable;  
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Relationship between Signals and Long-term Performance 
 
 H3-2: There is a discrepancy between perceived and actual effects of signals on investment 
yield and firm performance. 
 Table 9-5 shows whether the factors that were significant predictors of funding allocation 
outcomes have an effect on investment yield and firm performance. Overall, the results demonstrate 
that not all important antecedents of performance affect funding allocation outcomes. This suggests 
that discrepancies exist between perceived and actual effects of firms’ legitimacy attributes on 
performance, thereby supporting Hypothesis 3-2. 
 Role legitimacy signals are significantly associated with performance outcomes, but their 
impact is limited at the funding allocation stages. PI’s firm tenure is an accurate signal—it negatively 
affects the magnitude of initial commitment and is also negatively associated with sales and 
employment outcomes. Although PI’s role as a CEO signal decreases the likelihood of funding 
discontinuation, it negatively affects innovation yield and performance of firms with no prior awards 
(t = -2.42 and t = -2.09 at p<0.05, respectively). On the other hand, manager’s role as a CEO decreases 
sales and innovation performance of firms with prior awards (t = -2.55 and t = -2.97 at p<0.05, 
respectively), yet this factor has no impact on funding allocation. This finding is in line with the 
previous literature confirming that CEO’s involvement in functional roles can have differential effects 
under various circumstances. Science-focused CEOs and management-focused CEOs have different 
attitudes towards risks of undertaking new investments, with the former being risk-averse and the 
latter risk-friendly (Kish-Gephart and Campbell 2015). Perhaps, propensity for risk-taking behaviour 
can explain the negative effect of CEO’s involvement on performance. Whereas risk-taking is 
necessary for innovation, commercialisation and growth require more strategic planning. Therefore, 
CEO’s narrow functionalist perspectives result in underestimation of strategic opportunities, inhibiting 
innovation in new firms, while CEO’s broad functionalist perspectives result in overestimation of 
strategic opportunities, limiting commercial success and growth in existing firms. Other two indicators 
of role legitimacy have an impact on performance but are not attended to during Phase I and Phase II 
evaluation stages of firms’ potential. Manager’s entrepreneurial experience has a positive albeit weak 
effect on sales yield and performance of firms with no prior awards (t = 1.79 and t = 1.78 at p<0.1, 
respectively). PI’s entrepreneurial experience, on the other hand, has a strong negative effect on sales 
and employment performance of firms with prior awards (t = -3.23 and t = -2.78 at p<0.01, 
respectively). The potential explanation for the findings could be down to the role-experience 
alignment within the team. The manager with founding experience has a clear commercial task and 
relevant background to support the execution of commercialisation of projects in inexperienced firms. 
The PI with an entrepreneurial background, on the other hand, may struggle to balance out personal 
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entrepreneurial aspirations and responsibilities within the team, suggesting that narrow functionality 
coupled with an inclination towards risk-taking can distort the appreciation of commercial and growth 
opportunities in more experienced firms. The above findings indicate that the impact of role legitimacy 
on performance varies depending on the functional background of the TMT member within more and 
less experienced firms. 
 Resource legitimacy has a weak signalling power at the funding allocation stages, despite its 
significant role in explaining performance heterogeneity. PI’s professorship is a misleading signal—it is 
positively perceived at both funding allocation stages, yet it has a negative effect on innovation yield 
and performance (t = -2.55 and t = -2.97 at p<0.05, respectively). The seemingly counterintuitive 
finding can be attributed to the role-commitment trade-off that high academic status PIs have to 
make. Despite the expected full-time involvement of the PIs in the project stipulated by the SBIR 
programme, it appears that their active academic status may lower their commitment as a practising 
scientist, which significantly limits the inventive output of the firm. Previous studies also found that 
spinouts led by the academic inventors tend to underperform  (Zerbinati et al. 2012). This can be 
attributed to the fact that highly-ranked academic entrepreneurs are more likely to stay active in 
academia, retaining the position of a hybrid entrepreneur (Nicolaou and Souitaris 2016). Toole and 
Czarnitzki (2009) provide further support for this argument with their conclusion that academic human 
capital deeply oriented in leading science decreases the innovative performance of the firms.   
 Three indicators of resource legitimacy—namely, manager’s elite education, as well as 
manager’s and PI’s MBA degrees—influence performance outcomes, but are not used as signals by 
investors. Manager’s elite education has a positive though weak effect on innovation performance, 
which indicates that affiliation with high-status and high-quality academic institutions of commercial 
leaders helps them develop human and social capital necessary to guide innovation efforts in the 
direction of success. MBA degree is another ambiguous predictor of performance. Manager’s MBA 
degree has a positive and weak effect on sales and employment, but a negative and strong effect on 
innovation performance of firms with prior awards (t = -2.24 at p<0.05). This finding supports prior 
research which found that MBA graduates are on average more strategically and financially aggressive, 
but engage in less R&D (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). On the other hand, MBA-holding PIs have a weak 
positive influence on employment yield of firms with no prior awards but a weak negative influence 
on employment yield of firms with prior awards. Such dual effect can be explained by attitudes 
towards growth by PIs: commercially minded scientists of inexperienced firms might be more willing 
to grow the NPD team to explore opportunities, while commercially minded scientists of experienced 
firms tend to exploit NPD opportunities with in-house human resources.  
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 Three indicators of intellectual legitimacy have an effect on both funding allocation and 
performance outcomes. Manager’s patenting activity has an overall negative albeit weak effect on 
sales performance (t = -1.75 at p<0.1), and is also negatively perceived by investors, increasing the 
likelihood of funding discontinuation for firms with prior awards (t = 2.04 at p<0.05), which confirms 
its accuracy as a signal. This finding complements the argument that TMTs struggle to balance out the 
role-experience trade-off, as demonstrated by the finding that managers who demonstrate high 
inventive capacity, lose the focus from their direct commercialisation responsibilities. By the same 
token, PI’s patenting activity has a strong positive effect on innovation yield and performance, 
particularly of the firms with no prior awards (t = 2.91 and t = 2.79 at p<0.01, respectively). It has also 
proven to be an accurate signal during Phase I evaluation, with PI’s patenting activity being positively 
associated with the magnitude of initial commitment (t = 2.03 at p<0.05). The clear alignment of PI’s 
narrowly defined functional role within the team coupled with high inventive capacity translates into 
improved innovation patenting efforts. Finally, PI’s publication activity is an important indicator of 
intellectual legitimacy which has a strong positive impact on innovation yield and performance of firms 
with prior awards (t = 2.39 and t = 2.42 at p<0.05, respectively), yet diminishes the chances of such 
firms to attract higher amount of initial funding at Phase I, suggesting that the signal suffers from the 
misinterpretation bias. Investors associate PI’s high publication activity with excessive involvement in 
academic research. However, as the finding suggests, experienced firms benefit from basic academic 
research, which stimulates the influx of new knowledge and novel ideas from theoretical 
developments as well as access to the wider scientific community through co-authorships and 
conferences. In other words, PI’s patenting activity has a positive influence on innovation outcomes 
of less experienced firms, whereas PI’s publishing activity has a positive impact on innovation 
outcomes of more experienced firms. This suggests the criticality of balancing out exploration-
exploitation activities at different stages of the firm’s life cycle. The evidence presented here suggests 
that firms engaged in practical exploitation research enhance innovation performance at earlier 
stages, while generic exploration research is beneficial for innovation performance at later stages. 
 The results demonstrate that both indicators of efficacy are strongly associated with 
performance outcomes, making them the most accurate signals at Phase II evaluation stage. This 
indicates that investors correctly infer firm’s long-term performance from their intermediary 
performance, supporting the conclusion that what new ventures do is more valuable than what 
characteristics they possess. Project duration has a negative impact on investment yield, with the 
strongest effect on innovation yield and performance of firms with no prior awards (t = -3.12 and t = 
2.93 at p<0.01, respectively). On the other hand, invention activity has a strong positive impact on 
sales and employment performance of firms with prior awards (t = 2.38 at p<0.05 and t = 2.97 at 
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p<0.01, respectively). The findings imply that for less experienced firm the ability to keep the 
experimentation stage short enhances innovation efforts, while for more experienced firms the ability 
to patent emerging technical knowledge efficiently increases commercial success and growth.  
 Finally, the results mostly confirm the expectation that capabilities have a significant impact 
on performance, yet are given little attention at the funding allocation stages due to their low 
observability. The findings indicate that managerial capability is negatively associated with funding 
allocation, predominantly at Phase II, which may mean either that the investors intuitively infer 
managerial capability by observing other indicators of performance, or that strategically-minded 
managers opt from succeeding through funding stages and seek funding elsewhere. However, in 
reality, managerial capability has differential effects on long-term outcomes. Overall, firms benefit 
from the positive influence of managerial capability on innovation yield and performance (t = 2.10 at 
p<0.05 and t = 2.06 at p<0.1, respectively). It also has a strong and positive effect on sales and 
employment yield and performance of firms with no prior awards. At the same time, managerial 
capability has a negative effect on sales and employment performance of firms with prior awards (t = 
-1.99 at p<0.1 and t = 2.04 at p<0.05, respectively). R&D and intellectual capabilities also play an 
important role in explaining performance outcomes, although their signalling effect is insignificant at 
the funding allocation stages. Effects of capabilities on performance are discussed in more detail in 
the subsequent section.  
 In addition to the focal relationships, the results show discrepancies between the perceived 
and actual effects of controlling factors. Industry volatility has a strong negative impact on sales and 
employment yield, but does not affect funding allocation outcomes. This finding sheds more light on 
the execution of ROR logic by government venture funders. As was noted previously, ROR decision-
making explicitly accounts for environmental uncertainty when assessing the value of investment 
options (McGrath 1997), which is not evident in the case of government venture funders. Despite the 
associated gains from keeping initial commitments low or holding options under high market 
uncertainty, and exercising options under low market uncertainty (Bowman and Hurry 1993; McGrath 
1997), there is no apparent assessment of industry volatility by investors when making initial and 
subsequent funding decisions. This suggests that investors’ understanding of benefits associated with 
ROR when making investment decisions is limited, which minimises potential gains from the funding 
programme. On the other hand, the propensity to discontinue funding firms which are headquartered 
in more innovative states has no real impact on firms’ ability to enhance performance. Perhaps, firms 
continue to suffer from the liability of smallness when approaching finance providers elsewhere in the 
state. Last but not least, firm age is positively perceived by investors and increases the magnitude of 
initial funding allocation, but the results demonstrate that in reality firm age has differential effects 
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on various types of performance. Firm age enhances sales and employment yield and performance 
but reduces innovation yield (t = -2.52 at p<0.05). This finding implies that older firms are better 
equipped to commercialise technologies and grow, while younger firms are more creative at 
generating innovative ideas which can later be patented. 
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Table 9-5: Comparison of Part II and Part III signalling theory hypotheses testing results 
 Part II Part III 
 Initial Commitment Discontinuation Sales Yield Employment Yield Innovation Yield Sales Performance Employment Performance Innovation Performance 
Independent 
variables: 
Full NA WA Full NA WA  Full NA WA Full NA WA Full NA WA Full NA WA Full NA WA Full NA WA 
Role legitimacy                         
Manager CEO                  -/** -/**  -/**    
PI CEO    -/** -/* -/**        -/**         -/**  
PI’s firm tenure -/*** -/*     -/***  -/*** -/*** -/* -/***    -/** -/***  -/** -/** -/*    
Manager’s  
entrepreneurial  
experience         +/*          +/*        
PI’s 
entrepreneurial 
experience                  -/***   -/***    
Resource 
legitimacy                         
Manager’s elite 
education                       +/*   
Manager’s MBA       +/*  +/*   +/*        +/*       -/** 
PI’s MBA            +/* -/*             
PI’s 
professorship   +/**    -/*       -/*** -/*        -/*** -/**  
Intellectual 
legitimacy                         
Manager’s 
patents       +/**          -/*         
PI’s patents  +/**   +/*            +/***         +/**  +/***  
PI’s publications -/*  -/**           +/*   +/**        +/**   +/** 
Efficacy                         
Project duration      +/**  +/*  -/**   -/** -/** -/** -/** -/***     -/*    -/***  
Invention 
activity    -/***  -/**           +/**   +/**  +/**  +/***    
Capabilities                         
R&D capability               +/*         +/*  +/*  +/** 
Managerial 
capability  -/*   +/***   +/*   +/**    +/***   +/**     +/*** -/*   +/*** -/**  +/*   
Intellectual 
capability        -/*         -/**        
Control 
variables:                         
Industry 
volatility       -/***   -/**               
State 
innovativeness    +/*   +/**                   
Firm age +/***  +/*       +/** +/*   +/**  +/** -/**  -/*  +/***  +/**  +/***  +/**  +/**  +/***    
   Notes: Results in the table refer to t-values from corresponding full models. 
  To preserve space, the table only depicts relationships with significant effects: + sign denotes a positive effect, - sign denotes a negative effect, blank cells depict no effect. 
  Full – full sample, NA – cluster with no prior awards; WA – cluster with prior awards.  
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Relationship between Interactions of Capabilities and Long-term Performance  
 
 H3-3: Interactions of capabilities have both complementarity and substitutions effects on 
investment yield and long-term firm performance. 
 Although less observable signals of capabilities were not perceived as important signals, they 
play a significant role in explaining firm performance outcomes.  
 The results of Part III analysis show that capabilities and their interactions have differential 
effects on various types of performance and depending on firms’ experience in implementing real 
options investments. Table 9-6 depicts five prominent patterns of effects of capabilities on investment 
yield and firm performance of firms with and without prior awards. Recall from the previous chapters 
that managerial capability refers to manager’s efficiency of recognising opportunities and 
implementing strategic change; intellectual capability refers to PI’s academic efficiency which presents 
a fundamental component of firms’ explorative research; R&D capability refers to firm’s inventive 
efficiency and is a reflection of firm’s efforts to exploit basic research and apply it to commercial needs. 
Each pattern of capability configurations is discussed in detail below. 
 In pattern one, sales and employment outcomes of firms with no prior awards are positively 
affected by managerial capability but negatively affected by the interaction of R&D and managerial 
capability. In other words, the direct positive effect of managerial capability is substituted by R&D 
capability when interacted, meaning that firms’ high inventive efficiency distorts managers’ ability to 
recognise new opportunities and implement strategic change. At the same time, for firms with no 
prior awards, intellectual capability has a negative effect on sales yield and performance (t = -1.97 at 
p<0.1 and t = -2.15 at p<0.05, respectively), while the interaction of R&D and intellectual capability 
has a negative effect on sales and employment yield (t = -1.81 at p<0.1 and t = -2.23 at p<0.05, 
respectively). Since the proliferation of PI’s academic human capital is believed to enhance firms’ 
orientation towards the exploration of new knowledge, it may result in excessive experimentation and 
pursuit of risky ideas, limiting focus on refinement of existing ones (March 1991). The finding thereby 
indicates that for the first-time award winning firms, the propensity to engage in novel knowledge-
generating research distracts from activities aimed at translating inventions into products which can 
generate sales. Similarly, the interaction of intellectual and R&D capability can be expressed as the 
combination of explorative and exploitative research efficiency within the team, or research 
ambidexterity. As March (1991 p.71) noted in his seminal paper, exploitation encapsulates refinement 
and execution of existing knowledge, while exploration entails experimentation with newly discovered 
knowledge. However, simultaneously they also compete for scarce resources, leading to tensions and 
trade-offs which can have detrimental costs and impose limitations on organisational performance 
(March 1991). The ambidextrous strategy is particularly difficult to manage for small firms (Ebben and 
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Johnson 2005). Consistent with the propositions of the extant literature (March 1991; Nerkar 2003), 
the results demonstrate that knowledge ambidexterity has a negative effect on performance. 
 In pattern two, sales and employment performance of firms with prior awards is negatively 
affected by managerial capability (t = -1.99 at p<0.1 and t = -2.04 at p<0.05, respectively), but is 
positively affected by the interaction of R&D and managerial capability (t = 2.53 at p<0.05 and t = 2.21 
at p<0.05, respectively). Additionally, sales performance of firms with no prior awards is positively 
associated with the interaction of intellectual and managerial capability (t = 1.84 at p<0.1). That is, 
managerial capability can only enhance commercialisation efforts of experienced firms when 
complemented with firm’s inventive capacity or PI’s basic theoretical knowledge. This finding broadly 
supports evidence presented by Voss and Voss (2013) that the interaction of product exploitation and 
market exploration, as well as product exploration and market exploration,  have a positive effect on 
the performance of SMEs. That is, managerial systems play a profound role is interpreting and 
integrating individual and technical knowledge dimensions into a cohesive whole (Day 1994). 
 In pattern three, innovation yield and performance of firms with no prior awards is positively 
affected by R&D capability (t = 1.91 at p<0.1 and t = 1.77 at p<0.1, respectively), and its interaction 
with managerial capability (t = 1.94 at p<0.1 and t = 2.41 at p<0.05, respectively). The interaction of 
intellectual and managerial capabilities, on the other hand, has a negative effect (t= -2.12 at p<0.05 
and t = -1.96 at p<0.1, respectively). The positive impact of R&D capability on innovation outcomes is 
not surprising and supports prior empirical evidence (Dutta et al. 1999). A more poignant implication 
shown by the results is that for less experienced firms managerial capability is complemented by R&D 
capability, but substituted by intellectual capability. In other words, to enhance innovative knowledge 
commercialisation, exploitative research has to be supported by managers’ strategic efficiency, 
thereby allowing new firms to concentrate on extracting maximum potential from existing knowledge 
assets instead of exploring any new ones.  
 In pattern four, innovation yield and performance of firms with prior awards are positively 
affected by the interaction of intellectual and managerial capabilities (t = 2.19 and t = 2.24 at p<0.05, 
respectively), while R&D capability has a positive impact on innovation yield (t = 1.98 at p<0.05). Here, 
in addition to the direct positive effect of R&D efficiency and in sharp contrast to Pattern 3, the 
combination of PI’s academic excellence in generating valuable research ideas and manager’s ability 
to notice strategic opportunities combine in a mutually-enhancing configuration that has a strong 
positive impact on innovation outcomes. The effect of the latter interaction is consistent with Pattern 
2. 
 Fifth, sales and employment yield of firms with prior awards have no association with any of 
capabilities or their interactions. This finding implies that capabilities of existing award holders add no 
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value to the investment programme. This is counter to the intention of ROR, which postulates that 
through a chain of explore-exploit options a firm can learn from prior investments and build a stock 
of unique resources and capabilities, which can lead to superior performance. The result further 
emphasises that maximum rents can be appropriated from real options when making small positioning 
investments that enable firms to explore potential opportunities and develop necessary skills and 
capabilities for their successful realisation. As the results demonstrate, while established firms 
continue to benefit from capabilities developed as a result of option-like investments (Pattern 2 and 
4), there are no associated returns from funding the same firms to investors.
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Table 9-6: Summary of effects of capabilities on performance outcomes 
  Pattern 1   Pattern 2  Pattern 3 Pattern 4 Pattern 5 
Capability Sales  
Yield 
NA 
Employment 
Yield 
NA 
Sales 
Performance 
NA 
Employment 
Performance 
NA 
Sales 
Performance 
WA 
Employment 
Performance 
WA 
Innovation 
Yield 
NA 
Innovation 
Performance 
NA 
Innovation 
Yield 
WA 
Innovation 
Performance 
WA 
Sales  
Yield 
WA 
Employment 
Yield 
WA 
R&D        1.91*  1.77*   1.98**   
Managerial  2.90**  3.47***  3.20***  3.77*** -1.99* -2.04**       
Intellectual -1.97*  -2.15**          
R&DXMan -1.77* -2.46** -2.95* -2.41***  2.53**  2.21**  1.94*  2.41**     
R&DXIntel -1.81* -2.23**           
IntelXMan      1.84*  -2.12** -1.96*  2.19**  2.24**   
Notes: Results in the table refer to t-values from corresponding full models, blank cells depict no effect. 
  NA – cluster with no prior awards; WA – cluster with prior awards. 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1  
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9.3 Robustness Checks 
 
 Consistent with Part I and Part II, robustness checks were also conducted in Part III to 
determine whether possible heteroscedasticity of data might generate biassed p-values. Appendix 33 
reports estimated coefficients and t-values for the full sample SUEST regression model of Part III 
analysis, Appendix 34 for the cluster with no prior awards and Appendix 35 for the cluster with prior 
awards.  
 Robust standard errors produced under SUEST for each regression model have only slightly 
affected estimates of t-values and corresponding p-values of the full and split sample models. All 
independent variables established as important explanatory factors of performance outcomes under 
SUR estimation procedure remained significant. In fact, many effects have lower p-value under SUEST, 
which further confirms that SUR is a robust technique that produces conservative standard errors. As 
a result, it can be concluded that the interpretation of results for hypothesis testing is consistent under 
both modelling techniques. 
 
9.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 As in Part I, sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine whether the estimates suffer potential 
overstatement bias of sales yield and employment yield dependent variables. Appendix 36 shows how 
estimates change when sales and employment yield is reduced from 100% growth to 10% growth for 
full and split sample regression models. Additionally, Appendix 37 presents t-values based on robust 
standard errors for equations with 10% growth sales and employment yield as dependent variables. 
 Overall, none of the hypothesised relationships significantly changed their effects. The 
differences in estimates produced by the base model and the adjusted model are minute, which 
signifies that the findings are not sensitive to potential variations in the dependent variables, so 
hypotheses testing holds true. 
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9.5 Summary 
 
 The contribution of Part III analysis is threefold. First, the results confirm that prescriptions of 
ROR logic hold in the presence of other firm-level factors, suggesting that real options theory applies 
to practical organisational settings.   
 Second, there is an element of mismatch between the expected and actual impact of signalling 
characteristics on performance. The results indicate that effects of characteristics are not universal 
across firms with different levels of experience in implementing real options. Role-experience and 
role-commitment alignments within the team have important implications for performance. As Toole 
and Czarnitzki (2009 p.113) argued, the contribution of academic entrepreneurs is conditional upon 
the “match” between their specialised human capital and specific task within the firm. The authors 
stated that the scientifically-oriented human capital enhances research performance of firms, whilst 
commercially-oriented human capital enhances their inventive performance. 
 Finally, the findings emphasise that depending on whether or not the firms have received 
funding before, they will require distinct combinations of capabilities to achieve different types of 
performance. The orientation of human capital toward scientific or commercial opportunities can 
influence firms’ growth strategies (Toole and Czarnitzki 2009 p.113). Less experienced firms 
necessitate a relatively straightforward skillset: managerial capability is critical to stimulate sales and 
employment creation and also to enhance the direct positive effect of R&D capability on innovation 
outcomes. At the same time, less experienced firms should refrain from engaging in explorative and 
ambidextrous research following their opening of an option. More experienced firms, on the other 
hand, are faced with a more complex task: they need a combination of R&D and managerial capability 
to enhance sales and employment creation, and the combination of intellectual and managerial 
capability to enhance innovation performance. On its own, though, managerial capability reduces 
commercial outputs. That is, generation of innovation is made possible by PI’s search for novel ideas 
and manager’s ability to recognise their strategic potential, which should not, however, distract 
managers from the concurrent exploitation of firms’ existing inventions for commercial potential. By 
balancing a chain of simultaneous research activities, strategically adept managers of experienced 
ventures can create the virtuous cycle of value maximisation.  
 Overall, the results demonstrate that firms’ age and experience in managing real options 
matter a great deal. Thus, the goal of the government programme to meet all three objectives 
simultaneously might be unrealistic given the unique sets of resources and capabilities that each 
performance outcome necessitates. Unless the funds are allocated strategically, for instance, with 
grants to younger firms being specifically directed to innovation and grants to older firms being 
specifically directed to commercialisation, the value offered by the programme gets eroded. 
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 Conclusions, Implications, Limitations and Future 
Research Directions 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
 The role of VC in fostering entrepreneurship has been recognised at the academic and policy 
levels, and research found evidence of its positive impact on innovation, employment creation and 
economic growth (Samila and Sorenson 2011; Dutta and Folta 2016). The study makes an addition to 
this body of work by narrowing down the VC context to a specific type of investor, namely government. 
Governmental programmes are designed to financially support strategically important projects, such 
as R&D. Governmental subsidies for innovation and entrepreneurship activities have been extensively 
scrutinised in the literature and yet little consensus exists regarding the efficiency of such initiatives 
(Brander et al. 2014; Grilli and Murtinu 2014; Bertoni and Tykvova 2015). Empirical evidence from the 
U.S. and Europe indicated that more research is needed on assessing the design of public venture 
capital programmes in order to understand whether such initiatives could benefit from more 
structural changes and improved selection processes (Lerner 1999; Munari and Toschi 2015; 
Alperovych et al. 2015). 
 To address these issues, the primary research objective was to move away from the prevailing 
question in the extant literature on whether the provision of public venture capital helps SMEs 
innovate and grow, and instead to explore how and when investors and participants benefit most from 
the implementation of public financing programmes. This study has sought to assess the private and 
social impacts of the public programme by integrating investor’s and investee’s perspectives of target 
outcomes, which relate to sales, employment and innovation performance.  
 Defined by a discretely staged and sequential financing structure (Sahlman 1990; Gompers 
1995; Trigeorgis 1996) and by conditions of high uncertainty (Amit et al. 1998), venture capital 
presents a distinctive setting for testing propositions postulated by real options theory and allows 
gaining insights into the behavioural aspects of the decision-making process of resource allocations. 
On the one hand, the study utilised real options reasoning to understand the strategies of financial 
resource allocations; on the other hand, it attended to signalling theory and attention-based view to 
explore the process of resource allocation decision-making. 
 The study provides evidence from a novel multi-source data set on the antecedents and 
consequences of resource allocation outcomes of government venture funding. In broader terms, the 
study adds to the literature on real options theory and financing of innovation and SMEs, and more 
specifically, to the area of resource allocations and strategic management of innovation investment 
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portfolios. Finally, by testing hypotheses in the context of the public capital market, the study adds to 
the literature on government venture funding and public subsidies.  
 This final chapter presents the SWOT aspects of the entire study: strengths are presented as 
a set of summary insights and concluding implications for theory and practice; weaknesses and threats 
are related to the issues of external and internal validity of the findings; finally, a number of 
opportunities are expressed as directions for future research. 
 
10.2 Conclusions 
 
Summary of the Main Insights 
 
Contribution to the Understanding of Resource Allocation Strategies under Real Options Reasoning 
 
 The results presented in this study extend the empirical inquiry into the relationship between 
the strategic resource allocation decisions under ROR and performance, and confirm their direct 
positive impact. These results hold in the presence of firm-specific factors, indicating that ROR theory 
is applicable to practical organisational settings. As such, the study contributes to the rather small 
body of work on resource allocation strategies which has only started to emerge recently (Klingebiel 
and Rammer 2014; Klingebiel and Adner 2015). 
 First, the study found that the magnitude of initial commitment and high rate of sequencing 
have a diminishing effect on investment yield. Second, consistent matching of funding decisions across 
the entire portfolio of options promises positive returns from the investment process. In particular, 
the results demonstrate that the continuation decision should be informed by the magnitude of initial 
commitment. Finally, new options are subadditive to the existing portfolio and do not enhance 
investment yield, suggesting that, contrary to expectations, the firms that receive a higher number of 
subsidies do not capture more benefits from the support of their research. Generally, ROR elements 
have a strong significant effect on funders’ target outcomes but not on project owners’ or project 
managers’ target outcomes, corroborating the role of ROR as an investment tool to support optimal 
decision-making.  
 For the most part, the magnitude and the increased number of awards seem to have a 
cannibalisation effect on firms’ performance which can be a result of one or a combination of the 
following possible explanations. First, as nascent high-tech firms typically comprise a small research 
team led by a principal scientist and a manager, multiple projects in the portfolio might compete for 
scarce human capital resources and divert the attention of TMT from commercialising research 
towards developing research projects (Lerner 1999). On the other hand, ‘scaling up’ the project team 
at the early stages by hiring more personnel may not be a feasible objective as the project still has 
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uncertain prospects for success (Lerner 1999). At the same time, entrepreneurs may exhibit 
opportunistic behaviour and seek larger or more grants to increase salaries of knowledge workers, 
which is unlikely to be reflected in innovation efforts. Finally, the number of awards is not expected 
to enhance the certification effect (Lerner 1999). Therefore, small initial commitments and limited 
follow-on funding would be most beneficial in stimulating innovation activities (Goolsbee 1998). 
 By adopting a multi-level multi-stakeholder approach, the analysis revealed differential effects 
of ROR resource allocation elements on (i) various types of performance, i.e. sales, employment versus 
innovation; (ii) investors versus investees, (iii) first-time award holders versus multiple-award holders. 
These insights delineate the boundary conditions in the context of government venture funding. 
 
Contribution to the Understanding of Investment Decision-Making Practice 
 
 The use of signalling theory pointed out the characteristics of candidates that make investors 
deviate from the optimally small initial commitments and affect the likelihood of the option to 
discontinue funding.  
 Specifically, the study found that R&D options of multiple award holders attract higher initial 
commitments when their top scientists have proven technical expertise, expressed as technical 
experience and patenting record. On the other hand, for first-time award holders top scientists with 
a high academic status (PI’s professorship) and fewer years in the firm increases the initial funding 
commitment. Taken together, for firms with prior awards, investors prioritise intellectual and role 
legitimacy of the TMT, whereas for firms with no prior awards, resource legitimacy of the TMT is key. 
 The results shed light on later-stage funding allocation outcomes by showing that the 
discontinuation of the option is less likely when the CEO participates in technical roles. The likelihood 
of discontinuation is also lower when first-time award holders can achieve shorter experimentation 
time, whereas multiple award holders can increase inventive output. 
 In addition to signalling theory, the attention-based view provided insights into the types of 
distortions and deviations inherent in the investment decision-making process. Kogut and Kulatilaka 
(1994a) noted that organisational heuristics tend to be driven by short-termism, causing strategic 
myopia. The study finds support for this notion by showing that project appeal characteristics of 
multiple-award holders such as narrow project scope and cancer biology research override legitimacy 
characteristics in terms of weight, suggesting that allocation decisions are informed by the 
government’s research needs and priorities more than the firms’ potential to carry out research. Prior 
funding decisions have a strong attention-distorting effect on current funding allocation outcomes 
revealing the presence of decision-making inertia. These findings add to the literature on information 
processing and suggest that investment decision-making is often informed by intuitive heuristics, 
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which result in evaluation bias and disagreement between the pre-selected and actual selection 
criteria (Howell and Jaegle 1997). 
 Overall, the results depict that less observable signals have no effect on funding allocation 
decisions, conforming with the primary tenets of signalling theory and the ABV that only readily 
observable signals can get noticed and reacted upon. The findings show that more relevant categories 
of characteristics receive higher weights in the decision-making process, followed by salient and only 
then by observable categories. 
 
Contribution to the Understanding of Investment Decision-Making Accuracy 
 
 The results indicate that there is a discrepancy between the expected and actual impact of 
characteristics used as signals on long-term performance, suggesting that decision-making is prone to 
inefficiency. 
 The findings indicate that the use of standardised evaluation criteria prevents decision-makers 
from distilling high-profile candidates from a pool of applicants. In particular, the results demonstrate 
that firms require different combinations of skills and capabilities depending on their experience in 
managing options and the type of target outcome. Based on the results of Part III analysis, Table 10-1 
presents ‘ideal’ configurations of characteristics associated with high-profile candidates. Generally 
speaking, to achieve performance improvements, firms with no prior awards need to focus on 
developing the commercial orientation, whereas firms with prior awards should prioritise scientific 
orientation.
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Table 10-1: Characteristics of an ‘ideal’ high-profile candidate 
Target 
outcome 
Firms with no prior awards Firms with prior awards 
Characteristics Emphasis on Orientation Characteristics Emphasis on Orientation 
Sales yield High manager’s entrepreneurial experience 
Manager’s MBA 
Managerial capability 
High firm’s age 
Manager’s role-
resource 
commercial 
alignment 
Commercial Low PI’s firm tenure 
High firm’s age 
PI’s technical 
skills 
Scientific 
Employment 
yield 
Low PI’s firm tenure 
PI’s MBA  
Low project duration 
Managerial capability 
High firm’s age 
TMT’s 
commercial skills 
Commercial Low PI’s firm tenure 
PI’s non-MBA 
Low project duration 
High firm’s age 
PI’s technical 
skills 
Scientific 
Innovation 
yield 
Manager CEO 
PI non-professor 
PI’s patents 
Low project duration 
R&D capability 
R&D X Managerial capability 
PI’s exploitative 
research and 
manager’s 
commercial skills 
Commercial & 
scientific 
exploitative 
PI’s publications 
Intellectual X Managerial capability 
PI’s explorative 
research skills 
Scientific 
explorative 
Sales 
performance 
High manager’s entrepreneurial experience 
Low PI’s firm tenure 
Manager’s MBA 
Managerial capability 
High firm’s age 
Manager’s role-
resource 
commercial 
alignment 
Commercial PI CEO 
Low PI’s entrepreneurial experience 
High inventive activity 
High firm’s age 
R&D X Managerial capability 
PI’s role-
experience 
functional 
alignment 
Scientific 
exploitative 
Employment 
performance  
Low PI’s firm tenure 
Managerial capability 
High firm’s age 
Manager’s 
commercial skills 
Commercial PI CEO 
Low PI’s firm tenure 
Low PI’s entrepreneurial experience 
High inventive activity 
High firm’s age 
R&D X Managerial capability 
PI’s role-
experience 
functional 
alignment 
Scientific 
exploitative 
Innovation 
performance 
Manager CEO 
PI non-professor 
PI’s patents 
Low project duration 
R&D capability 
R&D X Managerial capability 
TMT’s technical 
and commercial 
skills 
Commercial & 
scientific 
exploitative 
Manager non-MBA 
PI’s publications 
R&D capability 
Intellectual X Managerial capability 
PI’s explorative 
research skills 
Scientific 
ambidextrous 
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10.3 Implications 
 
Theoretical Implications  
 
 One of the primary implications derived from the current analysis is that ROR theory has 
important empirical validity, and its understanding can be enhanced by integrating aspects from 
behavioural theories.  
 The findings presented here parallel the prior results that there exists a weak and approximate 
correspondence between decision-makers’ intuition and real options theory. The discrepancy 
between the actual and prescribed investment behaviour has been uncovered in the extant studies 
(e.g. Busby and Pitts 1997; Triantis 2005; Howell and Jaegle 1997) and described as an “intriguing 
paradox” (Miller and Shapira 2004 p.281). At the heart of this paradox is the compelling evidence that 
investment decisions reflect some primary elements of real options logic, yet such decisions are made 
intuitively rather than rationally. 
 Even in the presence of apparent biases and inefficiencies, decision-makers can roughly 
conform to the normative tenets of real options theory leading to “directionally correct” investment 
patterns (Miller and Shapira 2004 p.281) when employing qualitative assessments to assist in the 
decision-making process (Miller and Waller 2003).  
 The results point out that the extent to which decision-makers follow the real options 
reasoning investment logic to allocate financial resources to projects has significant repercussions for 
the process of value creation. The options approach helps investors contain risk by strategically 
managing financial resource allocations, leading to superior long-term returns on investments, but it 
does not necessarily enhance firms’ performance. This suggests the role of ROR as a decision-making 
tool, rather than a core ingredient for sustained competitive advantage. 
 The applicability of real options theory in practice may be limited by agency problems, when, 
for instance, personal goals of decision-makers conflict with the organisational goals of value 
maximisation, or when optimal rules and prescriptions are ignored (Trigeorgis 2005). The study 
documents that there exists a systematic tendency towards overinvestment, both at the initial option 
opening stage and subsequent exercising stage. Poor investment choices, however, trigger a chain of 
detrimental effects. Systematic overinvestment puts constraints on the overall budget, resulting in the 
reduced quota of awards which may untimely rule out potentially lucrative ventures. Generally 
speaking, the tendency for overinvestment increases the opportunity cost of competing investments 
as more potentially promising entrepreneurial opportunities are foregone in favour of a smaller 
number of more expensive options. 
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 The promise offered by real options reasoning heuristics can only be fulfilled if organisations 
have explicit structures and processes in place that assist with real options decision making, and avoid 
tendencies to overinvest by striking too many options or to underinvest by failing to strike promising 
options (Coff and Laverty 2007). Rational matching of options offers a way to limit the propensity for 
overinvestment. One of the advantages of matching decisions is expressed in its mechanism to confine 
the tendency towards escalated commitment. Subsequently, consistent matching of funding decisions 
can be utilised as a simple rule of thumb to enhance the process of value creation, and even substitute 
explicit risk assessment techniques to quantify the value of options and embedded uncertainty. 
 
Managerial Implications 
 
 The results can be used to inform innovative SMEs operating in high-tech sectors, including 
pharmaceuticals and biotech, applying for government funding. The findings outline which inherent 
qualities and characteristics entrepreneurs need to emphasise in the application process to increase 
their chances of receiving R&D grants.  
 The assessment of unique resources and capabilities in order to differentiate between high-
quality and low-quality candidates is complex. It seems that investors base their initial decision on the 
static indicators of TMT’s legitimacy, but attend to flow signals to derive new ventures’ operational 
performance. Broadly speaking, to reveal TMT’s integral abilities, first-time award holders need to 
strategically signal resource legitimacy, whilst multiple-award holders need to clearly signal 
intellectual and role legitimacy. The results demonstrate that while static signals of TMT background 
help resolve a portion of uncertainty at early funding stages, to prove the suitability for later-stage 
funding, nascent ventures need to demonstrate their operational legitimacy. This agrees with the 
notion that what entrepreneurs do is more important than who they are (Tornikoski and Newbert 
2007). These findings provide a clear indication to entrepreneurs that while their background and 
experience characteristics (e.g. PI’s low tenure and PI’s patents) are necessary indicators of confirming 
legitimacy that allows gaining traction in the market for early-stage funding, static characteristics of 
the TMT alone are insufficient for receiving continuous financial support. The strong relationship 
between efficacy signals and the likelihood of receiving late-stage awards indicates that acceptance 
of nascent entrepreneurs by external investors is a function of their intermittent performance more 
than their cumulative human capital. The results suggest that entrepreneurs need to concentrate on 
proactively engaging in specific behaviours, namely shorter experimentation and higher inventive 
activity in an effort to gain operational legitimacy in the eyes of external funding providers.
 Another notable finding is that the readability of project narratives has no impact on funding 
allocation decisions. This is in line with prior studies that asserted that some information contained in 
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business plans weakly affects VC funding decisions (e.g. Kirsch et al. 2009). Perhaps, due to the intrinsic 
complexity associated with projects related to cancer research, the effective communication of 
intricate information is not viewed as a relevant cue by decision-makers to assess the abilities of the 
applicants. 
 Additionally, the SMEs should bear in mind that the funding allocation process is hugely driven 
by the government’s agenda for scientific R&D. As a result, to align the application with government’s 
research needs and priorities, the entrepreneurs might benefit from referring to the solicitation listing 
that outlines calls for proposals and funding opportunities. 
 Finally, the summary results presented in Table 10-1 show that contingent upon their 
experience in the venture funding programme, the SMEs require specific skills and capabilities to 
achieve different types of target outcomes. The findings indicate that first-time funding holders should 
concentrate on developing a commercially-oriented TMT in order to develop their research ideas to 
the stage where they become ready for commercialisation. On the other hand, holders of multiple 
funding awards require TMTs with a continuous focus on the scientific orientation and need to be able 
to balance competing exploration and exploitation research activities. 
 
Implications for Public Policy Makers 
 
 As was noted in the introduction chapter, governments of the major OECD economies have 
been increasing the amount of public financial resources in support of R&D of small innovative 
ventures. As a consequence of this trend, a significant amount of effort has been devoted in academic 
and public policy domains to understand the role of the provision of public support for R&D projects 
in helping small financially constrained firms grow and in fostering innovation in high-tech SME 
sectors. 
 The results of the present study point out a number of implications for public policy makers 
related to structural and behavioural issues which cause deficiencies in the evaluation process. 
Overall, the use of taxpayers’ money is inefficient, which implies that these programmes warrant 
restructuring or at least reassessment. 
 
Rigid Evaluation 
 
 The results of the analysis summarised in Table 10-1 imply that government venture funders 
cannot ‘kill two birds with one stone’ by using standardised evaluation methods for both experienced 
and inexperienced participants. This is because nascent ventures necessitate different configurations 
of skills and capabilities to succeed. Therefore, the programme would benefit from a more fine-
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grained approach that takes account of different backgrounds of entrepreneurial firms during the 
evaluation process. 
 
Inaccurate Evaluation 
 
 The analysis revealed that deviations exist in decision-making from prescriptions of ROR 
indicating that investment patterns of government venture capitalists only partially reflect real options 
reasoning in practice. The finding that consistent implementation of ROR in organisational settings 
offers significant benefits, therefore, reinforces the need for training of government venture 
capitalists in implementing allocation financial resources in line with the real options approach (Howell 
and Jaegle 1997). 
 Some heuristics were found to be deficient, while a number of evaluation criteria appeared 
to be utilised inaccurately. The latter finding indicates that investors may have limited mechanisms in 
place to accurately evaluate the value of R&D projects and, in addition to tailored training, may benefit 
from advanced computer-aided analytical tools, which is consistent with recommendations by other 
scholars (e.g. Miller and Shapira 2004). Developing selection criteria based on factors that predict 
venture’s success would help decision-makers differentiate between high-achievers and under-
achievers (Lerner 2002). Therefore, the evaluation bias could be further minimised by explicitly taking 
into account the factors that are related to the achievement of desired outcomes by referring to Table 
10-1. Broadly speaking, the results indicate that commercially-oriented TMTs of first-time award 
holders and scientifically-oriented TMTs of multiple-time award holders have higher chances for 
success and hence such indicators can be used by decision-makers as reliable heuristics during the 
selection and evaluation process.   
 
Inefficient Monitoring 
 
 As was noted in the prior literature, government VC do not scrutinise the track record of 
applicants to the same degree as private VC. Sceptics pointed out that some government-funded 
innovative firms “have found a profitable niche with little incentive to venture into commercial 
markets” (Feldman and Kelley 2006). Taking into account the past performance of firms that have 
previously received government funding is particularly critical as it makes firms accountable for their 
progress (Lerner 2002). Low track record from prior grants is an indication that future progress is 
unlikely to be satisfactory. As such, the structure of the programme could benefit from the explicit, 
integrated and compulsory ex-post assessment of the performance of applicants in relation to each 
grant that they have been awarded. Overall, the process should strictly monitor how much funding 
the firms have previously received.    
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 In fact, the programme could be significantly improved if government venture funders got 
actively involved in the monitoring and controlling of investees in a way similar to private venture 
capitalists. For example, the critical need of first-time award holders to have a developed managerial 
skillset suggests that government venture capitalists could assist entrepreneurial teams lacking 
commercial experience in appointing professional managers specialising in running small firms (Lerner 
2002). 
 
Inefficient Structure  
 
 The results presented here support the studies that came to a conclusion that the design and 
structure of public programmes are crucially important (Feldman and Kelley 2006), and yet they are 
currently subjected to failures and require re-examination (Alperovych et al. 2015).  
 Specifically, the study indicates that the magnitude and high number of later stage grants do 
not increase the productivity of ventures necessary for subsequent commercialisation and growth, 
thereby decreasing investment yield. Therefore, the value from the investment process can be 
extracted when positioning trial commitments are small, and follow-up funds are allocated in a 
selective and disciplined manner. Allocation of more modest governmental awards could have a 
positive effect on the growth of small firms through the certification mechanism (Lerner 1999) or the 
prototyping channel (Howell 2015). 
 To sum up, this study’s notable implications for policy makers suggest that government 
venture programmes like the SBIR should be structured in such a way that (i) early-stage awards are 
low-cost and offered to a larger number of participants, and (ii) later-stage awards are allocated to 
participants with no other options in the portfolio. The primary idea behind the proposition is that 
first-time participants of the programme should be given priority over multiple-award holders—the 
conclusion completely supported by a recent study of Howell (2015).  
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10.4 Limitations & Future Research Directions 
 
 Having discussed the main findings and their primary implications for theory, practice and 
public policy, several words of caution are offered in relation to the data and analysis performed and 
how the findings could be taken further. 
 
Theoretical Issues 
 
Causal Direction of Relationships 
 
 The first word of caution relates to the fact that there might be potential ambiguity about the 
direction between the hypothesised cause and effect constructs. There is evidence of the selection 
bias inherent in the resource allocation process as a result of government venture funders’ preference 
of certain types of projects or structural inefficiencies of the programme. This raises an issue of 
potentially reversed causality, whereby it remains unclear whether government subsidies help 
ventures improve commercialisation and growth outcomes, or whether the ventures are awarded 
grants because they have all the necessary prerequisites to achieve such outcomes at the time of 
application. 
 While a thorough endogeneity analysis did not uncover any problems, the issue is still of 
theoretical importance. Care was taken to select accurate instrumental variables, yet it is still difficult 
to ascertain that all potentially relevant instruments were considered. The options for instruments 
were naturally limited by the data availability. Therefore, future research should continue to make an 
effort towards understanding the questions related to causal directions of relationships by selecting 
robust instruments and statistical modelling techniques. 
 
Potential Contamination of Theoretical Assumptions 
 
 As apparent from Part II analysis, models built upon propositions of signalling theory have a 
limited explanatory power.  
 One potential explanation can be that investors follow ROR inconsistently, as a result of which 
Part II dependent variables—initial commitment and discontinuation—might suffer contamination 
from behavioural intentions of investors. It currently remains unclear to what extent government 
venture funders understand the benefits of ROR and explicitly follow the logic. That is, although ROR 
logic prescribes that rents can be maximised when initial funding commitments are low, significant 
variability can be observed in the magnitude of initial commitment. This makes it difficult to demarcate 
government venture funder’s logical and perceptual decision-making rationale. In other words, if 
investors deliberately allocate high initial commitment and continue funding high-potential firms, it 
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suggests firms' legitimacy attributes drive their propensity towards perceptual decision-making. On 
the other hand, under the ROR investment logic, investors are aware that high-potential firms can 
extract as much value from low initial commitment and timely discontinuation of funding. Therefore, 
a better understanding of intentions underpinning decision-making process of government venture 
funders could help improve the model predicting funding allocation outcomes. In particular, it could 
shed light on the funding allocation outcomes of the firms with no prior awards, which are currently 
weakly explained by the conceptual model developed in this project. Perhaps, either a different 
theoretical lens or more fine-grained analyses are needed to understand which factors explain the 
phenomenon.  
 The second issue worth noting relates to the potential contamination of Phase II funding 
outcome, conceptualised as discontinuation. As Howell (2015) indicated, some firms opt not to apply 
for Phase II. Given that the current study had no data on whether the ventures received any funding 
from other sources (internal or external) preceding, during or after the participation in the 
programme, it was difficult to establish to what extent potential ‘opting out’ by the participants is of 
concern. Future research could address this issue.  
 In the present study, Phase II decision is treated as an outcome and is based on the observable 
fact that some Phase I projects received Phase II funding, while others did not. However, the model 
does not capture the factors explaining this outcome. One of the explanatory factors that has not been 
included in the model is the variable, perhaps a dummy, distinguishing the cases when Phase I 
awardees applied for Phase II and did or did not receive funding, versus the cases when Phase I 
awardees did not apply for Phase II. Then, it could be further investigated whether at this stage 
nascent firms chose to apply for any other type of external support such as private venture funding, 
and, more importantly, whether they received such support. This would provide evidence of the 
certification effect of grants, or lack thereof.  
 As was mentioned in the methodology chapter, the study covers Phase I and Phase II awards. 
There is also a stipulated, albeit unfunded under the initiative, Phase III leading to commercialisation, 
which the participants are strongly encouraged to undertake. Perhaps, future research could address 
this potential avenue and explore (i) whether firms undertake the formal Phase III, (ii) how Phase III is 
structured and funded, and also (iii) what are the outcomes of Phase III and how it fits with Phase I 
and Phase II funding. 
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Categorisation of Signal Attributes 
 
 The present study distinguishes between more and less observable signal categories, which, 
some might argue is a theoretically crude demarcation. For a signal to be considered as a signal, it 
needs to be readily observable to the receiver. This condition is explicitly taken into account: the study 
distinguishes between the signals that can be easily observed (e.g. all information that is included in 
the application form in its raw format) versus the signals that require time and effort to be observed 
(e.g. capabilities)37. While the categorisation of signals on the observability spectrum is deliberate and 
plausible in the present context, future studies could address to what extent this categorisation is 
applicable to other settings. The understanding of normative and descriptive tenets of signalling 
theory could also be enriched by exploring possible interaction effects among signals. For example, it 
could be investigated whether less observable signals need to interact with more observable signals 
to trigger the response of the receiver of the signal. 
 
Methodological Issues 
 
Sample 
 
 The classical concerns related to the sampling apply. First, the sample is limited to the SBIR 
programme funded by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) of the National Institute of Health (NIH) in 
the U.S., making the findings programme-, agency- and country-specific. Currently, it remains unclear 
to what extent these findings are generalisable to the entire SBIR programme, and similar initiatives 
in other countries. Second, the adopted research design is longitudinal yet truncated. It means that 
some grants may have had an effect beyond the period studied here. Third, the sample is randomly 
generated. However, much richer understanding of the functioning of the programme would be 
enabled by taking the entire population. It would allow investigating the effect of each individual grant 
on performance outcomes. To address these limitations, future research could attempt to replicate 
the findings of the present study in other empirical settings and using more longitudinal designs. 
  
                                                          
37 Prior literature has also distinguished between signals along its cost axis, ranging from expensive to cheap 
signals. 
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Selection, Operationalisation and Measurement of Constructs 
 
 It is well established that the estimation and modelling robustness is contingent upon the 
selection and validity of measurement instruments. Two issues are believed to be worthy of discussion 
here. 
 Capabilities were measured using the input-output model based on the stochastic frontier 
estimation. In particular, two measures are novel and have been presented for the first time. Similar 
to the identification of instrumental variables for the endogeneity analysis, the selection of valid 
outputs and inputs for the stochastic frontier estimation is challenging. Multiple conceptualisations of 
capabilities exist in the extant literature, and each has theoretical validity. While it is believed that the 
conceptualisations of selected capabilities closely reflect the theoretical underpinnings, there remains 
an untested question related to the extent that chosen inputs and outputs are appropriate and 
extensive. For example, the choice was limited to the data available from the secondary sources. 
Future research could dedicate empirical effort to developing alternative measures using the same 
analogy, or propose new alternatives, even using other methods, such as Bayesian analysis.   
 Another limitation relates to the fact that the measurement of the attractiveness of 
technology was outside the scope of the current study. One way future research could approach the 
development of the ‘technology attractiveness’ measure is by creating a rating scheme in conjunction 
with industry experts and then applying it empirically to assess the narratives of projects submitted as 
part of the application pack. Whereas the first, scale development, step is more complex and time-
consuming, the second, implementation, step could be facilitated by using methods such as the 
computed-aided textual analysis.  
 Additionally, access to internal data on applications would offer a useful indication of the 
overall quality of candidates and develop a more accurate understanding of what makes some 
applications more attractive in comparison to others. While it was beyond the scope of the present 
study to negotiate such access, perhaps future research could find the means to overcome this 
obstacle. 
 
Imputation Algorithm 
 
 The final point that needs mentioning concerns the choice of the imputation algorithm. 
Although at the time of assessment Amelia imputation algorithm was deemed the most appropriate, 
it later became apparent that there are more robust imputation methods available (e.g. ‘mice’ 
algorithm or Bayesian methods). It has been recently recognised that there is a dearth of practical 
literature on the imputation methodology, and currently, work is being undertaken38 to advise social 
                                                          
38 By the academic team of Professor Donald B. Rubin in Harvard University. 
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scientists on the methods, tools and techniques that need to be considered to carry out imputation 
efficiently. Future research should take the results derived from the imputed datasets with caution 
and be aware of the alternatives. 
 
10.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 The study examined the antecedents and outcomes of investment decisions in the 
government venture capital setting over a seven-year period. On the one hand, the analysis offers 
new insights into the normative aspects of real options theory by testing whether theoretical 
propositions have empirical value in the context of public venture capital. On the other hand, by 
studying public venture capitalists’ sense-making, the study contributes to the understanding of the 
descriptive tenets of ROR theory. 
 On the normative side, the research project explored to what extent the implementation of 
investment resource allocation strategies in line with prescriptions of real options logic offers 
performance advantages. The findings support the premise that public venture capital decision-
makers intuitively utilise real options reasoning, as demonstrated by the fact that consistent matching 
of funding decisions occurs in only around half the cases, and industry volatility does not affect 
outcomes of resource allocation decisions the way it is asserted in normative real options models. The 
results imply that the consistent implementation of the options approach offers significant benefits to 
developing the optimal investment procedures in the strategy field. 
 On the descriptive side, the study investigated the patterns of strategic funding decisions that 
are reflected in the observed investment behaviour. First, the study draws on the multilevel model to 
derive the factors that affect funding allocation decisions. By integrating individual-, project- and firm-
level factors in a coherent model it provides a deeper understanding of the distinct and joint effects 
of categories of signals. Second, the study documents the presence of distortions in the investment 
decisions—specific categories of signals that derail decision-makers’ attention from the pre-selected 
evaluation criteria. Therefore, it adds to the body of literature reporting that evaluation biases occur 
in a systematic fashion. 
 The present study offers a set of propositions that may help increase the effectiveness of 
sequential decision-making. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the few studies to empirically 
test the premises of logical financial allocations under the options approach so extensively. 
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Appendix 2: Standard ethical approval form 
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Appendix 3: Idea conversion models compared 
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Appendix 4: Summary of stochastic frontier estimation results 
 Managerial Capability PI’s Intellectual Capability R&D Capability 
 Variable Coefficient 
estimate 
Variable Coefficient 
estimate 
Variable Coefficient 
estimate 
Input 1 Commercial experience 0.0900* Quality-adjusted academic 
competence 
0.2004*** Quality-adjusted global 
patenting output 
0.3149*** 
Input 2 Inventive capacity 0.0451 Knowledge appropriation 0.0377 Knowledge breadth 0.3183*** 
Input 3   Inventive capacity 0.0010 PI’s intellectual capability 0.1234 
Output (Intercept) Innovation proliferation 3.4408*** Academic impact 3.4025*** Invention activity 0.4592 
 
Appendix 5: Summary of variables measuring elements of the dynamic managerial capabilities construct 
 
Source: Adapted from Helfat and Martin 2015, p. 1291
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Appendix 6: Cases identified as candidates for deletion due to excessive levels of missing values 
Case # # Missing % Missing 
53 81 51.3 
235 78 49.4 
56 78 49.4 
18 78 49.4 
221 74 46.8 
257 69 43.7 
103 64 40.5 
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Appendix 7: Univariate analysis of variables to identify the extent of missing values 
#39  Variable # 
Missing 
% 
Missing 
Valid 
N 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
(1) Manager’s commercial experience 132 35.1% 244 13.35 9.37 
(2) Manager’s technical experience 132 35.1% 244 14.91 12.85 
(3) Manager’s entrepreneurial experience 131 34.8% 245 6.66 8.44 
(4) Manager’s elite education 117 31.1% 259 27.38 28.71 
 Manager’s MBA 113 30.1% 263 - - 
(5) PI’s entrepreneurial experience 112 29.8% 264 4.44 6.45 
(6) PI’s technical experience 112 29.8% 264 17.11 10.15 
 Manager’s professorship 110 29.3% 266 - - 
(7) Manager’s firm tenure 99 26.3% 277 6.74 6.21 
(8) PI’s elite education 89 23.7% 287 25.86 26.33 
 PI’s professorship 88 23.4% 288 - - 
 PI’s MBA 83 22.1% 293 - - 
 Manager’s PhD 81 21.5% 295 - - 
(9) PI’s firm tenure 80 21.3% 296 5.37 5.30 
 Manager CEO 76 20.2% 300 - - 
(10) Manager’s publications 57 15.2% 319 30.03 69.29 
 PI’s PhD 55 14.6% 321 - - 
(11) Manager’s patents 49 13.0% 327 4.57 12.27 
 PI’s CEO 39 10.4% 337 - - 
(12) Sales performance 22 5.9% 354 6.65 75.60 
(13) Employment performance 21 5.6% 355 30.09 162.97 
(14) Firm age 10 2.7% 366 8.93 7.87 
(15) PI’s knowledge appropriation 8 2.1% 368 0.84 1.28 
(16) PI’s citations 8 2.1% 368 720.45 1554.07 
(17) PI’s h-index 8 2.1% 368 14.71 11.14 
(18) PI’s publications 6 1.6% 370 30.71 41.17 
(19) PI’s patents 4 1.1% 372 5.85 14.56 
(20) Project duration (post-funding) 2 0.5% 374 433.04 218.64 
 Project category 1 0.3% 375 - - 
(21) Industry volatility (t) 0 0.0% 376 28.76 23.16 
 Industry volatility (2014) 0 0.0% 376 18.32 6.25 
(22) Innovation performance 0 0.0% 376 7.93 24.18 
(23) Global patenting output 0 0.0% 376 5.39 17.43 
(24) Knowledge breadth 0 0.0% 376 3.21 5.33 
(25) Innovation proliferation 0 0.0% 376 4.93 6.95 
(26) Invention activity (post-funding) 0 0.0% 376 3.95 11.04 
(27) Initial commitment (project) 0 0.0% 376 .18 .15 
(28) State innovativeness 0 0.0% 376 67.71 15.36 
(29) Phase I prior investment ($) 0 0.0% 376 0.93 1.76 
(30) Phase I prior investment (# of awards) 0 0.0% 376 7.36 15.85 
(31) Phase II prior investment ($) 0 0.0% 376 1.83 4.25 
(32) Phase II prior investment (# of awards) 0 0.0% 376 2.43 6.27 
(33) Total prior investment ($) 0 0.0% 376 2.76 5.81 
(34) Total prior investment (# of awards) 0 0.0% 376 9.80 21.73 
(35) Abstract readability 0 0.0% 376 20.40 3.16 
 Discontinuation 0 0.0% 376 - - 
 Year cohort 0 0.0% 376 - - 
 Project scope 0 0.0% 376 - - 
 Non-woman-owned 0 0.0% 376 - - 
 Non-minority-owned 0 0.0% 376 - - 
 Non-HubZone-owned 0 0.0% 376 - - 
 
 
                                                          
39 Variable numbers are used in Appendix 10. 
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Appendix 8: Missing value patterns 
 
Note: Red cells depict missing cases  
 
Appendix 9: Examples of missing data patterns: monotone pattern on the left, general pattern on 
the right 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Little and Rubin (2002, p.5) 
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Appendix 10: Results of t-tests between the means of missing and non-missing data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Firm age  -  -  -  1.3  -  -  -  16.7***  -  3.6*** -0.1 1.6  3.2***   -  2.0*  1.9*  2.8**  4.7*** 
Sales performance -0.2 -1.0 -1.2 -0.1 -0.8  0.1 -0.1  0.2 -0.5  3.8***  1.1  - -0.7  0.9  2.4**  2.8**  2.8**  0.9 
Employment performance -0.4 -1.2 -1.0  0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.6  0.3 -1.0  3.7***  0.9  -  -  0.5  2.2**  2.4**  2.2**  0.6 
Manager’s firm tenure -3.6 -0.1  - -0.1  3.2***  1.0  - -0.6  2.1**  0.7  4.0*** 0.8  0.5 -1.3  1.9*  0.3  1.0 -0.1 
Manager’s technical exper. -5.7**  - -0.4 -1.6  3.1***  2.2** -0.6  0.1  1.9*  1.0  3.7*** 0.9  1.0 -0.6  2.2**  0.5  1.7  0.4 
Manager’s entrepren. exper. -3.6 -0.1  - -1.9*  3.8***  1.9* -0.5 -0.4  2.4**  0.6  3.1*** 0.9  1.0 -0.6  1.7*  0.4  1.4  0.3 
Manager’s commercial exper.  -  0.4  6.9*** -2.2**  3.9***  2**  0.0 -0.3  2.5**  0.6  3.1*** 1.0  1.1 -0.4  1.7*  0.3  1.2  0.2 
Manager’s elite education -1.8 -0.4  0.1  -  2.7***  1.1  0.9 -0.7  1.5  0.3  4.4*** 0.9  0.8 -0.8  1.5 -0.1  0.3 -0.4 
Manager’s patents  -  -  -  -  4.3***  0.2  - -1.1  3.9***  -  - 1.0  1.0  0.7  2.1** -0.2  0.4 -0.5 
Manager’s publications  -  -  -  -  4.2***  0.9  - -1.4  3.2***  -  6.8*** 1.1  1.1  0.6  2.5**  0.0  0.7 -0.2 
PI’s firm tenure -1.7* -0.1 -1.1 -1.9*  1.6  0.0 -2.7**  0.1  - -1.9* -1.6 1.1  1.0 -2.0**  1.3  0.6  1.8**  0.8 
PI’s technical experience -2.3**  0.4  0.0 -1.5 -0.6  - -1.7* -0.8 -1.0 -1.4 -1.3 1.0  0.9 -1.1  1.4  1.5  2.3**  2.2** 
PI’s entrepreneurial exper. -2.3**  0.2  0.0 -1.7  -  0.7 -1.7* -0.2 -1.0 -1.8* -1.4 1.0  0.9 -1.4  1.3  1.5  2.3**  2.1** 
PI’s elite education -1.7* -0.3 -0.8 -2.0*  0.9  0.2 -2.2*  -  0.3 -1.9* -1.5 0.6  0.3 -2.4**  1.1  1.3  0.9  0.8 
PI’s patents -0.2  0.5  1.6  0.9  -  -  2.5*  -  -  0.7  2.6** 0.5 -0.2  4.7**  -   -   -   - 
PI’s publications -0.2 -0.5  0.5  1.4 -1.1 -1.8  0.5  16.7*** -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 0.8  0.3  1.8  -  -  -  -  
PI’s h-index  0.0 -1.1  1.3  2.5** -1.1 -1.8  0.9 -0.5 -2.6* -0.4 -0.8 1.0  0.6 -0.3  -  -  - -11.8*** 
PI’s citations  0.0 -1.1  1.3  2.5** -1.1 -1.8  0.9 -0.5 -2.6* -0.4 -0.8 1.0  0.6 -0.3  -  -  - -11.8*** 
PI’s knowledge appropriation  0.0 -1.1  1.3  2.5** -1.1 -1.8  0.9 -0.5 -2.6 -0.4 -0.8 1.0  0.6 -0.3  -  -  - -11.8*** 
Manager CEO  -  -  - -0.9  2.8**  0.9  - -1.1  2.3** -0.7  2.6** 1.2  1.5  0.2  1.6 -0.3  0.5 -0.6 
Manager’s PhD  -  -  -  -   3.2***  1.0 -7.7** -1.1  2.1** -0.3  4.9*** 1.1  1.2 -0.2  1.9* -0.2  0.7 -0.4 
PI’s MBA -1.7  0.4  1.3  0.4  3.9***  1.7  0.6 -0.4  2.3**  0.3  4.7*** 0.8  0.7 -0.8  1.7*  0.3  0.7 -0.3 
PI’s CEO  0.0  0.4  0.6 -1.8*  -  0.7 -1.1  16.7***  - -0.4  1.6 1.3  2.0** -0.8  0.7  2.5  2.4**  1.3 
PI’s PhD -0.5  1.5  1.7 -2.1**  -  - -1.7*  - -3.1**  2.2***  2.8*** 0.9  1.3 -2.0*  3.6***  3.4  4.3***  3.1*** 
PI’s MBA -2.5**  1.0 -0.7 -2.0**  0.8  0.6 -1.9* -0.2 -0.1 -1.8** -1.4 1.0  1.0 -1.4  2.0**  1.9  2.6**  2.0** 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35)  
Firm age  0.8 -2.0*  3.6***  6.4***  6***  11.7***  13.9***  6.9***  1.7  0.6  9.8***  8.5***  7.8***  6.9***  8.7***  8.3*** -0.5  
Sales performance  0.4  0.3  5.3***  4.5***  4.3***  4.8***  3.1**  4.5***  0.5  1.6  3.3***  2.0*  2.1**  1.6  2.5**  1.9* -0.1  
Employment performance -0.3  0.4  5.1***  4.7***  4.2***  6.1***  3.1**  5.2***  2.7**  1.6  3.0**  1.8*  2*  1.5  2.3**  1.7 -0.3  
Manager’s firm tenure  2.0** -1.2  1.1  0.6  0.4 -0.9  1.1  1.3  1.1 -0.4  0.3 -0.4  2*  0.3  1.5 -0.2  0.6  
Manager’s technical exper.  2.7** -1.1  0.8  1.7  1.5  0.1  2.8**  2**  1.2  0.6  0.0 -0.5  1.7*  0.3  1.2 -0.3 -0.8  
Manager’s entrepren. exper.  2.6** -0.7  0.7  1.6  1.4 -0.1  2.4**  1.9*  1.1  0.1 -0.1 -0.6  1.7  0.2  1.1 -0.4 -0.7  
Manager’s commercial exper.  2.7** -1.0  0.6  1.7*  1.5  0.2  2.8**  2.1**  1.2  0.6  0.3 -0.4  1.8*  0.3  1.4 -0.2 -0.5  
Manager’s elite education  2.2** -0.3  0.9  1.2  1.0 -0.3  1.6  1.6  1.3  1.0  0.7 -0.1  1.6  0.2  1.4  0.0 -1.0  
Manager’s patents  2.8**  0.0 -0.8  0.8  0.7  1.1  2.4**  1.3  0.4 -2.6**  2.0**  1.4  2.1**  1.3  2.2**  1.4  0.7  
Manager’s publications  2.9***  0.2  0.1  1.1  1.0  1.5  2.7**  1.6  0.9 -1.3  2.7**  1.9*  3.7***  1.9*  3.5***  1.9*  0.7  
PI’s firm tenure  2.9*** -1.0  1.7* -1.9* -1.9* -0.2 -0.1 -1.1  0.0  1.8* -0.6 -1.0  0.5  0.5  0.1 -0.7  1.1  
PI’s technical experience -0.4 -1.2  1.3 -1.7* -1.8*  0.4  0.6 -0.8 -0.2  2.6** -0.6 -1.1 -0.1  0.3 -0.3 -0.8  0.2  
PI’s entrepreneurial exper. -0.4 -1.1  1.3 -1.7* -1.8*  0.5  0.7 -0.8 -0.4  2.2** -0.6 -1.1 -0.1  0.3 -0.3 -0.8  0.1  
PI’s elite education  2.4** -0.8  1.7* -2.5** -2.7** -1.7* -0.4 -1.7* -0.2  1.9* -1.3 -2.1**  0.4 -0.8 -0.2 -1.8* -0.5  
PI’s patents  -  1.4  1.7  2.9**  5.5***  2.2  1.2  0.3 -0.9  1.4  2.7**  4.4***  5.7***  5.4***  5.4***  4.8*** -0.9  
PI’s publications  5.9***  2.6**  1.5  3.9***  5.5***  3.0**  1.8  1.0 -0.8  0.3  4.0***  5.4***  6.8***  6.3***  6.5***  5.8*** -0.5  
PI’s h-index -1.6  0.3  1.6  3.8***  3.8***  2.6**  1.1  1.6 -0.7  0.8  3.6***  2.4**  3.8***  2.7***  4.0***  2.5** -0.2  
PI’s citations -1.6  0.3  1.6  3.8***  3.8***  2.6**  1.1  1.6 -0.7  0.8  3.6***  2.4**  3.8***  2.7***  4.0***  2.5** -0.2  
PI’s knowledge appropriation -1.6  0.3  1.6  3.8***  3.8***  2.6**  1.1  1.6 -0.7  0.8  3.6***  2.4**  3.8***  2.7***  4.0***  2.5** -0.2  
Manager CEO  2.0** -0.6  0.3  2.3**  2.1**  2.7**  3.6***  3.1***  1.3  0.5  1.5  0.8  2.6**  1.7*  2.3**  1.0  1.1  
Manager’s PhD  2.0** -0.6  1.3  1.5  1.3  1.5  2.5**  2.2**  1.4  0.0  1.2  0.4  1.9*  0.8  1.7*  0.5  0.0  
PI’s MBA  2.2** -1.5  1.7  1.0  0.8 -0.6  1.6  1.4  1.3  0.7  0.3 -0.5  1.3 -0.1  1.0 -0.4 -0.5  
PI’s CEO  5.2*** -1.2  0.5  3.8***  3.6***  2.4**  4.9***  4.3*** -0.6  2.7**  1.7  1.7  2.3**  2.2**  2.1*  1.8*  1.0  
PI’s PhD  4.4*** -1.2  2.0** -0.3 -0.5 -0.8  1.4  2.0** -0.5  1.9* -0.9 -1.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7 -1.2  1.0  
PI’s MBA  2.8** -1.0  2.5** -2.0** -2.1** -0.4  0.4 -1.2  0.1  2.6** -0.6 -1.3  0.4  0.2  0.0 -1.0  1.3  
 Notes: Significance levels (* <0.1, ** <0.05, ***<0.01); For each quantitative variable, pairs of groups are formed by indicator variables. Indicator variables with less than 1% missing are not displayed.  
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Appendix 11: Diagnostics of imputed variables – density plots 
             
 Firm age           Sales performance                  Employment performance                      Project duration 
 
 Manager CEO               Manager’s firm tenure                     Manager’s technical experience            Manager’s entrepreneurial experience 
 
 Manager’s commercial experience    Manager’s PhD              Manager’s MBA             Manager’s elite education 
 
 Manager’s patents              Manager’s publications      Manager’s professorship            PI CEO 
 
  PI’s firm tenure             PI’s technical experience              PI’s entrepreneurial experience           PI’s PhD  
 
            PI’s MBA                  PI’s elite education                   PI’s patents        PI’s publications 
 
          PI’s h-index        PI’s citations                PI’s professorship  
314 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 12: Diagnostics of imputed variables – overimputation40 
   
 Firm age           Sales performance                     Employment performance                   Project duration 
   
                   Manager’s firm tenure                                 Manager’s technical experience               Manager’s entrepreneurial experience     Manager’s commercial experience 
   
    Manager’s elite education          Manager’s patents   Manager’s publications                     PI’s firm tenure  
               
                  PI’s technical experience                 PI’s entrepreneurial experience          PI’s elite education                          PI’s publications    
 
                            PI’s h-index      PI’s citations                  PI’s knowledge appropriation  
 
  
                                                          
40 Vertical axes depict imputed values, horizontal axes depict observed values 
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Appendix 13: Sensitivity analysis of original versus imputed data – means and standard deviations compared41 
Statistic Firm age Sales 
performance 
Employment 
performance 
Project 
duration 
Manager CEO Manager’s 
firm 
tenure 
Manager’s 
technical 
experience 
Manager’s 
entrepreneurial 
experience 
Manager’s 
commercial 
experience 
Manager’s 
PhD 
Manager’s 
MBA 
Manager’s 
elite 
education 
Manager’s 
patents 
Manager’s 
publications 
Sample 0 mean 8.93 2.64 21.70 432.98 0.62 6.74 14.93 6.65 13.36 0.66 0.15 27.29 4.57 30.12 
Samples 1-5 average 
mean 
8.89 2.71 21.65 434.86 0.62 6.64 15.12 7.20 13.53 0.64 0.17 29.74 4.72 30.92 
Discrepancy in 
means 
-0.04 0.07 -0.05 1.88 0.00 -0.10 0.18 0.54 0.17 -0.03 0.02 2.45 0.15 0.80 
Sample 0 standard 
deviation 
7.88 5.67 39.72 218.93 0.49 6.22 12.87 8.46 9.38 0.47 0.36 28.73 12.29 69.38 
Samples 1-5 average 
standard deviation  
7.83 5.69 39.12 220.72 0.49 6.11 12.36 7.91 9.26 0.48 0.38 28.62 11.66 65.43 
Discrepancy in 
standard deviations 
-0.04 0.02 -0.60 1.79 0.00 -0.11 -0.51 -0.55 -0.13 0.01 0.02 -0.11 -0.62 -3.95 
Statistic Managers 
professor 
PI CEO PI’s firm 
tenure 
PI’s 
technical 
experience 
PI’s 
entrepreneurial 
experience 
PI’s PhD PI’s MBA PI’s elite 
education 
PI’s  patents PI’s 
publications 
PI’s h-
index 
PI’s 
citations 
PI’s 
knowledge 
appropriation 
PI professor 
Sample 0 mean 0.67 0.38 5.39 17.12 4.45 0.96 0.04 25.86 5.75 30.73 14.66 721.78 0.84 0.84 
Samples 1-5 average 
mean 
0.70 0.38 5.59 16.91 4.90 0.94 0.06 26.74 5.76 30.91 14.71 735.63 0.86 0.83 
Discrepancy in 
means 
0.03 0.00 0.21 -0.21 0.45 -0.02 0.02 0.88 0.01 0.18 0.05 13.85 0.02 -0.02 
Sample 0 standard 
deviation 
0.76 0.49 5.31 10.16 6.46 0.20 0.21 26.37 14.44 41.23 11.20 1555.98 1.28 0.75 
Samples 1-5 average 
standard deviation  
0.78 0.49 5.41 9.92 6.52 0.24 0.24 25.89 14.38 41.22 11.23 1556.02 1.31 0.76 
Discrepancy in 
standard deviations 
0.01 0.00 0.11 -0.24 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.48 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 
 
                                                          
41 Sample 0 refers to the original dataset, samples 1-5 refer to five imputed datasets. 
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Appendix 14: Potential candidates for deletion based on z-scores 
Case # Frequency 
153 18 
151 17 
152 17 
150 15 
294 8 
268 7 
337 7 
282 6 
295 6 
115 4 
225 4 
188 3 
 
Appendix 15: Potential candidates for deletion based on Mahalanobis D2 
Case # Frequency 
225 5 
337 5 
268 4 
153 3 
87 1 
110 1 
113 1 
374 1 
84 1 
 
317 
 
Appendix 16: Visual examination of outliers – box plots 
 
Industry volatility (t)           Firm age   Sales performance            Employment performance            Innovation performance 
 
 Global patenting output  Knowledge breadth   Innovation proliferation         Post-funding invention activity         Initial commitment (project) 
 
         Project duration  State innovativeness                     Phase I prior investment ($)    Phase I prior investment (# of awards)    Phase II prior investment ($)  
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 Phase II prior investment (# of awards)    Total prior investment ($)     Total prior investment (# of awards)  Abstract readability               Manager’s firm tenure 
 
     Manager’s technical experience  Manager’s entrepreneurial experience Manager’s commercial experience        Manager’s elite education   Manager’s patents 
 
Manager’s publications     PI’s firm tenure              PI’s technical experience       PI’s entrepreneurial experience                  PI’s elite education  
 
        PI’s patents        PI’s publications           PI’s h-index          PI’s citations              PI’s knowledge appropriation 
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Appendix 17: Potential candidates for deletion based on box plots 
Case # Variable 
245 Firm age 
268 Sales performance 
77 
150,151, 
152,153 
 
Employment performance  
Innovation performance, Post-
funding invention activity, Global 
patenting output, Manager’s 
patent’s, Manager’s publications,  
188 
266 
304, 89 
294, 295 
Knowledge breadth 
Innovation proliferation 
Initial commitment (project),  
All measures of Prior investment, 
Manager’s firm tenure, 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
185 Abstract readability, PI’s firm 
tenure  
88 Manager’s technical experience 
48, 34, 
337 
Manager’s commercial 
experience 
313, 104 PI’s technical experience 
89, 354 
247 
337 
115, 337 
373, 171 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience 
PI’s patents 
PI’s publications 
PI’s h-index, PI’s citations 
PI’s knowledge appropriation 
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Appendix 18: Visual examination of data for normality assumption – histograms and normal probability Q-Q plots42 
 
Industry volatility (t)      Industry volatility (2014) 
 
      Firm age       Sales performance 
 
     Sales yield                Employment performance 
 
                                                          
42 In Q-Q plots, gridlines are 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90 and 95 percentiles 
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Employment yield              Innovation performance 
 
Innovation yield     Post-funding invention activity 
 
Initial commitment (project)      Project duration 
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2  
State innovativeness      Initial commitment (portfolio)     
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   Manager’s entrepreneurial experience      Manager’s elite education    
 
Manager’s patents       Manager’s publications 
 
 
PI’s firm tenure                 PI’s technical experience  
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   PI’s entrepreneurial experience       PI’s elite education    
 
Manager’s patents       Manager’s publications 
 
R&D capability               Managerial capability 
PI’s intellectual capability 
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Appendix 19: Visual examination of data for linearity assumption – augmented component-plus-residual plots43 
DV: Initial Commitment (project) 
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43 Vertical axes depict the augmented component plus residual, horizontal axes depict the respective independent variable 
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Appendix 20: Visual examination of data for homoscedasticity assumption – residuals-versus-fitted plots 
ROR Equations 
                   DV: Sales Yield       DV: Employment Yield                DV: Innovation Yield 
           no prior awards              with prior awards               no prior awards      with prior awards                 no prior awards          with prior awards 
 
DV: Sales Performance               DV: Employment Performance            DV: Innovation Performance 
            no prior awards              with prior awards        no prior awards      with prior awards           no prior awards            with prior awards 
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Signalling Equations 
       DV: Initial Commitment (project)  
          no prior awards               with prior awards 
 
DV: Sales Yield            DV: Employment Yield                DV: Innovation Yield 
          no prior awards             with prior awards         no prior awards     with prior awards          no prior awards           with prior awards 
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Appendix 21: Multicollinearity diagnostics – variance inflation factor and conditional index 
DV: Initial Commitment (project)  
   Mean VIF      1.84
----------------------------------------------------
fit_firm_level      1.71    1.31    0.5851      0.4149
lnphaseiitransitionrate      1.56    1.25    0.6402      0.3598
lnaveragephaseiprojectsuccess      1.39    1.18    0.7173      0.2827
federalprogramtype      1.20    1.10    0.8310      0.1690
applicationbreadth      1.27    1.13    0.7891      0.2109
intellectual_cap      1.56    1.25    0.6403      0.3597
managerial_cap      1.65    1.29    0.6044      0.3956
    rd_cap      1.23    1.11    0.8131      0.1869
lnfogindex      1.23    1.11    0.8099      0.1901
lnp2_academiccompetence      2.43    1.56    0.4113      0.5887
lnp1_academiccompetence      3.59    1.90    0.2783      0.7217
lnp2_intellectualcompetence      1.86    1.36    0.5375      0.4625
lnp1_intellectualcompetence      2.00    1.42    0.4989      0.5011
p2_academicposition_dummy      1.65    1.28    0.6070      0.3930
p1_academicposition_dummy      2.05    1.43    0.4882      0.5118
p2_dr_status      1.39    1.18    0.7181      0.2819
p1_dr_status      2.13    1.46    0.4684      0.5316
p2_mba_status      1.26    1.12    0.7963      0.2037
p1_mba_status      1.50    1.22    0.6689      0.3311
p2_eliteeducation_score      1.55    1.25    0.6437      0.3563
p1_eliteeducation_score      1.81    1.35    0.5519      0.4481
p2_entrepreneurialcapability      2.57    1.60    0.3893      0.6107
p1_entrepreneurialcapability      2.51    1.58    0.3985      0.6015
p2_technicalcapability      2.39    1.55    0.4178      0.5822
p1_technicalcapability      3.07    1.75    0.3253      0.6747
p2_firm_specificcapability      2.88    1.70    0.3469      0.6531
p2_position      1.61    1.27    0.6209      0.3791
p1_position      1.71    1.31    0.5849      0.4151
 yeardummy      2.36    1.54    0.4238      0.5762
 lnfirmage      2.72    1.65    0.3681      0.6319
innovativeenvironment      1.27    1.13    0.7857      0.2143
industryvolatility_5_year_wind      2.29    1.51    0.4372      0.5628
hubzone_owned      1.20    1.10    0.8320      0.1680
minority_owned      1.14    1.07    0.8741      0.1259
woman_owned      1.28    1.13    0.7783      0.2217
lnsuccessmagnitude      1.27    1.13    0.7861      0.2139
----------------------------------------------------
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                        SQRT                   R-
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 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from deviation sscp (no intercept)
 Condition Number         5.1685 
---------------------------------
    36     0.1615          5.1685
    35     0.1840          4.8413
    34     0.2106          4.5257
    33     0.2238          4.3901
    32     0.2706          3.9923
    31     0.3084          3.7397
    30     0.3331          3.5983
    29     0.3659          3.4332
    28     0.3951          3.3038
    27     0.4246          3.1873
    26     0.4674          3.0378
    25     0.4962          2.9481
    24     0.5405          2.8249
    23     0.5886          2.7069
    22     0.6094          2.6604
    21     0.6364          2.6033
    20     0.6629          2.5507
    19     0.7066          2.4706
    18     0.7670          2.3713
    17     0.7937          2.3310
    16     0.8911          2.2000
    15     0.9081          2.1793
    14     0.9887          2.0886
    13     1.0207          2.0556
    12     1.0714          2.0064
    11     1.1767          1.9145
    10     1.2258          1.8758
    9     1.2483          1.8588
    8     1.5151          1.6872
    7     1.5827          1.6508
    6     1.6931          1.5961
    5     1.8927          1.5095
    4     2.0562          1.4483
    3     2.1917          1.4028
    2     3.0783          1.1837
    1     4.3130          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
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DV: Discontinuation 
   Mean VIF      1.88
----------------------------------------------------
fit_firm_level      1.71    1.31    0.5832      0.4168
lnphaseiitransitionrate      1.60    1.26    0.6261      0.3739
lnaveragephaseiprojectsuccess      1.41    1.19    0.7115      0.2885
lnsuccessmagnitude      1.37    1.17    0.7302      0.2698
federalprogramtype      1.22    1.10    0.8196      0.1804
applicationbreadth      1.28    1.13    0.7824      0.2176
intellectual_cap      1.57    1.25    0.6386      0.3614
managerial_cap      2.34    1.53    0.4280      0.5720
    rd_cap      1.36    1.17    0.7365      0.2635
lnfogindex      1.24    1.11    0.8075      0.1925
lnpostfundingrates_inventionacti      2.46    1.57    0.4072      0.5928
projecttime      1.39    1.18    0.7170      0.2830
lnp2_academiccompetence      2.44    1.56    0.4095      0.5905
lnp1_academiccompetence      3.62    1.90    0.2760      0.7240
lnp2_intellectualcompetence      1.94    1.39    0.5167      0.4833
lnp1_intellectualcompetence      2.04    1.43    0.4893      0.5107
p2_academicposition_dummy      1.67    1.29    0.5976      0.4024
p1_academicposition_dummy      2.06    1.43    0.4861      0.5139
p2_dr_status      1.41    1.19    0.7099      0.2901
p1_dr_status      2.15    1.47    0.4649      0.5351
p2_mba_status      1.26    1.12    0.7908      0.2092
p1_mba_status      1.53    1.24    0.6518      0.3482
p2_eliteeducation_score      1.57    1.25    0.6368      0.3632
p1_eliteeducation_score      1.84    1.36    0.5432      0.4568
p2_entrepreneurialcapability      2.58    1.61    0.3875      0.6125
p1_entrepreneurialcapability      2.54    1.59    0.3935      0.6065
p2_technicalcapability      2.47    1.57    0.4053      0.5947
p1_technicalcapability      3.10    1.76    0.3226      0.6774
p2_firm_specificcapability      2.92    1.71    0.3423      0.6577
p2_position      1.68    1.30    0.5940      0.4060
p1_position      1.74    1.32    0.5740      0.4260
 yeardummy      2.41    1.55    0.4143      0.5857
 lnfirmage      2.74    1.66    0.3644      0.6356
innovativeenvironment      1.29    1.13    0.7774      0.2226
industryvolatility_5_year_wind      2.34    1.53    0.4280      0.5720
hubzone_owned      1.24    1.12    0.8042      0.1958
minority_owned      1.16    1.07    0.8657      0.1343
woman_owned      1.31    1.14    0.7639      0.2361
success0failure1      1.26    1.12    0.7906      0.2094
----------------------------------------------------
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. 
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from deviation sscp (no intercept)
 Condition Number         5.2159 
---------------------------------
    39     0.1588          5.2159
    38     0.1815          4.8787
    37     0.2051          4.5900
    36     0.2168          4.4644
    35     0.2509          4.1502
    34     0.2771          3.9488
    33     0.3096          3.7361
    32     0.3287          3.6257
    31     0.3519          3.5042
    30     0.3920          3.3203
    29     0.4131          3.2344
    28     0.4663          3.0440
    27     0.4879          2.9759
    26     0.5048          2.9259
    25     0.5552          2.7897
    24     0.5910          2.7039
    23     0.6282          2.6226
    22     0.6588          2.5611
    21     0.6750          2.5302
    20     0.7449          2.4084
    19     0.7793          2.3547
    18     0.8222          2.2925
    17     0.8488          2.2563
    16     0.9204          2.1667
    15     0.9732          2.1072
    14     1.0148          2.0635
    13     1.0619          2.0172
    12     1.0929          1.9884
    11     1.2095          1.8901
    10     1.2368          1.8692
    9     1.4072          1.7523
    8     1.5930          1.6470
    7     1.6263          1.6300
    6     1.8022          1.5484
    5     1.9811          1.4769
    4     2.1158          1.4291
    3     2.4563          1.3263
    2     3.3396          1.1375
    1     4.3211          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
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DV: Sales Yield 
   Mean VIF      1.86
----------------------------------------------------
intcapxmancap      1.29    1.14    0.7735      0.2265
rdcapxintcap      1.22    1.10    0.8201      0.1799
rdcapxmancap      1.65    1.28    0.6065      0.3935
intellectual_cap      1.69    1.30    0.5904      0.4096
managerial_cap      2.95    1.72    0.3396      0.6604
    rd_cap      1.45    1.21    0.6875      0.3125
lnfogindex      1.24    1.11    0.8070      0.1930
lnpostfundingrates_inventionacti      2.52    1.59    0.3971      0.6029
projecttime      1.40    1.18    0.7152      0.2848
lnp2_academiccompetence      2.49    1.58    0.4011      0.5989
lnp1_academiccompetence      3.67    1.91    0.2727      0.7273
lnp2_intellectualcompetence      1.96    1.40    0.5090      0.4910
lnp1_intellectualcompetence      2.09    1.45    0.4774      0.5226
p2_academicposition_dummy      1.70    1.30    0.5872      0.4128
p1_academicposition_dummy      2.08    1.44    0.4800      0.5200
p2_dr_status      1.42    1.19    0.7035      0.2965
p1_dr_status      2.21    1.49    0.4516      0.5484
p2_mba_status      1.27    1.13    0.7867      0.2133
p1_mba_status      1.61    1.27    0.6206      0.3794
p2_eliteeducation_score      1.54    1.24    0.6487      0.3513
p1_eliteeducation_score      1.86    1.36    0.5367      0.4633
p2_entrepreneurialcapability      2.63    1.62    0.3806      0.6194
p1_entrepreneurialcapability      2.59    1.61    0.3856      0.6144
p2_technicalcapability      2.44    1.56    0.4106      0.5894
p1_technicalcapability      3.09    1.76    0.3238      0.6762
p2_firm_specificcapability      3.10    1.76    0.3229      0.6771
p2_position      1.68    1.30    0.5947      0.4053
p1_position      1.75    1.32    0.5723      0.4277
fit_firm_level      1.80    1.34    0.5569      0.4431
lnphaseiitransitionrate      1.69    1.30    0.5925      0.4075
lnaveragephaseiprojectsuccess      1.54    1.24    0.6493      0.3507
fit_project_level      1.18    1.09    0.8441      0.1559
success0failure1      1.34    1.16    0.7468      0.2532
lnsuccessmagnitude      1.39    1.18    0.7217      0.2783
 yeardummy      1.32    1.15    0.7561      0.2439
 lnfirmage      2.97    1.72    0.3362      0.6638
innovativeenvironment      1.33    1.15    0.7530      0.2470
industryvolatility_5_year_2013      1.33    1.15    0.7530      0.2470
hubzone_owned      1.25    1.12    0.7972      0.2028
minority_owned      1.16    1.08    0.8650      0.1350
woman_owned      1.35    1.16    0.7409      0.2591
lnsalesyield      1.79    1.34    0.5586      0.4414
----------------------------------------------------
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 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from deviation sscp (no intercept)
 Condition Number         5.2830 
---------------------------------
    42     0.1560          5.2830
    41     0.1692          5.0734
    40     0.1890          4.7999
    39     0.2045          4.6140
    38     0.2595          4.0961
    37     0.2821          3.9292
    36     0.3147          3.7196
    35     0.3268          3.6502
    34     0.3463          3.5459
    33     0.3798          3.3861
    32     0.4302          3.1816
    31     0.4639          3.0638
    30     0.4809          3.0092
    29     0.5043          2.9385
    28     0.5264          2.8761
    27     0.5751          2.7518
    26     0.5866          2.7245
    25     0.6382          2.6121
    24     0.6581          2.5723
    23     0.6816          2.5277
    22     0.7036          2.4878
    21     0.7661          2.3842
    20     0.7879          2.3510
    19     0.8201          2.3043
    18     0.8928          2.2085
    17     0.9666          2.1226
    16     1.0342          2.0520
    15     1.0491          2.0374
    14     1.0999          1.9897
    13     1.1190          1.9727
    12     1.1382          1.9560
    11     1.2594          1.8595
    10     1.2972          1.8322
    9     1.4486          1.7338
    8     1.4956          1.7063
    7     1.6162          1.6415
    6     1.6974          1.6017
    5     2.0250          1.4664
    4     2.2921          1.3783
    3     2.5082          1.3176
    2     3.4550          1.1227
    1     4.3546          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
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DV: Employment Yield 
   Mean VIF      1.88
----------------------------------------------------
intcapxmancap      1.30    1.14    0.7699      0.2301
rdcapxintcap      1.22    1.11    0.8185      0.1815
rdcapxmancap      1.65    1.28    0.6066      0.3934
intellectual_cap      1.69    1.30    0.5925      0.4075
managerial_cap      2.95    1.72    0.3394      0.6606
    rd_cap      1.46    1.21    0.6867      0.3133
lnfogindex      1.24    1.11    0.8049      0.1951
lnpostfundingrates_inventionacti      2.49    1.58    0.4014      0.5986
projecttime      1.42    1.19    0.7045      0.2955
lnp2_academiccompetence      2.50    1.58    0.4006      0.5994
lnp1_academiccompetence      3.67    1.91    0.2728      0.7272
lnp2_intellectualcompetence      1.96    1.40    0.5094      0.4906
lnp1_intellectualcompetence      2.10    1.45    0.4772      0.5228
p2_academicposition_dummy      1.70    1.30    0.5876      0.4124
p1_academicposition_dummy      2.09    1.44    0.4794      0.5206
p2_dr_status      1.42    1.19    0.7024      0.2976
p1_dr_status      2.23    1.49    0.4478      0.5522
p2_mba_status      1.28    1.13    0.7807      0.2193
p1_mba_status      1.62    1.27    0.6186      0.3814
p2_eliteeducation_score      1.56    1.25    0.6422      0.3578
p1_eliteeducation_score      1.85    1.36    0.5400      0.4600
p2_entrepreneurialcapability      2.62    1.62    0.3816      0.6184
p1_entrepreneurialcapability      2.59    1.61    0.3858      0.6142
p2_technicalcapability      2.44    1.56    0.4106      0.5894
p1_technicalcapability      3.09    1.76    0.3238      0.6762
p2_firm_specificcapability      3.18    1.78    0.3146      0.6854
p2_position      1.69    1.30    0.5921      0.4079
p1_position      1.75    1.32    0.5713      0.4287
fit_firm_level      1.80    1.34    0.5546      0.4454
lnphaseiitransitionrate      1.78    1.33    0.5622      0.4378
lnaveragephaseiprojectsuccess      1.64    1.28    0.6097      0.3903
fit_project_level      1.19    1.09    0.8438      0.1562
success0failure1      1.34    1.16    0.7460      0.2540
lnsuccessmagnitude      1.41    1.19    0.7098      0.2902
 yeardummy      1.32    1.15    0.7549      0.2451
 lnfirmage      2.98    1.72    0.3361      0.6639
innovativeenvironment      1.33    1.15    0.7532      0.2468
industryvolatility_5_year_2013      1.31    1.14    0.7652      0.2348
hubzone_owned      1.25    1.12    0.8003      0.1997
minority_owned      1.16    1.08    0.8636      0.1364
woman_owned      1.34    1.16    0.7471      0.2529
lnemploymentyield      2.24    1.50    0.4473      0.5527
----------------------------------------------------
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 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from deviation sscp (no intercept)
 Condition Number         5.3443 
---------------------------------
    42     0.1537          5.3443
    41     0.1647          5.1618
    40     0.1890          4.8184
    39     0.2029          4.6505
    38     0.2613          4.0985
    37     0.2819          3.9458
    36     0.3037          3.8016
    35     0.3259          3.6699
    34     0.3401          3.5921
    33     0.3718          3.4358
    32     0.3960          3.3292
    31     0.4583          3.0944
    30     0.4835          3.0130
    29     0.5048          2.9485
    28     0.5268          2.8863
    27     0.5760          2.7605
    26     0.5877          2.7328
    25     0.6274          2.6448
    24     0.6596          2.5795
    23     0.6822          2.5363
    22     0.7039          2.4970
    21     0.7582          2.4060
    20     0.7852          2.3642
    19     0.8124          2.3244
    18     0.8922          2.2179
    17     0.9674          2.1300
    16     1.0344          2.0598
    15     1.0514          2.0431
    14     1.0971          2.0001
    13     1.1177          1.9816
    12     1.1386          1.9633
    11     1.2505          1.8734
    10     1.2981          1.8388
    9     1.4484          1.7407
    8     1.5021          1.7093
    7     1.6015          1.6554
    6     1.6823          1.6152
    5     2.0153          1.4757
    4     2.3656          1.3621
    3     2.5002          1.3249
    2     3.4913          1.1212
    1     4.3888          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
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DV: Innovation Yield 
   Mean VIF      1.79
----------------------------------------------------
intcapxmancap      1.29    1.13    0.7781      0.2219
rdcapxintcap      1.22    1.10    0.8197      0.1803
rdcapxmancap      1.65    1.28    0.6074      0.3926
intellectual_cap      1.70    1.30    0.5872      0.4128
managerial_cap      2.33    1.53    0.4290      0.5710
    rd_cap      1.36    1.17    0.7363      0.2637
lnfogindex      1.24    1.11    0.8087      0.1913
projecttime      1.40    1.18    0.7142      0.2858
lnp2_academiccompetence      2.50    1.58    0.3998      0.6002
lnp1_academiccompetence      3.67    1.92    0.2726      0.7274
lnp2_intellectualcompetence      1.92    1.38    0.5217      0.4783
lnp1_intellectualcompetence      2.07    1.44    0.4823      0.5177
p2_academicposition_dummy      1.72    1.31    0.5811      0.4189
p1_academicposition_dummy      2.07    1.44    0.4830      0.5170
p2_dr_status      1.41    1.19    0.7106      0.2894
p1_dr_status      2.19    1.48    0.4557      0.5443
p2_mba_status      1.25    1.12    0.7998      0.2002
p1_mba_status      1.57    1.25    0.6355      0.3645
p2_eliteeducation_score      1.53    1.24    0.6549      0.3451
p1_eliteeducation_score      1.82    1.35    0.5508      0.4492
p2_entrepreneurialcapability      2.62    1.62    0.3820      0.6180
p1_entrepreneurialcapability      2.59    1.61    0.3860      0.6140
p2_technicalcapability      2.41    1.55    0.4154      0.5846
p1_technicalcapability      3.10    1.76    0.3223      0.6777
p2_firm_specificcapability      2.93    1.71    0.3416      0.6584
p2_position      1.68    1.30    0.5948      0.4052
p1_position      1.74    1.32    0.5753      0.4247
fit_firm_level      1.74    1.32    0.5759      0.4241
lnphaseiitransitionrate      1.60    1.27    0.6238      0.3762
lnaveragephaseiprojectsuccess      1.47    1.21    0.6812      0.3188
fit_project_level      1.18    1.09    0.8460      0.1540
success0failure1      1.33    1.15    0.7513      0.2487
lnsuccessmagnitude      1.36    1.17    0.7353      0.2647
 yeardummy      1.33    1.15    0.7499      0.2501
 lnfirmage      2.82    1.68    0.3552      0.6448
innovativeenvironment      1.32    1.15    0.7558      0.2442
industryvolatility_5_year_2013      1.28    1.13    0.7790      0.2210
hubzone_owned      1.23    1.11    0.8125      0.1875
minority_owned      1.14    1.07    0.8737      0.1263
woman_owned      1.29    1.13    0.7764      0.2236
lninnovationyield      1.39    1.18    0.7201      0.2799
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
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  Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from deviation sscp (no intercept)
 Condition Number         5.2754 
---------------------------------
    41     0.1571          5.2754
    40     0.1844          4.8702
    39     0.1962          4.7212
    38     0.2097          4.5669
    37     0.2796          3.9546
    36     0.3161          3.7193
    35     0.3254          3.6658
    34     0.3485          3.5420
    33     0.3828          3.3796
    32     0.4460          3.1313
    31     0.4691          3.0531
    30     0.4850          3.0027
    29     0.5059          2.9401
    28     0.5297          2.8731
    27     0.5666          2.7780
    26     0.5987          2.7025
    25     0.6157          2.6649
    24     0.6666          2.5612
    23     0.6839          2.5286
    22     0.7159          2.4715
    21     0.7507          2.4134
    20     0.7928          2.3485
    19     0.8057          2.3297
    18     0.9022          2.2015
    17     0.9695          2.1237
    16     1.0182          2.0723
    15     1.0437          2.0469
    14     1.0932          2.0000
    13     1.0992          1.9946
    12     1.1358          1.9621
    11     1.2236          1.8904
    10     1.2819          1.8470
    9     1.4224          1.7534
    8     1.4774          1.7204
    7     1.4906          1.7127
    6     1.6743          1.6161
    5     1.9412          1.5009
    4     2.2291          1.4006
    3     2.4296          1.3416
    2     3.1631          1.1758
    1     4.3728          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
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DV: Sales Performance 
   Mean VIF      1.85
----------------------------------------------------
intcapxmancap      1.29    1.14    0.7738      0.2262
rdcapxintcap      1.21    1.10    0.8274      0.1726
rdcapxmancap      1.61    1.27    0.6210      0.3790
intellectual_cap      1.69    1.30    0.5934      0.4066
managerial_cap      2.91    1.71    0.3432      0.6568
    rd_cap      1.44    1.20    0.6964      0.3036
lnfogindex      1.23    1.11    0.8098      0.1902
lnpostfundingrates_inventionacti      2.67    1.63    0.3749      0.6251
projecttime      1.39    1.18    0.7213      0.2787
lnp2_academiccompetence      2.48    1.57    0.4040      0.5960
lnp1_academiccompetence      3.64    1.91    0.2748      0.7252
lnp2_intellectualcompetence      1.94    1.39    0.5168      0.4832
lnp1_intellectualcompetence      2.07    1.44    0.4840      0.5160
p2_academicposition_dummy      1.70    1.30    0.5890      0.4110
p1_academicposition_dummy      2.05    1.43    0.4869      0.5131
p2_dr_status      1.42    1.19    0.7050      0.2950
p1_dr_status      2.20    1.48    0.4555      0.5445
p2_mba_status      1.25    1.12    0.7997      0.2003
p1_mba_status      1.54    1.24    0.6499      0.3501
p2_eliteeducation_score      1.53    1.24    0.6551      0.3449
p1_eliteeducation_score      1.80    1.34    0.5565      0.4435
p2_entrepreneurialcapability      2.65    1.63    0.3774      0.6226
p1_entrepreneurialcapability      2.60    1.61    0.3845      0.6155
p2_technicalcapability      2.38    1.54    0.4197      0.5803
p1_technicalcapability      3.08    1.76    0.3247      0.6753
p2_firm_specificcapability      2.90    1.70    0.3444      0.6556
p2_position      1.67    1.29    0.5985      0.4015
p1_position      1.76    1.33    0.5680      0.4320
fit_project_level      1.18    1.08    0.8505      0.1495
success0failure1      1.33    1.15    0.7545      0.2455
lnsuccessmagnitude      1.30    1.14    0.7667      0.2333
 yeardummy      1.31    1.14    0.7645      0.2355
 lnfirmage      2.94    1.71    0.3405      0.6595
innovativeenvironment      1.30    1.14    0.7670      0.2330
industryvolatility_5_year_2013      1.27    1.13    0.7878      0.2122
hubzone_owned      1.24    1.12    0.8037      0.1963
minority_owned      1.15    1.07    0.8733      0.1267
woman_owned      1.32    1.15    0.7564      0.2436
   lnsales      1.88    1.37    0.5310      0.4690
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
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. 
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from deviation sscp (no intercept)
 Condition Number         5.1361 
---------------------------------
    39     0.1622          5.1361
    38     0.1726          4.9799
    37     0.1917          4.7247
    36     0.2128          4.4848
    35     0.2508          4.1307
    34     0.2887          3.8499
    33     0.3259          3.6238
    32     0.3455          3.5193
    31     0.3597          3.4493
    30     0.3842          3.3375
    29     0.4645          3.0354
    28     0.4931          2.9460
    27     0.5175          2.8757
    26     0.5491          2.7919
    25     0.5844          2.7060
    24     0.6238          2.6194
    23     0.6553          2.5556
    22     0.6726          2.5225
    21     0.6868          2.4963
    20     0.7773          2.3465
    19     0.7939          2.3218
    18     0.8161          2.2900
    17     0.9208          2.1559
    16     0.9734          2.0968
    15     1.0235          2.0448
    14     1.0592          2.0101
    13     1.0891          1.9823
    12     1.1476          1.9311
    11     1.1788          1.9054
    10     1.2530          1.8482
    9     1.3066          1.8099
    8     1.4666          1.7083
    7     1.5365          1.6689
    6     1.6538          1.6087
    5     1.8178          1.5344
    4     2.0752          1.4361
    3     2.4697          1.3164
    2     3.4200          1.1186
    1     4.2797          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
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DV: Employment Performance 
 
 
  Mean VIF      1.86
----------------------------------------------------
intcapxmancap      1.28    1.13    0.7782      0.2218
rdcapxintcap      1.21    1.10    0.8247      0.1753
rdcapxmancap      1.61    1.27    0.6217      0.3783
intellectual_cap      1.69    1.30    0.5934      0.4066
managerial_cap      2.91    1.71    0.3436      0.6564
    rd_cap      1.43    1.20    0.6972      0.3028
lnfogindex      1.24    1.11    0.8091      0.1909
lnpostfundingrates_inventionacti      2.59    1.61    0.3858      0.6142
projecttime      1.40    1.18    0.7161      0.2839
lnp2_academiccompetence      2.48    1.58    0.4027      0.5973
lnp1_academiccompetence      3.64    1.91    0.2749      0.7251
lnp2_intellectualcompetence      1.93    1.39    0.5174      0.4826
lnp1_intellectualcompetence      2.05    1.43    0.4867      0.5133
p2_academicposition_dummy      1.70    1.30    0.5893      0.4107
p1_academicposition_dummy      2.05    1.43    0.4875      0.5125
p2_dr_status      1.42    1.19    0.7026      0.2974
p1_dr_status      2.20    1.48    0.4537      0.5463
p2_mba_status      1.25    1.12    0.7991      0.2009
p1_mba_status      1.54    1.24    0.6478      0.3522
p2_eliteeducation_score      1.53    1.24    0.6530      0.3470
p1_eliteeducation_score      1.80    1.34    0.5563      0.4437
p2_entrepreneurialcapability      2.64    1.63    0.3782      0.6218
p1_entrepreneurialcapability      2.60    1.61    0.3849      0.6151
p2_technicalcapability      2.39    1.55    0.4187      0.5813
p1_technicalcapability      3.08    1.76    0.3243      0.6757
p2_firm_specificcapability      2.92    1.71    0.3430      0.6570
p2_position      1.67    1.29    0.5983      0.4017
p1_position      1.77    1.33    0.5658      0.4342
fit_project_level      1.18    1.08    0.8502      0.1498
success0failure1      1.32    1.15    0.7558      0.2442
lnsuccessmagnitude      1.30    1.14    0.7680      0.2320
 yeardummy      1.33    1.15    0.7545      0.2455
 lnfirmage      3.03    1.74    0.3298      0.6702
innovativeenvironment      1.30    1.14    0.7672      0.2328
industryvolatility_5_year_2013      1.27    1.13    0.7880      0.2120
hubzone_owned      1.24    1.11    0.8069      0.1931
minority_owned      1.14    1.07    0.8742      0.1258
woman_owned      1.32    1.15    0.7556      0.2444
lnemployees      1.95    1.40    0.5125      0.4875
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
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  Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from deviation sscp (no intercept)
 Condition Number         5.1384 
---------------------------------
    39     0.1623          5.1384
    38     0.1709          5.0066
    37     0.1921          4.7227
    36     0.2098          4.5192
    35     0.2566          4.0861
    34     0.2892          3.8487
    33     0.3225          3.6448
    32     0.3399          3.5505
    31     0.3496          3.5005
    30     0.3815          3.3512
    29     0.4716          3.0141
    28     0.4929          2.9484
    27     0.5149          2.8846
    26     0.5596          2.7669
    25     0.5842          2.7080
    24     0.6230          2.6225
    23     0.6552          2.5572
    22     0.6861          2.4990
    21     0.7011          2.4721
    20     0.7750          2.3512
    19     0.7847          2.3367
    18     0.8069          2.3043
    17     0.9205          2.1574
    16     0.9746          2.0967
    15     1.0242          2.0453
    14     1.0601          2.0104
    13     1.0856          1.9866
    12     1.1454          1.9340
    11     1.1722          1.9118
    10     1.2531          1.8491
    9     1.3087          1.8093
    8     1.4701          1.7071
    7     1.5229          1.6773
    6     1.6545          1.6092
    5     1.7865          1.5486
    4     2.0706          1.4385
    3     2.4722          1.3164
    2     3.4646          1.1120
    1     4.2844          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
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DV: Innovation Performance 
   Mean VIF      1.79
----------------------------------------------------
intcapxmancap      1.28    1.13    0.7796      0.2204
rdcapxintcap      1.21    1.10    0.8250      0.1750
rdcapxmancap      1.61    1.27    0.6224      0.3776
intellectual_cap      1.70    1.30    0.5899      0.4101
managerial_cap      2.41    1.55    0.4146      0.5854
    rd_cap      1.36    1.17    0.7343      0.2657
lnfogindex      1.23    1.11    0.8108      0.1892
projecttime      1.38    1.18    0.7225      0.2775
lnp2_academiccompetence      2.48    1.58    0.4030      0.5970
lnp1_academiccompetence      3.62    1.90    0.2762      0.7238
lnp2_intellectualcompetence      1.91    1.38    0.5238      0.4762
lnp1_intellectualcompetence      2.01    1.42    0.4973      0.5027
p2_academicposition_dummy      1.69    1.30    0.5902      0.4098
p1_academicposition_dummy      2.04    1.43    0.4903      0.5097
p2_dr_status      1.40    1.18    0.7134      0.2866
p1_dr_status      2.19    1.48    0.4572      0.5428
p2_mba_status      1.25    1.12    0.8006      0.1994
p1_mba_status      1.55    1.25    0.6445      0.3555
p2_eliteeducation_score      1.52    1.23    0.6597      0.3403
p1_eliteeducation_score      1.78    1.33    0.5616      0.4384
p2_entrepreneurialcapability      2.64    1.62    0.3792      0.6208
p1_entrepreneurialcapability      2.58    1.61    0.3875      0.6125
p2_technicalcapability      2.38    1.54    0.4205      0.5795
p1_technicalcapability      3.15    1.78    0.3172      0.6828
p2_firm_specificcapability      2.85    1.69    0.3511      0.6489
p2_position      1.67    1.29    0.5972      0.4028
p1_position      1.72    1.31    0.5799      0.4201
fit_project_level      1.17    1.08    0.8522      0.1478
success0failure1      1.32    1.15    0.7564      0.2436
lnsuccessmagnitude      1.30    1.14    0.7687      0.2313
 yeardummy      1.33    1.15    0.7497      0.2503
 lnfirmage      2.54    1.59    0.3944      0.6056
innovativeenvironment      1.30    1.14    0.7680      0.2320
industryvolatility_5_year_2013      1.26    1.12    0.7934      0.2066
hubzone_owned      1.22    1.11    0.8178      0.1822
minority_owned      1.13    1.06    0.8827      0.1173
woman_owned      1.28    1.13    0.7799      0.2201
lninnovationperformance      1.62    1.27    0.6161      0.3839
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
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 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0000
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from deviation sscp (no intercept)
 Condition Number         5.1379 
---------------------------------
    38     0.1617          5.1379
    37     0.1856          4.7964
    36     0.1980          4.6429
    35     0.2168          4.4376
    34     0.2910          3.8304
    33     0.3174          3.6675
    32     0.3389          3.5491
    31     0.3649          3.4201
    30     0.4118          3.2196
    29     0.4403          3.1136
    28     0.4803          2.9812
    27     0.5066          2.9028
    26     0.5160          2.8764
    25     0.5745          2.7260
    24     0.6346          2.5937
    23     0.6522          2.5585
    22     0.6726          2.5193
    21     0.6915          2.4846
    20     0.7569          2.3749
    19     0.7855          2.3312
    18     0.8095          2.2965
    17     0.9340          2.1378
    16     0.9724          2.0952
    15     0.9950          2.0713
    14     1.0654          2.0017
    13     1.0780          1.9900
    12     1.1408          1.9345
    11     1.1639          1.9151
    10     1.2390          1.8562
    9     1.2786          1.8272
    8     1.4356          1.7244
    7     1.4898          1.6928
    6     1.6379          1.6144
    5     1.7768          1.5500
    4     2.0592          1.4398
    3     2.4878          1.3099
    2     2.9706          1.1988
    1     4.2688          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
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Appendix 22: Robustness check – system of equations (SUEST) results – full sample 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment 
Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation 
Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment -0.19 -2.92*** -0.24 -3.72*** -0.06 -1.22  0.08  1.49  0.05  0.99  0.05  0.83 
Discontinuation -0.06 -0.56 -0.06 -0.53 -0.16 -1.48  0.02  0.15 -0.03 -0.29 -0.20 -1.86* 
Fit -0.11 -1.05 -0.13 -1.29 -0.02 -0.23 -0.08 -0.75 -0.09 -0.93 -0.02 -0.18 
Portfolio-level constructs             
Fit  0.28  2.59***  0.31  2.92***  0.14  1.44 -0.03 -0.32 -0.01 -0.08  0.12  1.09 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.45  1.58  0.46  2.03*  0.20  1.12  0.27  1.10  0.40  1.77*  0.25  1.49 
Non-minority-owned -0.11 -0.31 -0.23 -0.86  0.38  2.26**  0.06  0.20  0.01  0.02  0.57  3.79*** 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.41 -1.25 -0.52 -1.66 -0.18 -0.65 -0.05 -0.21 -0.11 -0.42  0.12  0.59 
Industry volatility -0.21 -2.20*** -0.12 -1.44  0.03  0.38 -0.04 -0.52  0.05  0.65  0.06  0.95 
State innovativeness -0.05 -0.89 -0.06 -1.06  0.04  0.70  0.02  0.53  0.03  0.72  0.12  2.64*** 
Firm age  0.02  0.30 -0.11 -1.94* -0.18 -3.05***  0.46  8.84***  0.47  9.63***  0.13  2.21** 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.12   0.15   0.09   0.26   0.29   0.12  
Adjusted R2  0.08   0.12   0.05   0.23   0.23   0.08  
  N= 367 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 23: Robustness check – system of equations (SUEST) results – cluster with no prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield  
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment 
Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation 
Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment -0.43 -4.05*** -0.41 -4.92*** -0.09 -0.65 -0.14 -2.11** -0.19 -2.50**  0.01  0.10 
Discontinuation -0.35 -1.93* -0.27 -1.81* -0.50 -2.00** -0.18 -1.52 -0.25 -1.74* -0.26 -1.67 
Fit  0.21  1.24  0.22  1.66  0.13  0.54  0.12  0.98  0.20  1.45  0.05  0.34 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.46  1.17  0.68  2.40**  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.51  0.59  3.95*** -0.07 -0.20 
Non-minority-owned -0.08 -0.12 -0.24 -0.57  0.80  1.78*  0.09  0.26 -0.01 -0.04  0.55  2.03** 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.11 -0.25 -0.20 -0.56 -0.26 -0.56 -0.10 -0.35 -0.26 -0.79 -0.12 -0.46 
Industry volatility -0.21 -1.14 -0.06 -0.45  0.10  0.71 -0.12 -1.09 -0.01 -0.07  0.09  1.00 
State innovativeness  0.03  0.24  0.02  0.24  0.08  0.59  0.02  0.25  0.01  0.17  0.05  0.73 
Firm age  0.49  4.04***  0.37  4.17*** -0.06 -0.45  0.30  3.53***  0.36  4.09*** -0.01 -0.09 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.37    0.41   0.13   0.29   0.33   0.19  
Adjusted R2  0.28    0.33   0.01   0.20   0.24   0.08  
  N= 128 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 24: Robustness check – system of equations (SUEST) results – cluster with prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment 
Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation 
Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs -0.03 -0.49 -0.08 -1.31 -0.02 -0.32  0.15  2.44**  0.13  2.16**  0.05  0.76 
Initial commitment  0.07  0.67  0.03  0.29 -0.02 -0.22  0.06  0.39  0.00  0.03 -0.21 -1.46 
Discontinuation -0.02 -0.17 -0.07 -0.68  0.01  0.12 -0.18 -1.40 -0.23 -1.87* -0.04 -0.30 
Fit             
Portfolio-level constructs             
Initial commitment -0.13 -2.43** -0.15 -2.59** -0.11 -2.71*** -0.09 -1.14 -0.05 -0.66 -0.06 -0.93 
Sequencing -0.19 -4.43*** -0.24 -5.62*** -0.15 -3.30*** -0.01 -0.27 -0.01 -0.17 -0.03 -0.55 
Fit  0.17  1.78*  0.15  1.50  0.14  1.39 -0.11 -0.93 -0.14 -1.20  0.16  1.11 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.10  0.36  0.02  0.08  0.23  1.50  0.36  1.23  0.35  1.24  0.46  2.10* 
Non-minority-owned  0.01  0.04 -0.11 -0.48  0.34  2.40**  0.12  0.35  0.05  0.14  0.69  3.12*** 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.24 -0.67 -0.39 -1.11  0.10  0.40 -0.10 -0.31 -0.11 -0.31  0.28  0.91 
Industry volatility -0.07 -0.62  0.01  0.07 -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.29  0.05  0.40 -0.03 -0.28 
State innovativeness  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.15  0.04  0.91  0.01  0.22  0.03  0.56  0.13  2.15** 
Firm age  0.08  1.41  0.04  0.75 -0.09 -1.37  0.52  5.88***  0.50  6.00***  0.16  1.54 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.16   0.18   0.13   0.26   0.27   0.13  
Adjusted R2  0.09   0.12   0.06   0.20   0.22   0.06  
  N= 239 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 25: Sensitivity analysis – system of equations (SUR) results – full sample, clusters with no prior awards and with prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
 Full sample No prior awards With prior awards 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment -0.16 -3.01*** -0.24 -4.47*** -0.48 -3.42*** -0.49 -4.59***  0.00  0.02 -0.05 -1.36 
Discontinuation -0.04 -0.31 -0.05 -0.49 -0.25 -1.00 -0.27 -1.38  0.07  0.80  0.04  0.39 
Fit -0.08 -0.73 -0.13 -1.19  0.23  0.97  0.27  1.48 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.70 
Portfolio-level constructs             
Initial commitment         -0.09 -2.05** -0.13 -2.49** 
Sequencing         -0.11 -3.32*** -0.18 -4.44*** 
Fit  0.25  2.16**  0.32  2.92***      0.13  1.74*  0.17  1.90* 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.38  1.38  0.48  1.97  0.42  0.79  0.70  1.83* -0.01 -0.02  0.01  0.03 
Non-minority-owned -0.03 -0.09 -0.14 -0.44  0.02  0.03 -0.16 -0.27  0.05  0.25 -0.01 -0.06 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.38 -1.31 -0.51 -1.96 -0.08 -0.15 -0.24 -0.63 -0.22 -1.22 -0.31 -1.36 
Industry volatility -0.27 -3.47*** -0.17 -2.06 -0.33 -1.75 -0.11 -0.73 -0.09 -0.90 -0.04 -0.49 
State innovativeness -0.03 -0.63 -0.05 -0.91  0.04  0.38  0.01  0.07  0.02  0.56  0.03  0.75 
Firm age  0.06  1.13 -0.06 -1.19  0.57  4.15***  0.47  4.33***  0.03  0.65  0.03  0.53 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
N  367   367   128   128   239   239  
R2  0.24   0.38   0.33   0.39   0.15   0.17  
Adjusted R2  0.20   0.35   0.24   0.31   0.09   0.11  
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 26: Sensitivity analysis of robustness check – system of equations (SUEST) results – full sample, clusters with no prior awards and with prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
 Full sample No prior awards With prior awards 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level constructs             
Initial commitment -0.16 -2.48** -0.24 -3.52*** -0.48 -3.53*** -0.49 -4.97***  0.00  0.01 -0.05 -0.86 
Discontinuation -0.04 -0.34 -0.05 -0.53 -0.25 -1.25 -0.27 -1.54  0.07  0.83  0.04  0.40 
Fit -0.08 -0.90 -0.13 -1.36  0.23  1.17  0.27  1.67 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.74 
Portfolio-level constructs             
Initial commitment         -0.09 -2.43** -0.13 -2.86*** 
Sequencing         -0.11 -3.79*** -0.18 -4.98*** 
Fit  0.25  2.48**  0.32  3.17***      0.13  1.80*  0.17  1.98** 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.38  1.47  0.48  2.15**  0.42  1.25  0.70  2.77*** -0.01 -0.02  0.01  0.03 
Non-minority-owned -0.03 -0.10 -0.14 -0.52  0.02  0.03 -0.16 -0.31  0.05  0.31 -0.01 -0.07 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.38 -1.05 -0.51 -1.45 -0.08 -0.14 -0.24 -0.53 -0.22 -0.67 -0.31 -0.83 
Industry volatility -0.27 -2.61*** -0.17 -1.78* -0.33 -1.57 -0.11 -0.66 -0.09 -0.80 -0.04 -0.44 
State innovativeness -0.03 -0.55 -0.05 -0.83  0.04  0.32  0.01  0.06  0.02  0.62  0.03  0.83 
Firm age  0.06  0.94 -0.06 -1.10  0.57  3.35***  0.47  4.08***  0.03  0.72  0.03  0.60 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
N  367   367   128   128   239   239  
R2  0.12   0.15   0.33    0.39   0.15   0.17  
Adjusted R2  0.08   0.11   0.24    0.31   0.09   0.11  
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 27: Robustness check – OLS model results – full sample – DV: initial commitment 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:         
Role legitimacy          
Manager CEO -0.05 -0.36     -0.05 -0.39 
PI CEO -0.04 -0.31     -0.02 -0.13 
PI’s firm tenure -0.21 -2.53**     -0.23 -2.81*** 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
-0.13 -1.33     -0.11 -1.22 
PI’s technical experience  0.15  1.96**      0.10  1.36 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.17 -2.08**     -0.14 -1.72 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
 0.04  0.51      0.05  0.67 
Resource legitimacy          
Manager’s elite education  0.14  1.61      0.12  1.31 
PI’s elite education -0.10 -1.41     -0.07 -0.88 
Manager’s MBA -0.17 -0.94     -0.20 -1.19 
PI’s MBA  0.15  0.75      0.06  0.28 
Manager’s PhD  0.14  0.82      0.13  0.72 
PI’s PhD  0.06  0.19     -0.01 -0.04 
Manager’s professorship  0.10  0.61      0.12  0.70 
PI’s professorship  0.26  1.44      0.29  1.66 
Intellectual legitimacy         
Manager’s patents -0.09 -1.02     -0.10 -1.07 
PI’s patents  0.16  2.32**      0.15  2.12 
Manager’s publications  0.01  0.13      0.01  0.08 
PI’s publications -0.18 -2.17**     -0.17 -2.01* 
Abstract readability  0.25  0.26      0.06  0.06 
Capabilities         
R&D capability    0.73  1.29    0.56  0.92 
Managerial capability    0.42  1.06   -0.01 -0.02 
Intellectual Capability   -0.24 -0.62   -0.19 -0.40 
Project appeal         
Project scope (broad)     -0.30 -2.87*** -0.29 -2.41** 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     0.22  1.22  0.24  1.33 
Cancer treatment research      0.20  1.07  0.20  1.07 
Cancer biology research      0.58  2.54**  0.56  2.39** 
Control variables:         
Non-woman-owned  0.06  0.26  0.11  0.54  0.14  0.72 -0.01 -0.03 
Non-minority-owned  0.15  0.53  0.14  0.49  0.16  0.56  0.16  0.57 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.13 -0.35 -0.27 -0.75 -0.29 -0.80 -0.12 -0.34 
Industry volatility -0.04 -0.32  0.05  0.53 -0.01 -0.15 -0.09 -0.83 
State innovativeness  0.04  0.65  0.02  0.39  0.02  0.38  0.03  0.61 
Firm age  0.20  2.68***  0.04  0.76  0.08  1.59  0.23  2.90*** 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   
R2  0.16   0.05   0.08  0.20  
Adjusted R2  0.08   0.01   0.04  0.10  
  N= 367 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 28: Robustness check – OLS model results – cluster with no prior awards – DV: initial commitment 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:         
Role legitimacy          
Manager CEO -0.11 -0.57     -0.14 -0.67 
PI CEO  0.18  0.86      0.24  1.16 
PI’s firm tenure -0.35 -2.02*     -0.34 -2.00* 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
-0.04 -0.27     -0.02 -0.16 
PI’s technical experience  0.03  0.26      0.00  0.03 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.15 -1.23     -0.19 -1.41 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
 0.09  0.65      0.13  0.80 
Resource legitimacy          
Manager’s elite education -0.04 -0.31     -0.07 -0.59 
PI’s elite education -0.05 -0.52     -0.06 -0.60 
Manager’s MBA -0.11 -0.50     -0.09 -0.38 
PI’s MBA  0.29  0.69      0.16  0.36 
Manager’s PhD  0.04  0.14      0.03  0.11 
PI’s PhD  0.27  0.76      0.33  0.79 
Manager’s professorship -0.06 -0.25     -0.10 -0.36 
PI’s professorship  0.47  1.93*      0.51  2.10** 
Intellectual legitimacy         
Manager’s patents -0.01 -0.05      0.01  0.04 
PI’s patents  0.08  0.73      0.09  0.69 
Manager’s publications -0.15 -1.15     -0.22 -1.59 
PI’s publications -0.13 -1.17     -0.11 -0.78 
Abstract readability  0.04  0.03     -0.19 -0.12 
Capabilities         
R&D capability    0.81  1.10    0.27  0.30 
Managerial capability   -0.26 -0.59   -1.01 -1.78* 
Intellectual Capability   -0.57 -0.88   -0.15 -0.16 
Project appeal         
Project scope (broad)     -0.19 -1.05 -0.10 -0.46 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
    -0.10 -0.29  0.06  0.16 
Cancer treatment research     -0.10 -0.27  0.15  0.38 
Cancer biology research      0.25  0.53  0.21  0.44 
Control variables:         
Non-woman-owned  0.06  0.17 -0.11 -0.34 -0.03 -0.10  0.15  0.42 
Non-minority-owned  0.21  0.61  0.30  1.27  0.20  0.76  0.28  0.76 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.03  0.07 -0.24 -0.76 -0.22 -0.71 -0.01 -0.03 
Industry volatility -0.08 -0.47 -0.15 -0.96 -0.17 -1.12 -0.06 -0.34 
State innovativeness  0.04  0.59  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.15  0.04  0.50 
Firm age  0.19  1.60  0.02  0.33  0.03  0.46  0.25  2.03** 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    
R2  0.30   0.11   0.10   0.34  
Adjusted R2  0.06  -0.01  -0.03   0.04  
  N= 128 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 29: Robustness check – OLS model results – cluster with prior awards – DV: initial commitment 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3-1) Distortions (3-2) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent 
variables: 
          
Role legitimacy            
Manager CEO -0.02 -0.10       -0.10 -0.47 
PI CEO -0.17 -0.86       -0.16 -0.80 
PI’s firm tenure -0.16 -1.31       -0.16 -1.21 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
-0.12 -0.91       -0.10 -0.78 
PI’s technical 
experience 
 0.20  1.69        0.16  1.32 
Manager’s 
entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.21 -1.87*       -0.15 -1.28 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
 0.03  0.24        0.05  0.47 
Resource legitimacy            
Manager’s elite 
education 
 0.18  1.60        0.16  1.38 
PI’s elite education -0.10 -0.93       -0.04 -0.42 
Manager’s MBA -0.17 -0.52       -0.19 -0.57 
PI’s MBA -0.03 -0.11       -0.20 -0.63 
Manager’s PhD  0.22  0.80        0.14  0.47 
PI’s PhD -0.16 -0.30       -0.29 -0.52 
Manager’s 
professorship 
 0.19  0.70        0.15  0.53 
PI’s professorship  0.12  0.50        0.16  0.71 
Intellectual legitimacy           
Manager’s patents -0.14 -1.26       -0.19 -1.74* 
PI’s patents  0.19  1.98*        0.17  1.90* 
Manager’s 
publications 
 0.06  0.45        0.11  0.79 
PI’s publications -0.22 -1.89*       -0.23 -2.14** 
Abstract readability  0.70  0.56        0.18  0.15 
Capabilities           
R&D capability    0.61  0.72     -0.03 -0.03 
Managerial capability    0.59  1.14      0.20  0.37 
Intellectual capability   -0.19 -0.39     -0.19 -0.31 
Project appeal           
Project scope (broad)     -0.34 -2.28**   -0.35 -2.03** 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     0.36  1.56    0.21  0.83 
Cancer treatment 
research 
     0.38  1.62    0.16  0.65 
Cancer biology 
research 
     0.63  2.30**    0.67  2.28** 
Prior funding decisions           
Initial commitment 
(portfolio) 
       0.22  2.16**  0.22  2.15** 
Sequencing (portfolio)       -0.02 -0.29 -0.02 -0.24 
Fit (portfolio)        0.35  2.01**  0.28  1.50 
Control variables:           
Non-woman-owned  0.17  0.57  0.25  0.94  0.21  0.80  0.27  1.09  0.09  0.30 
Non-minority-owned  0.17  0.45  0.10  0.26  0.12  0.31  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.04 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.26 -0.37 -0.38 -0.56 -0.51 -0.72 -0.49 -0.69 -0.31 -0.46 
Industry volatility  0.03  0.18  0.16  1.33  0.05  0.37  0.12  0.96 -0.11 -0.65 
State innovativeness  0.01  0.20  0.00  0.01  0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.15 -0.05 -0.66 
Firm age  0.09  0.68 -0.09 -0.94 -0.03 -0.39  0.06  0.76  0.15  1.00 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    
R2  0.17   0.07   0.10   0.11   0.27  
Adjusted R2  0.05   0.01   0.04   0.06   0.11  
   N= 239 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 30: Robustness check – Logit model results – full sample – DV: discontinuation 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:         
Role legitimacy          
Manager CEO -0.13 -0.38      0.01  0.03 
PI CEO -1.06 -3.17***     -1.01 -2.88*** 
PI’s firm tenure  0.30  1.18      0.37  1.45 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
 0.19  0.75      0.26  0.99 
PI’s technical experience -0.22 -0.93     -0.23 -0.93 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.04 -0.17     -0.08 -0.26 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.01 -0.02     -0.07 -0.25 
Resource legitimacy          
Manager’s elite education  0.03  0.17      0.02  0.10 
PI’s elite education  0.10  0.59      0.17  0.98 
Manager’s MBA  0.15  0.30      0.12  0.22 
PI’s MBA -1.17 -1.35     -1.19 -1.27 
Manager’s PhD  0.24  0.50      0.36  0.75 
PI’s PhD  0.07  0.10     -0.32 -0.44 
Manager’s professorship -0.05 -0.12     -0.05 -0.12 
PI’s professorship -0.57 -1.55     -0.58 -1.46 
Intellectual legitimacy         
Manager’s patents  0.31  1.53      0.31  1.50 
PI’s patents  0.19  1.03      0.14  0.79 
Manager’s publications -0.25 -1.03     -0.23 -0.88 
PI’s publications -0.24 -1.33     -0.28 -1.30 
Abstract readability -0.07 -0.54     -0.09 -0.62 
Efficacy         
Project duration   0.33  2.37**      0.37  2.43** 
Invention activity -0.31 -1.91*     -0.65 -3.22*** 
Capabilities         
R&D capability   -0.05 -0.45    0.00  0.00 
Managerial capability    0.16  1.24    0.52  2.72*** 
Intellectual capability   -0.02 -0.16    0.10  0.43 
Project appeal         
Project scope (broad)      0.14  0.55  0.07  0.20 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     0.82  2.23**  0.90  2.01** 
Cancer treatment research      0.91  2.41**  0.72  1.58 
Cancer biology research      0.92  1.90*  0.98  1.63 
Prior funding decisions         
Initial commitment (project)      0.03  0.24 -0.04 -0.27 
Control variables:         
Non-woman-owned -0.24 -0.43  0.14  0.31  0.02  0.05 -0.45 -0.78 
Non-minority-owned -0.20 -0.24 -0.26 -0.39 -0.30 -0.46 -0.32 -0.34 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.50  0.73  1.03  1.83*  0.95  1.72*  0.69  0.94 
Industry volatility -0.21 -0.58 -0.25 -0.88 -0.35 -1.14 -0.34 -0.88 
State innovativeness  0.24  1.57  0.21  1.73*  0.24  1.98**  0.28  1.71* 
Firm age -0.12 -0.60 -0.04 -0.28  0.03  0.22 -0.21 -0.98 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   
Pseudo R2  0.19   0.09   0.10   0.22  
   N= 360 
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 31: Robustness check – Logit model results – cluster with no prior awards – DV: discontinuation 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:         
Role legitimacy          
Manager CEO  0.42  0.50      1.23  1.03 
PI CEO -1.51 -2.14**     -2.34 -1.83* 
PI’s firm tenure  0.72  1.30      0.96  0.97 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
 0.41  0.97      0.61  1.22 
PI’s technical experience  0.03  0.06     -0.37 -0.60 
Manager’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.14 -0.37      0.01  0.02 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
-0.13 -0.28     -0.42 -0.50 
Resource legitimacy          
Manager’s elite education -0.04 -0.08      0.04  0.07 
PI’s elite education  0.10  0.30      0.58  1.75* 
Manager’s MBA -0.35 -0.49     -0.82 -0.79 
PI’s MBA -1.80 -1.24     -2.42 -1.60 
Manager’s PhD -0.50 -0.66     -0.28 -0.21 
PI’s PhD -0.02 -0.02     -0.63 -0.50 
Manager’s professorship  0.37  0.43      0.75  0.63 
PI’s professorship -0.81 -0.81     -1.12 -0.68 
Intellectual legitimacy         
Manager’s patents  0.06  0.12      0.37  0.51 
PI’s patents  0.27  0.75      0.27  0.65 
Manager’s publications -0.03 -0.05     -0.34 -0.40 
PI’s publications -0.26 -0.80      0.24  0.43 
Abstract readability  0.04  0.12     -0.22 -0.60 
Efficacy         
Project duration   0.43  1.47      0.77  2.27** 
Invention activity -0.07 -0.19     -0.28 -0.64 
Capabilities         
R&D capability        0.44  1.50 
Managerial capability        0.62  1.29 
Intellectual capability       -0.90 -1.54 
Project appeal         
Project scope (broad)     -0.51 -1.02 -0.91 -1.38 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     1.21  1.76*  1.81  1.61 
Cancer treatment research      1.39  2.03**  1.41  1.44 
Cancer biology research      2.42  2.41**  4.17  2.75*** 
Prior funding decisions         
Initial commitment (project)     -0.12 -0.48 -0.17 -0.33 
Control variables:         
Non-woman-owned  0.78  0.59  1.52  1.30  1.56  1.31  0.22  0.13 
Non-minority-owned -0.88 -0.60 -1.58 -1.33 -1.69 -1.31 -0.43 -0.22 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.15  0.16  0.91  1.17  1.06  1.29  0.08  0.06 
Industry volatility -0.67 -0.86 -0.33 -0.65 -0.49 -0.95 -0.97 -0.98 
State innovativeness  0.07  0.24  0.04  0.18  0.16  0.69  0.08  0.24 
Firm age -0.65 -1.53 -0.30 -1.27 -0.17 -0.72 -0.62 -1.00 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    
Pseudo R2  0.24   0.13   0.15   0.35  
  N= 124 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 32: Robustness check – Logit model results – cluster with prior awards – DV: discontinuation 
 (1) Observables  (2) Unobservables (3-1) Distortions (3-2) Distortions (4) Full Model 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:           
Role legitimacy            
Manager CEO -0.47 -0.97       -0.49 -0.91 
PI CEO -1.14 -2.33**       -1.01 -1.96* 
PI’s firm tenure  0.15  0.39        0.46  1.10 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
 0.17  0.49        0.25  0.61 
PI’s technical 
experience 
-0.44 -1.46       -0.47 -1.26 
Manager’s 
entrepreneurial 
experience 
 0.01  0.03        0.02  0.04 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
 0.20  0.60        0.06  0.15 
Resource legitimacy            
Manager’s elite 
education 
 0.07  0.26        0.06  0.20 
PI’s elite education  0.09  0.43        0.17  0.71 
Manager’s MBA  0.53  0.60        0.54  0.56 
PI’s MBA -0.74 -0.78       -1.05 -0.94 
Manager’s PhD  0.39  0.56        0.71  1.02 
PI’s PhD  0.18  0.15       -0.31 -0.26 
Manager’s 
professorship 
-0.02 -0.05       -0.11 -0.21 
PI’s professorship -0.76 -1.50       -0.96 -1.66 
Intellectual legitimacy           
Manager’s patents  0.55  2.03**        0.66  2.07** 
PI’s patents  0.18  0.76        0.08  0.31 
Manager’s publications -0.33 -0.83       -0.36 -0.76 
PI’s publications -0.36 -1.41       -0.43 -1.66 
Abstract readability -0.17 -0.88       -0.13 -0.65 
Efficacy           
Project duration   0.22  1.17        0.32  1.58 
Invention activity -0.41 -1.78*       -0.78 -2.65** 
Capabilities           
R&D capability         -0.28 -1.20 
Managerial capability          0.61  2.01** 
Intellectual capability          0.32  1.04 
Project appeal           
Project scope (broad)      0.32  1.03    0.27  0.58 
Cancer detection and 
diagnosis research 
     0.66  1.38    0.43  0.67 
Cancer treatment 
research 
     0.72  1.47    0.42  0.62 
Cancer biology 
research 
     0.38  0.64   -0.22 -0.25 
Prior funding decisions           
Initial commitment 
(project) 
       0.04  0.29  0.04  0.22 
Initial commitment 
(portfolio) 
       0.01  0.05 -0.11 -0.53 
Sequencing (portfolio)       -0.32 -2.07** -0.24 -1.35 
Fit (portfolio)       -0.01 -0.04  0.28  0.67 
Control variables:           
Non-woman-owned -0.57 -0.76 -0.04 -0.07 -0.23 -0.42 -0.17 -0.33 -0.35 -0.40 
Non-minority-owned -0.13 -0.09  0.17  0.19  0.11  0.13  0.43  0.52 -0.33 -0.21 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.19  0.15  0.85  0.95  0.78  0.89  0.88  0.99  0.41  0.32 
Industry volatility  0.01  0.01 -0.27 -0.74 -0.34 -0.87 -0.31 -0.84 -0.09 -0.17 
State innovativeness  0.40  1.99**  0.27  1.68**  0.32  2.05**  0.33  2.13**  0.53  2.17** 
Firm age -0.01 -0.02  0.01  0.07  0.09  0.48  0.15  0.77 -0.26 -0.77 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.     Incl.    
Pseudo R2  0.24   0.11   0.11   0.12   0.30  
N= 236 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
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Appendix 33: Robustness check – system of equations (SUEST) results – full sample 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level funding             
Initial commitment -0.17 -2.69*** -0.22 -3.64*** -0.03 -0.49  0.03  0.55  0.02  0.36  0.03  0.59 
Discontinuation  0.00  0.02  0.00 -0.01 -0.17 -1.58  0.10  0.96  0.05  0.49 -0.26 -2.56** 
Fit -0.10 -1.02 -0.13 -1.37 -0.05 -0.57 -0.04 -0.44 -0.08 -0.90 -0.05 -0.55 
Portfolio-level funding             
Fit  0.22  2.06**  0.26  2.57**  0.08  0.88 -0.05 -0.50 -0.03 -0.27  0.07  0.67 
Role legitimacy              
Manager CEO -0.13 -0.83 -0.18 -1.09 -0.05 -0.38 -0.33 -2.34** -0.35 -2.45** -0.10 -0.77 
PI CEO  0.05  0.38  0.05  0.37 -0.15 -1.14  0.08  0.79  0.06  0.59 -0.11 -1.01 
PI’s firm tenure -0.35 -3.25*** -0.34 -3.71*** -0.08 -0.94 -0.19 -1.96* -0.19 -2.34**  0.02  0.19 
Manager’s technical experience  0.06  0.47  0.08  0.56  0.10  1.04 -0.03 -0.40 -0.05 -0.66  0.13  1.20 
PI’s technical experience  0.06  0.64  0.09  1.13  0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.33 -0.04 -0.62 -0.07 -0.96 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.36 -0.03 -0.29  0.03  0.27  0.02  0.20  0.04  0.42 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience  0.12  1.31  0.06  0.78  0.01  0.15 -0.11 -1.36 -0.09 -1.13 -0.11 -1.31 
Resource legitimacy              
Manager’s elite education -0.07 -0.95 -0.04 -0.49 -0.02 -0.35  0.10  1.40  0.10  1.36  0.11  1.79* 
PI’s elite education  0.05  0.71  0.08  1.11  0.05  0.80 -0.03 -0.45  0.02  0.35  0.00  0.07 
Manager’s MBA  0.42  1.78*  0.41  2.08**  0.16  0.66 -0.04 -0.27  0.03  0.24 -0.24 -1.24 
PI’s MBA -0.29 -1.27 -0.33 -1.33  0.04  0.13 -0.23 -1.37 -0.23 -1.32  0.19  0.87 
Manager’s PhD  0.02  0.11  0.10  0.44  0.11  0.59  0.06  0.38  0.10  0.56 -0.11 -0.71 
PI’s PhD -0.23 -0.61 -0.12 -0.45 -0.06 -0.23 -0.41 -1.01 -0.34 -1.03 -0.01 -0.05 
Manager’s professorship -0.11 -0.67 -0.13 -0.76  0.03  0.16 -0.10 -0.78 -0.01 -0.08  0.02  0.14 
PI’s professorship -0.09 -0.69 -0.05 -0.36 -0.41 -2.75***  0.17  1.25  0.14  1.00 -0.33 -2.76*** 
Intellectual legitimacy             
Manager’s patents -0.06 -0.76 -0.06 -0.78  0.02  0.22 -0.12 -1.91* -0.07 -0.96 -0.01 -0.09 
PI’s patents -0.06 -0.81 -0.04 -0.65  0.08  1.06 -0.05 -0.87  0.00  0.00  0.13  2.11** 
Manager’s publications  0.03  0.25 -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 -1.15  0.07  0.78  0.02  0.24 -0.04 -0.32 
PI’s publications  0.03  0.31  0.01  0.08  0.15  1.61  0.06  0.90  0.08  1.16  0.17  2.16** 
Abstract readability  0.02  0.41 -0.01 -0.16 -0.01 -0.19  0.02  0.54  0.00  0.06  0.00 -0.06 
Efficacy             
Project duration  -0.14 -2.41** -0.18 -3.09*** -0.12 -2.27** -0.04 -0.96 -0.08 -1.79*  0.02  0.39 
Invention activity  0.13  1.63  0.05  0.68    0.31  3.96***  0.26  3.41***   
Capabilities             
R&D capability -0.01 -0.14  0.01  0.07  0.03  0.44 -0.02 -0.42  0.00 -0.02  0.12  2.03** 
Managerial capability  0.09  0.73  0.05  0.47  0.20  2.12** -0.09 -0.92 -0.04 -0.43  0.22  2.08* 
Intellectual capability -0.09 -1.33 -0.02 -0.37  0.08  1.19 -0.02 -0.47 -0.01 -0.29  0.08  1.47 
R&DCapXManCap  0.00 -0.06  0.00  0.03 -0.02 -0.45  0.05  0.99  0.02   0.35 -0.01 -0.23 
R&DCapXIntCap  0.01  0.06 -0.01 -0.15  0.06  0.73  0.02  0.31 -0.01 -0.14  0.03  0.52 
IntCapXManCap  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.83  0.01  0.08  0.08  1.17  0.08  1.26  0.14  1.58 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.48  1.55  0.50  2.06**  0.03  0.16  0.27  1.02  0.34  1.36 -0.08 -0.48 
Non-minority-owned -0.40 -0.96 -0.51 -1.54  0.16  0.86 -0.43 -1.37 -0.43 -1.28  0.30  1.85 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.24 -0.66 -0.26 -0.80 -0.16 -0.60 -0.05 -0.17 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 -0.17 
Industry volatility -0.22 -2.50** -0.16 -2.04** -0.05 -0.69 -0.06 -0.86  0.02  0.24 -0.04 -0.60 
State innovativeness -0.09 -1.46 -0.09 -1.64  0.01  0.16 -0.03 -0.65 -0.03 -0.59  0.07  1.38 
Firm age  0.14  1.37  0.04  0.47 -0.20 -2.57**  0.51  5.81***  0.53  7.10*** -0.02 -0.34 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   
R2  0.27   0.31   0.24   0.49   0.50   0.38  
Adjusted R2  0.17   0.22   0.14   0.42   0.43   0.30  
   N= 367;   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 34: Robustness check – system of equations (SUEST) results – cluster with no prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation Performance 
 Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value Coefficient  
estimate 
t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level funding             
Initial commitment -0.32 -2.63** -0.34 -4.01***  0.13  0.73 -0.10 -1.25 -0.14 -1.73  0.13  1.13 
Discontinuation -0.10 -0.49 -0.11 -0.78 -0.19 -0.75 -0.05 -0.36 -0.14 -1.09 -0.09 -0.57 
Fit -0.04 -0.26  0.03  0.25 -0.18 -0.76 -0.03 -0.28  0.01  0.06 -0.12 -0.82 
Role legitimacy              
Manager CEO -0.06 -0.27  0.02  0.10  0.22  0.80 -0.06 -0.42 -0.01 -0.03  0.09  0.46 
PI CEO -0.07 -0.29 -0.15 -0.93 -0.82 -2.52**  0.04  0.29 -0.15 -1.05 -0.44 -2.19** 
PI’s firm tenure -0.40 -1.58 -0.29 -1.79* -0.34 -1.10 -0.31 -1.83* -0.33 -2.05* -0.26 -1.43 
Manager’s technical experience -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 -0.36  0.29  1.49 -0.08 -0.66 -0.10 -0.91  0.12  0.98 
PI’s technical experience -0.15 -0.84 -0.01 -0.12 -0.08 -0.41 -0.10 -1.27 -0.06 -0.69 -0.04 -0.36 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience  0.35  1.62  0.17  1.12  0.05  0.18  0.23  1.65  0.16  1.07  0.05  0.32 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience  0.08  0.44  0.01  0.08  0.03  0.19  0.11  0.81  0.12  1.00  0.06  0.53 
Resource legitimacy              
Manager’s elite education  0.13  1.24  0.12  1.39  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.89  0.11  1.07 -0.05 -0.46 
PI’s elite education  0.05  0.58  0.11  1.57 -0.06 -0.39  0.04  0.51  0.10  1.19 -0.04 -0.45 
Manager’s MBA  0.50  1.84*  0.29  1.49  0.24  0.73  0.28  1.76*  0.18  0.89  0.12  0.61 
PI’s MBA  0.42  1.14  0.56  2.01*  0.26  0.37  0.04  0.19  0.31  1.16 -0.02 -0.05 
Manager’s PhD -0.35 -1.30 -0.30 -1.21  0.01  0.02 -0.20 -1.17 -0.34 -1.47 -0.01 -0.05 
PI’s PhD -0.07 -0.13  0.18  0.64 -0.13 -0.26 -0.03 -0.09  0.17  0.73 -0.12 -0.40 
Manager’s professorship  0.29  1.12  0.17  0.90  0.45  1.22  0.15  0.86  0.14  0.68  0.24  1.04 
PI’s professorship  0.22  0.86  0.24  1.15 -0.70 -1.94*  0.10  0.68  0.13  0.77 -0.45 -2.16** 
Intellectual legitimacy             
Manager’s patents -0.02 -0.08  0.02  0.11 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.39 -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -0.22 
PI’s patents  0.14  0.84  0.13  1.23  0.48  2.92***  0.09  0.85  0.15  1.58  0.29  2.78*** 
Manager’s publications  0.30  1.15  0.23  1.20 -0.15 -0.71  0.22  1.51  0.27  1.52 -0.02 -0.17 
PI’s publications  0.11  0.66  0.04  0.32  0.16  0.73  0.05  0.70  0.04  0.48  0.06  0.48 
Abstract readability  0.10  1.13  0.04  0.51 -0.13 -0.98  0.10  1.59  0.09  1.43 -0.08 -1.00 
Efficacy             
Project duration  -0.17 -1.31 -0.17 -2.46** -0.46 -3.34*** -0.01 -0.18 -0.07 -1.03 -0.27 -2.93*** 
Invention activity  0.09  0.59  0.01  0.05    0.03  0.29  0.04  0.39   
Capabilities             
R&D capability  0.10  0.65  0.09  0.84  0.34  1.96*  0.01  0.08  0.03  0.32  0.19  1.84* 
Managerial capability  0.80  2.55**  0.53  3.27***  0.34  0.73  0.53  2.76**  0.57  3.49***  0.14  0.53 
Intellectual capability -0.37 -1.92* -0.15 -1.19 -0.01 -0.06 -0.23 -2.12** -0.15 -1.38 -0.02 -0.16 
R&DCapXManCap -0.25 -1.67 -0.22 -2.41**  0.35  1.95* -0.15 -1.49 -0.25 -2.55**  0.26  2.65*** 
R&DCapXIntCap -0.20 -1.82* -0.17 -2.32** -0.15 -1.33 -0.06 -1.00 -0.11 -1.61 -0.05 -0.78 
IntCapXManCap -0.35 -1.21 -0.04 -0.31 -0.66 -2.00* -0.24 -1.28 -0.04 -0.29 -0.37 -1.87* 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.45  1.25  0.67  2.21** -0.41 -0.77  0.13  0.44  0.55  2.73*** -0.30 -0.97 
Non-minority-owned -0.43 -0.54 -0.47 -1.01  0.76  1.23 -0.14 -0.35 -0.26 -0.62  0.58  1.60 
Non-HubZone-owned  0.00 -0.01 -0.11 -0.35 -0.37 -0.75 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.51 -0.12 -0.41 
Industry volatility -0.10 -0.56 -0.06 -0.47 -0.07 -0.34 -0.03 -0.27  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.04 
State innovativeness -0.02 -0.22 -0.02 -0.30  0.14  1.08 -0.01 -0.15 -0.04 -0.42  0.10  1.27 
Firm age  0.46  2.49**  0.35  2.88** -0.03 -0.14  0.30  2.49**  0.34  2.77**  0.02  0.22 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.63   0.68   0.44   0.56   0.64   0.45  
Adjusted R2  0.44   0.52   0.16   0.34   0.46   0.17  
  N= 128;  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 35: Robustness check – system of equations (SUEST) results – cluster with prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
Equation 3 
Innovation Yield 
Equation 4 
Sales Performance 
Equation 5 
Employment Performance 
Equation 6 
Innovation Performance 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level funding             
Initial commitment -0.05 -0.83 -0.09 -1.67 -0.03 -0.62  0.08  1.14  0.07  1.28  0.00  0.02 
Discontinuation  0.14  1.30  0.09  0.87  0.01  0.12  0.19  1.60  0.11  0.90 -0.18 -1.52 
Fit -0.02 -0.18 -0.07 -0.77 -0.06 -0.75 -0.12 -1.07 -0.19 -1.82* -0.09 -0.76 
Portfolio-level funding             
Initial commitment -0.11 -1.95* -0.13 -2.13** -0.10 -2.15** -0.04 -0.45 -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.54 
Sequencing -0.19 -4.02*** -0.25 -5.08*** -0.14 -3.24*** -0.04 -0.71 -0.04 -0.69 -0.01 -0.27 
Fit  0.14  1.52  0.13  1.22  0.12  1.34 -0.16 -1.45 -0.18 -1.50  0.13  1.03 
Role legitimacy              
Manager CEO -0.15 -0.98 -0.27 -1.66 -0.07 -0.54 -0.47 -2.48** -0.54 -2.94*** -0.03 -0.18 
PI CEO  0.08  0.68  0.10  0.86  0.12  1.08  0.13  0.68  0.13  0.75  0.17  1.11 
PI’s firm tenure -0.22 -3.63*** -0.27 -3.82*** -0.04 -0.57 -0.16 -1.65 -0.15 -1.83  0.09  0.83 
Manager’s technical experience -0.03 -0.35 -0.02 -0.17  0.03  0.43 -0.08 -0.81 -0.10 -1.17  0.23  1.45 
PI’s technical experience  0.06  0.89  0.05  0.75  0.01  0.07  0.04  0.41 -0.02 -0.18 -0.10 -0.93 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience -0.12 -0.97 -0.10 -0.76 -0.01 -0.15 -0.02 -0.17 -0.01 -0.08  0.02  0.20 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience  0.05  0.80  0.04  0.60  0.00  0.04 -0.26 -2.83*** -0.22 -2.53** -0.19 -1.62 
Resource legitimacy              
Manager’s elite education  0.04  0.56  0.08  0.90  0.05  0.73  0.12  1.17  0.12  1.37  0.15  1.57 
PI’s elite education -0.06 -0.87 -0.04 -0.61  0.03  0.60 -0.11 -1.08 -0.06 -0.71  0.00  0.00 
Manager’s MBA  0.10  0.46  0.10  0.45 -0.12 -0.58 -0.27 -1.16 -0.17 -0.72 -0.57 -2.15** 
PI’s MBA -0.34 -1.62 -0.46 -2.02** -0.16 -0.82 -0.23 -0.91 -0.29 -1.18  0.06  0.18 
Manager’s PhD  0.03  0.19  0.17  0.87 -0.04 -0.23  0.04  0.19  0.14  0.67 -0.30 -1.19 
PI’s PhD -0.48 -1.22 -0.42 -1.44  0.10  0.46 -0.61 -1.04 -0.59 -1.18  0.17  0.44 
Manager’s professorship  0.01  0.08  0.03  0.22 -0.15 -1.16 -0.07 -0.34  0.08  0.46 -0.25 -1.63 
PI’s professorship  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.15 -0.12 -1.08  0.22  1.23  0.18  1.00 -0.18 -1.17 
Intellectual legitimacy             
Manager’s patents  0.01  0.14  0.03  0.35  0.05  0.77 -0.09 -1.15 -0.01 -0.15 -0.02 -0.20 
PI’s patents -0.05 -0.83 -0.05 -0.79 -0.02 -0.30 -0.07 -0.88 -0.04 -0.51  0.07  0.88 
Manager’s publications -0.04 -0.46 -0.11 -1.31 -0.03 -0.32  0.04  0.35 -0.05 -0.54 -0.01 -0.07 
PI’s publications  0.03  0.42  0.04  0.50  0.15  2.35**  0.09  1.04  0.11  1.43  0.21  2.31** 
Abstract readability  0.00  0.01 -0.03 -0.49  0.00  0.08 -0.02 -0.35 -0.05 -1.03  0.02  0.40 
Efficacy             
Project duration  -0.08 -1.49 -0.14 -2.61** -0.01 -0.17 -0.05 -0.88 -0.08 -1.44  0.09  1.36 
Invention activity  0.18  2.12**  0.15  1.82*    0.38  3.87***  0.34  3.58***   
Capabilities             
R&D capability  0.00  0.06 -0.01 -0.11  0.03  0.37 -0.06 -0.74 -0.08 -0.95  0.19  2.21** 
Managerial capability -0.11 -1.22 -0.13 -1.52  0.09  0.91 -0.28 -2.69** -0.24 -2.58**  0.17  1.13 
Intellectual capability -0.02 -0.40  0.01  0.13  0.05  1.07 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 -0.16  0.08  1.32 
R&DCapXManCap  0.07  1.33  0.07  1.28 -0.02 -0.48  0.16  2.63***  0.14  2.43** -0.02 -0.32 
R&DCapXIntCap  0.04  0.60  0.02  0.30  0.11  1.63  0.07  0.78  0.06  0.63  0.06  0.68 
IntCapXManCap  0.07  0.82  0.09  1.16  0.15  1.85*  0.13  1.76*  0.09  1.30  0.24  2.26** 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.17  0.50  0.10  0.39  0.10  0.58  0.37  1.21  0.30  1.01  0.08  0.39 
Non-minority-owned -0.28 -1.11 -0.44 -1.59  0.23  1.36 -0.54 -1.65 -0.59 -1.58  0.50  2.18** 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.10 -0.29 -0.14 -0.43  0.09  0.37 -0.08 -0.24 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 
Industry volatility -0.12 -1.10 -0.05 -0.55 -0.08 -1.12 -0.12 -0.83  0.00 -0.03 -0.12 -1.32 
State innovativeness -0.03 -0.73 -0.03 -0.67 -0.02 -0.42 -0.06 -1.04 -0.04 -0.67  0.02  0.37 
Firm age  0.22  2.10*  0.21  2.59** -0.17 -1.88*  0.62  4.71***  0.59  5.35*** -0.09 -0.70 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.40   0.43   0.37   0.59   0.59   0.50  
Adjusted R2  0.25   0.30   0.23   0.50   0.49   0.39  
   N= 239;   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 36: Sensitivity analysis – system of equations (SUR) results – full sample, clusters with no prior awards and with prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield  
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield  
(10% growth) 
Equation 1 
Sales Yield  
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 1 
Sales Yield  
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
 Full sample No prior awards With prior awards 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level Funding             
Initial commitment -0.14 -2.46** -0.22 -4.05*** -0.34 -2.17** -0.41 -3.65*** -0.02 -0.39 -0.07 -1.56 
Discontinuation  0.02  0.14  0.01  0.08  0.05  0.20 -0.05 -0.28  0.09  1.10  0.07  0.72 
Fit -0.05 -0.47 -0.13 -1.23 -0.06 -0.28  0.01  0.09  0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.90 
Portfolio-level Funding             
Initial commitment         -0.09 -1.92* -0.13 -2.51** 
Sequencing         -0.11 -2.95*** -0.19 -4.37*** 
Fit  0.19  1.63  0.26  2.42**      0.12  1.65  0.14  1.58 
Role legitimacy              
Manager CEO -0.10 -0.57 -0.13 -0.75 -0.21 -0.74 -0.05 -0.27 -0.11 -1.04 -0.17 -1.26 
PI CEO  0.07  0.45  0.05  0.42  0.13  0.50 -0.11 -0.59  0.06  0.60  0.10  0.94 
PI’s firm tenure -0.32 -3.51*** -0.33 -3.97*** -0.53 -1.85* -0.38 -1.89* -0.13 -2.43** -0.20 -3.21*** 
Manager’s technical experience  0.07  0.49  0.08  0.59 -0.03 -0.16 -0.06 -0.41 -0.02 -0.26 -0.01 -0.07 
PI’s technical experience  0.04  0.40  0.08  1.00 -0.18 -0.82 -0.04 -0.31  0.02  0.33  0.03  0.52 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience  0.04  0.41 -0.04 -0.31  0.42  1.97*  0.23  1.24 -0.07 -0.83 -0.10 -0.94 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience  0.11  1.32  0.09  1.08  0.04  0.20  0.04  0.22  0.04  0.73  0.04  0.63 
Resource legitimacy              
Manager’s elite education -0.11 -1.49 -0.07 -0.95  0.14  0.97  0.17  1.55  0.03  0.53  0.07  1.00 
PI’s elite education  0.05  0.70  0.08  1.11 -0.01 -0.09  0.10  1.03 -0.05 -0.86 -0.04 -0.77 
Manager’s MBA  0.45  2.31**  0.44  2.21**  0.69  2.05*  0.37  1.47  0.11  0.74  0.12  0.68 
PI’s MBA -0.26 -1.05 -0.25 -1.03  0.39  0.77  0.70  1.94* -0.21 -1.32 -0.32 -1.70* 
Manager’s PhD  0.03  0.15  0.11  0.46 -0.36 -1.04 -0.40 -1.37  0.03  0.23  0.20  1.29 
PI’s PhD -0.15 -0.44 -0.15 -0.55  0.03  0.05  0.14  0.47 -0.38 -1.14 -0.43 -1.59 
Manager’s professorship -0.07 -0.48 -0.08 -0.46  0.27  0.80  0.26  1.04  0.02  0.20  0.05  0.42 
PI’s professorship -0.09 -0.69 -0.06 -0.40  0.15  0.47  0.28  1.12  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.22 
Intellectual legitimacy             
Manager’s patents -0.08 -1.08 -0.04 -0.52 -0.14 -0.59  0.02  0.09  0.01  0.26  0.05  0.78 
PI’s patents -0.05 -0.69 -0.04 -0.65  0.13  0.64  0.16  1.36 -0.01 -0.25 -0.03 -0.52 
Manager’s publications  0.05  0.43  0.00 -0.02  0.40  1.49  0.31  1.33 -0.03 -0.48 -0.12 -1.83* 
PI’s publications  0.03  0.42  0.01  0.11  0.14  0.76  0.06  0.44  0.02  0.41  0.03  0.45 
Abstract readability  0.04  0.76  0.01  0.18  0.17  1.45  0.07  0.79  0.01  0.24 -0.01 -0.25 
Efficacy             
Project duration  -0.10 -1.62 -0.16 -2.56** -0.13 -0.83 -0.18 -1.97* -0.04 -0.94 -0.10 -2.03* 
Invention activity  0.09  1.10  0.09  1.21 -0.08 -0.40  0.00 -0.03  0.07  1.17  0.09  1.38 
Capabilities             
R&D capability -0.06 -0.74  0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.38  0.07  0.51  0.02  0.31  0.04  0.51 
Managerial capability  0.17  1.56  0.09  0.89  1.30  3.17**  0.77  3.93*** -0.03 -0.38 -0.07 -0.96 
Intellectual capability -0.13 -1.96* -0.05 -0.73 -0.51 -2.20* -0.20 -1.24 -0.02 -0.61  0.01  0.16 
R&DCapXManCap -0.02 -0.28 -0.02 -0.27 -0.42 -2.57** -0.33 -2.92***  0.05  1.26  0.05  1.10 
R&DCapXIntCap  0.02  0.24 -0.01 -0.14 -0.18 -1.37 -0.22 -2.24**  0.03  0.54  0.02  0.35 
IntCapXManCap -0.08 -0.70  0.04  0.48 -0.64 -1.83 -0.06 -0.41  0.01  0.23  0.06  1.08 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.40  1.32  0.49  1.89  0.33  0.72  0.66  1.94  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.10 
Non-minority-owned -0.29 -0.69 -0.39 -1.09 -0.59 -0.65 -0.48 -0.80 -0.12 -0.53 -0.22 -0.89 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.23 -0.58 -0.31 -1.04  0.13  0.21 -0.09 -0.26 -0.12 -0.62 -0.14 -0.60 
Industry volatility -0.26 -3.21*** -0.20 -2.51** -0.21 -0.90 -0.11 -0.64 -0.12 -1.17 -0.07 -0.97 
State innovativeness -0.06 -1.15 -0.08 -1.44  0.03  0.28 -0.04 -0.37  0.01  0.18  0.02  0.42 
Firm age  0.16  1.69  0.06  0.69  0.54 2.41**  0.44  2.87**  0.12  1.37  0.16  2.11** 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   Incl.    Incl.  
R2 (Adjusted R2)  0.24 (0.14)   0.29 (0.19)   0.60 (0.39)   0.68 (0.52)   0.35 (0.20)   0.40 (0.26)  
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix 37: Sensitivity analysis of robustness check – system of equations (SUEST) results – full sample, clusters with no prior awards and with prior awards 
 Equation 1 
Sales Yield  
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 1 
Sales Yield  
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
Equation 1 
Sales Yield  
(10% growth) 
Equation 2 
Employment Yield 
(10% growth) 
 Full sample No prior awards With prior awards 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Independent variables:             
Project-level Funding             
Initial commitment -0.14 -2.28** -0.21 -3.46*** -0.35 -2.35** -0.41 -3.86*** -0.02 -0.32 -0.07 -1.25 
Discontinuation  0.01  0.11  0.00 -0.02  0.04  0.19 -0.05 -0.32  0.10  1.31  0.08  0.85 
Fit -0.05 -0.61 -0.14 -1.47 -0.03 -0.15  0.02  0.14  0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.94 
Portfolio-level Funding             
Initial commitment         -0.08 -2.05** -0.12 -2.61** 
Sequencing         -0.11 -3.30*** -0.19 -4.67*** 
Fit  0.19  1.87*  0.27  2.61***      0.12  1.71*  0.14  1.54 
Role legitimacy              
Manager CEO -0.11 -0.59 -0.14 -0.80 -0.18 -0.63 -0.05 -0.22 -0.11 -0.97 -0.17 -1.22 
PI CEO  0.07  0.49  0.05  0.43  0.16  0.57 -0.10 -0.53  0.06  0.55  0.09  0.97 
PI’s firm tenure -0.32 -2.51** -0.33 -3.11*** -0.51 -1.55 -0.38 -1.77* -0.14 -3.02*** -0.20 -3.67*** 
Manager’s technical experience  0.07  0.47  0.08  0.58 -0.03 -0.16 -0.06 -0.40 -0.03 -0.32 -0.01 -0.11 
PI’s technical experience  0.04  0.37  0.08  0.94 -0.18 -0.80 -0.04 -0.29  0.02  0.48  0.03  0.60 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience  0.04  0.35 -0.03 -0.27  0.42  1.70*  0.22  1.18 -0.07 -0.86 -0.10 -0.94 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience  0.11  1.02  0.08  0.96  0.02  0.09  0.03  0.20  0.05  0.90  0.04  0.80 
Resource legitimacy              
Manager’s elite education -0.10 -1.33 -0.06 -0.86  0.13  0.94  0.17  1.58  0.02  0.46  0.07  0.97 
PI’s elite education  0.05  0.68  0.08  1.14 -0.01 -0.12  0.10  1.11 -0.05 -0.88 -0.05 -0.79 
Manager’s MBA  0.45 1.92*  0.44  2.11**  0.66  1.97*  0.36  1.45  0.12  0.78  0.12  0.71 
PI’s MBA -0.26 -1.20 -0.25 -1.01  0.41  0.86  0.70  2.04** -0.21 -1.62 -0.32 -1.87* 
Manager’s PhD  0.03  0.13  0.10  0.42 -0.35 -1.00 -0.40 -1.29  0.04  0.23  0.20  1.25 
PI’s PhD -0.15 -0.42 -0.14 -0.49  0.02  0.03  0.14  0.43 -0.39 -1.06 -0.44 -1.49 
Manager’s professorship -0.07 -0.53 -0.08 -0.49  0.26  0.86  0.26  1.07  0.03  0.28  0.06  0.44 
PI’s professorship -0.09 -0.75 -0.07 -0.47  0.18  0.61  0.28  1.15  0.01  0.10  0.04  0.25 
Intellectual legitimacy             
Manager’s patents -0.08 -1.05 -0.04 -0.44 -0.17 -0.69  0.01  0.06  0.01  0.21  0.05  0.75 
PI’s patents -0.05 -0.55 -0.03 -0.50  0.11  0.51  0.16  1.22 -0.02 -0.39 -0.03 -0.57 
Manager’s publications  0.05  0.40  0.00 -0.01  0.41  1.51  0.31  1.33 -0.03 -0.41 -0.12 -1.60 
PI’s publications  0.03  0.38  0.01  0.15  0.13  0.71  0.06  0.42  0.02  0.35  0.02  0.40 
Abstract readability  0.04  0.84  0.01  0.16  0.18  1.68  0.07  0.85  0.01  0.27 -0.01 -0.22 
Efficacy             
Project duration  -0.10 -1.75* -0.16 -2.64** -0.12 -0.76 -0.18 -2.09** -0.04 -0.97 -0.10 -2.11** 
Invention activity  0.08  0.89  0.04  0.48  0.05  0.24  0.02  0.16  0.10  1.57  0.11  1.49 
Capabilities             
R&D capability -0.06 -0.59  0.01  0.09 -0.09 -0.46  0.06  0.43  0.01  0.11  0.03  0.44 
Managerial capability  0.18  1.35  0.12  1.01  1.22  2.69**  0.76  3.49*** -0.04 -0.56 -0.08 -1.03 
Intellectual capability -0.13 -1.84* -0.04 -0.72 -0.50 -2.11* -0.20 -1.23 -0.03 -0.65  0.01  0.13 
R&DCapXManCap -0.02 -0.27 -0.02 -0.26 -0.43 -2.25** -0.33 -2.73***  0.05  1.43  0.05  1.12 
R&DCapXIntCap  0.02  0.20 -0.01 -0.15 -0.18 -1.41 -0.21 -2.30**  0.04  0.88  0.03  0.49 
IntCapXManCap -0.07 -0.63  0.04  0.44 -0.61 -1.60 -0.06 -0.37  0.01  0.11  0.06  0.80 
Control variables:             
Non-woman-owned  0.40  1.39  0.48  1.93*  0.39  1.14  0.67  2.18**  0.02  0.08  0.03  0.11 
Non-minority-owned -0.28 -0.76 -0.38 -1.14 -0.65 -0.77 -0.49 -0.87 -0.13 -0.70 -0.23 -1.03 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.22 -0.51 -0.29 -0.76  0.10  0.15 -0.09 -0.25 -0.14 -0.45 -0.15 -0.45 
Industry volatility -0.26 -2.61** -0.20 -2.26** -0.20 -0.80 -0.10 -0.59 -0.11 -1.03 -0.07 -0.86 
State innovativeness -0.06 -0.99 -0.08 -1.24  0.03  0.23 -0.04 -0.36  0.00  0.12  0.02  0.40 
Firm age  0.16  1.35  0.06  0.62  0.53  2.27**  0.44  2.76**  0.12  1.38  0.16  2.25** 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2 (Adjusted R2)  0.24 (0.14)   0.29 (0.19)   0.60 (0.39)   0.68 (0.52)   0.35 (0.20)   0.40 (0.26)  
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Paper 1 
Decomposing the Role of Individual- and Firm-level Capabilities for 
Scientifically-based Innovation Commercialisation44 
ABSTRACT 
We build on the contingency theory of the resource-based view to decompose the effects of distinct 
capabilities of science-based ventures on innovation performance and sales performance. Our 
contribution focuses on the mediation and moderation analysis examining the competing explanations 
underlying this nomological network of relationships. We examine multi-source, secondary, longitudinal 
data on 367 projects from 275 small U.S. government-funded research-intensive ventures and find that 
the effect of research and development, managerial and intellectual capabilities on sales performance is 
mediated by innovation performance. In addition, our results show that innovation performance has a 
moderating role, enhancing the effect of managerial capability on sales performance. By adopting a multi-
level approach, we offer more granular insights into the role of capabilities, their interaction and their 
differential performance effects. The results of mediation and moderation analyses conclude that 
capabilities trigger a chain of effects, having impact on sales performance via innovation performance. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the core of the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) is the premise that organisational capabilities 
lead to enhanced performance (Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984). Although a significant body of empirical 
literature has provided support for this (e.g. Karna et al. 2016), the majority of studies have taken a macro-
level perspective and investigated the effects of organisational capabilities on aggregated firm 
performance. In particular, empirical research explaining why organisational capabilities positively relate 
to value creation within firms remains scarce (e.g. Newbert 2008). Instead studies have focused on 
examining the direct relationship between capabilities and organisational performance which are likely to 
generate disparate empirical findings and theoretical conclusions. Consequently, there have been calls for 
more research explicitly disaggregating firm performance into financial and non-financial measures 
                                                          
44 The above entitled manuscript was submitted for review and publication consideration for the “‘Theories from 
the Lab’ - How Research on Science Commercialization Can Contribute to Management Studies” Special Issue of 
the Journal of Management Studies on October 7, 2016. 
 
367 
 
(Ethiraj et al. 2005) and integrating moderation and mediation analyses (Ray et al. 2004) to explain the 
boundary conditions of the RBV. Additionally, the literature on competitive advantage is lacking the 
understanding of micro-foundations of organisational capabilities—micro-macro links clarifying how 
individual capabilities interact within organisations in an aggregated fashion (Barney and Felin 2013). 
Therefore, our primary focus is to understand the process that conditions the impact of capabilities on 
performance.  
 To respond to a recent call in the literature to understand the micro-foundations of capabilities 
(Coff and Kryscynski 2011; Foss 2011), we elucidate the explanatory and predictive adequacy of 
explanations underlying the micro-foundations of capabilities by investigating the micro-macro 
interactions of individual-level and firm-level capabilities. We distinguish between entrepreneurial action 
and entrepreneurial outcome constructs by disaggregating firm-level performance effects into process-
related and outcome-related performance. By drawing on the contingency view of the RBV, we propose 
that entrepreneurial process-related performance is a mechanism through which capabilities affect 
entrepreneurial outcomes. In line with this hypothesis, we investigate whether innovation performance, 
an intermediary competitive advantage, is a contingency that has a mediating or moderating role in the 
capabilities-sales performance relationship. Our paper therefore develops a multi-level approach to clarify 
a non-direct nature of the nomological network of relationships underpinning the capabilities-
performance link.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The conceptual model in Figure 1 depicts a set of relationships between capabilities, innovation 
performance and sales performance. The model distinguishes between the “backbone” direct 
relationships and hypothesised indirect relationships between all three capabilities and performance 
outcomes. The “backbone” direct relationships have been extensively examined in prior studies and there 
tends to be agreement in the literature that R&D capability, managerial capability and intellectual 
capability of a scientific team tend to have a positive effect on innovation and sales performance while 
interactions of capabilities tend to have a complementarity effect on innovation and sales performance 
(e.g. Deeds et al. 1999; Arora and Nandkumar 2012). 
 The primary objective of the paper is to understand the mechanism behind the capability-
performance link. Therefore, the study takes the direct “backbone” relationships as a theoretical given 
and instead focuses on developing the hypotheses concerned with the indirect effect of capabilities on 
sales performance. The expectation is that capabilities per se may not be sufficient to explain the 
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differences in firms’ commercial performance, as suggested by many RBV studies (e.g. Henderson and 
Cockburn 1994; Arora and Nandkumar 2012). Rather, we conjecture that the role of capabilities is 
transitioned through and magnified by the innovation process. This role is modelled through the form of 
mediation and moderation: the positive effect of capabilities on sales performance is enabled or 
conditioned by innovation performance.  
Hypothesis 1: Innovation performance mediates the effect of (a) R&D capability, (b) managerial 
capability, and (c) PI’s intellectual capability on sales performance. 
Hypothesis 2: Innovation performance increases the positive effect of (a) R&D capability, (b) 
managerial capability, and (c) PI’s intellectual capability on sales performance. 
 
Figure 1. A conceptualisation of the mediating and moderating relationships of innovation performance  
METHODS 
We test our hypotheses using multi-level, multi-source data on 367 projects from 275 firms that 
participated in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program administered by the National 
Health Institute in the U.S. from 2006 to 2012. Consistent with the ‘resource deployment’ logic, we adopt 
the input-output approach to operationalise capabilities and model firm’s activities as a transformation 
function of operational resources into practical objectives using stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) 
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technique (Dutta et al. 1999). Three capabilities examined in this study refer to distinct elements of the 
entrepreneurial process: intellectual capability of the PI reflects an input, R&D capability relates to the 
technological activity, whereas managerial capability captures the potential for output. The results of 
structural equation modelling (SEM) show that the effect of R&D, managerial and the Principal 
Investigator’s (PI) intellectual capability on sales performance is partially mediated by innovation 
performance, which is strongest for managerial capability. Also, innovation performance moderates the 
positive effect of managerial capability on sales performance.  
DISCUSSION 
Overall, our findings suggest that innovation performance is an underlying mechanism as well as a 
condition that affects the relationship between capabilities and sales performance. We offer fine-grained 
insights for the strategic management and entrepreneurship domains by demonstrating that it is not the 
mere possession of particular types of capabilities or their unique bundling that enhance firm’s 
commercialisation performance. Rather, it is the indirect effect of capabilities via an intermediary 
competitive advantage that leads to firm performance. Consequently, our results provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the contingency perspective of the RBV. From this, we derive a series of research 
implications and provide valuable managerial implications for decision-making. 
CONCLUSION 
The main contribution of our paper is that it clarifies that the impact of capabilities in enhancing firm 
performance is contingent upon the intermediary competitive advantage that it creates. Overall, the 
results imply that the access to and possession of valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
capabilities is insufficient to directly enhance firm’s performance. Rather, it is the efficient deployment of 
their combinations in a way that creates economic value and results in competitive advantage that then 
leads to performance improvements. From the practical perspective, our study outlines two primary 
implications. First, patenting of inventions is a potentially lucrative strategy that enables small firms to 
use available capabilities to make an economic contribution. Second, managerial capability is a higher-
order factor that links together all critical inputs and shapes the trajectory of their exploitation. Broadly 
speaking, our study indicates that small research-intensive firms pursuing commercialisation of their 
scientific effort benefit most from their unique capabilities when they make innovation activity central to 
their strategy, and nurture the capability of the manager to recognise opportunities and implement 
strategic change. 
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Table 1. Summary of measures 
Variable Level of 
Analysis 
Operationalisation Measurement Source Transformation 
Sales 
performance 
Firm Firm sales by employee Firm sales in t2014, $ million divided by the number of employees in 
t2014 
Hoover’s Online; 
firms’ LinkedIn 
profiles, Bloomberg 
Business Week, 
ZoomInfo, Manta, 
Find the Company, 
SalesSpider, PrivCo, 
CorporationWiki 
log10(1+x) 
Innovation 
performance 
Firm Patent applications  Patent application stock in the period from t until t2014 Patbase & 
Espacenet 
log10(1+x) 
R&D capability Firm SFE Equation: 
Output (Invention Activity) =  
Input 1 (Quality-Adjusted 
Patenting Output) + Input 2 
(Knowledge Breadth) + Input 3 
(PI’s Intellectual Capability)   
(1) Invention activity = total number of patent applications by firm in 
year t 
(2) Quality-adjusted global patenting output = citation-weighted 
patent stock by firm in year <t 
(3) Knowledge breadth = total number of patent classes firm has 
acquired in year <t 
(4) PI’s intellectual capability = efficiency scores derived from 
stochastic frontier analysis (specification of the measure outlined 
below)  
Patbase & 
Espacenet (1, 2, 3);  
SFE (4) 
None 
Managerial 
capability 
Manager 
 
SFE Equation: 
Output (Innovation Reach) =  
Input 1 (Commercial experience) 
+ Input 2 (Intellectual 
Competence) 
(1) International diversification= total number countries where the 
firm was granted patents in <t 
(2) Commercial experience= total number of years of manager’s 
experience in commercial positions in any sector in <t 
(3) Inventive capacity = total number of patent applications by the 
manager in year <t 
Patbase & 
Espacenet (1, 3);  
LinkedIn 
ZoomInfo 
Bloomberg Business 
Week (3) 
None 
PI’s Intellectual 
capability 
Principal 
investigator 
SFE Equation: 
Output (Academic Impact) =  
Input 1 (Quality-Adjusted 
Academic Competence) + Input 2 
(Knowledge Appropriation) + 
Input 3 (Intellectual Competence)   
(1) Academic impact = h-index of the principal investigator defined by 
Scopus in year t 
(2) Quality-adjusted academic competence = citation-weighted 
publications of the principal investigator in year <t 
(3) Knowledge appropriation = ratio of self-citations by total 
documents published by the principal investigator in year <t 
(4) Inventive capacity= total number of patent applications by the 
principal investigator in year <t 
Elsevier’s Scopus  
(1, 2, 3); 
Patbase & 
Espacenet (4)  
 
None 
R&D X 
Managerial 
capability 
Firm & 
Manager 
 
Interaction of R&D and 
managerial capabilities 
Multiplication of mean-centred variables SFE None 
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R&D X 
Intellectual 
capability 
Firm & 
Principal 
investigator 
Interaction of R&D and PI’s 
intellectual capabilities 
Multiplication of mean-centred variables SFE None 
Intellectual X 
Managerial 
capability 
Principal 
investigator 
& Manager 
Interaction of PI’s intellectual and 
managerial capabilities 
Multiplication of mean-centred variables SFE None 
Technology 
protection 
Firm The propensity to increase or 
decrease the patenting activity 
The difference between the number of patent applications in time t-1 
and t-2 
Patbase & 
Espacenet 
None 
Patenting 
experience 
Firm Years of patenting  Number of years since the first filed patent until the award date t Patbase & 
Espacenet 
log10(1+x) 
Success-
adjusted 
product 
portfolio 
breadth 
Firm The number of SBIR-funded 
projects in the pipeline 
The number of SBIR-funded projects in the pipeline for a 3-year 
window (t, t-1, t-2), weighted by the amount of financial support (in 
million dollars) received in the corresponding 3-year window 
SBIR data log10(1+x) 
State 
innovativeness 
Environment Innovation Scores of US States 
 
The ranking list retrieved from Bloomberg’s Visual Data platform Bloomberg None 
Industry 
volatility (2014) 
Environment Industry volatility for a 5-year 
rolling window, lagged by 1 year 
 
Industry stock return volatility computed as standard deviation from 
average annual equal-weighted returns of the Fama and French (1997) 
49 industries 
Ken French Data 
Library 
None 
Firm age Firm Firm age at project start 
 
Number of years, count Company website; 
Bloomberg Business 
Week 
log10(1+x) 
Project cohort Project Year of Phase I award, dummy 
 
Coding: 2006 = 1; 2007 = 2; 2008 = 3; 2009 = 4; 2010 = 5; 2011 = 6 
2012 = 7 
SBIR data None 
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Table 2. Structural equation modelling (SEM) results – direct effect modelsa 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Innovation Performance Commercial 
Performance 
Innovation Performance Commercial 
Performance 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Direct effects         
R&D capability (RDC)  0.17  3.47***  0.04  0.83  0.11  1.56  0.04  0.48 
Managerial capability (MC)  0.29  4.11***  0.21  2.96***  0.15  1.18  0.14  1.23 
Intellectual capability (IC)  0.12  2.61*** -0.07 -1.25  0.18  3.41*** -0.04 -0.65 
Interaction effects         
RDCxMC      0.08  0.85  0.05  0.55 
RDCxIC      0.06  0.78 -0.01 -0.17 
ICxMC      0.22  2.11**  0.13  1.25 
RDCxICxMC     -0.13 -1.31 -0.08 -0.80 
Control variables         
Technology protection  0.07  1.58  0.01  0.19  0.07  1.58  0.01  0.26 
Patenting experience  0.10  1.38 -0.10 -1.29  0.11  1.52 -0.10 -1.14 
Success-adjusted product 
portfolio breadth 
 0.20  3.79***  0.25  3.68***  0.20  3.94***  0.25  3.71*** 
State innovativeness  0.10  2.15** -0.03 -0.55  0.09  1.95* -0.03 -0.63 
Industry volatility -0.04 -0.65 -0.18 -1.65 -0.07 -1.06 -0.19 -1.70 
Firm age -0.08 -1.44  0.27  3.69*** -0.10 -1.79*  0.26  3.45*** 
F-Valueb  14.36***   8.90***   9.05***   6.39***  
R2  0.28   0.25   0.30   0.25  
Adjusted R2  0.26   0.23   0.27   0.23  
   a n= 367; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
   b F-Value, R2 and Adjusted R2 refer to individual equations 
 
Table 3. Structural equation modelling (SEM) results – indirect effect modelsa 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Innovation Performance Commercial 
Performance 
Innovation Performance Commercial 
Performance 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Direct effects         
R&D capability (RDC)  0.17  3.47***  0.00 -0.02  0.16  3.44***  0.02  0.45 
Managerial capability (MC)  0.29  4.11***  0.14  1.90*  0.29  3.99***  0.06  1.08 
Intellectual capability (IC)  0.12  2.61*** -0.10 -1.82*  0.13  2.80*** -0.08 -1.46 
Mediating effect         
Innovation performance (IP)    0.26  4.41***     
Moderating effect         
Innovation performance       -0.05 -0.14 
IPxRDC        0.10  0.78 
IPxMC        0.29  3.21*** 
IPxIC       -0.11 -0.83 
Control variables         
Technology protection  0.07  1.58 -0.01 -0.22  0.07  1.58 -0.02 -0.40 
Patenting experience  0.10  1.38 -0.13 -1.66  0.10  1.40 -0.07 -0.80 
Success-adjusted product 
portfolio breadth 
 0.20  3.79***  0.20  3.02***  0.19  3.77***  0.19  2.44** 
State innovativeness  0.10  2.15** -0.06 -1.08  0.10  2.17** -0.03 -0.62 
Industry volatility -0.04 -0.65 -0.17 -1.58 -0.04 -0.63 -0.15 -1.45 
Firm age -0.08 -1.44  0.29  4.07*** -0.08 -1.42  0.28  3.66*** 
F-Valueb  14.36***   10.23***   14.36***   10.47***  
R2  0.28   0.30   0.28   0.31  
Adjusted R2  0.26   0.28   0.26   0.29  
   a n= 367; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
   b F-Value, R2 and Adjusted R2 refer to individual equations 
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Paper 2 
Evaluating Innovation Investment Outcomes of Government Venture Funding in 
the U.S.: Real Options Perspective45 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the role of government venture funding in facilitating entrepreneurship and 
innovation. We draw upon real options reasoning (ROR) theory to understand the effects of various 
resource allocation strategies on investment yield. To investigate government investment patterns, 367 
projects that participated in the Small Business Innovation Research program in the U.S. were analysed 
over a seven-year period. We find that the formal ROR structure evident in the composition and execution 
of the government venture funding programme is only intuitively underpinned by the real options logic 
of decision-making. The results reveal that high initial funding commitment and continuation of funding 
have a diminishing effect on return on investment, whereas consistent matching of funding decisions in 
line with ROR allows extracting value from staged investments.  
INTRODUCTION 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) significantly contribute to employment and innovation creation, 
but their role in fostering the economic growth is less prominent due to limited access to finance. To 
address market imperfections, governments of major economies initiate high-budget publicly-funded 
financing programmes to support entrepreneurship and innovation. Although there is generally a wide 
consensus on the appropriateness of government intervention to stimulate the SME sector, the evidence 
on the effects of public funds to subsidise R&D efforts of small firms remains inconsistent. We respond to 
a call for more studies evaluating the effectiveness and limitations of government funding initiatives 
(Pavitt 1998; Bayona-Saez and Garcia-Marco 2010). We develop a conceptual approach to move beyond 
the sheer assumptions of the importance of budget as an input to the innovation process and instead 
examine how resources can be allocated in the most optimal way to yield performance benefits, making 
a contribution to the literature on strategic management of investment portfolios. We use real options 
theory to examine the outcomes of the staged government funding scheme, under which initial 
                                                          
45 The above entitled manuscript is to be submitted for review and publication consideration for the “Value 
Creation and Value Appropriation in the context of Public and Non-Profit Organizations” Special Issue of the 
Strategic Management Journal by February 28, 2017. 
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investment is characterised as a real option that grants investors the right to make further investment or 
to discontinue funding. The options approach has been described as a useful strategic tool in making 
resource commitments with the minimal risks (Chatterjee et al. 1999). We explore to what extent the 
implementation of investment resource allocation strategies in line with prescriptions of real options logic 
offers performance advantages in the context of government venture funding. The results imply that the 
consistent implementation of the options approach offers significant benefits to developing the optimal 
investment procedures in the strategy field. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The essence of real options reasoning is expressed in its proposed approach for informing resource 
allocation decisions in organisations, which is built on a number of fundamental assumptions intended to 
guide the logics of such processes (Adner 2007). These assumptions concern two types of decisions—
initial resource allocation and subsequent resource reallocation, and the correspondence of these 
decisions distinguishes real options decision-making from sequential decision-making (Adner and 
Levinthal 2004b; Adner and Levinthal 2004a; Adner 2007). Therefore, to differentiate between a coherent 
and disciplined decision-making prescribed by real options reasoning and a path-dependent decision-
making under other sequential approaches, it is important to disentangle distinct elements comprising 
resource allocation processes (Adner 2007; Klingebiel and Adner 2015). From the review of extant 
literature, constructs relevant to a strategic theory of investment incorporating ROR were identified as 
initial commitment, discontinuation and sequencing. Literature indicates that real options approach 
matches these elements in a way that allows to distinguish it from other resource allocation regimes 
(Klingebiel and Adner 2015). The primary objectives pursued by the government investment programmes 
are to increase commercialisation, encourage entrepreneurship and stimulate innovation. To reflect this, 
anticipated performance outcomes of real options investments were conceptualised along three 
dimensions as post-funding sales performance, employment creation and innovation activity, and 
expressed from the funders’ perspective as yield on investment. 
 To sum, in line with previous literature (Klingebiel and Adner 2015), the study proposes that 
distinct elements of real options reasoning—initial funding commitment, funding continuation, funding 
sequencing, and fit of funding decisions—might have differential effects on investment yield. The 
conceptual model in Figure 1 depicts a set of hypotheses consistent with the expectations that the 
presence of ROR in investment decisions will be reflected in a propensity to keep initial commitment and 
sequencing low to minimise downside risks, and to continue projects with high initial commitment and 
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discontinue projects with low initial commitment. The links between different elements of ROR and 
anticipated performance outcomes are expressed in a series of hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: The magnitude of initial funding commitment has a negative effect on investment 
yield—(a) sales yield, (b) employment yield, and (c) innovation yield. 
Hypothesis 2: Funding discontinuation has a negative effect on investment yield—(a) sales yield, (b) 
employment yield, and (c) innovation yield. 
Hypothesis 3: Fit of funding decisions, i.e. low initial funding commitment and discontinuation or 
high initial commitment and continuation, has a positive effect on investment yield—(a) sales yield, (b) 
employment yield, and (c) innovation yield. 
Hypothesis 4: For firms with prior awards, high rate of funding sequencing has a negative effect on 
investment yield—(a) sales yield, (b) employment yield, and (c) innovation yield. 
Hypothesis 5: The performance effect of fit of funding decisions is greater at the at the cumulated 
portfolio level than at the individual option level. 
Hypothesis 6: An opening of a new individual project has a positive effect on investment yield—(a) 
sales yield, (b) employment yield, and (c) innovation yield of firms with no prior awards, but an addition of 
a new individual project to the portfolio of firms with prior awards has no effect. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model 
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METHODS 
To examine the outcomes of government venture funding, we analysed performance of projects that 
received financial support under the SBIR program. The SBIR initiative is structured in phases and 
therefore represents a suitable context for testing our hypotheses. We propose that the SBIR venture 
funding programme follows the explicit ROR structure, whereby government funders sequence the 
process of potential value creation. First, funders invest in a number of Phase I projects and thereby create 
a portfolio of options, with the right to defer further investments in those options until a major part of 
uncertainty about their viability has been resolved. When Phase I awardees apply for Phase II funding, 
investors have to decide whether to exercise or abandon the option. The results of the seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) simultaneously validate a direct positive impact of real options logic and 
delineate its boundary conditions in the context of government venture funding. 
DISCUSSION 
The findings show that when venture capitalists allocate financial resources in line with real options 
decision-making logic, they gain significant improvements in performance outcomes, whereas deviations 
from prescriptions of ROR potentially detract from the value offered by a flexible options-like approach. 
Most importantly, the results indicate that the value offered by the government funding programmes gets 
eroded due to inefficient funding allocation decisions, whereby an additional unit of government 
investment does not lead to better stream of social value from the private sector. The value from the 
investment process can be extracted when positioning trial commitments are small, and follow-up funds 
are allocated to selected projects only. That is, discontinuation decision has to be exercised in a disciplined 
manner. It can be concluded that the overall positive effects of allocated funding on investment yield tend 
to decrease the more money or, the more grants the firms receive.  
CONCLUSION 
The present study offers a set of insights that may help increase the effectiveness of sequential investment 
decision-making. This study’s notable implication suggests that government venture programmes like the 
SBIR should be structured in such a way that (i) early-stage awards are low-cost and offered to a larger 
number of participants, and (ii) later-stage awards are allocated to participants with no other options in 
the portfolio. The primary idea behind the proposition is that first-time participants of the programme 
should be given priority over multiple-award holders. 
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Table 1. Summary of measures 
Variable Level of 
Analysis 
Operationalisation Measurement Source Transformation 
Sales yield Firm $ Million Firm sales in t2014 divided by total prior investment ($ million in ∑t, t-
1…t-n)  
Hoover’s Online, 
SBIR data 
log10(1+x) 
Employment 
yield 
Firm Headcount Number of employees in t2014, divided by total prior investment ($ 
million in ∑t, t-1…t-n)  
Hoover’s Online, 
SBIR data 
log10(1+x) 
Innovation 
yield 
Firm Patent applications  Patent application stock in the period from t until t2014 divided by 
total prior investment ($ million in ∑t, t-1…t-n) 
Patbase & 
Espacenet,  
SBIR data 
log10(1+x) 
Initial 
commitment 
(project-level 
funding) 
Project Success magnitude: $ amount of Phase 
I award granted to an individual 
project in the database 
Number retrieved from the SBIR database SBIR data log10(1+x) 
Initial 
commitment 
(project-level 
funding) 
Project Success magnitude: $ amount of Phase 
I award granted to an individual 
project in the database, dummy. 
Low initial commitment: <mean 
High initial commitment: >=mean 
Coding: 
Low initial commitment = 1 
High initial commitment = 0 
 
SBIR data none 
Discontinuation 
(project-level 
funding) 
Project  Phase II outcome: whether or not 
Phase I project in the database later 
received Phase II funding, dummy 
Coding:  
Discontinue = 1 
Continue = 0 
 
SBIR data none 
Fit  
(project-level 
funding) 
Project  Fit is an interaction of initial 
commitment and reallocation. 
Low initial commitment: <mean 
High initial commitment:- >=mean 
Coding: 
Low initial commitment x Discontinue / High initial commitment x 
Continue = 1 (fit) 
High initial commitment x Continue / Low initial commitment x 
Discontinue = 0 (no-fit) 
SBIR data none 
Initial 
commitment 
(portfolio-level 
funding) 
Portfolio Average $ amount the firm received 
for cumulated prior Phase I awards  
E.g., if the firm received a total of $0.75 million for 7 Phase I awards, 
then average prior Phase I $ award is 0.75/7=0.11  
SBIR data log10(1+x) 
Initial 
commitment 
(portfolio-level 
funding) 
Portfolio Average $ amount the firm received 
for cumulated prior Phase I awards, 
dummy. 
Low initial commitment: <mean 
High initial commitment: >=mean 
Coding: 
Low initial commitment = 1 
High initial commitment = 0 
SBIR data none 
Sequencing 
(portfolio-level 
funding) 
Portfolio Phase II transition rate: a ratio of a 
number of received Phase II awards 
per Phase I awards  
E.g., if the firm received 2 Phase II awards and 10 Phase I awards, 
then the Phase II transition rate is 2/10=0.2 
SBIR data log10(1+x) 
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Fit 
(portfolio-level 
funding) 
Portfolio  Fit is an interaction of initial 
commitment and reallocation. 
Low initial commitment: <mean 
High initial commitment: >=mean 
Discontinue: Phase II transition rate = 0 
Continue: Phase II transition rate > 0 
Coding: 
Low initial commitment x Discontinue / High initial commitment x 
Continue = 1 (fit) 
High initial commitment x Continue / Low initial commitment x 
Discontinue = 0 (no-fit) 
SBIR data none 
Non-woman-
owned 
Firm Whether or not the firm is woman-
owned, dummy 
Coding:  
Non-woman-owned = 1 
Woman-owned = 0 
SBIR data None 
Non-minority-
owned 
Firm 
 
Whether or not the firm is minority-
owned, dummy 
Coding: 
Non-minority-owned = 1 
Minority-owned = 0 
SBIR data None 
Non-HubZone-
owned 
Firm Whether or not the firm is HubZone-
owned, dummy 
Coding: 
Non-HubZone-owned = 1 
HubZone-owned = 0 
SBIR data None 
State 
innovativeness 
Environment Innovation Scores of US States 
 
The ranking list retrieved from Bloomberg’s Visual Data platform Bloomberg None 
Industry 
volatility (2014) 
Environment Industry volatility for a 5-year rolling 
window, lagged by 1 year 
 
Industry stock return volatility computed as standard deviation 
from average annual equal-weighted returns of the Fama and 
French (1997) 49 industries 
Ken French Data 
Library 
None 
Firm age Firm Firm age at project start 
 
Number of years, count Company 
website; 
Bloomberg 
Business Week 
log10(1+x) 
Project cohort Project Year of Phase I award, dummy 
 
Coding: 2006 = 1; 2007 = 2; 2008 = 3; 2009 = 4; 2010 = 5; 2011 = 6 
2012 = 7 
SBIR data None 
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Table 2: System of equations (SUR) results – full sample 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
 Sales Yield Employment Yield Innovation Yield 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Independent variables:       
Project-level constructs       
Initial commitment -0.19 -3.62*** -0.24 -4.51*** -0.06 -1.23 
Discontinuation -0.06 -0.52 -0.06 -0.51 -0.16 -1.40 
Fit -0.11 -0.93 -0.13 -1.22 -0.02 -0.18 
Portfolio-level constructs       
Fit  0.28  2.40**  0.31  2.81***  0.14  1.27 
Control variables:       
Non-woman-owned  0.45  1.51  0.46  1.93  0.20  0.99 
Non-minority-owned -0.11 -0.28 -0.23 -0.71  0.38  1.33 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.41 -1.60 -0.52 -2.02** -0.18 -0.75 
Industry volatility -0.21 -2.66*** -0.12 -1.61  0.03  0.36 
State innovativeness -0.05 -0.96 -0.06 -1.12  0.04  0.79 
Firm age  0.02  0.32 -0.11 -2.04** -0.18 -3.34*** 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.12   0.15   0.09  
Adjusted R2  0.08   0.12   0.05  
  N= 367 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 3: System of equations (SUR) results – cluster with no prior awards 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
 Sales Yield Employment Yield Innovation Yield 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Independent variables:       
Project-level constructs       
Initial commitment -0.43 -3.75*** -0.41 -4.76*** -0.09 -0.61 
Discontinuation -0.35 -1.68* -0.27 -1.74* -0.50 -1.88* 
Fit  0.21  1.10  0.22  1.55  0.13  0.51 
Control variables:       
Non-woman-owned  0.46  0.95  0.68  2.23**  0.00  0.00 
Non-minority-owned -0.08 -0.11 -0.24 -0.52  0.80  1.15 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.11 -0.28 -0.20 -0.69 -0.26 -0.58 
Industry volatility -0.21 -1.26 -0.06 -0.49  0.10  0.71 
State innovativeness  0.03  0.26  0.02  0.25  0.08  0.67 
Firm age  0.49  4.30***  0.37  4.30*** -0.06 -0.49 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.37   0.41   0.13  
Adjusted R2  0.28   0.33   0.01  
  N= 128 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Table 4: System of equations (SUR) results – cluster with prior awards 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
 Sales Yield Employment Yield Innovation Yield 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Independent variables:       
Project-level constructs       
Initial commitment -0.03 -0.69 -0.08 -1.66 -0.02 -0.37 
Discontinuation  0.07  0.65  0.03  0.28 -0.02 -0.21 
Fit -0.02 -0.16 -0.07 -0.66  0.01  0.11 
Portfolio-level constructs       
Initial commitment -0.13 -2.19** -0.15 -2.40** -0.11 -2.01** 
Sequencing -0.19 -3.96*** -0.24 -4.95*** -0.15 -3.21*** 
Fit  0.17  1.74*  0.15  1.43  0.14  1.46 
Control variables:       
Non-woman-owned  0.10  0.37  0.02  0.08  0.23  1.39 
Non-minority-owned  0.01  0.03 -0.11 -0.37  0.34  1.39 
Non-HubZone-owned -0.24 -0.95 -0.39 -1.40  0.10  0.40 
Industry volatility -0.07 -0.69  0.01  0.08 -0.01 -0.12 
State innovativeness  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.14  0.04  0.90 
Firm age  0.08  1.31  0.04  0.69 -0.09 -1.46 
Year dummies  Incl.   Incl.   Incl.  
R2  0.16   0.18   0.13  
Adjusted R2  0.10   0.12   0.06  
  N= 239 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Paper 3 
Analysing Perceived and Actual Effects of Public Venture Capitalists’ Selection 
Criteria on Firm Performance: Signalling Perspective46 
ABSTRACT 
Under conditions of information asymmetry, markets attend to observable characteristics of firms to infer 
their unobservable but desirable attributes(Sanders and Boivie 2004). Therefore, forming investor opinion 
around positive competences is critical to the success of nascent ventures in obtaining capital. We 
examine which characteristics of firms, projects and individuals are perceived as signals of quality, or lack 
thereof, and influence decisions of government venture capitalists to allocate or withdraw funding. 
Specifically, by leaning on signalling theory we outline categories of factors that influence investors’ 
perceptions during the evaluation process. We find that public investors’ decision-making is subject to 
evaluation bias and inefficiency, reflected in the discrepancies between the perceived and actual impact 
of selection criteria on firms’ performance.  
INTRODUCTION 
Signals communicate useful information about economic agents’ underlying qualities. However, 
interpretation of signals can be complicated by contextual factors as well as recipients’ experience and 
frames of reference. In particular, interpretation of signals transmitted by firms operating in nascent or 
niche industries is problematic. The early years of nascent firms are characterised by fluid entrepreneurial 
processes which emerge as a result of learning-by-doing. Thus, task uncertainty, defined as the 
discrepancy between required information and possessed information necessary to perform a task 
(Sapienza and Gupta 1994), is greater for early-stage ventures working on highly innovative projects.  
 Such emergent nature of entrepreneurial practices coupled with task uncertainty makes it difficult 
to define ex-ante the desired list of skills and abilities of economic players in nascent industries, further 
magnifying information asymmetry(Zahra and Filatotchev 2004). Given that emerging industries face 
greater unresolved uncertainties, evaluators try to project their future course of development by relying 
on memories of historical performance of established industries (Zahra and Filatotchev 2004). However, 
overreliance on prior knowledge may lead to misconceptions and subsequent misinterpretation of signals. 
                                                          
46 The above entitled manuscript is to be submitted for review and publication consideration to the Journal of 
Business Venturing. 
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 Ambiguity involved in new ventures’ evaluation makes investors predisposed to heuristics and 
biases. One of the most prevalent biases in investment context is that of overconfidence, which can be 
manifested in the increased propensity to overestimate the likelihood of occurrence of future outcomes 
or validity of own knowledge, resulting in impaired decision-making (Griffin and Varey 1996). Zacharakis 
and Shepherd (2001) showed evidence that overconfidence negatively affects venture capitalists’ decision 
accuracy. Among other factors, the authors found that overconfidence can surge when decision-makers 
automatically process familiar information relevant to the decision and refrain from questioning existing 
knowledge and seeking new information (Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001). A study by Shepherd (1999) 
also provided empirical evidence that the accuracy of venture capitalists’ introspection is limited.  
 Organisational research on behavioural theories has made progress towards understanding 
decision-making processes underpinning innovation investment outcomes. Still, more research is needed 
to examine the correspondence of the theory with decision-making practices, accounting for heuristics 
and biases inherent in the process (Scherpereel 2008). Our objective is to understand the evaluation 
process and selection criteria that public capital investors follow to allocate funding to candidates. 
Additionally, we examine the investors’ ability in distilling high-profile candidates. We analyse investors’ 
decision-making accuracy by comparing the effects of candidates’ characteristics that were used as 
important selection criteria on desired performance outcomes. In sum, the expectation is that there is a 
discrepancy between expected and real association of firms’ attributes with anticipated performance 
outcomes, which adversely affects decision accuracy and subsequently upside potential of investments. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In line with entrepreneurship research, we focus on legitimacy characteristics pertaining to the manager 
and the principal investigator, project attributes and firm’s efficacy. The logic for selecting these 
constructs is that legitimacy attributes are relevant to the intangible assets necessary to proceed in 
innovation activity, project attributes are relevant to the individual R&D proposition, while efficacy is 
relevant to the activities of the firm as a whole as well as the viability of the R&D project to reach the 
commercialisation stage. The first proposition is that TMTs’ different characteristics signal their legitimacy 
which minimises investors’ uncertainty in firms’ underlying quality. TMT legitimacy was conceptualised as 
a cumulative function of (i) role legitimacy, (ii) resource legitimacy and (iii) intellectual legitimacy (Cohen 
and Dean 2005; Higgins and Gulati 2006). The underlying reasoning is that types of previous experience, 
advanced qualifications, affiliations with educational institutions and productive output of TMT members 
are associated with higher quality firms and enhance investors’ perceptions of legitimacy. Second, we 
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assert that certain types of projects will be perceived as more appealing based on evaluators’ expectations 
and perceptual filters. As a result, projects will be selected by their scope and category. Third, we expect 
signals that convey up-to-date information to be perceived as particularly strong and reliable by investors 
(Janney and Folta 2006) as they indicate firms’ intentions and abilities (DeKinder and Kohli 2008), such as 
organisational efficacy and performance in carrying out the R&D task. Figure 1 depicts a configuration of 
tested relationships between signals, their perceived effect (outcomes of investors’ decision-making) and 
their actual effect (firm performance). 
 Hypothesis 1: Signals of role legitimacy, resource legitimacy and intellectual legitimacy have a 
positive effect on (a) the magnitude of initial funding commitment, (b) the likelihood of funding 
continuation, (c) sales performance, (d) employment performance, and (e) innovation performance. 
 Hypothesis 2: Project appeal characteristics have a positive effect on (a) the magnitude of initial 
funding commitment, (b) the likelihood of funding continuation, (c) sales performance, (d) employment 
performance, and (e) innovation performance. 
 Hypothesis 3: Signals of efficacy have a positive effect on (b) the likelihood of funding continuation, 
(c) sales performance, (d) employment performance, and (e) innovation performance. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model 
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METHODS 
Signalling occurs in the staged investment process of the government venture capital programme. At t=0, 
firms include specific information in a funding application form to signal their underlying abilities. To 
resolve information asymmetry, investors evaluate attributes of the applicants based on evidence 
included in the application narratives, and their perceptions of firms’ and projects’ potential is reflected 
in the variation of monetary sizes of awards. At t=2, in addition to already known attributes of applicants, 
investors also have access to post-Phase I interim information, that can help draw further conclusions 
about firms’ or projects’ potential for future payoffs, which results in the decision to continue or 
discontinue subsequent funding. We retrieved a list of scored review criteria used by government venture 
capital decision-makers when assessing new applications for funding. Then, we matched them with their 
corresponding theoretical counterparts derived from the extant literature to reflect the investment logic.  
DISCUSSION 
Overall, the results demonstrate that although some signals are directionally correct, others are ignored 
as important antecedents of performance, suggesting the presence of the misinterpretation bias. Role-
experience and role-commitment alignments within the team have important implications for 
performance. Efficacy is generally associated with performance outcomes, making it an important signal 
at Phase II evaluation stage, whereas project appeal characteristics are crude signals. 
CONCLUSION 
The study offers insights into the decision-making process of government venture capital providers. The 
findings suggest that there is an element of mismatch between the expected and actual impact of 
selection criteria on performance. Deficient criteria indicate that investors may have limited mechanisms 
in place to accurately evaluate the value of R&D projects. Developing selection criteria based on factors 
that predict venture’s success would minimise the evaluation bias and help decision-makers differentiate 
between high-achievers and under-achievers (Lerner 2002). The results also show that effects of 
characteristics are not universal across different indicators of firm’s performance. Thus, the goal of the 
government programme to simultaneously increase commercialisation, encourage entrepreneurship and 
stimulate innovation might be unrealistic given the unique sets of resources that nascent ventures 
necessitate to achieve certain performance outcomes. The results imply that government funders cannot 
‘kill two birds with one stone’ by using standardised evaluation methods. Therefore, a more fine-grained 
approach would help distil high-profile candidates from a pool of applicants.
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Table 1. Summary of measures 
Variable Level of 
Analysis 
Operationalisation Measurement Source Transformation 
Sales Performance Firm $ Million Firm sales in t2014, $ million 
 
Hoover’s 
Online 
log10(1+x) 
Employment 
Performance 
Firm Headcount Number of employees in t2014 Hoover’s 
Online 
log10(1+x) 
Innovation 
Performance 
Firm Patent applications  Patents application stock in the period from t until t2014 Patbase & 
Espacenet 
log10(1+x) 
Manager CEO 
PI CEO 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Whether or not the person is a CEO at the 
award date t, dummy 
Coding: 
CEO = 1 
Non-CEO = 0 
LinkedIn None 
PI’s firm tenure Principal 
investigator 
Tenure with the firm at the award date t Number of years, count LinkedIn None 
Manager’s technical 
experience 
PI’s technical 
experience 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Experience in technical positions in the 
same sector of the start-up before award 
date at t-1 
Number of years, count LinkedIn None 
Manager’s 
entrepreneurial 
experience 
PI’s entrepreneurial 
experience 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Entrepreneurial experience in any sector 
before award date at t-1 
Number of years, count LinkedIn None 
Manager’ elite 
education 
PI’s elite education 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
A score of the last attended university 
from the Top 100 worldwide universities 
ranking at time t. Universities not in the 
top 100 received a score of zero 
Scores retrieved from Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU)   Shanghai 
Ranking 
None 
Manager’s MBA  
PI’s MBA 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Whether or not the person has an MBA 
degree at time t, dummy 
Coding: 
MBA = 1 
No MBA = 0 
LinkedIn None 
Manager’s PhD 
PI’s PhD 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Whether or not the person has a 
doctorate degree at time t, dummy 
Coding: 
Dr = 1 
Mr/Ms = 0 
LinkedIn None 
Manager’s 
professorship 
PI’s professorship 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
Whether or not the person is a professor 
at time t, dummy  
Coding: 
Professor = 1 
Not Professor = 0 
LinkedIn None 
Manager’s patents 
PI’s patents 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
How many patent applications the person 
had prior to award date at t-1 
Number of patent applications, count Patbase log10(1+x) 
Manager’s 
publications 
PI’s publications 
Manager 
Principal 
investigator 
How many published documents the 
person had prior to award date at t-1 
Number of published documents, count 
(includes journal articles, conference papers, books, and other) 
Scopus log10(1+x) 
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Project duration Firm How much time elapsed between Phase I 
project start and project end date at time 
t 
Number of days, count SBIR data None 
Invention activity Firm How many patents applications the firm 
filed in a 3-year window following Phase I 
award (t+1, t+2, t+3) 
Number of patent applications from Patbase, count Patbase log10(1+x) 
Project scope Project Whether the project targets a specific 
cancer type or multiple at time t 
Coding:  
Multiple cancer types targeted = 1 (broad) 
Specific cancer type targeted = 0 (narrow) 
SBIR data None 
Project category Project Federal programme type by assigned 
category from the Catalogue of Federal 
Domestic Assistance (CFDA) at time t 
Coding: 
Cancer Cause and Prevention Research = 1 
Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research = 2  
Cancer Treatment Research = 3 
Cancer Biology Research = 4 
SBIR data None 
State innovativeness Environment Innovation Scores of US States 
 
The ranking list retrieved from Bloomberg’s Visual Data platform Bloomberg None 
Industry volatility 
(2014) 
Environment Industry volatility for a 5-year rolling 
window, lagged by 1 year (2013) 
 
Industry stock return volatility computed as standard deviation from 
average annual equal-weighted returns of the Fama and French (1997) 
49 industries 
Ken French 
Data Library 
None 
Industry volatility (t) Environment Industry volatility for a 5-year rolling 
window, lagged by 1 year (t-1) 
Industry stock return volatility computed as standard deviation from 
average annual equal-weighted returns of the Fama and French (1997) 
49 industries 
Ken French 
Data Library 
None 
Firm age Firm Firm age at project start 
 
Number of years, count Company 
website; 
Bloomberg 
Business 
Week 
log10(1+x) 
Project cohort Project Year of Phase I award, dummy 
 
Coding: 2006 = 1; 2007 = 2; 2008 = 3; 2009 = 4; 2010 = 5; 2011 = 6 
2012 = 7 
SBIR data None 
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               Table 2: Estimation results47 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 
 Initial Commitment Discontinuation Sales Performance Employment Performance Innovation Performance 
 Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Independent variables:           
Role legitimacy            
Manager CEO -0.08 -0.62 -0.04 -0.11 -0.34 -2.58** -0.34 -2.64** -0.27 -2.22** 
PI CEO  0.00 -0.02 -1.03 -3.15***  0.09  0.78  0.05  0.49 -0.02 -0.18 
PI’s firm tenure -0.23 -2.62***  0.33  1.31 -0.19 -2.70*** -0.20 -2.95*** -0.04 -0.45 
Manager’s technical experience -0.12 -1.28  0.25  1.02 -0.02 -0.31 -0.04 -0.59  0.11  1.00 
PI’s technical experience  0.11  1.50 -0.27 -1.14 -0.03 -0.43 -0.04 -0.55 -0.11 -1.51 
Manager’s entrepreneurial experience -0.14 -1.60 -0.09 -0.33  0.03  0.30  0.01  0.07  0.04  0.41 
PI’s entrepreneurial experience  0.04  0.48  0.04  0.14 -0.12 -1.86* -0.09 -1.41 -0.10 -1.32 
Resource legitimacy            
Manager’s elite education  0.13  1.51  0.04  0.20  0.13  1.76  0.12  1.58  0.19  3.24*** 
PI’s elite education -0.07 -0.86  0.11  0.60 -0.03 -0.38  0.02  0.24 -0.04 -0.56 
Manager’s MBA -0.18 -1.04  0.07  0.15 -0.05 -0.35  0.03  0.20 -0.21 -1.14 
PI’s MBA  0.04  0.16 -1.24 -1.34 -0.27 -1.32 -0.25 -1.19  0.03  0.15 
Manager’s PhD  0.14  0.92  0.20  0.43  0.06  0.42  0.09  0.54 -0.17 -0.97 
PI’s PhD -0.05 -0.14 -0.10 -0.13 -0.47 -1.20 -0.37 -1.15  0.04  0.18 
Manager’s professorship  0.13  0.76 -0.05 -0.11 -0.09 -0.73  0.01  0.10  0.04  0.31 
PI’s professorship  0.28  1.67 -0.47 -1.23  0.17  1.39  0.16  1.16 -0.26 -1.93* 
Intellectual legitimacy           
Manager’s patents -0.10 -1.15  0.27  1.31 -0.11 -1.80* -0.07 -0.99 -0.07 -1.00 
PI’s patents  0.16  2.28**  0.17  0.96 -0.01 -0.16  0.03  0.57  0.24  4.05*** 
Manager’s publications  0.01  0.10 -0.28 -1.09  0.07  0.95  0.02  0.31 -0.02 -0.20 
PI’s publications -0.19 -2.32** -0.26 -1.36  0.04  0.61  0.05  0.87  0.15  2.14** 
Efficacy           
Project duration     0.33  2.49** -0.02 -0.55 -0.07 -1.43 -0.02 -0.38 
Invention activity   -0.34 -1.96*  0.17  3.12***  0.20  3.57***   
Project Appeal           
Project_broad appeal -0.28 -2.31***  0.05  0.15 -0.01 -0.12  0.05  0.35 -0.05 -0.50 
Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research  0.27  1.51  0.83  1.83*  0.25  1.53  0.17  1.19  0.46  2.91*** 
Cancer Treatment Research  0.22  1.22  0.78  1.74*  0.18  1.10  0.14  0.95  0.33  2.03** 
Cancer Biology Research  0.57  2.47**  0.91  1.59  0.15  0.72  0.08  0.41  0.27  1.33 
Control variables:           
Industry volatility -0.11 -0.82 -0.29 -0.86 -0.04 -0.52  0.04  0.61  0.04  0.59 
State innovativeness  0.03  0.57  0.25  1.70*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.04  0.85 
Firm age  0.22  2.76*** -0.12 -0.64  0.55  7.87***  0.56  9.09***  0.07  0.97 
Year dummies  Incl.    Incl.    Incl.   Incl.   Incl.   
R2  0.19   0.20   0.48   0.49   0.29  
Adjusted R2  0.11     0.42   0.43   0.22  
                 N= 367; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
                                                          
47 OLS model was used to estimate Equation 1, Logit model to estimate Equation 2, and SUR model to estimation Equations 3, 4 and 5. 
